Biting the Cow’s Tongue: Securitization and Capacity Building in the South China Sea

Abstract

The South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes have become one of the most significant security challenges in the East Asian Supercomplex (EAS). Described in Buzan and Wæver’s classic study as a Great Power Bipolar Supercomplex defined by China and Japan, the emergence and actions of South Korea and Indonesia as regional powers have rendered the EAS multipolar and unusually volatile. As the hierarchy in the EAS transforms into a multipolar one, the securitization of China has allowed Japan and South Korea to facilitate the capacity building efforts of Southeast Asian states at the expense of China. As a result, the littoral states surrounding the SCS have taken advantage of this strategic competition in order to advance their own interests.

Keywords

Capacity building South China Sea regional security securitization speech-acts

Introduction

In the past two decades, the world has witnessed the transfer of economic dynamism from the West to the East. In particular, East Asia has been at the forefront of this transition through its immense economic growth. The region had an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7.1 per cent in 2013, and contributed 40 per cent of global growth and one-third of global trade that year, ‘higher than any other region in the world’ (The World Bank, 2013). That trend continued with the region posting 6.9 and 6.7 per cent growth in 2014 and 2015 respectively (The World Bank, 2015a).

However, despite this economic vitality, East Asia is plagued by numerous territorial disputes that threaten to undermine the stability required for continued economic development. Currently, the most unstable and requiring immediate attention are those in the South China Sea (SCS). Claimants in the SCS, which include China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and, now, Indonesia, have disputes that revolve around competing sovereignty claims over reefs, shoals, their surrounding waters, as well as overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Further complicating these disputes are China’s maps featuring nine dashed lines outlining a cow’s tongue-shaped area covering about 90 per cent of the SCS (O’Rourke, 2015, p. 18). China has remained ambiguous over the type of claims the ‘cow’s tongue’ represents (US Department of State, 2014). However, despite of this ambiguity, the cow’s tongue has encouraged the littoral states of the SCS to unify in challenging China (ibid.).

These disputes are important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the waters of the SCS are host to significant maritime trade activity, giving it substantial strategic importance. It is estimated that over ‘50% of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage crosses through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea’ (Emmers, 2010, p. 65). The SCS is effectively a maritime superhighway. The tanker traffic that passes through the Malacca Straits ‘is more than three times greater than the Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times more than the traffic of the Panama Canal’ (Khemakorn, 2006, p. 14). A second factor is its energy deposits. Although estimates of the oil and gas reserves in the area vary depending on the institution conducting the study, it is clear that increasing energy demand by East Asian countries has been a key factor in the disputes as they venture into disputed waters to exploit these resources. Recent evidence of this can be found in the ongoing row between China and Vietnam over the positioning of an oil platform in the Gulf of Tonkin (Blanchard, Rose, & Torode, 2015). Lastly, the third factor that makes the SCS strategically important is its abundant marine resources. The depletion of coastal fish stocks has led to greater interest of the contested waters in the SCS, which produces 10 per cent of the world’s catch (Dupont & Baker, 2014, p. 81).

These three factors, as well as the fact that the SCS is a critical Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) for the world, require stability in order to ensure safe transit and sustained economic growth. However, stability in East Asia has been undermined in recent years due to increased tensions among key players in the region. Growing military capabilities by pivotal players in East Asia have exacerbated existing grievances that in turn fuel patterns of enmity. For example, China’s military modernization has allowed it to more effectively challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and push for unilateral changes in the status quo in the SCS, while Japan’s ‘normalization’ has led to greater defence spending and political reforms that have allowed Japan to more effectively assist Southeast Asian states in their efforts to challenge Chinese territorial claims in the SCS through capacity building programmes. South Korea, wary of its two larger neighbours, and motivated to play a larger security role in the region has developed a blue-water navy, adding a new player to the already crowded waters in the region. These events feed existing patterns of enmity that underpin the securitization language, resulting in an increase of strategic competition between China, Japan and South Korea. In recent years, this strategic competition has spilled over from the East China Sea (ECS) to the SCS. As a result, the littoral states surrounding the SCS have taken advantage of this development in order to advance their own interests.

This study demonstrates that as China’s military modernization continues, it has become more assertive in the disputes, which has prompted other contenders to push for comprehensive military overhauls of their own. The primary objective of the littoral states surrounding the SCS has been to build capacity and develop a minimum credible defence in order to deter China from unilaterally changing the status quo to a point of no return. These states are attempting to become the cow’s teeth that can bite on China’s cow’s tongue. In other words, by increasing their capacity these states believe they will be able to exact material costs on China should it choose to continue its aggressive SCS policy. Additionally, as its neighbours securitize China, strategic rivals of China, Japan and South Korea, have found it increasingly easier to facilitate capacity building efforts in these littoral states, and thus, sharpen those teeth. For its part, Japan, although securitized by China and South Korea, continues to ‘normalize’ its political and military status and has sought to play a more proactive security role in the region. This is a development that has been welcomed by Southeast Asian countries, which have all but desecuritized Japan. Likewise, South Korea, which essentially enjoys a non-securitized status in Southeast Asia, has pushed for greater recognition as a regional power with security interests beyond its own peninsula.

Theory and Organization

The position taken in this study is that states craft their foreign policy based on threat perceptions rather than purely material capabilities accrued by any given state. In other words, material capability is but one of the many factors that influence how a state perceives threat along with proximity, perceived intent and past interactions (Gross, 2013; Rousseau, 2007; Walt, 1985). Additionally, threat perception is shaped by the meaning that is attached to the material capabilities and apparent intent of a given state, as a result, speech-acts become an important dimension for analyzing how a state perceives threat (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). It is here where securitization and desecuritization patterns become a useful analytical tool because they are the most extreme form of speech-acts and the most explicit way in which states vocalize perceived threats (Williams, 2003).

Securitization is a process through which security threats are constructed. This process relies on speech-acts, which elevate non-politicized or politicized issues to the security realm (ibid.). An important characteristic that separates securitized and politicized issues is that the former heightens the sense of urgency and opens the possibility for extraordinary measures to be taken (ibid.). Speech-acts, in essence, transform ‘security’ into an act itself. The utterance by a state representative classifying a referent object, in this case the state’s sovereignty, as threatened, is itself an ‘act’, but more importantly, it moves this development to an arena that requires action (Wæver, 1995). Because these maritime disputes are sovereignty issues at their core, state representatives can more effectively galvanize consensus through securitization speech-acts and achieve a greater degree of policy actions. Evidence of this can be found in Japan’s ‘normalization’ process, which has resulted in reinterpretations of its constitution (Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2015), or in the Philippines’ defence spending increases despite budget constrains (Heydarian, 2015a).

As a result of the importance of securitization speech-acts and the regional scope of the article, this article aims to organize the East Asian region under the regional security complex (RSC) framework. In Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), regions are grouped into security complexes which are defined as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44). RSCs are characterized by ‘durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. The particular character of local RSC will often be affected by historical factors such as long-standing enmities’ (ibid., p. 45). This particular characteristic of RSCs will be central to the study, as it will focus on the existing patterns of amity and enmity and how they affect processes of securitization and desecuritization; especially how these processes have facilitated Japan and South Korea’s efforts to make greater security role claims as well as enable capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia.

The East Asian region is unique in the RSCT framework in which it is the only recognized Supercomplex. In Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Buzan and Wæver demonstrate how Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia began to merge as a single RSC in the 1990s. They identify two factors that facilitated this phenomenon: (a) the end of the Cold War and (b) economic integration. The vacuum left by the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Southeast Asia, and in some respects, Northeast Asia, allowed China to increase its influence and power. In other words, the end of the Cold War provided China with a strategic opening that paved the way for it to enhance its position in East Asia due to the fact that it met little resistance from the United States and the Russian Federation. Long-standing military links between China and some Southeast Asian countries strengthened as a result. The second factor originated from Japanese investments in Southeast Asia, which intensified economic relations in the region and led to greater interdependence. As a result, economic growth resulting from greater economic interdependence became increasingly linked to regional security and stability. These events led to the merging of two separate subregions into a single East Asian Supercomplex (EAS). The EAS is described as a bipolar great power RSC in which China and Japan occupy the top level of the regional hierarchy (ibid., pp. 45, 155–156). This hierarchy, however, is potentially evolving into a multipolar one as a result of increased capabilities by other states in the region, particularly South Korea and Indonesia. Furthermore, the presence of a superpower, the United States, in the region makes the notion of bipolarity in the EAS tenuous at best.

This study assesses the evolution of the EAS in the past decade as it transitions from a bipolar great power RSC into a multipolar great power RSC. It does so in an effort to illustrate how a changing hierarchy and patterns of amity and enmity affect the SCS disputes. Because patterns of amity and enmity influence securitization and desecuritization processes, it is important to understand how this process develops as well as how it influences the capacity building efforts by the different states surrounding the SCS. As a result, the study is organized into four sections: (a) an assessment of the evolution of the EAS; (b) an evaluation of the patterns of securitization and desecuritization with case studies of China, Japan and South Korea; (c) an assessment of how securitization language has facilitated the capacity building efforts of Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia and (d) and finally, the implications of these efforts. The decision to select Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia for this study stems from the fact that these three littoral states have been the most proactive in the political–military sphere in contesting China’s SCS claims as well as in taking advantage of the strategic rivalry between the key players in the region.

Evolution of the East Asian Supercomplex

As indicated above, the EAS has been a bipolar great power RSC defined by China’s political–military links, and Japan’s economic links in the region. However, these traditionally specific roles have become more diversified over the years. China has now become the economic driver of the region instead of Japan. Simultaneously, Japan, while no longer the primary economic driver of East Asia, remains a significant source of investment and economic aid. Furthermore, Japan’s ongoing ‘normalization’ process is allowing it to play a security role that it has been unable or unwilling to play since the end of World War II. In other words, both states possess similar roles in the EAS, although to varying degrees.

More important to the evolution of the EAS, however, has been the emergence of South Korea as a legitimate Regional Power (Shim & Flamm, 2012), and the potential for Indonesia to achieve a similar status (Beeson & Lee, 2015). In RSCT, hierarchies are defined by a state’s discursive and material power (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Material power is measured by economic wealth and military capabilities while discursive power is measured by the effectiveness of its speech-acts; in this case, securitization and desecuritization processes. Successful securitization speech-acts are intrinsically linked to material capabilities, but also to social capital reflected in a state’s prestige and normative power. This article takes the position that South Korea possesses both dimensions of power at a level commensurate with Regional Power status, while Indonesia is still in the early stages of achieving those capabilities.

Since 2000, South Korea has tripled its military spending, and currently has the 10th largest defence budget in the world and 3rd largest in the EAS (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015b). South Korean companies have also begun to establish themselves as capable arms exporters, entering a market that has been traditionally dominated by American, Russian and European firms. From 2010 to 2014, South Korea emerged as the 15th largest weapons exporter, and while its global market share remains small in proportion to established players (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015c), its growth has been exponential and its technology has been highly regarded. In fact, South Korea is poised to overtake China as the largest weapons exporter in the EAS by the end of the decade (Moores, Salapasidis, Forrestes, & Burton, 2015). South Korea has also managed to elevate itself to the 13th largest economy in the world and the 3rd largest in the EAS (The World Bank, 2015b). These material factors have allowed South Korea to receive a greater degree of recognition and prestige among its peers in the EAS and abroad, ultimately increasing its discursive and normative capacity and cementing its position as a regional power.

Indonesia, while only possessing the 6th largest defence budget in the EAS (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015b), holds other characteristics that reveal the country’s potential to achieve regional power status. For example, Indonesia has a burgeoning military industrial complex as a result of the tech transfers it has received and the indigenous research and development it continues to conduct. Evidence of this is found in its sale of landing dock platform vessels to the Philippines and Peru, patrol crafts to Bangladesh, as well as transport aircraft to Malaysia and the Philippines (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015a). Indonesia has also emerged as the 16th largest economy in the world and the 4th largest in the EAS (The World Bank, 2015b). In addition to this, the country possesses vast amounts of resources and a sizeable young population which are indicators of latent potential (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Geography also grants Indonesia strategic importance and leverage due to the fact that the Strait of Malacca, as well as the Sunda, Lombok and Wetar straits are located within the Indonesian EEZ. As with South Korea, Indonesia’s extant and potential material capacities, supplemented with a traditionally ‘middle way’ foreign policy, have allowed it to elevate its diplomatic position and national prestige (Santikajaya, 2014), thus increasing its discursive and normative capacity.

What is important about this development is that the emergence of more capable actors in the EAS adds a new layer of complexity to regional dynamics. This is due to the fact that these actors have the wherewithal to drive securitization and desecuritization processes in the region which shapes how the region’s growing military capabilities are perceived. In other words, the rise of South Korea to Regional Power status and the potential for Indonesia to do the same can reinforce or hinder the securitization and desecuritization processes of existing Great Powers in the EAS (China and Japan), while also having the autonomy to initiate processes of their own. Nevertheless, this article contends that for the time being, South Korea and Indonesia have joined Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam in the mutual securitization of China’s assertiveness despite the fact that little coordination and cooperation has occurred between Japan and South Korea regarding this process.

Securitization and Desecuritization Processes

In RSCT, patterns of amity and enmity are an important factor in interstate relations. These patterns inform the securitization and desecuritization processes of each state and, thus, how their foreign policy is formulated. Traditionally, in the EAS, the main agents driving securitization and desecuritization processes have been China and Japan. However, as stated above, as South Korea gains prominence as a Regional Power, it has also become a leading agent in these processes. These three states have been primarily focused on securitizing each other through speech-acts in an effort not only to shore up domestic support through nationalist sentiment, but also to gain international legitimacy and recognition of their expressed foreign policy goals. Much of the growing enmity that drives the securitization language employed by these three powers stems from unresolved historical grievances, ongoing territorial disputes between them and mistrust resulting from greater military expenditure.

China: Becoming Securitized

Since China’s economic opening, the country has experienced accelerated economic growth. This economic growth was capped with China’s ascent to the number two position behind the United States in total GDP in 2010 (Monahan, 2010). As a result of its newfound wealth, as well as its realization that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was incapable of operating under modern warfare conditions, China has invested heavily in modernizing its military. China’s investment in modernizing the PLA has made it the 2nd largest military spender after the United States. The Department of Defense (DoD) estimates that China spends US$165 billion annually in defence spending although the officially disclosed budget is US$136 billion. The DoD states that the discrepancy between its estimated figure and the official figures is due to ‘China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition from a command economy’ (US Department of Defense, 2015, p. 49). Furthermore, ‘China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure, such as procurement of foreign weapons and equipment, and research and development’ (ibid.).

It is precisely this modernization drive that has allowed China to become increasingly assertive in its territorial claims in the ECS and the SCS. As a result, the country faces increasing securitization language from its neighbours. Japan is perhaps one of the most vocal critics of China’s military modernization and the increasing assertiveness that China has displayed in its ongoing territorial disputes in both the ECS and the SCS. Japan’s 2014 white paper, released by the Ministry of Defense, demonstrates the country’s concern with China’s lack of transparency in both military expenditures and its encroachment into what Japan considers its waters and airspace (Government of Japan, 2014a, pp. 33–34). Furthermore, the Ministry’s 2015 white paper claims that ‘China, particularly over conflicting maritime issues, continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts to change the status quo, and is poised to fulfill its unilateral demands high-handedly without compromise’ (Government of Japan, 2015a, p. 33). The report goes on to state that these attempts are ‘incompatible with the existing order of international law’ (ibid.). An important dimension of this securitization language is the fact that Japan considers the ECS and the SCS disputes as interrelated. Therefore, although Japan is not a party to the SCS disputes, it is cognizant that its most critical SLOC traverses those waters. This ultimately motivates Japan to support China’s rivals in Southeast Asia as a way of shoring up its defences. In other words, ‘by supporting front-line states in the South China Sea, Japan sees itself as defending its own interests by upholding the norm of peaceful resolution, ironically, through military deterrence’ (Pollmann, 2015).

In addition to Japan, China has effectively become securitized by key littoral states surrounding the SCS. Vietnam and the Philippines have been the most active in their securitization language although Indonesia has also entered the debate in recent years. The Philippines, arguably the country in the weakest military position in the region, has been active in securitizing China and its assertive posture in the SCS. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III on a number of occasions has likened China’s actions to that of Nazi Germany’s expansionism before World War II (Bradsher, 2014; Takenaka, 2015). Furthermore, during a visit to Japan, President Aquino, in reference to China, stated that stability in the region was ‘at risk of being disrupted by attempts to redraw the geographic limits and entitlements outside those clearly bestowed by the law of nations’ (Aquino III, 2015).

Officials in Vietnam have also questioned the legality of China’s actions in the SCS. In a show of solidarity with the Philippines, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that he and President Aquino ‘shared the deep concerns over the current extremely dangerous situation caused by China’s many actions that violate international law’ (Mogato & Ruthwitch, 2014). Prime Minister Dung also added that ‘the two sides are determined to oppose China’s violations and called on countries and the international community to continue strongly condemning China and demanding China immediately end its violations’ (ibid.). Unlike other rival claimants, Vietnam shares a land border with China as well as the greatest level of maritime proximity; as a result, the country has endured the brunt of China’s slow but gradual encroachment on the SCS since the 1970s. This makes public denunciations, such as those presented above, all the more important due to the security implications they carry.

For its part, Indonesia had remained relatively silent on the ongoing SCS disputes for many years. As a matter of fact, the country is often left out of the list of SCS claimants. However, due to the fact that China’s cow’s tongue overlaps with the EEZ of the Natunas Islands, which is internationally recognized Indonesian territory, Indonesia has stepped up its rhetoric against China. Indonesian president Joko Widodo has argued that the ‘“nine-dashed line” that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any international law’ (Sieg, 2015). Like other claimants in the SCS, along with Japan and South Korea, Indonesia supports the ratification of a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS as means of resolving the disputes through peaceful means and to deter unilateral actions by any state.

Out of all the countries highlighted in this study, South Korea appears to have the most muted response to increasing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS, preferring to reiterate its support for a CoC and for the resolution of disputes through peaceful means (Kang, 2015). However, a statement from South Korean Embassy Minister and Consul General Ming Kyong-Ho stationed in the Philippines, indicated that China’s actions were ‘not just provocative but really serious for you and for us’ (Mabasa, 2014). This signifies recognition that, like Japan’s, South Korea’s most vital SLOC also traverses the SCS, and as a result, South Korea does not benefit from increased tensions resulting from China’s assertiveness in the region. Furthermore, because ‘some experts believe [that] China’s stance is linked to greater maritime ambitions, highlighted by disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands and with Southeast Asian nations’, the South Korean Navy has pushed ahead with its construction of a naval base on Jeju Island despite strong local opposition. Jeju is located in a strategic position between the Yellow Sea and the ECS. The navy argues that the naval base ‘is necessary to protect the country’s shipping lanes and respond to future territorial disputes with China’ (Choo, 2011).

The success of securitization language aimed at China has had mixed results with the domestic populations of the many countries discussed in this study. A poll by the Pew Research Center indicates that people in Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines have the most negative view of China with 7, 16 and 38 per cent of their respective populations having favourable views of the country. However, South Korea and Indonesia have far more positive views with 56 and 66 per cent of their respective population having favourable views of China (Pew Research Center, 2014). This discrepancy appears to be a result of a higher number of clashes between China and the former three countries while muted securitization language by South Korea and greater geographic distance of Indonesia facilitates stable relations between them and China. Nonetheless, the same poll demonstrates that the majority of the population of all five states are concerned about their ongoing territorial disputes with China, as well as its growing military capabilities (ibid.). Official statements and white papers by different countries in the EAS reflect that China has become securitized, and as a result, has facilitated its strategic rival’s efforts to make bids for greater regional leadership and assist the capacity building efforts of Southeast Asian states.

Japan: Securitized and Desecuritized

Japan finds itself in a unique position. The legacy of the atrocities committed by its armed forces during World War II remains a significant impediment to its political and military interests. At the same time, however, China’s increasingly securitized status has allowed Japan to step in as a contributor to security and capacity building in the region. These two realities have accorded Japan with securitized as well as desecuritized status in the EAS. The securitization of Japan originates primarily from China and South Korea and is laced with historical grievances that continue to exacerbate their relations. The actions and statements of numerous Japanese officials, particularly visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine or the whitewashing of history, have been an obstacle to maintaining warm relations between the three countries. Furthermore, ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the ECS, as well as Japan and South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan continue to drive securitization rhetoric aimed at Japan.

At the core of Japan’s securitization is the country’s gradual ‘normalization’ of its military. Although the ‘normalization’ of the military ostensibly began in the early 1990s with the passage of the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace Keeping Operations and Other Operations, recent reinterpretations of the constitution under the administration of Shinzo Abe have heightened tensions between Japan and its two powerful neighbours. As Japan readies itself to participate in collective self-defence agreements as a result of the passage of two bills in the lower house of the Diet, Chinese and South Korean officials have voiced their disapproval through increased securitization language towards Japan. In an official statement, Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry, urged Japan to ‘refrain from jeopardizing China’s sovereignty and security interests or crippling regional peace and stability’ (Hua, 2015). Lu Kang, another spokesperson from the Foreign Ministry, denounced Japan’s 2015 white paper stating that Japan was deliberately playing the ‘China military threat’ card, and countered that ‘Japan’s actions of deliberately intervening in the South China Sea issue and playing up regional tensions run counter to regional peace and stability, and severely undermine the political and security mutual trust between China and Japan’ (Xinhua News, 2015).

Like China, South Korea has not remained silent as Japan gradually reinterprets its constitution. As Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet mulled the reinterpretation of the constitution in order to enable Japan to participate in collective self-defence agreements in 2014, the South Korean Foreign Ministry released a series of statements noting that the ‘Japanese government, while upholding the basic spirit of its more than 60-year-old pacifist Constitution and within the framework of the US–Japan alliance, should be transparent in its efforts and should not undermine regional peace and stability’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2014). Furthermore, the press release stated that ‘in terms of defense and security issues, the Japanese government should renounce historical revisionism and take right actions in order to dispel doubts and concerns stemming from historical issues and to win the trust from its neighboring countries’, highlighting the trust gap that exists between the two countries and how historical grievances continue to hinder their bilateral relations (ibid.).

Despite becoming increasingly securitized in the Northeast Asian subcomplex as a result of lingering historical and territorial issues as well as its ongoing ‘normalization’ process, Japan has been largely desecuritized in the Southeast Asian subcomplex. Although countries in Southeast Asia suffered at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II, anti-Japan sentiment in the region continues to diminish, as China increasingly becomes the target of securitization. Philippine President Aquino has been one the most ardent supporters of Japan’s ‘normalization’. In a visit to Japan, President Aquino stated that ‘nations of goodwill can only benefit if the Japanese government is empowered to assist others and is allowed the wherewithal to come to the aid of those in need, especially in the area of collective self-defense’ (Reynolds & Takahashi, 2014). Albert Del Rosario, the Philippine Foreign Minister, has also gone on record stating that the Philippines is ‘looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a significant balancing factor’ (Pilling, Landingin, & Soble, 2012). Echoing official Philippine statements, during his tenure, former Indonesian Defense Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, supported Japan’s efforts to increase its security profile in the region by continuing the ‘normalization’ of the country (Antara News, 2013).

In many ways, the trends in the securitization and desecuritization of Japan are reflected in the aforementioned Pew Research Center Poll. In the poll, China and South Korea held generally unfavourable views of Japan with only 8 and 22 per cent of their respective population having favourable views of the country. However, in Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, 77, 77 and 80 per cent of the population have favourable views on Japan. This dichotomy is a result of the ongoing disputes in the Northeast Asian subcomplex, which fuels the securitization language aimed at Japan. At the same time, Japan’s lack of territorial claims in the SCS and its shared rivalry in China make it a target of desecuritization among key actors in the Southeast Asian subcomplex. In other words, Japan has an easier time pursuing greater security roles in Southeast Asia than it does in Northeast Asia, therefore facilitating capacity building efforts in the former.

South Korea: Non-securitized?

Perhaps more than China or Japan, South Korea is poised to play a greater security role in the EAS. Having largely focused on its northern rival, in recent years, South Korea has demonstrated its commitment and willingness to become a regional and global player. Possessing the 13th largest economy in the world and the 10th largest military budget, South Korea has developed interests beyond its peninsula encouraging it to develop a blue-water navy (Perlo-Freeman, Fleurant, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2015, p. 2). These interests are centred on South Korea’s growing international trade, which requires greater investments in the safety of its SLOC (ibid.).

South Korea’s status in the EAS is non-securitized. Although territorial and EEZ disputes persist between South Korea and its two powerful neighbours in the Northeast Asian subcomplex, very little securitization language has been directed at South Korea. Periodic flare-ups regarding the sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands between South Korea and Japan or the issue of overlapping EEZ boundaries between South Korea and China have not created a greater push for the securitization of South Korea. In fact, it is South Korea that has used these periodic flare-ups to securitize its neighbours as demonstrated above. Furthermore, while a case can be made that North Korea and South Korea have securitized each other, it is clear that the former’s securitization of the latter has had little effect on the views of other states in the region.

For their part, countries in the Southeast Asian subcomplex, having no historical or ongoing grievances with South Korea, have had no reason to securitize South Korea, and as a result, there has been no need to desecuritize it in the same manner that Japan has had to be desecuritized. This provides South Korea with strategic opportunities not currently available to either China or Japan. While China continues to be the main economic driver in the region, its overwhelming economic power has made many of its neighbours fear that they have become far too dependent on China for their continued economic growth (Heydarian, 2015b). For South Korea, being a wealthy nation with increased levels of outgoing foreign direct investment allows it to play the role of economic driver without the threat of displacing the domestic industries of its neighbours (Export and Import Bank of Korea, 2012).

Simultaneously, while Japan continues to be a greater source of official development assistance (ODA) than China and South Korea combined, South Korea has shown greater commitment to ODA than China has thus far (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). Furthermore, South Korea’s status as a regional power between two major powers in the EAS allows it more economic and political flexibility in Southeast Asia, as it does not carry the same political and historical baggage that its two powerful neighbours possess. In recent years, it has become not only a significant investor and donor in the region but also a source of military hardware for Southeast Asian countries pursuing a minimum credible defence against China’s increasingly assertive policies in the SCS. This indicates that South Korea has begun to shed its image as a ‘free-rider’ and has sought to actively pursue security interests independent of the United States even if those interests are shared by its main ally and its main rival (Japan).

Capacity Building Efforts in the Southeast Asian Subcomplex

As China increases the capabilities of the PLA through its comprehensive military modernization programme, it has become increasingly assertive in its disputes with its neighbours in the ECS and the SCS. As a result of these developments, many countries in the EAS have essentially securitized China and have responded with military budget increases of their own (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2015, pp. 3–4). Biting the cow’s tongue appears to be the implicit goal of these states. In other words, the littoral states in the SCS are attempting to deter China from unilaterally changing the status quo, and should it choose to do so it may incur political, economic and military costs down the line.

Nevertheless, Southeast Asian states contesting China face numerous material and geographical constraints. One of the most glaring realities for the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia is that they cannot hope to match China’s military build-up even if their programmes were fully successful. Furthermore, capacity building programmes require time to mature and become the vessel of a minimum credible defence. As a result, these states have sought external support for their capacity building efforts from China’s regional strategic rivals, Japan and South Korea. Japanese and South Korean assistance in the capacity building efforts of these Southeast Asian countries has been facilitated by their mutual securitization of China and its assertive maritime policies.

The Philippines

The Philippines has been among the weakest members of the EAS in both military capability and defence spending for decades (National Defense College of the Philippines, 2013). However, increasing tensions with China have motivated Philippine President Aquino to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The main goal of Aquino’s administration is to deter further Chinese encroachment on what the Philippine government considers its territory in the SCS. In 2012, President Aquino signed into law RA 10349, which is a revision of the AFP Modernization Act that was seen as largely unsuccessful (Goldman, 2013, p. 10). The new law has been far more successful in allowing the Philippines to train and acquire new equipment (Fisher, 2012). Furthermore, recent trends indicate that the administration is keen on increasing military spending over the next few years (Defense News, 2015).

However, despite clear improvements in the AFP, the Philippine government is aware that even if the modernization of the armed forces is entirely successful, the country simply does not have the material capabilities to stand toe-to-toe with China. As a result of this recognition, the Philippine government has sought external political and material support to supplement its capacity building efforts. The United States—the Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty allows the Philippines to receive support from current dominant power with little effort. Furthermore, a similar treaty between the United States and Japan has encouraged the Philippine government to pursue a closer relationship with America’s main ally in the EAS. In fact, during a meeting in 2013, the former Defense Minister of Japan, Itsunori Onodera, and his Philippine counterpart, Voltaire Gazmin, discussed that Japan and the Philippines should work together to make the American rebalance in the region a reality (Dizon, 2013). Reflecting the growing strategic partnership between Japan and the Philippines, President Aquino signalled to Japanese Prime Minister Abe that his country is ‘ready for talks that would allow Japanese military aircraft and naval vessels to use the Philippines to refuel, allowing them to extend their range of operation into the South China Sea’ (Kelly, 2015).

So far, the Philippine efforts to cooperate with the United States and Japan have facilitated its AFP modernization and capacity building programme. The AFP has already received a number of decommissioned US Coast Guard cutters which are currently the largest vessels it operates, and will receive two C-130T Hercules transport aircraft in order to increase the country’s airlift capacity. However, more significantly, Japan and the Philippines have formally signed an agreement that will allow the Philippines to receive low-interest aid from Japan to purchase 10 coast guard vessels from Japan, marking a shift in Japan’s foreign aid programmes which have traditionally been focused on infrastructure projects (Sekiguchi, 2015). This agreement demonstrates how the securitization of China in the EAS has allowed Japan to increase its security profile in the region and thus, become a pillar for the Philippines’ capacity building efforts.

Although the United States and Japan have predominantly aided the Philippines’ capacity building efforts, South Korea, itself an American ally, has begun its own efforts to aid the Philippines in its endeavours. To date, South Korea has donated a corvette, a number of landing craft and 16 rubber boats to the Philippines (Business Insider, 2014). Manila and Seoul have also signed arms deals to procure 12 FA-50 light fighters from South Korea (Moss, 2014). Furthermore, South Korea is currently bidding to sell the Philippines two frigates, which would significantly increase the ability of the AFP Navy to patrol its waters (ibid.). Although it will take many years for the Philippines to assess the success of its capacity building efforts, it is clear that American, Japanese and South Korean support will be crucial.

Vietnam

Like the Philippines, Vietnam has pursued a modernization and capacity building programme for its armed forces. Unlike the Philippines, however, Vietnam’s proximity and economic ties to China adds another layer of complexity to the country’s efforts of acquiring external support. Nevertheless, the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) has made significant acquisitions in recent years, particularly the purchase of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015a). In fact, the country’s military spending has grown 128 per cent since 2005 (Boudreau, 2015), making it the largest growth in military spending in Southeast Asia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015b). For the most part, Russia has been the primary source of Vietnam’s weapon acquisitions, although recent efforts to diversify indicate that the country is open to purchasing from other sources as well (Boudreau, 2015).

In recent years, Vietnam has signed a number of agreements in an effort to enhance security cooperation between itself and other global and regional powers. Its most significant political achievement, however, has been signing a defence cooperation agreement with Japan in 2011, which allowed Vietnam to receive critical expertise in diving medicine, a vital asset as Vietnam begins to commission its Kilo-class submarines (Government of Japan, 2014b). Furthermore, Japan has agreed to provide Vietnam with patrol boats in a package similar to that which was offered to the Philippines (Cheney-Peters, 2014). Another important development for Vietnam has been the partial lifting of a ban on lethal arms sales by the United States in 2014, which opens the door for potential weapons purchase by Vietnam from the US manufacturers. In fact, the United States has already agreed to provide Vietnam with six patrol boats as part of a military aid package (Boudreau, 2015).

So far, South Korea has not begun weapons sales or transfers to Vietnam despite the fact that both countries became strategic partners in 2009. However, South Korea’s willingness to actively donate or sell weapons to Southeast Asian countries signifies that Vietnam may soon benefit from this partnership. Vietnam has also signed or strengthened strategic partnerships with India and Russia in 2007 and 2012 respectively. For now, Russia remains Vietnam’s largest supplier, which is reflected in Vietnam’s purchase of ‘20 Su-30MK jetfighters (with 12 more to be delivered between 2014–2015), two Gepard-3 frigates (with two more to be delivered between 2014–2016), and two K-300P Bastion-P coastal defense missile systems’ (Le, 2013). India has also shown interest in providing Vietnam with its prized BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile as tensions rise between India and China over their interests in the SCS (Majumdar, 2014).

As it stands, Vietnam’s efforts to obtain external assistance for its capacity building programme, and diversify its imports from Russia, have had measurable success, particularly with the United States and Japan. Nevertheless, its newfound relationship with key regional powers remains nascent and will require time to mature. While Vietnam has not received nearly as much military aid as the Philippines, it has still been able to strengthen its strategic partnerships with key players in the region as well as begin a comprehensive rapprochement with the United States. It is also possible that the reason why Vietnam has not been the recipient of as much largesse as the Philippines is due to the fact that its armed forces are considered far more capable than its archipelagic neighbour.

Indonesia

Following regional trends, Indonesia has pursued modernization and capacity building programmes for its armed forces. That being said, Indonesia is in a much better position than either the Philippines or Vietnam in its efforts to build capacity and defend its interests. An important factor that aids Indonesia’s position is the fact that its main concern with China lies in the proper demarcation of the EEZ and not in a sovereignty dispute over the Natunas Islands or other land features in the SCS. Another important factor is the fact that Indonesia’s distance from mainland China allows it to more effectively safeguard its interests since China does not yet possess the capability to project and sustain significant amounts of naval or air power in the southern stretches of the SCS, although recent reef reclamation efforts by China in the SCS may soon provide it that much sought-after capability (Government of Japan, 2015b).

Like the other two states, Indonesia has also sought external assistance for its programmes. However, Indonesia’s growing identity as a Regional Power accords it with significantly more policy options and confidence than either of its neighbours (Beeson & Lee, 2014, p. 79). Having more than tripled its defence spending since 2005 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015b), Indonesia announced in 2015 that it would double its defence outlays in the span of a year (Grevatt & Caffrey, 2015). In a press release by Ahmad Hanafi Rais, the Vice Chairman of the Indonesian House of Representatives, stated that the commitment is in ‘line with the government’s stated pledge to increase military spending as a proportion of GDP from the existing 0.8% to 1.5%’ (ibid.). Indonesia’s growing Regional Power identity and its burgeoning relationship with Japan and South Korea has allowed the country to reap rewards in many forms.

Japan has already provided Indonesia with three patrol vessels and a recent memorandum on defence cooperation will allow Indonesia to benefit from increased access to modern weaponry and training. In addition to existing agreements, the Japanese have recognized Indonesia’s status as a key power in the region with a strategic position. As a result, Japan has agreed not only to export more weapons to Indonesia, but also to share weapons technology; making it the first Southeast Asian country for which Japan has agreed to do this (Yoshida, 2015). Nevertheless, despite the improvement of relations with Japan, the archipelagic country has benefitted most from its relationship with South Korea.

In 2005 and 2012, South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) upgraded two of Indonesia’s Type 209-class submarines; then, in 2011, it beat Russia, France and Germany in a competition to supply Indonesia with three Type 209-class boats in a contract valued at US$1.1 billion (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). South Korea has also sold 17 KT-1 Woong basic trainer/light attack aircraft (Airforce-Technology, 2015a) and 16 T-50 Golden Eagle Lead-in-Fighter Training aircraft (LIFT) to Indonesia in contracts valued at US$60 million and US$400 million respectively (Airforce-Technology, 2015b). The two countries are also cooperating on a fighter jet programme tentatively named KF-X. Indonesia became a partner in the development of the new fighter in 2010, and the agreement calls for South Korea to pay for 80 per cent of the costs while Indonesia will bear the remaining 20 per cent (Hardy, 2014). A key part of this agreement will be technology transfers that Indonesia will receive as its firms participate in the development of the 4.5 generation fighter (ibid.). Furthermore, South Korea’s Dae Sun Shipbuilding & Engineering designed and built two Makassar-class landing platform docks (LPDs) with another two built in Indonesia with technical assistance from Dae Sun. This represents another transfer of technology from South Korea to Indonesia, which signifies the latter’s great success in developing a beneficial relationship with the former (Naval-Technology, 2015).

Ultimately, Indonesia’s efforts to obtain external support for its capacity building efforts have been highly successful. Improved ties with Japan allow it to maintain a wider set of strategic options as well as willing partners. Furthermore, its existing relationship with South Korea will allow Indonesia to benefit from significant technology transfers which can ultimately cement the country’s image as a burgeoning regional power.

Conclusion

The EAS continues to evolve as its traditional bipolar hierarchy becomes contested by regional powers like South Korea as well as emerging regional powers like Indonesia. Securitization and desecuritization processes have allowed key players in the EAS to more effectively pursue their interests, often at the expense of China, which has become securitized as a result of its more assertive policies in the ECS and the SCS. In many ways, China’s ongoing military modernization programme has galvanized Japan’s ‘normalization’ process as well as the development of South Korea’s blue-water navy. The SCS territorial dispute provides an interesting case study of how securitization and desecuritization processes have shaped the policy preferences and strategic choices of the countries in the region.

Countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia have followed similar paths in the sense that all three have pursued modernization and capacity building programmes for their armed forces in an effort to develop a minimum credible defence that they hope would ultimately deter China from unilaterally changing the status quo in the SCS. However, realizing that China’s sheer economic and military power is beyond their capabilities to match on their own, these states have sought to obtain external support to supplement their programmes. The Philippines, having the weakest military and starting from the lowest position in its modernization efforts, has had measurable success. Its alliance with the United States has produced tangible results in the form of donated vessels and cargo planes. Growing cooperation with Japan and South Korea has also benefitted the Philippines in the form of donated ships or low-interest loans to acquire future weapons.

Vietnam, having a much more capable military has sought to diversify and enhance its defence cooperation agreements with key regional powers. These agreements have allowed Vietnam to benefit from greater access to arms sales and training as well as a key rapprochement with the United States. However, many of its new-found relationships with regional powers remain nascent and it will take some time before Vietnam will reap greater rewards from them.

Of all the Southeast Asian countries examined, Indonesia finds itself in the best position. It does not share the same geographical proximity with China that Vietnam does, nor does its military have to start at such low point as the AFP. Furthermore, Indonesia’s emergence as a Regional Power grants it a number of strategic options not currently available to its neighbours. Namely, other key states will accord Indonesia a higher degree of prestige and political consideration. In many ways, this can be observed in the Japan–Indonesia agreements, and particularly, the South Korean–Indonesia nexus where the former has been willing to transfer vital technologies that benefit the Indonesian military industrial complex, an option that is arguably not available for states like the Philippines or Vietnam which for the moment must rely on direct sales or donations.

China’s assertive maritime policies have resulted in its mutual securitization by Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. This process is further complicated by a ‘normalizing’ Japan that seeks greater security roles in the region, and by the emergence of Regional Powers like South Korea and Indonesia which have become more willing to pursue their own interests as the EAS hierarchy evolves. These events have resulted in a number of consequences for China. The first has been a growing security dilemma illustrated by the modernization and capacity building efforts of its neighbours, and the internationalization of the SCS disputes which has brought greater US commitments to the region. The second has been the facilitation of Japanese and South Korean efforts to secure their regional interests at the expense of China’s interests. What is interesting about this development is that despite a lack of cooperation and coordination, Japan and South Korea have essentially followed similar policies in Southeast Asia, namely, to facilitate capacity building efforts in the region. The third has been the desecuritization of Japan in the Southeast Asian subcomplex despite lingering historical grievances, which allows it greater strategic freedom in the EAS.

Ultimately, while capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia have greatly benefitted from external assistance of Japan, South Korea, the United States and other regional powers, these states still confront the reality that it will take time for these programmes to mature and for their respective armed forces to be able to develop a minimum credible defence. The fact is that China remains quantitatively and qualitatively superior to its Southeast Asian counterparts and, as its island reclamation efforts have shown, continues to enjoy greater strategic freedom than they do. However, it is important to note that unilateral changes of the status quo are not sustainable in the long run. The three consequences outlined above pose a real risk to China. Capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia supplemented by external support from key regional powers, if successful, can truly become the cow’s teeth that bites on the tongue.

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