Abstract
Studies of geopolitics are important because the intertwining geographical and political knowledge carries huge implications for the construction of national identity and historical discourse. In her ambitious book titled Japanese Geopolitics and the Western Imagination, Atsuko Watanabe traces the evolution of geopolitics from a Western-originated concept into one that is adopted and localized by and in Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. This process merits attention, not least because Japan is the only non-Western power to have ever invoked the classical theory of the modern state to justify its imperial expansion.
The core argument made by Watanabe is that Japanese geopolitics—broken down as the interplay between ‘place’ and ‘power’—was formed first through the import of classical European theories on geopolitics, then subconsciously modified to fit what was familiar with the local imaginations, rather than what was correct. The result is an opposite of the European-originated conceptualization of the State as a territorially confined space. In Japanese geopolitics, because political boundaries simply do not exist, the State is imagined as an ‘unbounded space’ capable of limitless expansion and accommodation. The book, comprised eight chapters, is the product of an arduous intellectual journey in which theory, space, and history cross paths and are cross-examined with both English and Japanese writings.
Using a constructivist approach, Watanabe presents an intricate theoretical mapping of how political theory travels inter-regionally and how local macro-politics affect the contextualization of such theory in an unnoticeable way. Watanabe draws heavily on the Western literature on critical and classical geopolitics as well as Japanese scholarship on geopolitics. The first Japanese-language writings on geopolitics (chiseigaku) emerged in 1925–1926 when Japan was going through an ‘identity crisis’ after having won three wars (the first Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I) and exhausting its economy. What Watanabe calls ‘the collective appropriation of foreign knowledge’ took place in the 1930s and 1940s as Japan confronted Western modernity and simultaneously sought to overcome such modernity. Against this historical background, to understand how geopolitical thought travelled a long distance to and made sense in Japan, Watanabe suggests a tripartite interpretation covering the (i) standpoint that a particular context provides; (ii) imagination that fills in the cognitive gap; and (iii) assemblage that treats theory and history on the same ground. In this sense, Japan is treated as a ‘social space’ upon which its experience, that is, the de-contextualization and re-contextualization of Western knowledge, is analysed.
In her conclusion, Watanabe suggests that the Japanese disarmament was a natural outcome of the war, that they accepted the defeat, understood they were not destined to rule the world, and willingly became part of a unified world order led by the Americans. This argument seems a bit simplistic, for it only considers the viewpoint of Japan and neglects that of other nations, such as the United States. These gaps stem from the single-minded focus of the book on setting the places of knowledge dissemination and assimilation, identifying the subject and object of knowledge, and re-interpreting geopolitics from the recipient viewpoint. Here, readers unfamiliar with the political theory and philosophy would be bombarded with academic abstractions such as ‘political spatialization’, ‘epistemological principles’, or ‘Kantian epistemology’ with little explanation as to what the terms mean or how they are being used. Moreover, the repetitiveness of the research questions and subsequent justifications makes several passages unnecessarily long-winded and even convoluted.
Pedantries aside, while the historical and analytical depth is worthy of praise, this book’s arguments unfortunately still leaves many questions unanswered, including: how does this understanding of Japanese geopolitics help explain Japan’s quick turnaround to pacifism after World War II? Is this pacifist embrace in line with ‘de-territorialization’ in the sense that a state can become one big pacifist globe? Furthermore, as Japanese interpretation of geopolitics places an emphasis on the unconscious and subconscious modification of imported knowledge, it is also unclear whether Japan’s imperial pursuit was a product of the nature of thinking geopolitically or a deliberate choice by the Japanese. Additionally, by providing such theoretical density and intensity, Watanabe has only limited room for implications of the concept beyond its historical interpretations. Considering territorial disputes are most often the cause of armed conflicts and even wars worldwide, the book could certainly benefit from additional discussion on how to overcome boundaries as a site of conflict.
On the issue of boundary, it also appears that because Watanabe’s argument is drawn primarily from the literature on critical geopolitics, which suggests removing boundary and boundary-making espoused by classical geopolitics, she has intentionally overlooked the limitations of this discipline’s application to history. Although Watanabe does touch on the contrasting stances of the two disciplines in constructing a political space, she does not discuss whether the two disciplines can be reconciled and how either one or both can be utilized in contemporary international relations discourse. As with the case of all theories, a multitude of descriptions and explanatory models exist and can account for the conceptual framework. Under the Japanese imagination of geopolitics, geographical features are eliminated to give way for an abstract position of limitless, unified space. This interpretation is interesting but frames Japan’s imperial expansion in a strangely positive light. What if only by presenting the pursuit of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as simply an expansion into a limitless space, could the current Japanese leadership justify territorial expansion, gain widespread support from the Japanese society, and reinforce nationalism? This is perhaps where classical geopolitics could contribute a more critical voice.
In sum, the book is a valuable addition to the literature on international political theory albeit with its own serious shortcomings. On the one hand, the Japanese standpoint provides a much-needed non-Western take on a widely used concept in the field. On the other hand, this poses inherent bias and risks an over-generous and over-optimistic interpretation of Japanese geopolitics, both its conceptualization and application. Nonetheless, for anyone interested in the social construction of the modern state, modernity, and world order, the book provides a well-grounded theoretical foundation for such inquiry.
