Abstract
Minimum deterrence (MD) is only one of many deterrence doctrines that a nuclear state can adopt to prevent aggressive behaviour of its adversary states. The other types of deterrence include, deterrence via assured destruction, virtual deterrence and opaque deterrence. During the Cold War, the USA and the USSR followed the assured deterrence strategy through developing their nuclear weapons more than required number. However, scholars like Kenneth Waltz argued that the number of nuclear weapons does not matter and if a state has second strike capability, it can deter any other states even with a small number of nuclear weapons. The policy of MD is an appropriate strategy for the countries with limited resources, such as India and Pakistan. Pakistan advocated this strategy to deter Indian nuclear and conventional attacks. However, after the nuclear test of 1998, Pakistan kept the ‘minimum’ ambiguous and expanded its weapons in the name of credibility. Zafar Khan, author of the book Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, which has been developed from his PhD thesis at the University of Hull, examines this shift in Pakistan’s nuclear policy from MD to Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD).
Zafar Khan introduces the book by providing an outline of different ways deterrence can be used and then he further enunciates the essentials of the MD. Khan then goes on to describe the historical development of the nuclear program in Pakistan after independence. The nuclear energy program of Pakistan had started following the ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative of the USA. Even though there was no military agenda in its first decade, Pakistan kept the possibility of such a program open. Ayub Khan was against the development of nuclear weapon. However, succeeding events like the defeat of Pakistan in the wars with India in 1965 and 1971, the rise of Z.A. Bhutto as a civilian leader and India’s nuclear test in 1974 motivated Pakistan to develop their own nuclear bomb to deter India. After the death of Bhutto and the return of military government, the nuclear program became more ambiguous for the next two decades. Nonetheless, it is now known that nuclear scientists, most notably A.Q. Khan, continued their research for the militarization of nuclear weapons. The ‘tit-for-tat’ tests of 1998 was not a development of few days, but it was a result of research of more than three decades.
Unlike the Cold War enemies, the USA and USSR, India and Pakistan followed MD policy as it is useful for both countries to avoid a costly nuclear arms race in the South Asian region. The minimum number helps Pakistan control effectively their nuclear arsenals and to easing the external pressure. Zafar Khan (2016) in his article “The Conceptual Essentials of Minimum: Explaining Pakistan’s Rationale of Minimum Deterrence” has also identified various rationales behind the minimum policy of Pakistan such as ensuring security and survivability by effective dispersal and control and reduction of the unwanted accidental use of nuclear weapons. Since Pakistan is the comparatively weaker economy, the impact of an arms race with India will make it worse. However, still, Pakistan has not put a quantity limit upon its MD, and it interprets the term ‘minimum deterrence’ as a relative and changeable one according to regional and international conditions. According to most estimates, the number of nuclear warheads of Pakistan is slightly ahead of its adversary India. In the absence of an Arms Control Regime in the region, the apprehension about second strike capability and the trust deficit are major reasons for Pakistan to follow an ambiguous policy of MCD. However, since the minimum is not defined in exact numbers, this in turn undermines the true spirit of MD.
In succeeding chapters, Khan analyses the nature of nuclear force of Pakistan. Utilizing the three models developed by Barry Buzan, that is, the action-reaction model, the domestic structure model and the technological imperative model, Khan argues that Pakistan follows the action-reaction model of force building. For countering India, Pakistan has developed Air Force and missile systems for delivering nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan still lacks enough submarine capacity to complete the triad of delivery platforms for its nuclear force, although Khan reveals that Pakistan is planning to build a nuclear capable submarine within next 5 to 8 years. The author also acknowledges the fact that China has provided significant assistance to in developing Pakistan’s nuclear forces, including building facilities such as nuclear complex and missile base at Khushab.
Pakistan has refused to declare a No-First-Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy against any Indian attack. Since Pakistan is weak power in conventional weapons, it uses its ambiguous First Use (FU) policy to deter conventional weapons of India. This FU policy is confused mainly by Pakistan’s assertion that it will only use its nuclear weapons as a last resort while leaving unclear what possible circumstance or threshold would trigger their use. Khan argues that India has also begun shifting away from its declared NFU policy, citing India’s Cold Start Doctrine as evidence for the shift towards a FU policy. This Cold Start Doctrine of India, fear of pre-emptive attack, weakness in conventional weapons and the opposition from the military are obstacles for Pakistan from adopting an NFU policy.
Khan also details how Pakistan’s attitude towards arms control regimes has changed over time. In the initial stage of independence, it had supported nuclear disarmament and the idea of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, when Pakistan recognized India will not sign the NPT, it changed its normative approach to a strategic one and declared that it will not sign the treaty unless India does the same. After its nuclear test in 1998, Pakistan again changed policy, declaring that that it would join NPT if it is recognized as a nuclear weapon state. In the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pakistan did not sign it because of the absence of India from the treaty and to keep an option for the nuclear test open. Even though Nawaz Sharif declared that Pakistan would sign CTBT before September 1999, Pakistan failed to do so because of the many domestic and international reasons, namely the pressure from the military to develop a credible nuclear deterrence and to get the status of a recognized nuclear weapon state. The approach of Pakistan towards Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) was also based on an India-centric approach, arguing that the current asymmetry between India and Pakistan’s fissile material needs to be addressed before it can be controlled. The attitude of Pakistan towards these regimes indicates that Pakistan keeps the doors open for more tests and weapons to maintain credibility in the deterrence. The ambiguity in the term credibility undermines the spirit of the minimum.
The book Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy gives detailed information about development and policies of nuclear Pakistan. It recognizes the centrality of India in the nuclear policies of Pakistan. However, the difficulty with this analysis is that the nuclear policy of India cannot be understood without considering the role of China. When India develops its military to deter China, Pakistan misinterprets it as a threat against it. It leads to an unnecessary arms race in South Asia with the spiralling development of more and more weapons, and in this process, the concept of MD is blatantly ignored. Even though the author analyses the shift in policy of Pakistan from MD to MCD, this book could not prove that there was a stage of MD without giving importance to credibility. Whenever Pakistan put forward the policy of MD, the minimum was ambiguous and was interpreted in relative terms. The nature of the deterrence of Pakistan before the test of 1998 was characterized as ‘recessed’, ‘opaque’ and ‘existential’ deterrent. However, Khan has correctly identified the tendency of Pakistan to undermine the importance of ‘minimum’ for avoiding the economic burden and for ensuring the stability of South Asia in the name of credibility. The author concludes the book by urging for an actual minimum in the deterrence policy of Pakistan. All in all, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy is an interesting read, providing very useful and detail information about the nuclear history and policies of Pakistan in a lucid way. It is a must read for both nuclear policymakers and scholars of International Relation, Security Studies and nuclear proliferation.