Abstract
The East Asian security order has been affected by the increasing rivalry between China and Japan in recent years against the backdrop of the evolving Sino-Japan balance of power and the renewed nationalism in both countries. These developments have emerged as powerful wild cards, reinforcing the security dilemma and undermining the prospect for building a lasting peace between these two major powers in the region. This research is designed to examine Sino-Japan relations as well as the overall security order in East Asia. In particular, it looks into how the politics of nationalism intertwined with the changing regional power dynamics could affect the East China Sea dispute by creating an environment more conducive to bilateral tensions rather than mutual trust and cooperation.
Introduction
The relationship between China and Japan has been one of the most influential and occasionally destabilizing factors that shape the security environment in East Asia. Whereas China and Japan have maintained ‘negative peace’, these countries are still in for the long haul to achieve ‘positive peace’ due to the lack of mutual success in overcoming the sense of past injustices through open and comprehensive communication. 1 More recently, both sides’ renewed nationalism and their increasing geostrategic rivalry, accompanied by changes in the regional status quo, have become powerful wild cards, reinforcing the security dilemma and undermining the prospect for building a lasting peace between the two states. Despite their close economic relations and deepening social interactions, political and security tensions between the two have remained due to historical memory of mutual antagonism, aggravated by the rise of nationalism and further intensified by the shifting power parity in East Asia. Among the long list of grievances between the two sides, tensions in the East China Sea surrounding a few, uninhabited small islands and rocks, known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan have emerged as important elements that could test Sino-Japanese relations with greater regional security implications. In particular, the East China Sea dispute can be a good indicator that looks into the effects of nationalism and other related issues of mutual antipathy, derived from history and against the backdrop of on-going changes in geostrategic environment caused by China’s rapid rise and Japan’s relative decline. What further complicates the matter is the fact that Sino-Japan relations, including the territorial dispute, are not merely a bilateral affair, but also closely related to important interests of other countries, including the USA, as both China and Japan are intimately connected to this global superpower. Despite Washington’s claim that it takes no position on where ultimate sovereignty lies in the East China Sea dispute, it has been more than a passive player in the affair due to its security commitment to defending Japan in addition to its economic and geostrategic stakes in winning the broader Sino-US competition for what both sides perceive their own sphere of influence. Therefore, the ways in which the East China Sea dispute is addressed would likely to play a critical role in shaping the overall security order in East Asia as well as the future of Sino-Japan relations.
This research is designed to explore the increasing rivalry between China and Japan with particular focus on how their shifting power relations and the politics of nationalism—both popular and state-promoted nationalism—intertwined with collective memory of history have affected the Sino-Japanese dispute in the East China Sea and the regional security order. The structure of this article is as follows. First, it examines competing analytical frameworks regarding power transition as well as nationalism, looking into how the regional power shift accompanied by renewed nationalism may affect the overall security and peace in East Asia. Then, the East China Sea dispute shall be evaluated, including conflicting positions between China and Japan over the given issue in conjunction with the differences in stakes for Beijing and Tokyo in terms of tangible and intangible significance of not losing their claims amid the evolving regional status quo and rising nationalism in both countries. The final section recapitulates core findings of the research and their implications for the future of Sino-Japan relations. In addition, it looks into policy options for China and Japan, both of which have special interests and responsibilities in constructively managing this conflict and achieving genuine reconciliation so to build a stable regional order in the twenty-first century.
Power Shift and Nationalism in Sino-Japan Relations
Despite its relative weakening of status as a global hegemon, the USA is still the most influential state in the world ‘when power is measured in terms of economic and military assets’ and will remain so for some time to come (Art, 2010, p. 359). Nonetheless, the relative power and influence in some parts of the world, most notably in Asia and even beyond, is gradually tipping towards China and inevitably affecting the power dynamics between this rising Asian giant and its neighbours, including Japan, one of America’s closest allies (Goldstein, 2007; Sutter, 2010; Tammen & Kugler, 2006). In general, power transition theory (PTT) postulates that war is likely to occur against the backdrop of altering power parity between nations caused by their differential growth rates, especially when the relative power between a declining dominant state and a rising challenger approaches parity (Gilpin, 1981; Lemke, 1995; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980). In addition, variant branches of power transition theory look into ‘[T]he relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction’ in order to assess the probability of conflict or integration (Efird, Kugler & Genna, 2003, p. 293). The theory suggests that the future of war and peace would be determined by the interaction effect between ‘relative power and the degree of satisfaction with the international order (or status quo)’ (DiCicco & Levy, 1999, p. 682). According to these theoretical assumptions, catastrophic war is likely to be averted even after a rising China would eventually become the world’s most powerful state if the country emerges as a satisfied dominant power with ‘no substantial demands for change to the international system’s organizing principles’ or to the regional order (Lemke & Tammen, 2003, p. 270). However, the probability of conflict would rise dramatically if an increasingly powerful China with deep-seated grievances against the existing order—previously established and maintained by the USA and its core allies like Japan—seeks to challenge the status quo.
During most of the Cold War when there was an ordered hierarchy, Sino-Japan power relations were quite stable with neither side having enough capability to emerge as a regional hegemon or to challenge the East Asian security order, established and led by the superpowers. Whereas China was a weak country, marred by widespread poverty, Japan also fell short of becoming a major power on its own. Notwithstanding Japan’s successful post-war recovery to the point where it even became America’s economic rival, it remained under the US security umbrella while enduring constraints on its military sovereignty in line with its Peace Constitution. Simultaneously, China embraced the US-led regional order to counterbalance the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split and to encourage economically robust and militarily advanced Japan to remain low key, thus constraining the former enemy from re-emerging as a threat to China’s national security. Although the entire geostrategic context was hierarchical, dominated by the Cold War superpowers, neither China nor Japan was in a position to assume a leadership role in East Asia. It was during this time of fairly straightforward and unequivocal regional status quo when the Sino-Japan rapprochement was promoted along with the mutually beneficial economic partnership between the two with neither side willing or able to undermine the interests of the other or to challenge the existing order.
Since the rise of China and the relative decline of US hegemonic outreach; however, there has been a greater tension in Sino-Japan relations as each side more openly struggles to secure its regional dominance and prevent the other from becoming a leading player in East Asia. While Beijing and Tokyo continue to share a common interest in keeping regional stability as a necessary condition for their lucrative economic cooperation, the shifting power dynamics have encouraged both sides to redefine their status in East Asia as well as their relations to each other (Jimbo, 2012). At the same time, the regional power shift has pushed nationalism on both sides, simmering underneath for decades, to resurface in a more overt and precarious way. In addition, the lingering mutual distrust, embedded in unresolved historical issues, has further complicated Sino-Japan ties, increasing the chances that the changing regional hierarchy would clash with rising nationalism. The politics of nationalism, intertwined with a heightened sense of insecurity due to shifting regional power parity, could not only affect contemporary Sino-Japan relations but also reshape the overall security order in East Asia.
In effect, the rise of nationalism has emerged as one of the most potent forces that could deteriorate the relationship between China and Japan (Matthews, 2003; Zheng, 1999). Yet, nationalism is a constantly evolving and renovating phenomenon, characterized by ‘conflation, multivocality, indeterminateness, confusion, and mysticism’ (McVeigh, 2004, p. 6). It is challenging to fully grasp the workings of nationalism in addition to comprehending its role in Sino-Japan relations because nationalism could be quite ‘malleable and vulnerable to manipulation and/or guidance by leaders and media, as well as driven to some extent by events’ and even by the public (Moore, 2010, p. 298). Moreover, further analysis is needed to evaluate the linkage between power shift and nationalism, in particular how and in what ways the changing power relations between China and Japan have affected each other’s nationalism and created a regional order in which Sino-Japan tensions, rather than rapprochement and cooperation, are more likely to dominate their bilateral ties. In what follows, a country-specific approach will be taken to better explore the complex interactions between power shift and nationalism as well as their effects on the changes and continuities in Sino-Japan relations and the overall security order in East Asia.
The Fall and Rise of China: Its Evolving Power and Nationalism
The concept of nationalism was first adopted by Chinese elites even before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to defend the country ‘from foreign invasion and to gain its independent status, and hence acquired strong negative and reactive sense’ (Cui, 2012, p. 204). Since then, Chinese nationalism has revolved around a narrative of China’s century of humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers, including Japan. Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) earliest years, the theme of resisting Japan, embedded in the history of Japanese past atrocities against China, has been an important ‘source of political capital’ to uphold the legitimacy of the party leadership (Hughes, 2008, pp. 247–248). China’s nationalism before its rise served as an effective protective mechanism to keep Chinese national identity and bring the people together in times of weakness. Nonetheless, this early nationalism did not generate any substantial measure to demonstrate China’s greatness or reclaim its regional supremacy through assertive expansionist policies because the country was not fully capable of blatantly projecting its strength while simultaneously withstanding negative repercussions, expected in so doing. Besides, China was preoccupied with its internal struggles during the turbulent years of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Then, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the national focus shifted to preserving domestic and regional stability as a precondition for China’s economic growth.
In addition, China had to carefully consider its limited policy options and the overall regional power disparity in Japan’s favour throughout the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split made Beijing lack any reliable Communist allies without getting diplomatic and military support from another superpower, the USA, whereas the solidarity between Tokyo and Washington remained steadfast. The Sino-Soviet split increased China’s needs to accept the US-led regional order along with Beijing’s conviction that rapprochement with Washington would be strategically desirable to counter the threat posed by Moscow. Under the condition, Beijing largely practiced ‘a pragmatic nationalism based on a sober assessment of China’s domestic and global challenges and tempered by diplomatic prudence’ without recklessly exploiting nationalist sentiment to the extent that it could cause alarm even though nationalism connected with the idea of resisting Japan was an indispensable theme in Chinese political discourse (S. Zhao, 2013, p. 536).
Despite nationalism playing an important part in China’s relations with Japan, Chinese foreign policy was not exclusively driven by ideological factors but by pragmatism supported by Beijing’s political, economic and strategic calculations derived from its realistic assessment of the limits of its own power, which subsequently paved the way for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the 1970s. After acknowledging the regional order in favour of Japan and Tokyo’s strategic value within the realm of trade, investment and aid, Beijing tried to cultivate its ties with the former enemy. As for the Chinese leaders, economic growth, partly with support from Japan, was regarded as a major component of China’s regime stability and national development. Additionally, Beijing’s fear of Japan reasserting its wartime disposition towards militarism was alleviated by ‘the fact that Japan was safely ensconced within a security alliance with the United States’ (Smith, 2009, p. 232). This set-up further encouraged China to accept the existing regional hierarchy with relative satisfaction. Under the circumstances, Beijing controlled popular nationalism when it came to making Chinese foreign policy without resorting to emotional nationalistic rhetoric.
In recent years, however, China has shown a greater degree of assertive nationalism in safeguarding what it considers its core interests. 2 This is not because China’s priorities for seeking economic growth while maintaining regional stability have become less important but because it has amassed considerable power and influence to express its past grievances and its desire to create a new regional order in a more overt manner. This phenomenon has been facilitated by China’s rise as a global economic behemoth with deep pockets even to enhance its military and diplomatic posture. Concurrently, the Sino-Japan power dynamics have shifted in favour of China due to Japan’s weakened status as a major economic engine in Asia and beyond in addition to the relative decline of its indispensable ally, the USA, as the world’s sole superpower. Meanwhile, China has started redressing its previous geostrategic vulnerability, originated from the Sino-Soviet split, by mending its ties with Russia (Rozman, 1998). Despite Moscow’s carefully calculated hedging strategy against Beijing to limit China’s growing influence in the region, their shared concern about America’s containment policy towards Russia and China has brought the two countries together for mutual strategic utility. The warming ties between China and Russia have granted Beijing greater diplomatic leverage when dealing with a list of controversial issues revolving around China’s more forceful projection of its national interests in recent years (Duchâtel & Godement, 2016).
China’s increasingly overt nationalism, therefore, can be seen as a reflection of its outward confidence against the backdrop of altering regional power dynamics to its advantage. At the same time, China’s more explicit expression of national interests can also be seen as a manifestation of its inward sense of identity crisis and internal complications, intensified during the course of its rapid rise. This is the peculiarity of China’s new nationalism, which heightens Beijing’s dilemma to manage the discrepancy between the renewed national clout on the one hand and the unprecedented uncertainty over the future of the Chinese system on the other. The rise of China—largely made possible by its unique model of development through underplaying Communist tenets and embracing certain aspects of liberal capitalism—has caused the unintended but inevitable challenge to its own identity by widening the gap between the country’s outward confidence, especially regarding its global economic leverage, and its internal struggle to handle the increasingly complex society.
Despite an inflated sense of empowerment thanks to China’s new quotient of wealth, the Chinese national spirit began to decline due to its ideological crisis by the end of the Cold War together with an uncertain future filled with growing economic, social and political tensions at home. The tangible benefits of China’s successful economic reform, although enabling the country’s splendid rise, have served as a double-edged sword by making China remain potentially vulnerable with internal developments that could destabilize its domestic cohesiveness. Under the circumstances, the needs for the Chinese elites to use nationalism as a means to maintain political legitimacy have increased as doing so could divert public discontents regarding domestic problems towards external challenges. Notwithstanding Chinese leaders’ concern over the potential dangers of depending too extensively on national sentiments that could eventually be unmanageable, Beijing has shown its growing inclination to incorporate nationalism in shaping more assertive foreign policies in order to unite the Chinese public and divert their energies and frustrations outward (Downs & Saunders, 1998/99; Fravel, 2010; Whiting, 1995). In this process, Chinese new nationalism has emerged as a potentially powerful domestic source of its muscle-flexing foreign policy, reflected in its more overt push to redefine territorial boundaries in the region. This trend has also been reinforced by China’s efforts to cope with its enduring historical recollection of outside forces’ infringement of its sovereignty and its growing aspirations/capabilities to reposition itself as the principal architect of regional order.
The political utility of nationalism has further increased with the Chinese leaders more actively embracing this force ‘to fill the ideological vacuum left by the decline of Marxism and Maoism’ (Zheng, 1999, p. 90). As asserted by Yu, ‘the Chinese government is under heavy pressure’ to restore China’s historical glory through facilitating the rise of nationalism against the backdrop of ‘the declining appeal of communism, as well as the corruption and isolation of official academia’ (2014, p. 1174). With the decline of its ideology-based legitimacy, the CCP has begun to intensify patriotic education, designed to promote ‘loyalty by direct evocation of Chinese nationalism’ and to legitimize the continuation of one party rule as the best way to ensure political stability and continuing economic growth (Cui, 2012, p. 208). There has also been an effort to remember and highlight collective memory of history on the mass scale, focusing on the time of war against Japan so to facilitate national unity among the public. Promoted by Chinese state nationalism, the Chinese collective memory of Japan’s wartime atrocities and numerous unresolved historical issues, including the Nanjing Massacre, lack of apologies from Tokyo, and the territorial dispute, etc., have emerged ‘at the forefront of public perception of the Japanese,’ triggering public anger and resentment against Japan (Qin, 2006, p. 32). Yet, the rise of popular nationalistic sentiment has started constraining ‘Beijing’s control mechanisms and its ability to direct nationalist discourse in ways convenient to itself’ (Cui, 2012, p. 199). In effect, Chinese nationalism at the popular level has emerged as a considerable force, led by increasingly effective nationalist groups equipped with new communication technology that allows them to easily spread information, mobilize the public and organize mass protests. The massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China’s major cities in the past few years can be seen as the expression of Chinese bottom-up nationalism, led by societal forces that criticize not only the ‘unremorseful’ former enemy, Japan, but also the communist state that is not confident enough to protect China’s core national interests. As such, Chinese nationalism ‘has changed from an essentially state-led ideology to an increasingly society-driven phenomenon’ in the process of the CCP losing its monopoly of controlling this force with a growing tide of popular nationalist sentiment (Lampton, 2014, p. 22).
One might question whether China’s rising popular nationalism has become a significant enough force, ‘compelling the Chinese leadership to take a tougher stand on a range of foreign policy issues, particularly maritime disputes in East Asia’ (Johnston, 2016, p. 7). Indeed, it would be an exaggeration to treat the role of popular nationalism as the only factor to determine China’s foreign policy because there are other elements that could also influence ‘China’s coercive diplomacy on maritime issues, such as elite opinion, the personal preferences of top leaders, security dilemma dynamics, organizational interests, or some combination thereof’ (ibid.). Moreover, the PRC as a party-state, which still remains in the driver’s seat, is not entirely swayed by public opinion in making China’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the chances for the elite to respond to popular nationalism, instead of simply utilizing and manipulating the public sentiment for their own politico-diplomatic purposes, have increased along with the growing demands of nationalist legitimation as well as China’s increasing capabilities to accommodate such demands.
China’s exceptional economic development, made possible partly by successfully implementing certain aspects of capitalism, has served as the engine behind its remarkable and much-celebrated rise. Nonetheless, the rise of China itself has made its unique system of governance potentially vulnerable by triggering a new state-society balance with individuals gaining greater control over their lives than ever before in China’s modern history. This has created a dilemma for Chinese leaders regarding the discrepancy between their externally projected strength and internally perceived weakness when governing this idiosyncratic communist state in the twenty-first century. Chinese popular nationalists share the dream with their government to make their country powerful enough to stand up against the bullies of any outside forces. Suspicious of foreign powers’ conspiracy to hamper China’s rise, popular nationalism has been vocal and emotional in criticisms of not only other countries’ harmful intentions against China but also Beijing’s failure to demonstrate stronger resolve to defend the national interests. Under this new environment, Chinese leaders have become more reluctant to control the expression of popular nationalism and willing to accept the popular nationalist’s demand to take a resolute position against any hostile outside forces, including Japan. Inexorably, Beijing has less flexibility in operating on sensitive issues, involving China’s vital interests vis-à-vis Japan such as history-related controversies and territorial disputes (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2016). This is due to its concerns about the possibility of popular anger targeting Japan turning against what the Chinese public also sees as the incompetent and weak-willed Chinese authorities, causing social and political instability. In this regard, the increasing responsiveness of the Chinese government to public opinion is an important development of China’s internal affairs that reflects ‘the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism’ with implication for a more assertive and confrontational Chinese foreign policy in the long run (S. Zhao, 2013, p. 536).
All in all, Beijing’s efforts to promote harmonious relations with Tokyo to further expedite China’s rise have been constrained by some contradictory elements within its own definition of nationalism that revolves around the theme of resisting Japan and strengthening Chinese national unity against its former enemy. It has proved difficult to even-handedly ‘promote social and political stability through sustained economic growth—surely best achieved through good relations’ with its closest neighbours, including Japan, while reconciling with strident nationalist discourse, based on a clear distinction between us versus them (Cui, 2012, p. 215). As China’s President Xi Jinping (2017) has proclaimed during his nineteenth Congress speech on 18 October 2017, the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation is ‘a dream about history, the present, and the future’, working tirelessly for ‘the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’; notwithstanding his emphasis on ‘preserving world peace and promoting common development’, Xi’s speech sheds important light on the difficulties and intricacies of China’s approach to Japan. When dealing with delicate matters associated with sovereignty, national pride, and historically unresolved tensions, it has become more tempting and tactically convenient for Beijing to resort to assertive nationalism though doing so could be a strategic liability in the long run (Chen-Weiss, 2014). This is the case even though Beijing acknowledges the needs to facilitate diplomatic flexibility and mutually beneficial ties with Tokyo as doing so would be more conducive to achieving the Chinese dream in the twenty-first century, that is, as asserted by Xi Jinping, ‘to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation’ through promoting lasting peace, economic development and international security (quoted in Xinhua, 2012).
Japan’s Power and Nationalism at a Crossroad
By the early twentieth century, Japan was perceived as a considerable power in Asia with the burgeoning sense of hierarchical nationalism that placed the Japanese nation on top. The present usage of Japanese nationalism, embedded in the concept of minzoku (an ethnic nation), as opposed to kokumin (the constitutional sense of national identity), emerged around World War I to call for ‘one nation, one state’, envisioning the superiority of the Japanese minzoku (Doak, 2006). In effect, the political elite started connecting Japanese nationalism to the monarchy with its emperor being portrayed as the key force to unify the people in the course of Japan’s imperial expansion. After the war, however, nationalism was depoliticized (Sannosuke, 1971). During the early post-war period when Japan’s power was at its nadir, there was a widespread sense of cultural nihilism, which downgraded the Japanese traditional values as responsible for the rise of devastating pre-war nationalism. In fact, it was taboo to promote political nationalism during the early post-war period.
Nonetheless, policies of economic nationalism were gradually endorsed by the Japanese leaders as necessary measures to facilitate the economic rehabilitation in post-war Japan. Subsequently, Japan experienced notable economic achievement that allowed its people to have a renewed sense of pride in their country’s abilities and cultural values, previously suppressed due to Japan’s negative status as a major perpetrator of the war. By the early 1980s, the regional economic order was in Japan’s favour as the country had become one of the world’s leading economies with significant leverage over East Asia and beyond. Against this backdrop, ideas of Japanese national distinctiveness were produced and disseminated again in the society (Yoshino, 1992). The result of this development was the emergence of a ‘new nationalist mood’, encouraging the Japanese people to feel that their country should ‘play a more active political role in international affairs commensurate with’ its global economic status (Rose, 2000, p. 171). Since the 1990s, however, Japan was in the grip of a revisionist trend associated with the emergence of neo-nationalism. As discussed by Kersten (1999, p. 191), ‘[t]he tumultuous context of the 1990s, including the Gulf War, death of Hirohito and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 1945, have provided a fertile environment’ for the rise of the so-called ‘liberal school of history’ with a core objective to promote a positive view of the country through nationalistic education and correction of the so-called ‘dark history’.
At the end of the twentieth century, Japan has started losing its supremacy in the realm of economics without yet having acquired political goodwill and diplomatic strength sufficient enough to dissipate its neighbours’ lingering antipathy towards the country, embedded in the memories of its imperial expansion and atrocities in the past. 3 Internally, a combination of Japan’s own political and economic malaise has conflicted with its basic sense of superiority as the ‘lead goose’ in the course of the Asian economic miracle and ‘the only Asian power able to beat the Westerners at their own game in the past’ (Moore, 2010, pp. 300–301). In addition, the growing economic competition from its neighbours, including China and South Korea, has started challenging Japan’s distinctive identity as the most economically powerful and technologically advanced country.
Against this backdrop of shifting power parity in Asia, the nature of Japan’s nationalism has been transformed from a reflection of its confidence into a critical mechanism to safeguard its identity as a leading state in the region. In line with the so-called ‘healthy patriotism’, a positive view of Japanese history has been promoted in order to ‘allow Japan to mobilize its energies for a variety of pressing tasks, including reviving the economy … and defending against external threats’ (Berger, 2014). Simultaneously, there has been a revitalized discussion about constitutional revision to boost its military strength and keep the regional order from shifting in favour of a rising China (Mito, 2008). The reinterpretation of the peace constitution’s limits on military activities, which would allow Japanese forces to help defend its allies, most notably the USA, can be seen as Japan’s efforts to maintain the regional order, defined as the US-led status quo rather than the new power dynamics, moulded by China. Japan’s determination ‘to extricate itself from many of the military constraints’ also reflects and reinforces heightened nationalism at home and across the region (Haass, 2013).
Especially with regard to the role of nationalism in Japan’s China policy, there has been a distinct evolution since the Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972 (Mochizuki, 2007). Tokyo initially pursued a conciliatory policy towards Beijing during the era of friendship diplomacy (1972–1989), promoting bilateral economic ties while taking an accommodating position regarding Japan’s past atrocities against China without concerning much about security competition from its Chinese counterpart. The rapprochement was made possible partly due to Japan’s military alliance with the USA, the insurmountable global superpower back then, as well as its economic superiority over China, the combination of which kept the regional order in Japan’s favour, allowing Tokyo to take a malleable approach towards Beijing without having to face the possibility of such a measure undermining Japan’s overall national interests. Before the emergence of the so-called China threat discourse, China was not ‘a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism’ or a target against which Japan should be more ‘resolute’ (Suzuki, 2015, p. 96). Throughout these periods, tensions in Sino-Japanese relations did revolve around highly controversial issues including the interpretation of history and the question of sovereignty over disputed islands. However, patriotic rhetoric in Japan was mostly aimed at a domestic audience rather than being translated into a hostile policy towards China.
However, China has gradually emerged as a potentially domineering neighbour that could undermine the regional stability and Japan’s national interests. Herein, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 became an important turning point in Sino-Japan relations as ‘the brutal repression of the Chinese democracy movement soured the country’s image for the Japanese public’, making Japanese elites become more wary of engaging with China (Mochizuki, 2007, p. 749). Japanese public opinion regarding China was further deteriorated by subsequent episodes, including China’s assertion of sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 1992, nuclear testing in 1995, and conducting military exercises (including missile launches) during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With the intensification of China’s rise alongside the relative decline of America’s hegemonic influence—the backbone of Japan’s post-war security—Japan’s China policy has incorporated a more active balancing strategy through expanding the scope and strength of its own military power (Nakano, 2016).
The regional power shift has been complicated by the clash of Sino-Japan nationalisms in conjunction with historically rooted animosity on both sides, creating an environment more conducive to bilateral tensions rather than mutual trust and cooperation. Mounting tensions between China and Japan challenge a widely held assumption that close economic relations would lead to a more stable regional order. Liberal optimism emphasizes that inextricably related and mutually reinforcing mechanisms, such as economic interdependence, generate substantial pacifying effects by extending the scope of shared interests among countries involved while increasing the costs of security disputes (Brooks, 1999; Gartzke, 2007). Although it would be imprudent to hastily dismiss the liberal view, the growing rivalry between China and Japan in recent years as well as their enduring struggle to achieve ‘positive peace’ could shed light on the limits of such optimism. Despite their close economic interdependence and shared understanding about devastating cost of war, the rise of China can be seen as a facilitating force for Japan’s greater openness to talk about its needs to become a ‘normal country’ with stronger military capabilities, a discussion less imaginable a decade or two ago.
Japan’s nationalism has been heightened by its growing sense of vulnerability, attributable in large part to a rising China with emerging military and economic capabilities. In Japanese political discourse, the China threat theory has been ramped up as this country, which is determined to become a regional hegemon and alter the existing order, is increasingly being described as a potential national-security threat. Against this backdrop, ‘politicians seen to be “tough” on China have been praised, regardless of their party political affiliations’ whereas those seen to be more compromising have come under heavy fire for being diplomatically weak (Suzuki, 2015, p. 96). Notwithstanding the existence of partisan divides in terms of Japanese attitudes towards China, these developments allowed Japanese politicians from both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) little choice but to take a tougher stance towards China when the recent bickering between the two countries over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands plunged the bilateral ties into the lowest point. 4 Such determinations to face China in a more resolute manner have become noticeable in the Japanese political discourse, widely seen as a departure from Japan’s more accommodating diplomacy vis-à-vis China in the past.
All in all, the resurgence of Japan’s nationalism combined with its efforts to strengthen security posture and more actively protect national interests, including the control over the East China Sea islands, are the manifestations of its unwavering resistance to the changing relative power in East Asia, which could lead to a new regional order shaped by a rising China, irrespective of (if not against) Japan’s interests. Simultaneously, Japan’s unfulfilled historical reconciliation with China has been feeding the spirit of ‘jingoism and xenophobia’ at home while hardening nationalist attitudes in its counterpart (Kingston, 2016). This has created an environment that many liberals describe as the ‘pacifying effects’ of economic interactions could be easily offset by other competing factors, including the intensifying security dilemma caused by the shifting regional power in China’s favour and the enduring Sino-Japan strategic distrust, rooted in their unpleasantly shared past.
The East China Sea Dispute
Beijing and Tokyo kept their precarious nationalism at bay throughout the Cold War. Furthermore, both sides managed to build rapprochement thanks to their mutual interests in economic development as well as the relatively stable bilateral power relations, anchored in the US-led regional order, with neither side feeling the urgency or having the capacity to aggressively claim one’s national interests at the expense of the other. 5 However, the chances for the clash of nationalism between these two major players in East Asia have increased in recent years together with the growing inclination on both sides to pursue their national interests in more assertive manners. Against the backdrop of shifting power dynamics in Sino-Japan relations and the overall change in the regional status quo, caused by the rise of China and the relative weakening of the US-dominated regional order that guaranteed Japan’s security, ‘undercurrents of mutual unfriendliness’ have become more pronounced (Roy, 2005, p. 201). Concurrently, the rise of nationalism in both countries has further plagued Sino-Japan relations, creating politically colder climate and even damaging their previously warm economics ties.
Among a number of perennial problems in Sino-Japanese relations, the East China Sea dispute has emerged as one of the most dangerous flashpoints, posing intricate questions of legality, national pride and beyond. This is a historically rooted issue of sovereignty that could be affected by the shifting relative power in Sino-Japan relations together with intensifying Chinese and Japanese nationalisms and their effects on both countries’ increasingly unyielding foreign policy vis-à-via each other. Beijing’s official narrative is that the Diaoyu islands were taken away by the Japanese along with their acquisition of Taiwan in 1895; thus Japan’s annexation of the islands is an intrinsic part of the history of Japan’s imperialistic aggression against China. According to this view, the islands were stolen when the regional order was in Japan’s favour while China was falling prey to the Western imperialist powers and not in a position to counter Japan’s expansion. Conversely, Tokyo asserts that the islands were not Chinese sovereign territory but ‘terra nullius’ (nobody’s land) in time of Japan’s discovery; hence, Japan’s 1895 annexation was a lawful territorial consolidation, unrelated to the war between Qing dynasty China and Meiji Japan in the nineteenth century (Smith, 2013, p. 29).
In the aftermath of World War II, the USA assumed administrative control of the islands as part of its greater governing responsibilities over Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain. During those years, neither China nor Japan was in a position to challenge the regional order designed by the rising superpower. In addition, the relative power was in Japan’s favour not because Japan had a major military clout but because it was firmly placed under the US security umbrella together with economic and diplomatic support from Washington. On the other hand, Beijing was preoccupied with the task of building a communist state on the ruins left by years of the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War while starting to face its diplomatic isolation at the dawn of the Sino-Soviet split. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were not highly valued by either China or Japan until the discovery of potentially substantial energy deposits around the area in late 1960s and the Okinawa Reversion in the early 1970s that granted Japan the administrative control of the islands. Tokyo’s claims to the island chain were contested by Beijing (and Taipei) ‘particularly during the time when the United States returned Okinawa to Japan’ (Q. Zhao, 2013, p. 47). This development led Washington to take a middle way that was to return administrative rights to Japan while asserting its neutrality doctrine on the sovereignty question and describing the Okinawa Reversion Treaty not affecting the islands’ legal status. It meant, according to then-Secretary of State William Rogers, ‘whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect’ (quoted in Susumu & Selden, 2014). Nevertheless, the US neutrality doctrine was insufficient to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough and address the discontents among the parties involved. Instead of ultimately solving the controversy, it placed the given issue at the centre of a historically charged sovereignty dispute, which has been pushed to the forefront of Sino-Japan relations more recently along with the regional power shift and the resurgence of nationalism on both sides. 6
Concurrently, mounting tensions over the islands have further activated the collective memories inside both countries, raising the stakes for Beijing and Tokyo in shrewdly connecting the East China Sea issue with the sense of national identity and pride. Especially with an acceleration of the regional power shift in recent years, ‘there has been a vicious cycle’ of the clash of nationalistic sentiments in both China and Japan, which has included, ‘on the Chinese side, reviving and reinforcing memories of Japan’s wartime aggression and, on the Japanese side, efforts to obscure or deny aspects of wartime history—which in turn provokes reactions from Japan’s Asian neighbours’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in Johnson, 2016). Beyond the security, economic and geopolitical challenges, therefore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has been ‘an identity-based conflict in which the two nations’ divergent perceptions, attitudes and intentions interact intensely with one another’; such an identity-based conflict combined with the growing shift in regional power parity could further stimulate the opposing nations’ historical experiences to influence ‘the present crisis, and activate their collective traumas and glories’ that keep bedeviling their ties (Arai & Wang, 2013, p. 99). Heightened anxiety on both sides and tougher rhetoric taken by Beijing and Tokyo regarding this issue illustrate the growing complexity of politics of nationalism. This phenomenon has been reflected in (and reinforced by) each country’s foreign policy against the backdrop of shifting regional power dynamics and simmering potential for the emergence of new security order. Thus, the given dispute is embedded in a much more substantial and intricate controversy than Sino-Japan competition for geostrategic manoeuvres or expected energy deposits in the area.
In the past, however, the dispute was not considered as a major obstacle that could prevent Sino-Japan normalization due to higher political priorities and strategic considerations within both countries as well as the relatively steady regional order, which kept potentially destabilizing nationalist passions at bay. Notwithstanding their disagreement over the territoriality of the islands, both sides demonstrated restraint as neither was interested in letting the given issue undermine the prospect of consolidating bilateral ties, the priorities shared by Beijing and Tokyo. After the revelation of Washington’s intention to normalize its diplomatic relations with Beijing, Tokyo pushed further to seek rapprochement with its communist neighbour as a precaution for the potential change in the post-war regional security order away from Japan’s unique advantage as an exclusive partner of the USA. During the time of the Sino-Japan rapprochement, China, with Japan’s concurrence, ‘demonstrated that, while the island controversy was important, it was subsidiary to Beijing’s larger political goals vis-à-vis Japan’ (Smith, 2013, p. 37). Then, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a ‘tacit’ agreement to shelve the islands dispute and leave the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue to the ‘next generation’, which ‘would be wise enough to find good solutions satisfactory to all’ (Yang, 2013, p. 25). According to the Chinese records on the conversation between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou in 1972, Zhou indicated China’s preference to defer the East China Sea issue for the sake of more urgent task of normalizing Sino-Japan relations. Tanaka did not challenge Zhou’s unwillingness to discuss the island dispute, concurring on the Chinese view to ‘talk about it sometime in the future’ (Jiping, 2012). 7
For decades thereafter, the Chinese government took a markedly restrained approach, playing down the issue to maintain stable Sino-Japan ties as a necessary condition for China’s economic growth and prevent any nationalistic pro-Diaoyu demonstrations from escalating into anti-Japanese protests. Likewise, the Japanese leadership was ‘mindful of the effect a return to “old” nationalism would have on its relationship with China’, and remained ambivalent about the nationalistic inclination on the islands issue (Rose, 2000, pp. 178–179). Despite their disagreements over a range of disputes including the sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, economic ties were taken as shared priorities. In addition, the lack of capacity and willingness on both sides to revise the US-led regional order worked as a powerful force to prevent Beijing and Tokyo from letting their nationalist passions spiralling out of control. Although nationalism was an important political component in both countries, the development of Chinese and Japanese nationalism was more about domestic debates with domestic claims, thus not a powerful enough force that could adversely affect Sino-Japan relations. In retrospect, Beijing’s pragmatic posture would work as one of the key contributing factors to the Sino-Japan power shift by facilitating China’s rapid rise in the following decades. Inevitably, however, the politics of nationalism regarding the East China Sea dispute would become more complicated in the regional environment, created by China’s growing clout combined with Japan’s increasingly overt resistance to the power shift and the emergence of new security order less favourable to its interests.
The changing regional security and economic power dynamics have drawn Beijing and Tokyo further into the politics of nationalism at the cost of bringing both sides closer to the edge of military confrontation. In effect, the power shift in East Asia has raised the stake in the longstanding tension over the East China Sea as this is where the Sino-Japan clash of nationalism and battle for supremacy are likely to occur during the course of China’s attempt to revise the existing order and Japan’s resistance to the rise of China-led regional security system. Especially for Beijing, the East China Sea (as well as the South China Sea where another row over disputed islands is on-going) is not merely a stage where it tries to flex its muscles and show-off its newly gained power but also an importance piece to complete the overall picture of China’s re-emergence as a dominant player in the region after its century of humiliation. China’s extraordinary growth over the past quarter century has not only led to a surge of national pride but also provided the country more resources to invest in military modernization, through which to fulfil its growing strategic ambitions to reclaim its place in the sun. 8
The East China Sea dispute is particularly complicated because it is an issue, deeply rooted in the lingering animosity and unresolved historical grievances between China and Japan. China’s pursuit of national rejuvenation revolves around closely interrelated objectives, including its re-emergence as the leading architect of the security order in East Asia as well as the shedding of its national disgrace imposed by the imperial Japan and other Western powers over the past centuries. Herein, the Chinese aspiration to surpass Japan geo-strategically, economically and otherwise is a major part of their vision of national rejuvenation given that the legacy of Chinese humiliation was closely associated with Japan’s relative superiority over China in the past. This sheds important light on ‘why Beijing places significance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue’ and demonstrates greater emotional and nationalistic attachments to this matter compared to ‘other territorial disputes, such as the ones involving Vietnam, India, and the Philippines’ (Wu, 2013, p. 70). At the same time, Beijing has been more cautious in dealing with the East China Sea dispute and demonstrating its assertiveness vis-à-vis Japan. Unlike the South China Sea disputes, which have gained greater attention in recent years due to Beijing’s controversial land reclamation and militarization in contested waters, the East China Sea has been quieter even with a few high-profile developments, including Japan’s nationalization of the disputed islands and China’s declaration of air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the area. This is not only because Sino-Japan power asymmetry has been less extreme compared to China’s relations with each individual claimant in the South China Sea disputes but also because Japan’s alliance with the US has been more consolidated with greater strategic capacity to contain China’s blatant expansionism in the East China Sea. However, this pattern of relative calmness may not last given the on-going regional power shift combined with their mutual distrust and intensifying nationalism, embedded in bitter memories of shared history between China and Japan.
Although the longstanding East China Sea impasse appears to have been better managed compared to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the Sino-Japan territorial row could become even more volatile in the long run with the clash of power and nationalism on both sides during their contest for supremacy in East Asia. Furthermore, there remains a dangerous potential for the convergence of increasingly explosive territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas. This could happen if what Japan sees as China’s blatant expansionism into the South China Sea toughens Japanese policy towards China in general and the East China Sea issue in particular, further hardening China’s dealing with Japan regarding the islands dispute and beyond. In fact, Japan has been more vocal against China’s large-scale land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, implying that Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture towards the South China Sea disputes could be replicated in the East China Sea (AFP, 2016).
Japan’s growing fear is that it might lose its regional leverage while having to deal with China’s rising military might and increasingly unyielding territorial claims, reinforced by the surge of Chinese nationalistic fervour. Concurrently, Japan’s own nationalist impulses have increased to the extent to enable conservative elements in Japanese politics to start pushing for a more resolute security posture and bolstering its own military capabilities. 9 In September 2015, for example, Japan enacted bills expanding the scope of its pacifist constitution’s limits on military by allowing the country to deploy troops abroad to help allies fight in the name of collective self-defence. Despite domestic and regional concerns over the potential end of Japan’s post-war pacifism and the growing danger of Japan being ensnared in US-led conflicts, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the need for his country’s defence policy shift to ‘meet new challenges such as from a rising China’ (Sieg, 2015). 10 In a larger sense, this measure could affect Sino-Japan tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by further complicating the security dilemma between the two states and their aggregated military might through alliance relations (or lack thereof) with other major powers such as the USA. Also, it has become more likely to see an open clash between Japan’s aspiration to maintain the status quo, including its de facto control over the islands, and China’s effort to ‘correct’ past injustices such as the loss of sovereignty over what it considers its own territory.
There has always been a critical perception gap between the two sides over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and mutual suspicion about the other side’s long-term objectives to alter the status quo by manipulating the given dispute. What’s relatively unprecedented, however, is that the evolving economic and geostrategic power parity, caused by China’s rise and Japan’s new defence policy, have raised the stake of the issue along with the chances for overt confrontation between the two states. Pew Research Center’s 2016 survey, ‘Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan’, shows the continuing salience of historically rooted mutual distrust and scepticism about the future of Sino-Japanese relations (Stokes, 2016). Viewing each other as violent and with disdain, majorities in Japan and China are concerned about a prolonged dispute regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands with 80 per cent of Japanese and 59 per cent Chinese fear military clash around the East China Sea. Herein, more Japanese (35%) than Chinese (18%) are ‘very concerned’ about a potential conflict over their territorial disputes. What accounts for this different degree of security concern over the same issue is the major regional power shift with China becoming more formidable in various dimensions whereas Japan is becoming relatively less dominant in East Asia. 11 This change has created uncertainty, further reinforcing historically rooted tensions like the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and ‘nationalist sentiments on both sides, as people in Japan feel anxiety at China’s rising power, and people in China feel that the rest of the world does not sufficiently respect their country’s newfound status’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in Johnson, 2016).
Departing from their previous positions of playing down the question of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus islands, both Beijing and Tokyo have begun to use military assets in recent years to reinforce their respective claims within the disputed area (O’Rourke, 2014; Valencia, 2007). Although Beijing and Tokyo managed to reach an agreement in 2008 to co-develop the East China Sea that could have facilitated joint resources explorations, this deal was scuttled by the 2010 fishing boat collision incident, widely considered as a turning point of bilateral relations that sparked China-Japan diplomatic row. Eventually, a series of retaliatory diplomatic paroxysm and economic pressure taken by China forced the Japanese government to end the crisis in line with Beijing’s terms of resolution, including the release of the Chinese boat captain, but also fuelled Japan’s anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment (Bradsher, 2010). Sino-Japanese relations have been further strained since 2012 when Tokyo decided to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Japanese government considered that nationalization was necessary to prevent the then Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, known for his fiery nationalism, from purchasing the islands and making them a playground for more dangerous moves, causing serious diplomatic fallout in Sino-Japan ties. However, Beijing took it as a severely provocative and calculated measure designed to perpetuate Japanese occupation of Chinese territory by distorting the sovereign status of the disputed islands. The Chinese saw Tokyo’s nationalization of the islands an unacceptable infringement of China’s sovereignty and ‘conspiracy between Ishihara and the Japanese government’ to justify the purchase so as to ‘move from de facto administrative control to a more de jure exercise of sovereignty’ (Wang, 2013, p. 12). The tension over Japan’s nationalization of the islands has forced Sino-Japan relations to hit a new low, adversely affecting bilateral trade and travel while demonstrators, sometimes violently, staging protests in both countries. The economic impact caused by the demonstrations became so severe that Christine Lagarde, the chief of the International Monetary Fund, warned against the negative consequences that deteriorating ties between China and Japan, ‘distracted by territorial division’, could make on the global economy (quoted in Chan, 2012).
The US-Japan alliance, under which Washington is committed to Japan’s security, has further complicated the matter. This arrangement has placed the East China Sea dispute in a more complex and strategically dangerous context given the potential for mounting friction between China and Japan escalating into regional conflicts with global implications. Notwithstanding US declaration of neutrality on the sovereignty issue regarding the East China Sea dispute, Washington has supported Japan’s administrative rights over the islands and signalled the US willingness to defend the disputed waters in case of military contingency in line with the US-Japan defence treaty. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US officials used intentionally ambiguous language, stating their ‘personal’ views that the Mutual Security Treaty ‘could be interpreted’ to cover the disputed islands (Smith, 2013, p. 40). This gave Beijing some breathing space when dealing with Tokyo (as well as the nationalistic Chinese public) regarding the East China Sea controversy. Unlike the previously cautious use of language, the US officials have been more unequivocal in recent years when it comes to discussing whether the disputed islands would fall within the scope of the alliance. These changes could be seen as a reflection of Washington’s aspiration to maintain American hegemony by consolidating its alliance with Tokyo and countering Beijing’s growing ambitions for regaining regional supremacy through attempting to revise the US-led order in East Asia.
During press conference at the US embassy in Tokyo in October 2010, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell dispelled Washington’s long-held policy of strategic ambiguity by stating ‘very clearly about the applicability of Article V’ of the Security Treaty to the islands (US Department of State, 2010). Likewise, the then President Barack Obama acknowledged US treaty obligations to Japan in April 2014 by asserting that Washington would come to Tokyo’s aid in case of conflict in the East China Sea. Even while emphasizing Sino-Japan diplomacy for a peaceful resolution to the longstanding territorial row and Washington’s neutrality in the sovereignty dispute, Obama emphasized that the US ‘commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands’ (The White House, 2014). In a similar vein, US Defense Secretary James Mattis under President Donald Trump has reaffirmed Washington’s continuing recognition of Japan’s administrative control of ‘the Senkaku Islands … [which] fall within the scope of article five of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty’ (US Department of State, 2017).
For decades, US leadership in East Asia facilitated a relatively stable regional order, peace and prosperity. America’s uncontested primacy also allowed this superpower enough wiggle room to embrace strategic ambiguity when dealing with many delicate and intractable regional problems, including the East China Sea issue. As asserted by White (2015), however, this era seems to have come to an end with China ‘resuming the challenge to US power in Asia’, forcing Washington to take a more resolute stance to preserve its hegemonic influence. Paradoxically, Washington’s policy shift from reserved strategic support towards greater clarity has exacerbated the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue by nudging Tokyo towards implementing controversial measures, including the nationalization of the disputed islands, so as to reinforce Japan’s claims over the East China Sea. US security assurances to Japan have also aggravated Sino-American tensions with the possibility of major power conflict by provoking increasingly confident and nationalistic China to see the issue not merely as a Sino-Japan bilateral dispute but also a part of America’s hegemonic strategy to constrain China’s rise by joining forces with Japan’s anti-Chinese nationalists. From China’s perspective, the US involvement in the East China Sea dispute is closely linked to the regional power shift caused by China’s rise and America’s larger strategic objectives to prevent this emerging Asian giant from challenging the post-war East Asian order, underpinned by the US-Japan alliance. Herein, Beijing has interpreted Washington’s security affirmation of defending Tokyo’s administration of the East China Sea islands ‘a carefully calculated scheme to cage the rapidly developing [China] by rallying U.S. allies and reinforcing U.S. presence’ (Xinhua, 2014a).
All in all, the territorial row between these two Asian heavyweights has been affected by a list of inextricably connected elements, including Sino-Japan animosity rooted in unresolved historical issues, the rise of more assertive nationalism on both sides, their evolving power parity alongside the changing nature of America’s presence in the region. This precarious and multifaceted drama poses worrying questions not just about solvability of the given dispute but also its implications for the overall peace and security in East Asia. Especially considering the on-going regional power shift and escalating nationalist passions on both sides, which put pressure on policymakers to be tougher when dealing with the Diaoyu/Senkaku controversy, the tug-of-war between China and Japan is likely to escalate with greater challenges to find any sustainable and peaceful resolution.
Challenges Ahead
The long-standing row between Beijing and Tokyo over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, rooted in history and mutual antipathy, has emerged at the forefront of Sino-Japan nationalist tensions in the course of changing regional power dynamics. This issue could be one of the most volatile minefields as it puts the two major regional powers at loggerheads, pitching them against each other not only for resources but also for ‘national status and influence that is not just limited to Asia but affects the global stage’ (Huang, 2012). Although shrewd diplomacy and careful management have controlled the dispute for decades, especially when there was a relatively stable power parity in the region, the lack of historical reconciliation between the two sides has not only failed to narrow the gap in mutual understanding towards averting a possible clash of their nationalisms but also made the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue fester in the process of regional power shift. For a genuine rapprochement, therefore, it would be essential for both governments to approach the historical issues based upon a shared understanding of their inextricably linked fate and encourage their own people to accept the idea that unfriendly Sino-Japan ties would be mutually defeating. In the end, both are more likely to benefit from taking a pragmatic perspective about the altering regional power dynamics, which would not necessarily have to be settled in favour of one’s side at the expense of another.
China and Japan simultaneously assert that the disputed islands constitute an integral part of their sovereign territories. In this sense, the two claims are mutually exclusive, making both sides unable to accept the other’s stance. Regarding the insoluble question of sovereignty under the present condition, both sides must be willing to acknowledge their different positions, agreeing to disagree peacefully instead of making precarious efforts to change the status quo. It would also be essential to prevent the potentially dangerous clash of Sino-Japan nationalism or the rapidly evolving regional order from further complicating the already sensitive islands dispute between these two major East Asian countries. Considering the volatility in Sino-Japan security relations, as clearly demonstrated in their on-going tensions over the disputed islands, both governments may still need to set aside the intractable question of sovereignty for now and focus on other important aspects of their ties as a more approachable path to build a common ground. Herein, Beijing and Tokyo must make concerted efforts to depoliticize the controversy over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and demilitarize the disputed waters for the sake of long-term security and prosperity in East Asia. Especially considering their complex interdependence in the realm of economics and beyond, neither side can truly expect to win in military conflicts to deal with the East China Sea issue or any other significant bilateral problems. Thus, the two sides should continue to build on the existing ‘strength in the bilateral cultural and economic ties’ on the one hand and carefully cope with ‘the vulnerability in security and sovereignty issues on the other’ (Takahara, 2013, p. 79). Eventually, Beijing and Tokyo may also want to consider moving away from the Westphalian model of exclusive sovereignty towards a more positive-sum stance, while making substantial efforts to facilitate ‘joint development of the water area, co-management of the territory, or another conflict resolution strategy’ (Q. Zhao, 2013, p. 54).
Though none of these ideas are unprecedented, the likelihood of success of these proposals would increase only if Beijing and Tokyo squarely acknowledge the needs to change their perspectives about what should be prioritized so as to better bridge the gap between their seemingly irreconcilable territorial claims in the East China Sea and constructively build their shared future. Moving towards positive peace would be possible only when these regional powers work towards creating an environment where both sides could be relatively satisfied with the altering status quo in East Asia. In this, it would be mutually beneficial to make efforts to control rising nationalism on both sides through continuing dialogue while treating the task of building trust as an ultimate goal rather than a precondition for their much-needed cordial interactions. It is in this spirit that the two countries reached a four-point agreement in 2014 to move their bilateral ties onto a positive track through gradually resuming ‘political, diplomatic and security dialogue while acknowledging different positions on’ the disputed islands (Xinhua, 2014b). Though neither side made any meaningful compromise regarding such issues of great sensitivity as history and the tensions over the East China Sea dispute, it has laid the foundation for the two sides to resume senior-level exchanges with long-term goals to develop the Sino-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit while emphasizing joint consultation and crisis management to overcome political obstacles that aggravate the bilateral tensions. As repeatedly acknowledged by leaders of both sides, these goals are significant because of the symbiotic Sino-Japan relationship, intricately rooted in common strategic interests and co-prosperity even in the face of their rising nationalism and the shifting power dynamics in East Asia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016).
In the eyes of China and Japan, the East China Sea dispute is not just about a few uninhabited islets and rocks but also about emotionally potent questions of national pride, identity, and sovereignty. Especially for Beijing, this is a place where it could demonstrate how far China has emerged after its century of humiliation. Nonetheless, the larger geostrategic and economic reality needs not be obscured or derailed by the Sino-Japan disagreement on the Diaoyu/Senkaku controversy, not to mention the intensification of great power competition in the region. The relations between China and Japan, two largest economies in Asia and an inextricably tied power dyad bound by their geostrategic proximity and economic/cultural integration, ‘bear directly on peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world as a whole’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). Thus, both sides must strive to strengthen the bilateral ties in a way to overcome their divisive nationalist tendencies and bolster greater regional interests. Tensions in the East China Sea are indeed the manifestation of Sino-Japanese power competition and their evolving nationalisms, fuelled by historically rooted mutual antagonism. China and Japan may still have a long way to go to avert the potentially dangerous clash of power and nationalism in the disputed area, not to mention developing lasting peace. Nonetheless, the future of China-Japan relations is not predetermined. Rather it could either retrogress or advance depending on the level of their cooperation and success in devising a mutually agreeable and satisfactory framework of common practice in the East China Sea and elsewhere. As aptly put by Wang Yi, ‘just as you cannot clap with one hand alone, the two sides need to meet each other half way’ (quoted in Mansour, 2016). That is, for Japan to treat China as a crucial partner rather than a threatening rival but also for China to do the same so as to invalidate the notion of ‘the China threat’ and reinforce Beijing’s claim to pursue the Chinese dream in the context of its peaceful rise.
Footnotes
1.
2.
For further analysis on the transformation of China’s foreign policy from the Deng Xiaoping-era approach of keeping a low profile to the strategy of striving for achievement with greater assertiveness, see He and Feng (2013) and Yan (
).
3.
It is important to note that the antipathy emanates from Japan’s neighbours in Northeast Asia has been enduring whereas its Southeast Asian neighbours, which had relatively limited experience with Japan’s colonial expansion, have been able to more effectively de-securitized the country. For further discussion on securitization theory, see Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) and Williams ().
4.
5.
For instance, Beijing has not tried ‘as hard as it might’ to challenge America’s preeminent status in Asia or the US-led system of alliances for decades. This was not because of Beijing’s lack of ambition to alter the existing regional order but because of China’s leaders’ awareness that the country did not have enough power to seek such changes. See Johnston ().
6.
Given enormous geostrategic interests involved, the East China Sea dispute should not be seen solely through the lens of Sino-Japan historical animosity or nationalism alone. As asserted by Green (quoted in Pilling, 2012) ‘Underlying all of this is a geostrategic context for dominance of what Japan calls the first island chain and China calls the Near Sea.’ As for Tokyo (and Washington), preservation of the territorial status quo through dissuading China’s assertiveness indicates the strength of the US-Japan alliance, especially the alliance’s robustness to provide sufficient deterrence against increasingly aggressive and capable challengers like a rising China (Green & Cooper, 2014). From the Chinese perspective, however, this is their near sea, from which all the previous threats in its history, ranging from the Western imperialism, Japanese invasion, and the US policy of containment, came. Thus, Beijing has its own strategic imperative to exert greater influence over (if not fully dominate) the East China Sea not only for a matter of national pride but also for its security impulse to control one of the most important sea lanes and maritime areas in the region. In this regard, this critical geostrategic friction, where the control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is the focus, has been reinforced by the shifting power dynamics in Sino-Japan relations as much as the issue is being affected by, or revealing, their intensifying nationalism.
7.
In recent years, a disagreement between the two countries over whether there was a tacit agreement has further fuelled the East China Sea dispute. Tokyo has publicly denied that the tacit agreement with Beijing over the islands ever existed whereas Beijing has blamed Japan’s move as a blatant and complete breach of trust. For further analysis, see Yang (, p. 25).
8.
9.
The role of nationalism in Japan’s domestic politics has increased against the backdrop of its leaders’ exploiting nationalism to consolidate their power and to achieve their economic and political agenda. For a comparison between the Koizumi and Abe administrations’ use to nationalism to mobilize popular support for their respective policy agenda, see Nagy ().
10.
11.
For further discussion on the evolution of China and Japan’s perception towards each other, see Christensen (2006) and Zhang ().