Abstract
The end of the Cold War ushered in new thinking about security and a new way to manage security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of security was broadened to include not just traditional issues such as war and peace but also non-traditional ones such as trafficking, disasters and climate change. At the same time, terrorist attacks and territorial disputes replaced hegemonic and ideological conflicts as the hottest issues in the region’s security agenda. In response to these new threats, many militaries in the region shifted their focus from arms racing to defence diplomacy. A new regional architecture emerged with multilateralism awarded a more prominent place than ever before. More intriguingly, it is not any great power but a group of small powers, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that is often regarded, praised and reassured as the centre of the evolving regional architecture.
Against this background, International Security in the Asia-Pacific: Transcending ASEAN towards Transitional Polycentrism adopts an unusual but interesting approach to examining international security in the Asia-Pacific region. Readers who want to get the big picture and the major dynamics of regional security may be disappointed at first, but a closer look at the volume will suggest that the features and dynamics discussed in the book are some of the most important in the regional security landscape. Revolving around the notion of ASEAN’s centrality in the Asia-Pacific security architecture, the book critically examines this notion and argues that the key characteristic of international security in the Asia-Pacific today is a transition towards a polycentric order where the transition may persist for an indefinite long term. According to the volume’s editor, Alan Chong, this indefinite transition is possible ‘because of the persistence of neo-realist competition among great powers, alongside the diplomatic “middle ground” appeal of the spaces afforded both great powers and weak states alike by ASEAN centrality’ (p. 20). In this transitional polycentrism, ASEAN may not lose all clout, but it is ‘collectively marginalized’ (p. 10). Also pertaining to this transitional polycentrism is an interesting dynamic of great power competition spotted by Collin Koh in his chapter on Sino-Japanese rivalry in the East China Sea. In Chong’s words, great powers are ‘establishing through acts of both omission and commission a virtual security order that builds fleeting zones of restraint after diplomatic and military collisions’ (p. 37).
The book is focused on a myriad of issues, actors and developments that are rendering ASEAN less central and less relevant to regional security governance. These challenges can be roughly divided into two groups, one of which is what Chong terms ‘unilateral behaviour’ with little regard for ASEAN of the major powers, including China, India, Japan and the United States. It is more accurate to call this challenge a ‘going their own ways’ approach as it includes not just unilateral efforts such as China’s artificial island building and the United States’ ‘freedom of navigation operations’ in the South China Sea but also bilateral and multilateral efforts such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the cooperation among the Quad that encompasses the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Instead of addressing these developments, some of the book’s authors single out the US ‘rebalance’ policy as an effort to emphasize Washington’s ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system at the expense of ASEAN-centred multilateralism. This view is based on an inaccurate reading of US strategy, since strengthening ASEAN, including its unity and centrality, has in fact been a key prong of the ‘rebalance’. Still, the authors are right for the wrong reasons. The Trump Administration, which ditched the ‘rebalance’ policy shortly after it took power, has little regard for ASEAN as a regional security manager.
While this book is not strong on US strategy, it has excellent chapters on Chinese and Indian strategies. Hoo Tiang Boon’s chapter convincingly argues that China is pursuing a strategy of ‘flexible assertiveness’ that combines a tougher and more uncompromising approach towards what China regards as its core interests, or connecting to its core interests, with a more flexible and cooperative approach towards other more negotiable interests that, while significant, of relative secondary importance to China. Described by the axiom yingde gengying, ruande gengruan (hardening the hard, softening the soft), the underlying strategy of this dual approach relies on bigger carrots and bigger sticks to accentuate the difference between cooperating with China and working against it.
The chapter by Manjeet Pardesi sheds light on the origins and evolution of India’s regional outlook and ambitions. Inheriting the British Raj’s view of itself as the ‘paramount power’ in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India first developed a hegemonic ambition in the subcontinent and its surrounding waters, only to recognize later that it can at best achieve primacy among the great powers that have strong interests in this part of the world. Pardesi also convincingly argues that with the simultaneous rise of China and India, the strategic boundaries between South Asia/Indian Ocean and East Asia/West Pacific is getting increasingly blurred, resulting in the strategic merging of the two regions.
The second group of challenges to ASEAN centrality is inherently related to the ASEAN Way. Ooi Kee Beng’s chapter compellingly argues that given the multifaceted diversity of Southeast Asia, the insecurity of its governments, and the high speed of its economic growth, the ASEAN Way, particularly the principle of making decisions based on consensus, is the only path for the region to project stable unity and magnify its significance on the global arena. On the other hand, as the chapter by Kriengsak Chareonwongsak equally convincingly argues, ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanism has been rendered irrelevant by the spirit of conflict avoidance and the key obstacles are the principles of consensus and non-interference. Chareonwongsak proposes that ASEAN must transcend its current nature as an intergovernmental venture and involve civil society in conflict mediation and resolution, to become a people-oriented regional community that consults below the level of sovereign governments. A common thread in this book is that whereas ASEAN has become an indispensable manager of regional security because of its ironclad respect for sovereignty, its operation on the lowest common denominator and its unusual mode of norm building that is emphatically unaccompanied by specific sanctions, these very features have hindered its effectiveness in dealing with various security issues in the region.
Although International Security in the Asia-Pacific falls short of explicating or resolving this ‘ASEAN paradox’ (ASEAN’s success sows the seeds of ASEAN’s failure), the authors suggest a number of ways for ASEAN to maintain its relevancy in regional security governance. First, ASEAN can act as a hedge against the dependence on completely bilateral and minilateral (engagements consisting of more than two states but not inclusive of the majority of states in the region) security arrangements among themselves (p. 10). Second, ASEAN can serve as a diplomatic buffer or safety valve, should the great powers ail in maintaining a minimal level of diplomatic civility (p. 10). Third, ASEAN can perform consolatory functions where neo-realist competition marks out the shape of regional peace (p. 20). The chapters by Takeshi Yuzawa and Manjeet Pardesi demonstrate that ASEAN can also remain central in being the object of China’s, Japan’s and India’s tussle for Asian influence. This, however, comes with the price that ASEAN is likely to become a battleground for major power rivalries.
Although the title of this book may be misleading (no chapter in the bookdeals with central issues of international security in the Asia-Pacific such as US–China relations and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions), its subtitle is spot on.This book is a good read for those who are interested in ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific region.