Korean National Identity,Civic Activism and the Dokdo/Takeshima Territorial Dispute

Introduction

Dokdo (Japanese name Takeshima) is the name of two tiny islets in the Sea of Japan (East Sea in Korean). Since early 1950s, they have been administered by the Republic of Korea (Korea) and claimed by Japan. Today, the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima islets is one of the main areas of contention between the two neighbours. The current phase of tensions started to take shape in early 2000s and since then ‘Dokdo’ became one of the most important national symbols in Korea. Over the last decade, numerous governmental institutions were established with the purpose of advocating Korea’s historical rights to the islets through research, conferences, publications and other activities. During the same period, ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement has become one of the noticeable features of the Korean society. The movement is comprised of multiple civil society organizations that engage in activities aimed at protecting Dokdo, educating the public about the issue and generally manifest their love and devotion to the islets (Choi, 2005).

In general, the extant academic literature on the issue attributes this proliferation of civic activism to the symbolic importance of ‘Dokdo’ in the context of historical memory of Japanese colonialism, the latter being one of the dominant tropes in Korea’s contemporary national identity (Bong, 2013; Wiegand, 2015). As this symbolic role is generally taken as a given, none of the extant works actually examines the arguments and statements made about the dispute by the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. There is no doubt that the anti-Japanese sentiment is an integral part of the Dokdo related activism. However, in order to provide a more nuanced interpretation of this movement and its role in today’s Korean society, here I suggest locating it within the context of civic activism in Korea and its relationship with the discursively constructed Korean national identity.

The first part of this article will provide a brief historical introduction to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and set the background for the emergence of ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement in early 2000s. The second part will start with examining the discursive construction of post-independence Korean identity and the role of the democratization movement in this construction. This will be followed by a detailed analysis of Dokdo related narrative promoted by the largest civil society group in the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. This section will argue that, when examined against the background of civic activism and national identity in Korea, the discursive role of ‘Dokdo’ can be seen as going beyond the construction of the Korean ‘self’ in opposition to Japan. To a large extent, Dokdo related activism can be seen as an extension of the democratization movement of the 1970s–1980s. The narrative on Dokdo, it will be argued, plays an important role in stabilizing Korean national identity after the transition to democracy and related developments.

Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute

Since there are numerous academic works that examine the history of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute (Choi, 2005; Kajimura, 1997; Launius, 2002), this section will introduce only those aspects that are important for contextualizing the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement.

The islets were officially incorporated into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture on 28 January 1905. Today, Japan’s official position argues that this incorporation was simply an act of confirmation of historical possession. The fact that the incorporation of the islets happened prior to Japan’s official annexation of the Korean Peninsula as well as the history of administration of the islets by Japan’s Shimane Prefecture rather than the Government-General of Korea are used by Japan today to argue the illegality of Korea’s possession of the islets (Tsukamoto, 2011). This interpretation raises numerous questions and there is enough evidence to suggest that the incorporation of the islets in 1905 was not a simple act of confirming historical ownership but stemmed from Imperial Japan’s strategic interests (Naito, 2008). Contrastingly, The Korean government’s official position argues that the 1905 incorporation was illegal as the islets were an integral part of historical Korea. Today, the Korean scholars and the general public alike generally perceive the 1905 incorporation of the islets as the first step in Japan’s colonization of the peninsula (Bong, 2013, p. 193).

From 1905 till Japan’s defeat in WWII and its subsequent occupation by the allies, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture effectively administered the islets. Seal hunting and abalone gathering were the main economic activities conducted there. The Japanese officials signed the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, and the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) became the highest authority in occupied Japan. In June 1946, SCAP issued a decree (SCAPIN 1033) that restricted the areas of fishing, whaling and other similar activities by the Japanese. This decree placed Dokdo/Takeshima outside the restricting line that came to be known in Japan as ‘MacArthur Line’, named after the Supreme Commander of the occupation authorities. The purpose of these boundaries was of a purely administrative nature and did not purport to delimit Japan’s territory.

While preparing the final peace treaty with Japan, various drafts were produced by the US authorities. In the early drafts, compiled in 1947–1949, the ownership over the islets was allocated to Korea. Later drafts however either allocated the islets to Japan, or did not mention them at all. There were probably numerous reasons for this change but arguably the politics of the Cold War played the decisive role in this transformation (Hara, 2006). The Peace Treaty with Japan (also known as San-Francisco Peace Treaty) was signed on 8 September 1951 in the midst of the Korean War (1950–1953). While neither of the two Koreas were parties to the treaty, in Article 2(a) Japan recognized Korea’s independence. The article does mention some of Korea’s islands but does not have any references to Dokdo/Takeshima. In the period preceding the signing of the treaty, both the Japanese and the South Korea governments lobbied the US authorities to specify their respective ownership over the islets in the treaty. Neither side’s wishes were granted. Subsequently both governments adopted interpretations of the treaty and the preceding processes that support their respective claims of ownership (Lee, 2002).

In January 1952, three months before the Peace Treaty with Japan came into force, Syngman Rhee government issued a presidential proclamation of sovereignty over the adjacent seas. In this proclamation, South Korea declared national sovereignty over the seas within the designated line, known as the Peace Line or Rhee Line. The purpose of the line was to replace the ‘MacArthur Line’ that limited the fishing activities of the Japanese vessels during the occupation period. The line passed just outside of Dokdo/Takeshima including the islets within Korean territory. Japan’s government protested immediately arguing territorial rights to the islets. Over the following years, there were a number of clashes on the islets and the adjacent waters that involved Japanese and Korean fishermen and coast guards of the two countries but Japan did not make any attempts to recapture the islets by force.

Since South Korea was not a party to the Peace Treaty with Japan, there was a need for a separate treaty to settle the various disputes and determine the basic principles of post-war Japan’s relations with its former colony. The negotiations started in 1952 but the parties could not reach an agreement on many issues related to the four decades of Japan’s colonial rule including the question of territorial rights to Dokdo/Takeshima. Anti-Japanese sentiment played an important role in maintaining South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s domestic legitimacy (Cho & Park, 2011, p. 286). Thus he pursued a hard-line policy in normalization negotiations. As the Japanese side was also not willing to compromise on a number of issues related to colonial legacy, the negotiations in the 1950s were not very fruitful. In April 1960, mass protests against rigged elections forced Rhee to resign. In 1961, as a result of a military coup d’etat, South Korea came under the rule of General Park Chung Hee. Park viewed Japan’s economic assistance as vital for Korean development and embarked on developing closer ties with Japan soon after seizing power (Huh, 2013).

In 1965, the two governments officially normalized the bilateral relations by signing the Japan-Korea Treaty on Basic Relations. The issue of ownership over Dokdo/Takeshima was one of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations process. Both sides realized that the economic importance of the islets is negligible. ¹ Neither however was willing to yield to the other side’s demands. The reasons for this could be found in domestic politics. Park Chung Hee’s dictatorial rule was perceived as illegitimate by many of his countrymen. Furthermore, his policy of rapprochement with Japan was very unpopular in South Korea and revelation of the details of the forthcoming treaty resulted in mass demonstrations against it (Lee, 2011). In Japan, the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faced strong criticism from the Socialist Party, the latter being against fostering closer relations with South Korea’s military dictatorship. Giving up the claims to the islets would have enhanced the opposition.

Thus, the final text of the treaty did not touch on the territorial issue. Interviews with bureaucrats and politicians involved in the negotiations suggest that the sides have reached a tacit agreement regarding the dispute. ² According to this agreement, the dispute was to be shelved and both governments would continue to hold their respective interpretations regarding the belonging of the islets but would avoid escalation of the dispute.

The territorial dispute however could not be successfully shelved without resolving the question of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the islets. This issue was addressed in the agreement on fisheries that accompanied the treaty. Under this agreement, a joint regulation zone that included waters surrounding the islets was established. The agreement enabled fishermen from both countries to fish in the joint regulation zone where the party whose flag the vessel flies enforced laws. ³

Until mid-1990s, the territorial dispute was mostly in a dormant state. Both governments maintained their respective interpretations of the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations and their claims to the islets. Neither side however took any significant steps to challenge the status quo. The issue of ownership over Dokdo/Takeshima rose to the fore of bilateral agenda again in 1996 when both Japan and Korea ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and declared their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In accordance with their claims, both countries included the islets as their sovereign territory. This led again to both Japanese and Korean politicians proclaiming their country’s historical rights to the islets and denouncing the other side’s claims. After two years of exchanges, the parties reached a solution not dissimilar to the 1965 one. They agreed to separate claims of sovereignty from fisheries related issues and demarcated their respective EEZs in a new fisheries agreement, which was signed in 1998. ⁴ A central area in the Sea of Japan that encompassed Dokdo/Takeshima was designated, this time as a ‘provisional zone’, where rules similar to the 1965 Fishing Agreement applied. Thus fishermen from both countries could continue to fish in the waters surrounding the islets while both governments continued to maintain their respective claims to territorial rights. There was one important difference however between the 1965 and the 1998 arrangements. Namely, Article 15 of the new treaty implicitly referred to the territorial question by stating that the present agreement should not be interpreted as undermining positions of either of the parties related to international legal problems other than fisheries.

‘Protect Dokdo’ movement emerged in early 2000s and to a great extent constituted a response to the new fisheries treaty, the latter perceived by the activists as a betrayal of the national cause by their own government. ⁵ In 2004, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture passed a prefectural ordinance that designated the 22nd of February as ‘Takeshima Day’. The ordinance was more of an expression of frustration with Japan’s central government’s dealing with the territorial issue rather than of anti-Korean sentiments and directed at Tokyo rather than at Seoul (Bukh, 2015). Nevertheless, it was met with strong protests from the Korean government and civil society groups alike. Despite any attempts of the Japanese government to regain control over the islets and continuous administration of the islets by Korea, from 2004 onwards the territorial dispute gained nationwide popularity in Korea and the number of civil society groups devoted to the protection of Dokdo grew significantly.

Korean National Identity and the Democratization Movement

The previous section outlined the main historical and political developments related to the dispute. It may seem that the importance of Dokdo for Korean society lies solely in the history of Korea’s relations with Japan. At the same time, it was noted in the previous section that Korea’s relations with its former colonial ruler was also an important issue in domestic political struggles between Korea’s successive authoritarian regimes and their opponents. This section provides further analysis of this confrontation and examines the two competing national identity constructs advocated by the ruling elites and the democratization movement.

The events that led to the liberation of Korea from colonial rule and Cold War politics that shaped the post-liberation political developments on the Korean Peninsula created three major interrelated problems for the construction of Korean identity. One was the fact that unlike most of other former colonies, Korea’s liberation from the colonial subjugation was achieved by external forces rather than by indigenous struggle (Kang, 2011, p. 173). The other was the nature of the new state and the government, which was to a large extent created by the American occupation in complete disregard of the indigenous provisional government. Moreover, Syngman Rhee’s government was not only created by the occupation but also continued to be strongly dependent on the US (Brazinsky, 2007). The third was the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean nation into two states, which not only opposed each other in ideological terms but also engaged in a bloody war in which even family members occasionally fought on opposite sides.

As independence, uniqueness and the overlap of the nation with the state are central traits of modern nationalism, the South Korean national identity narrative developed by the new ruling elites had to conceal the above-mentioned predicament. This was achieved by mobilizing anti-communism as the main tenet of South Korean identity. Syngman Rhee and his associates did draw on the ethnic and organic nationalism that spread in Korea during the colonial period. As such nation was articulated as natural, indivisible and superior to all individual interests (Shin, 2006, pp. 100–102). By coupling this ethnic nationalism with anti-communism, however, the North Koreans and other Koreans that did not adhere to anti-communist ideology were by default excluded from the national community. This emphasis on anti-communism as the main tenet of Korean identity enabled the ruling elites to avoid the question of Korean independence. Well into the 1960s, the official historical narrative as epitomized in history textbooks did not pay much attention to the Korean independence movement and depicted the liberation as being the result of the Allied (mainly, the US) victory (Baek, 2005).

General Park Chung Hee seized power in Korea in 1961 and ruled the country till his assignation in 1979. Park who suffered from legitimacy deficit adopted various measures aimed at tackling this problem. Thus he was an ardent promoter of indigenous culture and identity, and modified the historical narrative on Korea’s independence to emphasize the centrality of the Korean provisional government in the liberation process. The purpose of the latter was to enhance the legitimacy of Park’s regime by establishing continuity with the colonial era independence struggle. Not surprisingly, the modified historical narrative also delegitimized North Korea by downplaying or omitting the role of socialist or communist groups in the struggle for independence (ibid., p. 57). Economic development was one of the main policies pursued by Park and hence the established official identity discourse was infused with developmentalism during his rule. Overall however, the role of ethnic nationalism and anti-communism as the main tropes of Korean identity remained unchanged during Park’s rule (Shin, 2006, p. 103).

There are possibly different ways to categorize and periodize civic activism in post-independence Korea, but generally its origins are traced to the spring of 1960 when students engaged in large-scale demonstrations against Syngman Rhee. The democratization movement against Korea’s successive dictators was not only about the domestic political system but also advocated a more independent policy for South Korea. Thus the 1960 uprising (4.19 Movement) that eventually toppled Rhee was as much about his dictatorial ruling style and corruption as it was about the economic dependence on the American aid (Oohata, 2011, p. 28). Hence it is not surprising that many of the leaders of this revolt initially welcomed the coup of Park Chung Hee perceiving his policies as ‘nationalistic’ (Lee, 2007, p. 29). However, Park’s economic development plan that envisioned Korean development as dependent on attraction of foreign capital and the related Korea–Japan Treaty on Basic Relations that enabled flow of Japanese capital to Korea was perceived by the domestic civic organizations as a betrayal of the national cause. Thus the subsequent struggle was directed at both the government and the ‘external forces’. In the worldview of the activists, both of these entities existed in a synergy (Mizuno, 2010, pp. 14–15).

Importantly, the democratization movement also advocated an alternative national identity narrative for the nation, which was directly related to its perception of Korea’s politics, the national history and Korea’s relations with its neighbours. The most important manifestation of this counter discourse was the critical historiography and its focus on minjung, which can be roughly translated as the ‘people’ or the ‘masses’. The minjung ideology emerged in the second half of the 1970s, spurred by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Park’s regime and the growing economic inequality (Koo, 1999, p. 59).

Minjung was defined as the people in the ruled position (politically, economically or culturally) and, while belonging to different social and economic strata, engage in a struggle against the unjust political power (as cited by Han Wan Sang in Kim, 1995, p. 47). Thus minjung was not identified with a particular class and aimed as including all parts of the Korean society such as workers, farmers, students and intellectuals that engaged in a struggle against the regime. The minjung ideology was strongly influenced by various neo-Marxist theories such as dependency theory (Koo, 1999, p. 59). Thus it is not surprising that the definition of minjung bears striking resemblance to the notion of multitude, central to a much more recent neo-Marxist theory developed by Hardt and Negri (2001). Both minjung and multitude are defined not by certain inherent characteristics but mainly through their oppositional position to the oppressive ‘other’. In case of the former, it acquired its subjectivity through opposition to the domestic regime and its external supporters. Similarly, for multitude it is the struggle against the empire that creates it as a subject.

This new critical historiography was an integral part of the democratization movement and sought to establish Korea’s subjectivity as a nation by rewriting the nation’s modern history from a people (minjung)-centred position as opposed to the previously dominant focus on the role of great powers and individual leaders. It also aimed at producing praxis-oriented individuals, arming them with knowledge of the ideal community worth struggling for (Em, 1993, p. 452). Thus, minjung historiography was not only an intellectual exercise but also a social movement that engaged in an emancipatory struggle both against the authoritarian state, as well as the colonial past and present (Choi, 1993, p. 91). In this new activist discourse that engaged in the production of alternative Korean identity, the post-independence Korean state and the colonial forces (mainly Japan and the US) existed in a symbiosis of difference, juxtaposed with the minjung (Wells, 1995, p. 17). Unlike the earlier historiography that portrayed the Korean people as passive victims, the new historiography narrated them as innocent heroes that engage in a continuous struggle against the external imperial forces and domestic oppressors (Em, 1993, p. 457). Most importantly, in minjung narrative, democratization was associated with unification of the two Koreas and the emergence of a new, truly independent Korean nation that would be governed by the cultural values of the people.

The main tenets of the historiographical narrative were as follows. The failure of the indigenous united movement of the left and the right aimed at establishing one socially oriented national state in the immediate post-liberation days, and the subsequent division of the Peninsula were attributed to external forces and their supporters (i.e., Sygman Rhee group) (Kang, 2011, p. 257). Korean geopolitical importance was seen as one of the main factors in precluding unification of Korea as the peninsula became the clashing point between the continental communist (USSR and China) and maritime capitalist (US) forces (ibid., p. 248). It was also argued that national unification could be achieved only through indigenous Korean initiative. The ‘Korean nation’ was juxtaposed with the political elites (both South and North) that are driven by their egoistic interests. Minjung was seen as the leading force in the struggle for independence throughout modern Korean history. Thus minjung was argued to be the main actor in the nineteenth century struggle to maintain independence and reform, the subsequent struggle against Japanese colonialism and the post-liberation struggle for democracy and national unification (Kang, 1995). Emphasizing the importance of national unification, minjung nationalism was strongly anti-imperial and was inspired by Franz Fanon and other ideologues of anti-colonial struggle. It construed the Korean struggle for national unity as being an integral part of the international anti-colonial movement. It also advocated the need for a cultural unity based on indigenous culture as opposed to the commercialized and consumerist culture of the West. The latter was perceived as alienating those that lack the means to adopt it, and was blamed for driving further apart the two Koreas. The advocates of this cultural unity based on popular culture saw it as a prerequisite for a national unity. Popular culture was given a very specific meaning: it was seen as an empowering and liberating element, juxtaposed with the dividing and oppressing imported Western culture (Choi, 1993, pp. 106–108).

The emergence of this counter-discourse on Korean national identity embodied in the critical historiography meant that in the 1970s and 1980s there were two competing national identity discourses in South Korea. One was the narrative promoted by the ruling elites. It constructed Korean identity as existing in opposition to North Korea and communism in general, and located the Korean nation within the capitalist camp. The other discourse embraced by the critical intellectuals, students and other social movements construed the people or minjung as the embodiment of Korean national identity. Similarly, to the mainstream narrative, the counter-discourse emphasized the ethnic and organic nature of the Korean nation. On the other hand, it did not construe the nation in opposition to communism but to the oppressors, both domestic and external. The nation was not seen as independent and it was argued that only through democratization and unification true national independence and subjectivity can be achieved.

The democratization of South Korea that started with the June 1987 uprising did not result in the rise to dominance of the minjung discourse but resulted in the destabilization of both of the identity discourses. Needless to say that democratization brought a number of important changes many of which were welcomed by the minjung activists. At the same time, however, the policies pursued by the newly elected progressive leaders did not embody either of the extant identity discourses. It is rather obvious that the Sunshine Policy pursued by Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003) and Roh Mu-Hyun (2003–2008) governments, which emphasized co-operation, co-existence and eventual peaceful reunification between the North and the South, undermined the construction of South Korean identity in direct opposition to the North. These and other related political developments however also destabilized the minjung construct.

First, the abolition of dictatorship and democratization as well as the emergence of new ruling elites whose members included many former activists undermined the most important tenet of minjung identity, namely, its definition in opposition to the ruling power. Moreover, the new democratic leadership not only continued to maintain the close relations with the US but adopted numerous policies (such as the Free Trade Agreement) that were perceived by many activists as further undermining Korea’s autonomy (For example, Citizen’s Solidarity for Implementation of Human, 2007).

Second, the democratization did not bring about a national unity based in the cultural values of minjung. To the opposite, many groups such as the workers’ unions, which, according to the minjung narrative, constituted their core and participated in the democratization movement, started to distance themselves from the minjung ideology and pursue their narrow interests (Kim, 1995, p. 55). Furthermore, while relations between the two Koreas have improved, the prospects for the reunification of the peninsula remains as dim as before, undermining the veracity of the democratization and unification symbiosis dominant in the minjung narrative. As such, it can be argued that one of the side effects of the democratization of South Korea and related developments was destabilization of the extant identity narratives. As the section below will argue, it is against the background of the democratization movement and in the context of post-democratization national identity crisis that the symbolic role of Dokdo and related activism should be understood.

Dokdo Headquarters and the Dokdo Crisis

Today there are tens if not hundreds of organizations in Korea that engage in Dokdo related activism. Most of these civil society organizations have emerged in early 2000s and together comprise the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. As already noted, in academia and media alike, the movement has been generally located within the context of Korea’s historical memory of Japanese colonization and interpreted as another expression of the negative feelings Koreans have towards one-time colonial ruler. There is no doubt that to a large extent this interpretation is correct and the movement is a manifestation of this historical memory shared by many Koreans. At the same time, however, it will be argued below that the narrative promoted by certain key agents in the movement is more complex than a simple expression of anti-Japanese sentiment. It will also show that many of the roots of many of the ideas advocated by parts of the movement can be traced to the democratization movement of the 1970s and 1980s.

It is important to note that ‘Protect Dokdo’ organizations are numerous and very diverse in terms of their membership, sources of funding, activities and ideas. Their perceptions of Dokdo and its value as well as governmental policies and their effectiveness in protecting Dokdo are also quite diverse. As such, while the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement is unified by its desire to sustain and further enhance Korea’s administration of the islets, the discourse produced by the movement is rather diverse. This section focuses only on one of the organizations in the movement called Dokdo Headquarters (Doktto Bonbu). Dokdo Headquarters (DH) was the first organization that formed ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. It is also the largest organization in the movement. As of 2013, DH has about 4000 to 5000 members. ⁶ The most important reason for focusing on DH however is its independence from the government. Unlike most of other large organizations in the movement, DH does not receive any financial or other assistance from the Korean government and relies solely on donations and membership fees. ⁷ As such while probably not representing the views of others and government dependent organizations in the movement, it can be considered as a genuine representative of the Korean civil society.

DH was established in 2000 and headed by Kim Bong U. Kim was active in the democratization movement in late 1980s and early 1990s and at that time occupied a senior position in one of the students’ organizations (Chosun Ilbo People’s Database, 2014). The main purpose of DH activities is to protect Dokdo from the Korean government giving it away to Japan. The actual activities are focused on education of the public (public speeches and pamphlets), exercising pressure on the government through demonstrations and petitions, monthly study meetings and visits to Dokdo. ⁸ The organization also created a virtual Dokdo archive that consists of Dokdo-related articles from newspapers.

In 2006, DH published a series of booklets, which, according to one of its leaders, embodies the main arguments of the organization. ⁹ Below I will introduce the main tenets of this narrative and analyze it in the context of Korea’s national identity crisis described above.

According to DH, the main reason for the occurrence of ‘Dokdo Crisis’ and the subsequent need to protect the islets is the new fisheries agreement concluded between Japan and Korea in 1999. Criticizing the dominant understanding of the Dokdo issue, promulgated by the government, mainstream scholarship and media, DH argues that Article 15 of the new agreement does not confirm Korea’s rights to the islets but gives an equal position to both Korea’s and Japan’s claims of rightful ownership. Hence it is argued that the agreement serves only Japan’s interests but Korea’s national interests dictate its swift abolishment (Dokdo Headquarters, 2006a). In the question of ownership over Dokdo, DH adopts a position, which is surprisingly similar to that of Japan. Namely, unlike the Korean governmental position that argues Korea’s ownership over the islets to be indisputable, DH states that Dokdo is actually a disputed territory. As Japan has expressed persistent objection to Korea’s ownership, the activist narrative argues that ignoring this fact can eventually lead to the disappearance of Korea’s rights or make them indeterminate (ibid., p. 37). Therefore, it is argued, the national interest in this situation dictates the need to establish beyond doubt the legality of Korea’s ownership. To achieve this, it is important to show Korea’s intention to govern Dokdo and have an effective control over the territory. The degree of Korea’s will and exercise of effective control over Dokdo is seen as a key to a successful resolution of the dispute (ibid., pp. 14–18).

DH argues that the economic and strategic importance of Dokdo has increased significantly after the coming to force of UNCLOS in 1994 which enabled nations to claims 200 miles of adjacent waters. As a result, control over Dokdo has enabled to control the whole East Sea (Sea of Japan). Besides being an important base for maritime research it is argued that the islets can become an important rest area for ships as well as a base for dealing with emergency situations in the East Sea. The narrative also emphasizes the potential oil deposits in the waters adjacent to the islets that can provide Korea with energy resources and the benefits for Korean economy that will result from construction of various facilities on the islets and in the surrounding waters (Dokdo Headquarters, 2006b).

DH narrative criticizes both the Korean government and Japan. The former is criticized for not preparing properly for the negotiations of the new fishing agreement and not protecting Korea’s national interests. Japan is criticized for what is seen as a clever cunning plan to get control over Dokdo. As a result of the fisheries agreement, it is argued, Japan managed to establish itself in an equal position to Korea in relation to the ownership of Dokdo (ibid., pp. 75–78).

As such, DH sees the new fisheries agreement as compromising Korea’s ownership economically and strategically important territory and argues for the need to defend it from both the Japanese encroachment and the Korean government’s ineptness. Most importantly however the discussion of Dokdo is not limited to this criticism but develops into a broader narrative directly related to Korean national identity. It is in this narrative that the continuity between the DH construction of Korean identity and the minjung ideology as well as the stabilizing role of the narrative can be observed.

DH construes the Dokdo problem as a symptom of a broader national crisis that has befell the Korean since the end of the seventh century. The Dokdo issue is seen as both being a symptom of this national crisis and, in a somewhat paradoxical fashion, its remedy. The main characteristics of the national crisis as depicted by DH are the dominance of flunkeyism among the Korean elites and the general lack of a national consciousness among the members of the nation. The ‘Dokdo crisis’ is seen as providing the Korean people with the opportunity of getting rid of flunkeyism, which is seen as the main ideology of the Korean mainstream and achieving a true and proper national consciousness (ibid., p. 36).

Flunkeyism is seen as one of the main historical ills of the Korean elites and its origins are perceived as going back to the seventh century. DH argues that Korea became secluded from the world after the demise of the Goguryeo Kingdom, locked on the Korean Peninsula and continuously engaged in internal conflicts while relying on external powers. The narrative denies the sole responsibility of Japanese colonialism for the ills of post-independence Korean society and traces the roots of contemporary flunkeyism to Joseon dynasty’s relations with China. This characteristic of the Korean elites is seen and the cause of today’s social divisions and mutual hatred along class, education, regional, political, religious and professional lines. DH argues that all the domestic forces that produce these social divisions continue to rely on external powers hoping to gain an upper hand and by this continuously preserve these internal conflicts (ibid., pp. 37–38).

Another aspect of the national crisis is the lack of proper ‘territorial consciousness’ (yeongto insik) among the Korean people. Territory, it is argued, is a bowl that holds the nation. Without a territory the nation will not be able to function properly and hence there is a need to defend national territory. Korean nation however is lacking a proper understanding of territory, which was lost after the fall of Goguryeo Kingdom in the seventh century and the embracement of flunkeyism (sadae juui) by the ruling elites. The reason for the continuity in this lack of proper understanding of territory is traced to the process that led to Korea’s liberation from the Japanese rule. The liberation, it is argued, was not achieved through indigenous effort. Korea gained its independence as a result of an external intervention and entrusted its fate to the US. Thus, during the Cold War, Koreans failed to gain an understanding of the importance of territory for the nation and were preoccupied with the Cold War ideological struggle. Together with flunkeyism, this lack of a proper understanding of the importance of territory is seen as the main reason behind the conclusion of the new fisheries agreement. If the situation is not changed and the new understanding of territory does not gain dominance inside the Korean society, it is argued, that there is danger of Korea again becoming a victim of great powers policy of redrawing borders (ibid., pp. 13–16).

The persistence of the national crisis is further explained through a structural prism that combines elements of geopolitical theory that construes world history as a struggle between maritime and land powers (for example, see Mahan, 1900), and the theory of cultural imperialism not dissimilar to the post-colonial discourse of the 1960s spread among the radical intellectuals in the West. ¹⁰ The latter manifests itself in a critical reference to globalization, which is seen as one of the causes of national crisis. ‘Globalization’ is construed as a process aimed at destroying national consciousness and brought by the imperialistic great powers and their domestic collaborators and is argued to be one of the causes of the gradual disappearance of Korean national consciousness (Dokdo Headquarters, 2006b, p. 28). Influences of geopolitical theory can be observed in the emphasis on the location of the Korean Peninsula as sandwiched between the land powers Russia and China and the maritime powers US and Japan. This geopolitical factor is argued to be responsible for Korea’s colonization by Japan and the division of the peninsula in the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War. Today’s South Korea is argued to be a protectorate of the US-Japan Alliance while the North that of Russia and China. US-Japan hegemony over South Korea is seen as one of the main factors that perpetuate Korean elites’ flunkeyism and their subsequent inability to properly respond to Japan’s Dokdo related claims (ibid., pp. 20–21). The division of the Korean Peninsula, which resulted from great powers struggle, is seen as another factor in the disappearance of Korean national consciousness. It is argued that the division and the continuous conflict between the South and the North Koreas create and perpetuate a feeling of animosity and distance between members of the same nation (ibid., p. 27).

In the context of this continuous national crisis, Dokdo is seen not only as its symptom but also as a great gift that will help the Korean nations to overcome it. First, Dokdo is argued to be the ultimate cure that will enable the recovery of historical consciousness of Korean people. Today, it is argued, Korean historical consciousness of their national history starts with the colonial time. Thus the majority of Koreans perceive their nation as having a very short history. Similarly, the spatial consciousness of their national borders is limited to the southern part of the peninsula. As, according to DH, the history of Dokdo goes back to at least sixth century, learning this history is the solution to overcoming the problems related to historical and spatial consciousness of the nation (ibid., pp. 17–19).

Furthermore, Dokdo has the potential of uniting all of the members of the nation (South, North and overseas Koreans) and fostering the emergence of a true autonomous consciousness for the nation, which in turn will bring national unification (ibid., p. 22). As Dokdo is not disputed and loved by all of the members of the national community and requires a unified response, it is seen as a ‘treasure’ that will enable national unification (ibid., pp. 23–26). As such, Dokdo is seen as the key to the national reunification, which has been the most important issue in Korean politics since the end of WWII.

To a great extent, the depiction of the nation and the national crisis in DH narrative repeats the main tenets of the minjung discourse. It construes the Korean people in opposition to the all of the external ‘colonial’ forces-Japan but also the US, and in opposition to the domestic elites and the government. It also construes the nation as an organic, ethno-cultural entity whose members include all ethnic Koreans including those living on the other side of the 38th parallel and the overseas Koreans. Not dissimilar to the activists in the 1970s and 1980s that emphasized the rediscovery of indigenous culture (Koo, 1999, p. 60), DH argues for the need to rediscover Dokdo as an important cultural symbol of the Korean people. Furthermore, similarly to minjung activists (Wells, 1995, p. 25), DH emphasizes the importance of historical knowledge as a tool of liberation, construes the people as unware of their historical role and sees education of the masses as their mission.

At the same time, the DH narrative is completely void of any socialist elements that were quite dominant in the minjung ideology. The critique of globalization is reminiscent of Marxism but does not carry any references to capitalism, economy, inequality and other traits of a progressive discourse. Furthermore, the narrative does not ascribe any socially progressive values to the people’s culture. Territorial consciousness and historical consciousness are seen as tools of national liberation but the current condition of semi-dependence on US and Japan is seen as a product of centuries-old cultural habits and geopolitics, rather than economic relations. While the narrative does make references to gaps and inequalities within the Korean society, these are not seen as related to economic relations of power, either domestic or global, but resulting mainly from the division of the peninsula. The narrative does not refer to oppression and, while critical of elites’ flunkeyism, does not criticize the current political system of the Korean society. Finally, the Korean experience is seen as absolutely unique and there is no attempt to establish a certain unity between Korea and other nations in similar condition.

As such, the construction of the Korean national identity depicted in the DH narrative can be seen as a modified version of the minjung discourse. Both construe the Korean nation as an organic, ethnic entity that includes all those who share Korean blood, constructed in opposition to certain domestic and external ‘others’. At the same time, the centrality of the disputed islets in the DH narrative enables it to avoid completely any discussion of political ideologies. Unlike in the minjung discourse, Korean people are not construed as oppressed but simply as lacking proper understanding of history and territory. The people/government dichotomy relies solely on the flunkeyism of the elites for its existence and does not involve any socially or politically progressive elements. The unity of the nation is construed as possible through achievement of proper historical and territorial consciousness and, most importantly, through the love of Dokdo. In other words, national unity is constructed without resolving important questions related to ideological differences inside South Korea but also between the South and the North, South Korea’s relations with the US and other political issues that brought about the national identity crisis. Dokdo is the embodiment of the Korean nation, and the Korean nation is the love of Dokdo. All other ideational aspects that characterized the two national identity constructs are simply eliminated from the discourse.

Conclusion

Focusing on one of the main civil society organizations in the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement, this article analyzed its main ideas and arguments. Unlike the extant scholarship that attributes Dokdo related activism solely to anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, this article located the Dokdo narrative in the context of the broader debates on Korea’s national identity. I argued that while anti-Japanese sentiment is definitely one of the factors that led to the emergence of this movement, the symbolic role of Dokdo is not limited to historical memory of Japanese colonialism. By juxtaposing the main tenets of DH narrative with those of minjung ideology, I have shown that there are important similarities between the two in terms of their construction of the Korean nation. At the same time, I argued that the former is void of any socialist elements, which were rather dominant in the latter. Territory is an empty signifier that does not imply any political norms. This emptiness enabled a construction of national identity discourse that bridges between the two extant identity constructs by focusing on Dokdo and the epitome of the Korean nation.