Abstract
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has not only changed how the USA engages in warfare but also how it maintains its military supremacy and how other nations budget and strategize. The very idea of the RMA has impacted how nations manage their technological advantages and raises the questions of can the RMA be monopolized and if not, which nations can adopt their own RMA? In September 2000, the Japan Defence Agency (now the Ministry of Defence [MOD]) produced a report titled ‘“Info-RMA”: Study on Info-RMA and the Future of the Self-Defence Forces’ to explore the prospects of implementing RMA principles in the Japan Self-Defence Forces. In this article, I explore to what extent can RMA principles be implemented in the Self-Defence Forces? I argue that although several significant changes have been implemented in technology, doctrine, operations and organization, various normative and technical constraints have directed the MOD to craft an RMA with Japanese characteristics, emphasizing defence and interconnectedness with the US armed forces. These findings suggest that current efforts to ‘normalize’ the Self-Defence Forces can succeed if crafted to appeal to the sensibilities of the Japanese public.
Introduction
With the emergence of new international threats and rapid advances in technology since the end of the Cold War, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has been increasingly discussed in security studies. Government leaders and military strategists grapple with not only how to engage stateless threats such as terrorism and cyberattacks but also how to do it efficiently when defence budgets are shrinking and the general public is less willing to bear the costs of war. Political scientists, historians and policymakers seek to determine whether the RMA is applicable to states other than the USA and what implications the RMA may have for future warfare?
The Japan Defence Agency (JDA) (now the Ministry of Defence/MOD) was interested in the same questions, and in September 2000, the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) of the JDA produced a report titled ‘On Information-RMA’ [情報RMAについて], later summarized in English as ‘Info-RMA: Study on Info-RMA and the Future of the Self-Defence Forces’, to explore the prospects of implementing RMA principles in the Japan Self-Defence Forces (SDF). Although at the time the JDA had no concrete policies, OSS officials believed RMA-influenced ‘drastic changes’ to the JDA/SDF was inevitable and Japan should ‘take advantage of the fruits of the information revolution and begin the systematic study of the RMA’ (Japan Defence Agency [JDA] 2000a, p. 1). Since the Info-RMA report, the MOD and the National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS) have produced additional reports on the applicability of the RMA to Japan. However, due to concerns that the offensive potential of the RMA could violate Japan’s exclusively defence-oriented policy and constitutional commitment to not become a military power, it is unclear if Japan could pursue its own RMA.
In this article, I address the question, ‘to what extent can RMA principles be implemented in the SDF?’ I argue that although several key changes have been instituted in the SDF, various constraints will direct the MOD to craft an RMA with Japanese characteristics, emphasizing defence and interconnectedness with the US Armed Forces. The Japan case has broad implications concerning military norms. As a close US ally, Japan is sensitive to pressure to adopt US warfare practices. Japan’s limitations indicate that although states are influenced by US security policies and doctrines, they may have difficulty implementing them due to domestic constraints. Thus, although the USA drives much of the theory on how to conduct warfare, it remains an outlier in practice.
Data for this article are primarily drawn from the Info-RMA report, the original Japanese On Information-RMA report, Defence of Japan White Papers, National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), Mid-term Defence Programs (MTDP), National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS), Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation, NIDS reports, MOD budgets and semi-structured elite interviews. I utilize Saida Bédar’s definition of the RMA to analyse the seven principles that serve as basic guidelines for defence build-up outlined in the Info-RMA report. According to Bédar (2001), the RMA encompasses three levels:
Technology: the integration of new IT into existing weapons systems and integrated C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance);
Doctrine and operations: experimenting with technology to create new types of warfare; and
Organization: there can be no RMA without far-reaching institutional change (‘jointness’, the business-style revolution in Pentagon management, civilian-military integration) (27–28).
An RMA requires a strong synergy among the three levels. This synergy is heavily reliant on information dominance, which allows for the ‘integration of battlefield operatives and the rapidity in decision-taking and the conduct of operations, but also full spectrum integration of weapon systems, agencies and allies, civilianization and industrial–military synergies: in short, the construction of a ‘system of systems’. 1 According to Michael E. O’Hanlon (2000), there are four primary schools of thought within the RMA debate: the ‘systems of systems’ school, the ‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ (DBK) school, the ‘global reach, global power’ school and the ‘vulnerability’ school. The ‘system of systems’ and DBK schools are most applicable to Japan because of the Info-RMA report’s emphasis on C4ISR. Moreover, Japan’s exclusively defence-oriented policy prevent it from pursuing the more ambitious and lethal ‘global research, global power’ school. The ‘vulnerability’ school may have increase salience in Japan if the SDF expands its global footprint and participates in ‘hot’ conflict zones. A nation limited in resources and willpower, or constrained by socio-political factors, may only be able to focus on some parts of the RMA. And, unless a state can create synergy among the parts, one could argue that it is not undergoing a true RMA.
According to the Info-RMA report, ‘the RMA is the transformation in military affairs, including equipment, organization, tactics, and training, designed to make a quantum leap in the efficient achievement of advanced technologies to the military sphere, with information technology as its core’ (JDA, 2000a, p. 1). The report emphasized that the fundamental factors of an information-based RMA were that information technology is the decisive factor in military superiority, systemization and linking of equipment and systems create a synergistic effect that greatly improves efficiency, and various innovations in organization, tactics and training methods occur simultaneously. With this conceptualization, the OSS established seven principles that would become the basic guidelines for possible implementation of the RMA in the SDF. The guidelines are as follows (JDA, 2000a, pp. 7–9): (a) information, (b) jointness, (c) speed and mobility, (d) efficiency, (e) flexibility, (f) protection and (g) interoperability. These principles are organized into the three categories established by Bédar throughout this article (Table 1).
Implementation of RMA Principles in the MOD and SDF
Reorganization of the MOD
This article is divided into three sections. First, I examine academic literature on the RMA. This article does not seek to revisit the RMA debate but to determine whether RMA principles are exportable and localized. The literature shows cleavages on the impact of the RMA on the international system, but in general concludes that states adopting advanced technologies while reorienting organizational structures and doctrine to achieve qualitatively and quantitatively new forms of warfare are achieving an RMA. Second, I analyse Japan’s implementation of Bédar’s RMA principles of changes in technology, doctrine and operations, and organization to determine whether Japan is undergoing its own revolution. Third, I provide some concluding remarks on the multiple dimensions of the RMA and possible research questions for the future.
What is the RMA?
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov first conceived of a revolution in military affairs as a ‘Military Technical Revolution’ during the early 1980s when he was analysing the rapid development of computer systems and high-technology weapons utilized by NATO (Takahashi, 2008). The Soviet concept made its way to the West and was further expanded through the US Department of Defence and its Office of Net Assessment (Cohen, 1996). The RMA became a decidedly American phenomenon (referred to as ‘military transformation’ by some experts) because the USA had the technological capabilities to initiate the military–technical revolution. According to Demi Adamsky (2010), a country’s military culture is as important as its technological capabilities in producing military innovation, which may explain the USA’s success and possible failure of other states in pursing an RMA. Few, if any, countries have the technology, resources, experience, global reach or will to pursue a full RMA. The USA’s pre-eminence in military technology in conventional wars has been made evident several times since the end of the Cold War (First Gulf War, the bombing of Yugoslavia, War in Afghanistan, and Iraq War) and provided much of the data that would help American security analysts further develop the RMA concept.
The USA’s success has been an impetus for other nations to mimic the RMA and has been used as evidence by military leaders to justify certain kinds of defence spending. Moreover, as the USA adopted certain methods to combating contemporary threats such as terrorism, it pressured its allies to adopt similar approaches to increase interoperability. However, implementation of RMA principles is not uniform among states. States maintaining pre-eminence, seeking pre-eminence, seeking survival or seeking normalcy and a larger role in international relations implement different policies. The difficulty with studying the RMA is that it is both a process and objective. A state might be undergoing RMA-like transformations, but not under the same precepts of the RMA or arriving at the same outcomes.
The RMA has been primarily discussed in the discipline of history under the term ‘Military Revolution’. A Military Revolution occurs when changes in the military lead to seminal changes in the world in general, such as shifts in geopolitical order or mass adoption and use of the new technology. Historians Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox (2006) contend that military revolutions fundamentally change the framework of war and have transformative impacts on society, the state and military organizations to which states have a greater capacity to project military power. Clifford Rogers (2000, p. 22) argues that the RMA is ‘a revolutionary change in how war is fought—a change that can be often recognized by the ease with which “participating” armed forces can defeat “nonparticipating” ones’.
The RMA is a much narrower concept in political science (also refer Biddle, 2004; Morgan, 2000). According to Andrew Marshall (quoted in Gongora & Riekhoff, 2000, p. 1), the first person to use the term ‘RMA’, the RMA ‘is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovation of application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations’. Unlike military revolutions, RMAs do not have ‘wide-ranging implications for social, economic, and political structures, balances of power, and other areas outside the realm of armed forces’ (Rogers, 2000, p. 22).
Bjorn Moller (2003) has examined the various assumptions of the RMA, namely, (a) technological supremacy will be decisive (in terms who wins); (b) information dominance will be decisive; (c) air power, and eventually space power will be decisive; (d) geography and topography will decline in importance with the de-territorialization of warfare; (e) surgical precision will be achievable; and (f) determined offenses will be able to break through all defences. Like Bédar, Moller contends that the RMA requires complete immersion and cohesive strategy; it is not a policy that can be adopted piecemeal. Moreover, one can determine whether a state is undergoing a true revolution or ordinary change by the levels in the hierarchy of military science (politics, grand strategy, strategy, operational art and tactics) at which an RMA’s effects become visible (Moller, 2003, p. 6). An RMA can be seen when a state displays a significant change from a defensive to an offensive orientation and is able to achieve ends that were not possible in the past or achieve goals by fundamentally different means (Moller, 2003, p. 10).
Within the literature, there is a general consensus that the RMA, and specifically technology, allows for new types of warfare and increased likelihood of quick military success. Due to evolutionary advancements in the range, precision and lethality of modern weapons, and the high technological requirements of an RMA, the new type of warfare is likely to increase a military’s power projection capabilities and combat power. In other words, the intention behind the use of weapons systems is divorced from the actual capabilities of the weapons systems after a certain point of lethality. Scholars such as Gerrald Quille (2001) have argued for a role of non-lethal weapons in the RMA, such as cyberwarfare and robotics; however, not to the degree that would diminish the importance of offensive technologies. The potential offensive possibilities of the RMA are not lost on the MOD. In the Info-RMA report and several NIDS reports, analysts cautioned that a full RMA could violate Japan’s pacifistic principles and the Constitution, and thus, if pursued, would need to be tailored for defensive purposes (National Institute for Defence Studies [NIDS], 2001). The MOD’s assumption that the RMA is offensive has very much to do with Japan’s geopolitical reality. First, the Japanese Constitution forbids development and acquisition of defence technology that may have offensive capabilities. A full RMA is particularly difficult to pursue because the necessary technology allows for new types of warfare that may pose unforeseen constitutional violations. Second, Japan is highly sensitive to its security situation vis-à-vis its neighbours. In the 2005 Defence of Japan White Paper, in the section analysing regional threats, China was identified as a country seeking to implement its own RMA, which suggests that the MOD believes the RMA has a significant offensive component. Relatedly, Japan does not want to signal to its neighbours that it is acquiring technology and implementing doctrinal changes that are offensive in nature.
Thus, Japan’s path towards adopting RMA principles is narrow. Emily Goldman (2004) has researched the process of RMA copying, or diffusion, by examining if states practice innovation. Innovation is ‘radical changes in organizational structure, resource allocation, doctrine, and strategy’ and ‘encompasses the process of adapting the institutions and practices of war making to changing technological opportunities and/or social and political developments’ and undergoes the process of speculation, experimentation and implementation (Goldman, 2004, p. 1, 4). Goldman contends that innovation cannot be mono-polized because late starters can more quickly and cheaply adopt new techno-logy. However, innovators face their own constraints, which are government, military, society and culture, economy and international in nature (Goldman, 2004, p. 16). Thus, Goldman believes that the RMA is not completely divorced from the social and normative world. How fast a nation can undergo an RMA is not only tied to technology and resources but also willpower, which is dependent on the social and political norms of a state.
Although it is plausible that latecomers have an advantage in obtaining advanced technology because it is cheaper and more readily available, there are several possible scenarios regarding diffusion. Technological advancement is moving at a feverish pace. It may be that frontrunners such as the USA make such quick advancements that other states cannot keep up. The USA spends more on defence than the next 11 biggest spenders combined, and four times as much as its next competitor China. Unlike the consumer technology sector where leaders seek to establish their technology as the industry norm, the military technology sector is driven by secrecy and the need to always stay ahead of the competition. Hence, military technology might not plateau, stagnate or even stabilize long enough for late starters to catch up. Additionally, since military technology is researched years in advance, the current publicly known technologies may be only the tip of the iceberg. Technology used in warfare is very diverse, covering land, sea, air, cyberspace, espionage, defence and offense. Since the RMA emphasizes synergy among technology and the different branches within the armed forces, late starters cannot simply undergo a full RMA by just adopting technology randomly—there needs to be a concerted effort to pick up technologies that logically and easily complement one another, and this can be very expensive.
Conversely, late starters might possess other unique advantages of following the leader. To begin, late starters might be able to ‘skip steps’ and forego expensive research and development and inefficient projects. Research and development is very time consuming and costly and may not always yield positive results. Late starters can choose to adopt only proven technologies and spend their time and resources improving what they acquire. Moreover, late starters can acquire technology from other nations legally, as seen with China’s practice of buying arms from Russia. Additionally, states can also develop their own innovations. Lastly, latecomers might acquire advanced technology accidentally, such as when China was able to extract valuable data from an EP-3E ARIES II SIGINT jet crash during the Hainan Island incident (Herse, 2010). Managing an RMA can be as taxing as undergoing one and a state that is significantly behind can fortuitously catch up under the right conditions.
RMA with Japanese Characteristics
In many ways, Japan is the perfect case study on the possibility of an RMA outside of the USA. Even though countries such as China have more overtly pursued an RMA, Japan has historically shown greater capability due to its advanced technology and strong economy. According to Captain Keizo Kitagawa, Director of National Security and Strategic of the JMSDF Command and Staff College, any country at the level of G7 is naturally influenced by the RMA, and Japan has adopted new technologies related to cyberwarfare and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in accordance with the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) every 5 years to address its security situation (Author’s Interview, May 2017). Paul Dibb (as cited in Goldman, 2004, p. 2) argues that Japan has high capability for diffusing the RMA, whereas Ron Matthews (2001) believes ‘Japan has not demonstrated the financial commitment necessary to mirror the US technological progress, particularly in the integration of military technologies.’ Matthews (2001, p. 12) does acknowledge that Japan shows immense potential for high levels of civil–military technological integration because Japanese industries that produce for both the civilian sector and the SDF have well-established production chains that produce cutting-edge micro-electronic components, materials and miniaturized electronic systems, which can be transferred effortlessly and at low cost. In other words, Japan has the potential to pursue RMA principles, but is stymied by a lack of political will.
The lack of political will for aggressive policy change has been attributed to Japanese anti-militarism attitudes that developed from the devastating losses of WWII (Berger, 1993). It is this anti-militarism history that makes it easier to recognize significant technological, organizational and doctrinal changes in military operations. Since an RMA is not only the acquisition of advanced technology but also a specific implementation of that technology, changes in the SDF’s tactical strategy might indicate a Japanese RMA. In other words, technology creates new possibilities for warfare, but political will is necessary to explore those possibilities.
Additionally, as the Info-RMA report (Japan Defence Agency, 2000a, p. 6) indicates, Japanese officials are pursuing an ‘info-RMA tailored to Japan’s own strategy’ and unique socio-political situation. As outlined in the 2013 NDPG, the MOD is pursuing broader changes to security policy that may allow for easier and far-reaching implementation of RMA principles in the SDF. Specifically, the pursuit of ‘collective self-defence’, strengthening the US–Japan alliance, and increasing cooperation with countries that share common values and strategic interests is likely to influence SDF technology, doctrine and operations and organization.
Changes in Technology
Due to the RMA’s heavy emphasis on technological prowess, Japan has been regarded as one of the more likely candidates to achieve a military transformation. Takahashi (2008) contends that the RMA cannot be a one-size-fits-all formula, and thus Japan is carving out its own version of the Information Technology-RMA. The Info-RMA report principles of ‘information’ and ‘protection’ are most aligned with Bédar’s first RMA principle, technology. The information principle seeks to decrease the ‘fog of war’ through information-sharing and effective and efficient functioning of C4ISR and the protection principle aims to develop robust anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities.
The MOD’s emphasis on defence has led to prioritizing the implementation reconnaissance technology. According to the 2014 to 2017 Defence Programs and Budget of Japan, the MOD seeks to build defence capabilities with particular emphasis ‘intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; intelligence capabilities, command, control, communication, intelligence (C4I) capabilities; response to attacks on remote islands; response to ballistic missile attacks; response to outer space and cyberspace threats; responses to large-scale disasters, etc.’ (p. 1). Specifically, due to recent incursions of Chinese ships into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, goal of maintaining ‘Open and Stable Seas’, and concerns over cybersecurity and terrorism, the MOD has acquired and implemented important new reconnaissance technology across all three branches of the SDF (Government of Japan, 2013c, pp. 24–26).
In the 2014 finalized budget, two primary goals were established, acquisition of new reconnaissance technologies and upgrading of current crafts to have modern surveillance capabilities. The 2014 budget outlined money for three P-1 fixed-wing patrol aircraft (¥59.4 billion), four SH-60k patrol helicopters (¥24.2 billion), one DD destroyer (¥72.9 billion), one SS submarine (¥51.7 billion) and four F-35A aircrafts (¥63.8 billion). The 2014 budget also outlined plans to upgrade the Air Self-defence Force’s (ASDF) F-15 fighters and upgrade the capabilities of its F-2 fighters. Along with these the acquisition of new technologies to improve surveillance, the 2013 NDPG also laid the foundation for research that can fundamentally change the orientation of the SDF. The 2013 NDPG established the following: (a) study and research on the compatibility of ship-based UAV with Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) vessels; (b) study for the introduction of airborne early warning (and control) aircraft, (c) improvement of the capability of Airborne Warning And Control System; (d) implement a project for the conversion of central computing devices and installation of electronic warfare support measures in order to improve the warning and control capability of the existing E-767; and (e) research for the introduction of UAV (Government of Japan, 2014). The MOD is showing particular interest in UAV, especially after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster in which the USA dispatched its Global Hawk UAV (Government of Japan, 2014b). The Government of Japan (2017b) budget set aside ¥16.8 billion for UAV, up from ¥200 million just 3 years earlier. The MOD is also considering developing UAV that can take off and land from destroyers. These planned acquisitions, upgrades to current equipment and commitment to R&D align with Bédar’s first principle of integrating new technologies into existing weapons systems. Most notably, the MOD’s emphasis on C4ISR technologies over conventional deterrence weapons systems, such as ICBM, long-range strategic bombers or attack aircraft carriers, demonstrates the carefully curated path that it has set for itself. Furthermore, given that Japan’s primary security challengers, China and North Korea have pursued greater power projection capabilities by developing their ICBM systems and constructing aircraft carriers, the focus on ISR is a strong indicator that Japan has chosen not to pursue a full RMA.
North Korea’s rapidly developing nuclear programme and increased provocation have increased pressure on Japanese defence officials to heavily invest in ballistic missile defence. The Japanese ABM system is a multi-tiered defence system ‘consisting of an upper-tier defence through the SM-3 Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defence through the Patriot PAC-3 for base protection’ (Government of Japan, 2011). Another defence strategy that the Japanese government has shown temperate interest has been the militarization of space technology. In 2008, the government approved the Basic Space Law, which allowed for the development of defence-oriented space technology (Moltz, 2011, p. 59). The primary function of Japanese space technology is to improve its surveillance, reconnaissance and ABM capabilities. However, Japan’s lack of military space operational experience, previous costly failures, decades of bureaucratic dysfunction, lack of public support, absence of major defence aerospace investments and general anti-militaristic orientation suggest that Japan has a long way to go to be able to substantially utilize space in its RMA (Berner, 2005; Moltz, 2011).
A major producer of technological initiatives in the MOD has been the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), which along with the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (EPCO) were merged into the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in 2015. Since 2002, the TRDI has researched technology for ‘building cyber training environments’ to deal with cyberattacks. (Government of Japan, 2014). The MOD has linked Japan’s need for improved cybersecurity with the need for increased interoperability. In September 2010, Japan joined the US Department of Homeland Security-led international cybersecurity exercise ‘Cyber Storm’. This exercise is but one of several cyber-training programmes that Japan has joined over the last few years. The TRDI technological initiatives have also sought to improve organization within the SDF. For example, the TRDI has ‘been engaged in developing high-performance digital data link systems integrated on fighter aircrafts such as F-2 fighters to realize organized fighting by networking forces through tactical information sharing’ and ‘research on application of wireless secret communication function between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces using software defined radio technology over already developed field communication network’ (Government of Japan, 2014).
The 2013 NDPG establishes clear goals that follow RMA principles outlined in the Info-RMA report and many of the technologies will be explored and adopted. However, an underdeveloped military–industrial complex significantly hinders Japan’s ability to pursue the RMA. Although Japan enjoys technological superiority in the consumer market, the defence industry is stymied by the prohibition of arms exports, ‘a unique policy adopted as a symbol of a “peace-oriented country”’ (Takahashi, 2004, p. 103). For decades, the Three Principles of Arms Exports banned all arms exports, which prevented military technology transfers and made it difficult for Japanese companies to gain tactical experience (market data) and combat testing. Although the ban was lifted in 2015, it will take years to determine whether the military–industrial complex can make up so much lost time. Not only do the business practices of the military–industrial complex need to change but also its cultural practices.
According to one NIDS researcher, the Japanese defence sector lacks experience and knowledge of the international arms market. Moreover, it is difficult to prove the quality of Japanese defence equipment because they have not been tested in ‘real war’ (Author’s Interview, May 2017). According to Tsuneo Watanabe, senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, ‘change will be gradual and will need a complete rethinking of the industry’ (Author’s Interview, May 2017). Japan has historically practiced a policy of kokusanka (indigenous production), which has made acquiring new technology increasingly difficult (Takahashi, 2004, p. 106). Kokusanka is the practice of purchasing or leasing technology for indigenous development instead of purchasing equipment wholesale. This allows Japan to develop its defence industry (and create jobs) but relies on other nations willing to sell technology over completed and more expensive equipment. At first, the USA was tolerant of this practice because Japan was a crucial strategic interest following World War II. However, with Japan’s rise in technological capability and the USA’s desire for Japan to play a larger role in the alliance, the USA has been less willing to ‘give away’ technology. Either Japan buys defence technology off the shelf (too expensive) or provides reciprocal technology (limited). Consequently, Thomas Mahnken (2004) has found that of the 14 indicators of innovation, Japan has met only three. 2 Thus, according to Vice President of the Democratic Party (DP), Representative Kazuhiro Haraguchi, Japan has become incredibly reliant on US arms and has not developed the ability to compete in the international market (Author’s Interview, May 2017).
The Japanese military–industrial complex is defined by a tight-knit relationship between the government and corporations. 3 Since the government rarely makes bulk purchases, Japanese corporations take an initial loss with the hope that the government will consistently buy and thus development costs will be recouped over the long term. Yet, throughout the post-war period, the Japanese government has consistently spent less than 1 per cent of the GDP on defence. For over a decade, Japan has seen decreases in both relative and absolute aggregate spending (Government of Japan, 2010). Only over the last six years has there been an uptick in defence expenditures, but the 2013 NDPG locks defence expenditures to roughly 1 per cent of GDP for the next 10 years. The Japanese government has clearly not shown the long-term commitment to spending what is necessary to maintain its technological dominance. The defence industry is struggling to survive. Since 2003, roughly 20 companies have left the industry because as Sumitomo Electric argues, ‘given that defence-related businesses have little promise of future growth while requiring highly advanced technology, limited human resources and production facilities should be allocated to civilian purposes’ (Kubota, 2010). Although the possession of key technologies is more critical to the RMA than the cost of equipment, onerous expenses can hinder a state’s ability to maintain or fully pursue an RMA.
It should be of no surprise that Japanese defence contractors are comprised of mostly dual-use consumer goods companies that are subsidiaries of a very limited group of corporations. 4 Tsuneo Watanabe argues that Japanese defence contractors are a ‘part-time military industry’ that does ‘not seriously want to be competitive’ because they can survive without the military industry (Author’s Interview, May 2017). Japanese contractors pale in comparison with their rivals across the globe in defence-related revenue. As of 2017, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan’s largest defence corporation, ranked 21st in the world and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Japan’s second largest defence corporation, ranked 68th (Defence News, 2017).
The MOD is well aware of the limitations of the military–industrial complex. According to TRDI (2007, p. 12),
new equipment R&D generally takes 10 to 15 years, depending on the scale, functions, and performance of each piece of equipment as well as the level of the technology base retained. In particular, it takes a longer time to produce equipment that incorporates advanced technologies and thereby has new functions and performance. Accordingly, it is necessary to promptly undertake research in such undeveloped areas.
The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, which was formed after the lifting of the arms export ban, is the MOD’s latest attempt to improve the acquisition process and facilitate private-sector research and development; but it has yet to achieve noticeable successes.
The defence orientation of the SDF indicates that Japan is pursuing an RMA posture different than the USA because the nature in which its armed forces operate remains unchanged; it is a reactionary force that is limited to the Japanese islands. As stated by the Info-RMA report, ‘considering the strategic differences between the United States and Japan, the weapons and capabilities necessary for the post-RMA SDF would be different from those of U.S. forces as a matter of course’ (JDA, 2000b, p. 6). What has changed is how the MOD approaches defence. Even though spending has decreased and the SDF has not made the shift from defence to offense, the MOD has made targeted purchases and implanted policies to allow for new kinds of defence. These changes allow Japan to accomplish one of the RMA’s ultimate goals, which is changing attrition warfare into decisive warfare. By increasing the SDF’s early detection capabilities, the MOD will decrease the likelihood of having to engage in major unpredictable warfare. The MOD has found ways to make the SDF theoretically more effective (the new policies have not been battle-tested) and expanded the robustness of the surveillance capabilities of its forces. Since the MOD will continually be constrained by normative and structural factors, the RMA serves as an effective way to increase the capabilities of defence forces while adhering to anti-militaristic sensibilities and reassuring its neighbours.
Changes in Doctrine and Operations
In the Info-RMA report, the principles most aligned with Bédar’s second RMA principle of doctrine and operations are ‘efficiency’ and ‘interoperability’. According to Bédar, the experimentation of new technologies allows for new kinds of warfare. However, due to the exclusively defence-oriented policy, Japan has a narrow interpreted of warfare, which is the defence of the mainland. Moreover, as discussed earlier, beyond technological limitations, it is the political hurdles that have served having major obstacles to the SDF’s warfare capabilities. According to Jun Nishida, Deputy Director of the National Security Policy Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japanese government is seeking to make SDF operability more ‘seamless’ and rid unnecessary complexity within laws related to security measures (Author’s Interview, August 18, 2014).
The major operations change stemming from the introduction of new technologies in the SDF over the last 15 years has been the adoption of ‘dynamic defence force’. According to the MOD, the dynamic defence force emphasizes ‘readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities.’ Due to the limited defence budget,
Japan will carry out ‘selection and concentration’ to selectively concentrate resources on truly necessary functions and bring about structural reform to the defence force to produced increased outcome with limited resources after carrying out drastic optimization and streamlining the SDF overall through fundamental review of the equipment, personnel, organization, and force disposition. (Government of Japan, 2011, p. 149)
In the 2013 NDPG, this policy was upgraded to ‘dynamic joint defence force’. Due to concerns that the ‘dynamic defence force’ philosophy could not address ‘grey zones’ (neither peace nor conflict situations), the 2013 NDPG added mobile deployment capabilities and a wide range of logical support systems to the SDF.
The SDF also aims to increase its readiness posture and joint operations posture, which is accomplished using intelligence on the ground. Within the southwest region of Japan, the ASDF increased moving radar warning and developed infrastructure for continuous operation of early warning aircraft, the GSDF reorganized forces to increase deployment and increased surveillance, and the MSDF increased surveillance by increasing submarine force strength (Government of Japan, 2011, p. 160). All the branches of the MOD have increased the mobility of its forces by increasing surveillance technology and reorganizing forces. The SDF aims to develop defence forces ‘underpinned by advanced technology and information technologies’ by ensuring ‘reliable command and control and quick information sharing’ and ‘developing an advanced command communications network, as well as develop a system responding to cyber-attacks in an integral manner’ (Government of Japan, 2011, p. 159). Moreover, the MOD authorized the promotion ‘of the development and use of outer space in the view of strengthening information gathering and communications functions’. To accomplish this, the MOD has started programmes to increase the amount of information gathering satellites in space and improve their large-volume data capabilities and fidelity. The implementation of this advanced technology will allow for greater on-the-ground flexibility and provide forces with valuable terrain data.
Another example of a major change in the organization of forces is how the MOD has dealt with forces in Hokkaido. The majority of the SDF train in Hokkaido because of its size, proximity to traditional threat Russia, and political benefits; troops are kept away from civilians and jobs are created in a job-sparse region. Thus, maintaining a large SDF presence on the island has become fairly institutionalized and difficult to change. However, in 2010, the MOD reorganized the divisions and brigades on the island, even reducing outposts to increase mobility and readiness. The three branches of the SDF are being reorganized to match these new priorities: GSDF will be reorganized and approximately half of its divisions and bridges will be reorganized into rapid deployment divisions and brigades, the MSDF will add seven destroyers and two Aegis destroyers to its fleet, and the ASDF will increase the number of Air Warning and Control Units (Government of Japan, 2017a, pp. 221–224). In addition to the restructuring of forces, the MOD decreased Cold War-style equipment, such as tanks and artillery, by over 25 per cent. These clear away movements from dated technology and operations towards RMA-style strategies, and equipment indicates that there have been significant changes to how the SDF operates on the ground.
Another key development in the 2013 NDPG is the introduction of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. This is not simply modernization of the SDF, but the adoption of new amphibious tactics to improve the flexibility of the GSDF. By FY2018, the MOD plans to deploy 3,000 personnel to this group (Government of Japan, 2014). Since 2005, the GSDF has conducted combined training operations with US marines, which should allow for easier transition into this new phase of the SDF.
Interoperability is emphasized throughout Defence of Japan White Papers, NSS and 2013 NDPG. The USA and Japan have conducted joint exercises since 1985, but under the new guidelines, the MOD looks to increase the seamlessness between the two forces and ‘strengthen the Japan–US alliance in all its aspects, including political, economic, and security areas’ (Government of Japan, 2013c). Moreover, the NSS establishes a clear objective to building stronger relations with the ROK, Australia, India and ASEAN. Additionally, due to rising tension in regional island disputes, within the last year, Japan has engaged in capacity building projects in Timor-Leste, Cambodia, Mongolia, Indonesia and Vietnam (Government of Japan, 2014). In accordance to the interoperability objective, Japan has moved from ‘observer’ status to permanent partner on important exercises, such as when it joined Exercise Malabar in 2015. Further examples of regular bilateral and multilateral exercises and exchanges include Exercise RIMPAC, Exercise Talisman Sabre, Pacific Shield, Cobra Gold, Pacific Reach, Annual Exercise, Northern Viper, Keen Sword, North Wind, Submarine Competition (SUBCOMP), ASEAN Regional Foreign Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) and USA–Japan joint disaster exercises. Additionally, the SDF participates in many ad hoc exercises which include humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), rescue operations, C4ISR and high-end naval warfare BMD (ballistic missile defence) exercises and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises.
The most significant policy change that has increased interoperability has been the 2015 updated Guidelines for Japan–US Defence cooperation. The new guidelines, which had not been updated since 1997, emphasize the following: ‘1) seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; 2) synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; a whole-of-government Alliance approach; 4) cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and 5) the global nature of the Japan–US Alliance’ (Ministry of Defence, 2015). To achieve these objectives, Japan and the USA have implemented initiatives such as establishing an Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), increasing personnel exchanges, creating new procedures for information-sharing, improving logistics support, expanding joint/shared use of facilities and promoting education and research exchanges (Government of Japan, 2017).
There have also been two major developments in Japanese security policy that are worth mentioning, although it is still too early to determine the full extent and ramifications of these developments. On 15 May 2014, an advisory panel established by Prime Minister Abe argued that it is necessary to reinterpret Article 9 to come to the aid of allies who are under attack. Under the slogan of ‘proactive peace’, Abe claimed that a changing international environment, growth of non-state threats, and the need for Japan to work more closely with the US and play a greater role in international relations would require Japan to be more assertive in its security policy. In 2015, Prime Minister Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party successfully passed legislation allowing for ‘collective self-defence’, which came to into effect on 29 March 2016.
Even prior to implementation of the new legislation, the MOD had expanded the role of the SDF beyond self-defence and promoted ‘regional order’, ‘global cooperation’ and ‘common values of the region or the international community’ as operational goals (Government of Japan, 2005, p. 2). As of 2017, the SDF has engaged in 14 UN peacekeeping operations, utilized about 12,000 personnel, and participated in diverse missions such as refuelling in combat zones, monitoring elections and providing disaster relief. In general, the Japanese public has been supportive of SDF peacekeeping operations and holds a favourable account of the military forces. According to Government of Japan (2012) poll, 91.7 per cent of respondents have a favourable opinion of the SDF. The SDF’s reputation has steadily increased over the last few decades, and the most recent boost in reputation is most certainly due to its work during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. Conversely, the public has not been as supportive of major constitutional revision. Polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun from April to July 2014, more than 50 per cent of the public did not support the reinterpretation. According to Kyodo News survey, 84 per cent of the public felt the government had not provided sufficient explanation of the collective self-defence decision (The Japan Times, 2014).
The reach of the reinterpretation is difficult to calculate because hundreds of existing laws will need to be amended to make the new security framework constitutional. It will be years before one can accurately determine how the SDF has changed due to the new legislation. Given that the legislation is so controversial, the government will have to allay fears and appeal to the pro-peacekeeping sensibilities of the public to make meaningful changes to existing laws that would allow for unhindered collective self-defence.
The second major policy shift that may contribute to changes to doctrine and operations has been the weakening of the arms export ban. It is much too early to accurately predict the consequences of this policy shift, yet one can consider the implications. The private sector might benefit the most from this policy adjustment because it can now jointly develop technologies with much more developed military–industrial complexes. According to one anonymous Japanese security expert, there will be ‘a higher level of enthusiasm for Japan to pursue joint development’, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in areas such as robotics, artificial intelligence and automation (Author’s Interview, May 2017). For example, the MOD has also just recently announced that it will procure the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft. This decision, coupled with allowance of joint development, can yield significant positive results for lagging Japanese defence contractors. However, unless there are buyers, the Japanese military–industrial complex will remain stagnated. Technology acquisition will most definitely increase the quality of the industry, but it will be sales growth that will determine whether the industry is solvent. Since the Japanese military–industrial complex is so far behind and military contracts are signed for the long term, it might be decades before one sees any significant growth. Japanese contractors themselves have lacked initiative. According to Michito Tsuruoka, former NIDS researcher and current professor at Keio University, the prospects of significant defence sector growth is low because ‘companies are still wondering what is okay and what is not’ and the ‘government has yet to come up with a clear defence industry policy’ (Author’s Interview, May 2017). Tsuruoka concludes that, ‘Japan’s defence industry is not bright because it is fully aware the international market is already crowded and highly competitive. They cannot be enthusiastic about their international business, regardless of what defence industrial policy the government comes up with’ (Author’s Interview, May 2017). Within Japanese security expert circles, Japan’s failure to secure a submarine deal with Australia after significant effort by the Abe administration signalled a tough road ahead.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimaru has stressed that the Three Principles on Arms Exports ban is still in place. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology limits arms export opportunities, sales will be ‘subject to government approval on a case-by-case basis’, and companies are ‘still prevented from selling equipment that might end up being used in anger’ (Moss, 2011). To prevent arms from reaching terrorists or strife-torn countries, Japan will establish mechanisms to control the movement of its arms. Moreover, since the SDF is primarily focused on disaster relief and peace-building, the government does not expect exports of guns and weapons, instead, the primary exports will be ‘patrol boats, bullet-proof vests, and heavy machinery that are used by Self-Defence Forces abroad’ (Ito, 2011). Nevertheless, relaxing the arms export ban is a fundamental philosophical shift. The aforementioned establishment of ATLA at the very least provides the MOD with a more streamlined and robust defence equipment transfers process and lays the groundwork to more easily acquire RMA technologies. The ATLA has already established limited defence equipment and technology transfer agreements or memorandum of understanding with the USA, UK, France, Italy, Australia, India and the Philippines (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency [ATLA], 2017). For 49 years, there was a blanket ban on exports with a few exceptions. From 2014 forward, there is a blanket allowance with exceptions.
The changes to doctrine and operations demonstrate Japan’s unique application of Bédar’s second RMA principle. The introduction of new technology has led to more efficiency and capabilities, but more importantly, has positioned the SDF to adopt doctrines and operations that would necessitate additional technology acquisitions and increase interoperability. The most extraordinary example of this phenomenon has been the establishment of a semi-permanent base outside of the main islands of Japan for the first time since the end of World War II. Established in June 2009, the Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti is the first full-fledged overseas SDF base equipped with a maintenance hangar for P-3C patrol aircraft. In establishing the base
the government hopes the base will play a key role in international cooperation for peace in the Middle East and Africa. The base, located north of Djibouti–Ambouli Airport, has a command headquarters, accommodation for SDF personnel, a dining hall, gym and bath house, and cost about 4.7 billion yen to construct. (Tao, 2011)
Although the base is small, the creation of the base is a significant move for the MOD not only because it crosses an anti-militaristic normative bright-line by placing the SDF more permanently outside of Japan, but also because it was not at the behest of the USA. Jun Shummi, Japan’s ambassador to Djibouti, has conceptualized the base to be a strong link to the region remarking that ‘there is little doubt that the withdrawal of the SDF has become much harder’ and ‘the reality is that we [SDF] won’t find a just cause to withdraw for the foreseeable future’ (Kato, 2011). This base expands the scope of the SDF mission, increases SDF interactions with other armed forces and creates the opportunity to put into action new technologies and security practices.
The doctrine and operations’ changes begin to close the gap in training, combat readiness and allied operation knowledge. Coupled with the increased professionalization, capabilities and universalization of procedures established by RMA principles, one should expect noticeable improvements to Japan’s joint operations in the future.
Changes in Organization
To achieve an RMA posture, a state needs to have an organizational structure that would allow for more effective decision-making. Thus, one would predict that Japan would implement a structure that would better facilitate communication within the military hierarchy. Of the three RMA principles outlined by Bédar, Japan has implemented the most significant changes to the SDF organizational structure. The ‘Info-RMA’ principles most aligned with changes in organization are ‘jointness’, ‘speed and mobility’, and ‘flexibility’.
On 7 January 2007, the JDA was upgraded to MOD, giving the military arm of government much more freedom, prestige and authority. Military and government leaders justified this fiercely debated transition by calling attention to the challenges of the new century, namely, terrorism, piracy and North Korean nuclear proliferation (Government of Japan, 2007). Fumio Kyuma, Japan’s Minister of State for Defence at the time argued that the MOD needed to ‘begin a rebirth as a policymaking organization’, and thus, the SDF would undergo structural reorganization (Government of Japan, 2007). On 1 September 2007 the MOD released a White Paper outlining the four key points of the extensive reorganization of the armed forces.
The reorganization of the MOD focused on cutting down inefficiency, increasing capabilities and professionalizing the SDF. Additionally, in 2013, the Abe administration established the National Security Council (NSC), which aimed to create centralized, cohesive and efficient security planning among defence-related agencies (Government of Japan, 2013a). Beyond creating new security-related positions, such as National Security Advisor, the NSC holds ‘4-Minister Meetings’ (4MM) which aim to ‘sharpen the focus of discussions at the NSC and allow the prime minister and his top advisors to more efficiently direct foreign and defence policies regarding national security’ as well as increase coordination with Japan’s allies (Miller, 2014).
This rationalization of the defence forces has been pervasive over the last few years. The restructuring of the SDF was heavily influenced by the idea that the defence forces needed to be harmonized. In line with the RMA logic of synergy, the TRDI argued, ‘to respond to any contingency quickly and effectively under these circumstances, the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defence Forces need to operate as a ingle unit. Accordingly, the MOD has set up a Joint Staff Office and just completed the transition to a full-fledged joint operation system’ (TRDI, 2007). Examples of increased jointness include increasing duties for the joint chief of staff, increasing the responsibilities of the Minister of Defence, organization of ‘joint mission units’, establishing broad-based and mobile intelligence and communications infrastructures, studying education/training activities and identifying areas for enhancement (Government of Japan, 2006). The SDF has also pursued joint training operations with other nations and further aligned operability with the USA. These changes match the RMA principles of flattening the military hierarchy and increasing the rapidity to which information is transferred.
The clear emphasis on technology to improve unified command indicates synergy of technology and organization. According to the TRDI, ‘The progress in technology, such as information and communication technology, not only enables the sharing of information required for joint operations and unified command and control, but also ensures that the progress of strategies is accelerated’ (Technical Research and Development Institute [TRDI], 2007, p. 11). Accordingly, the MOD has argued,
It is important to remain prepared for operating the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defence Forces organically and integrally for the Self-Defence Forces to perform their duties quickly and effectively in response to the aforementioned new roles of defence capabilities. Subject to this, a build-up for joint operations and enhanced informational functions has just been launched. (Government of Japan, 2011, p. 218)
In line with the RMA principle of doctrine and operations, the MOD has also sought to increase the level of quality and responsibility of ground-level forces, which decreases the hierarchy of the SDF and allows for more flexibility during combat situations. Since at the unit level, commanders of major units ‘may be required to take command of a joint task force during peacetime’, they ‘need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods’ (Government of Japan, 2011). To accomplish better use of the Joint Command, the SDF is considering increasing joint staff personnel and placing personnel from other SDF branches at major command headquarters. In a more general sense, the SDF has sought to increase the professionalization of its forces by increasing study opportunities for soldiers at graduate schools, reviewing the current curriculum and implementing basic education for various duties (Ministry of Defence Minister’s Secretariat, 2009). The harmonization of different branches and increased responsibility of unit-level commanders are strong indicators of RMA principles.
The creation of the Joint Staff Office, new command protocols and interaction with more militarily experienced states has influenced how SDF soldiers operate on the ground. The USA has strongly pushed for more support from Japan under the RMA principles that emphasize the standardization of certain military practices. One implication of the universalization of military protocols is that it could lead to a ‘plug and play’ model, where the SDF can be easily inserted into USA and UN peacekeeping missions.
A few issues arise when determining whether these organizational changes equate to an RMA. First, over 60 measures increasing the duties and roles of the SDF and MOD have been passed over the past 20 years (Government of Japan, 2007, p. 16). It is difficult to determine whether these changes are the result of a new military doctrine, or the natural evolution of a military seeking to ‘normalize’. Second, increased symmetry with the USA might not indicate Japan has adopted the RMA as a goal. For decades, the USA has pressured Japan to play a greater role in the alliance. Changes in organization may just be a way for Japan to reaffirm its commitment to the USA. Third, the SDF might be overly reliant on outside forces. The SDF may have increased synergy with the UN and USA, but it must also improve synergy among the several military branches in the MOD. Although the process has begun, tangible changes are likely to take much more time because Japan does not engage in comprehensive military activities of its own. Fourth, professionalization and better operating procedures are simply expected in military organizations. These improvements can allow for better war-making capabilities as well as prevent unnecessary conflict in the battlefield, an arena where SDF personnel have very little experience. Last, not all the organization changes have been popular. The public’s attitude regarding the upgrade of the JDA to MOD was mixed. According to a January 2007 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 16.3 per cent greatly supported, 29.4 per cent somewhat supported, 27.8 per cent did not support very much, 11.4 per cent did not support at all and 15 per cent did not know if they supported the change (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007). The public is still distrustful of an independent military and thus, implementation of RMA-principles must be gradual and complementary to the public’s sensibilities.
Ultimately, the ‘software’ must match the ‘hardware’. In Japan’s case, it has operated on a completely different operating system from most other countries. The aforementioned changes certainly meet Bédar’s principles of increasing organization jointness and professionalization, but one should expect that it will take some time to work out the ‘bugs’. Japan may not currently be able to meet a full-RMA and may never demonstrate the desire, but the successful implementation of certain RMA principles demonstrates the possibility of crafting a unique version reflective of the nation’s political, economic and cultural reality.
Conclusion
Japan has shown signs of undergoing an RMA, but in a very unique and constrained way. The government has begun implementing policies that improve communication, technology, flexibility and professionalization. Moreover, the increasing horizontalization of the forces will increase the rapidity in which information travels. However, with each movement towards an RMA, one is reminded of the many obstacles that prevent Japan’s military ‘normalization’. The MOD is well aware of the sensitivities of the general public to militarization and thus most of implementation of RMA principles would impact operations within the vicinity of the mainland. As stated by Info-RMA report, Japan is a case where RMA principles make sense for defence, but a full RMA itself is not reasonable, attractive or even necessary.
There are several interesting research questions that arise regarding the RMA. As the findings in this research article indicate, security policy is difficult to divorce from larger social phenomenon. In Japan’s case, the weakening economy, capitalistic orientation and deep-rooted history of antimilitarism can impact a government’s ability to dedicate resources to defence development. Pursuing an RMA is incredibly expensive. Japan’s dire financial situation along with the high cost of maintaining the SDF requires policymakers to be efficient and creative with the defence budget. Although the MOD has implemented many RMA-inspired policies, wide-ranging and permanent changes will not be likely until the government receives more support from the public. Since an RMA usually achieves lower causality rates and increases the likelihood of short decisive war, exploring how governments ‘sell’ the RMA to the public to gain support for the military could be a fruitful project. Also, understanding that the RMA is markedly American can raise interesting questions regarding ‘exporting’ certain military cultures. Since 1991, Japan has slowly shed some of its pacifistic tendencies to satisfy US appeals for a more proactive partner in their security alliance. A 2013 NIDS report concluded Japan’s transition into the Information RMA is less a voluntary choice than a necessity due to Japan’s military system existing as a de facto subsystem of the US military system (53). Adopting the RMA might not be just adopting a new military posture, but also American geopolitical strategy and worldview.
Moreover, as several scholars have argued, there is not one definition of an RMA and Japan might be able to pursue its own version. The Japan case suggests that there can be variants of the RMA, such as defence-oriented RMA. Expanding the definition of the RMA can yield useful theorizing regarding how ideas of the RMA can guide security policy. When different states maintain an RMA posture, they may share the same general strategies of increasing synergy among forces and adopting the latest technology but may pursue those goals with different strategies and arriving at different configurations.
Finally, the RMA has surely changed the nature of warfare. Attacks are more precise, unintended casualties are less likely to occur, and over time, warfare will be more efficient and cheap. States might be more able to follow jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality. Thus, will there be an increase in sensitivity to human rights? The general public seems to be increasingly intolerant for ‘unnecessary’ and ‘unjustified’ deaths of both civilians and the military. Or will the opposite occur, where warfare is ‘cleaned up’ due to advances in technology and the public will become more desensitized to killing? On the other hand, due to the increased precision of modern militaries, the public may hold the armed forces more accountable for its actions.
The current revolution in military affairs will certainly have far-reaching implications, possibly qualifying it as a true military revolution. It may depend on who controls the message. Even if countries such as Japan cannot pursue an RMA in a fashion similar to the USA, RMA principles can still impact Japanese security policy, whether directly or indirectly. As one-half of the US–Japan alliance, the RMA will influence Japanese leaders’ policy goals, world outlook and security calculations. Japan’s willingness to craft a unique version of the RMA suggests that the USA will find itself with a more confident, capable and less dependent partner.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article derives from a paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference and at the USC Korean Studies Institute Graduate Student Symposium. Thanks to the editors of JASIA and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. I would also like to thank Erika Hongo and Yuki Numata for their research assistance and to thank Neil Chaturvedi and Masaaki Higashijima for their comments on earlier drafts. I conducted some of the research while on a Fulbright Fellowship to Japan. Some of the data I gained during that year is included in the article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
1.
The system of ‘systems’ refers to the integration of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems and subsystems affecting their operation (R&D, production and procurement of weapons) but also force structures, logistics, infrastructure and human factors, i.e. doctrine, strategic culture and political and legal systems. (Bédar, 2001, p. 33)
2.
Innovation indicators are as follows: (a) publication describing new combat methods; (b) establishment of official organizations to study recent wars; (c) study of foreign innovation efforts; (d) establishment of organizations charged with experimentation; (e) formation of experimental units; (f) experiments with new warfare methods; (g) war gaming of new warfare methods; (h) leadership consensus with new warfare methods, (i) allocation of resources to support new warfare methods; (j) development of formal transformation strategy; (k) establishment of innovative military units; (l) revision of doctrine to accommodate new ways of war; (m) new branches, career paths; and (n) field training exercises with new doctrine, organization (Mahnken, 2004).
3.
The top 20 Japanese military suppliers by percentage of defence budget allocation are as follows: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, NEC, Fujitsu, Komatsu, Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Corporation, Nakagawa Co., The Japan Steel Works, Nippon Oil Corporation, IHI, COSMO, DAIKIN, ISUZU, OKI, IHI AEROSPACE Co., Fuji Heavy Industries (Government of Japan, 2010).
4.
Mitsubishi and IHI engage in many different industries. NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and OKI primarily sell telecommunications, printers and consumer electronics. Nakagawa (oil), Japan Steel, and Nippon Oil specialize in natural resources, not military technology.