Iran-Hezbollah Alliance Reconsidered: What Contributes to the Survival of State-Proxy Alliance?

Introduction

In the 1980s, Lebanon was engulfed in extraordinary violence and turmoil, often remembered in the Middle East with ineradicable images of the destructions of infrastructure and human lives obliterated by the fighting groups in civil strife. Anarchic Lebanon provided a window of opportunity for other regional states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran to intervene in the domestic affairs of Beirut. However, Tehran took a decisive step in bringing the impoverished Lebanese Shiite under an umbrella to stretch its muscles in a strategically important area, and the establishment of Hezbollah in 1982 was a manifestation of this strategy. Initially, Hezbollah was a collection of a few marginalised and ideologically less inspired and tattered Shiite fighters in south Lebanon (Art & Richardson, 2007). However, Tehran adroitly exploited their grievances and vulnerabilities through its revolutionary potentials, including the propagation of Iranian revolutionary doctrine, the concept of martyrdom, the establishment of social welfare institutions and provision of their services. ¹

As the alliance between Iran and Hezbollah started developing, Iran convinced the religiously motivated hardliners within Hezbollah to its cause, which connected the allying partners firmly along sectarian lines. Initially, to demonstrate and consolidate its power, Hezbollah carried out a bombing campaign, which killed dozens of US and French forces in Lebanon. ²

States in the context of rivalry have always provided support to non-state actors to hunt their strategic objectives (Akins, 2019), but states and non-state actors have consistently failed to develop a long-term reliable and trustworthy relationship because of greed, opportunism and diverging interests (Shapiro, 2013). Non-state actors often come to the surface and collapse within a very short period without achieving their political objectives (Cronin, 2009). For example, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida failed to work together because of lack of trust and commitment, which led to their alliance’s collapse. Moreover, there are multiple such instances where states have provided help, including sanctuaries, weapons, training, etc., to terrorist groups against their rivals but failed to build an alliance. For example: Venezuela and Ecuador extended their support to the Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Forero, 2010; Kuffner, 2009); the US supported Cuban exile terrorist movements, such as Omega 7 and Alpha 66 between the 1960s and 1990s (Weiner, 2005); Iran and Iraq sponsored terrorist groups, including Kurdistan Worker Party (KDP), Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), etc., against each other during the 1980s and 1990s; the Chadian government provided aid to rebels in the Darfur region of Sudan (Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011); India sponsored the Tamil Tigers operating in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. In all these cases, states and their non-state proxies failed to establish a credible alliance because of commitment problems, opportunism and diverging interest.

However, the case of Iran and Hezbollah has given us a different picture. Over time, Iran and Hezbollah have not only maintained their alliance but also built a stable and trustworthy relationship. Scholars have inquired about the alliance’s ‘effectiveness,’ ‘growth,’ ‘identity,’ ‘global tentacles’ and its role in Lebanese domestic politics (Childs, 2011; DeVore & Stähli, 2015; Leuprecht, Walther, Skillicorn, & Ryde-Collins, 2015; Norton, 2007b; Salamey & Pearson, 2007), but overlooked the longevity of the alliance. The present study aims to address the logic of survival of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance and asks these questions: How Iran and Hezbollah have maintained their partnership for over three decades and escaped collapse? To what extent Iran and Hezbollah have built an edifice of cooperation and commitment to ensure their alliance’s survival, and undermined opportunism?

The research puzzle was selected for the following reasons: long-term survival of the alliance; Hezbollah’s reputation as a capable organisation; its military operations against Israel and its involvement in external conflicts. The potentially hostile and dangerous alliance between Iran and Hezbollah is currently transforming the regional strategic landscape. Thus, the survival of this alliance is rarely considered, which has entered its fourth decade of organisational existence and perpetual influence with the multiplex geopolitical realities of the region. This study suggests that unlike other state–nonstate proxy alliances the Iran-Hezbollah alliance has escaped collapse because Iran has given Hezbollah significant autonomy over its actions and activities. Also, Hezbollah has control over its resources. Moreover, Iran has at times demonstrated its commitment to the alliance and both the allying partners have steadfastly guarded against any forms of opportunism. Additionally, the intersection of their core interests, regional chaos and destabilisation have created a cohesive bond between Iran and Hezbollah. The findings contribute to the existing body of literature in terms of providing a rationalised dimension to the consolidation, survivability and strategic expansion of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance in the Middle East. Thus, state-proxy alliance may sustain and escape collapse if they have converging objectives and similar preferences.

In the following section, we provide a brief literature review related to cooperation and bargain in international relations and apply it to state-proxy alliance. In the subsequent sections, we discuss the concept of cooperation and trust; how Hezbollah ensured its presence in Lebanon initially; how Hezbollah and Iran successfully overshadowed their diverging interests and guaranteed the survival of their alliance; how Iran ensured Hezbollah’s autonomy over its actions and control over resources and the production of joint security and Iran’s strategic interests vis-à-vis Hezbollah. The last section concludes the article.

Cooperation, Reputation, Commitment and Survival in Retrospect

The concept of cooperation between different actors has always been a complex phenomenon in the field of international relations, which is fashioned mainly by interests and outcomes. One section of the literature on cooperation suggests that cooperation and future contacts are highly associated (Axelrod, 2006). The survival of the state-proxy relation wholly depends upon this notion, but some doubt that the alliance between state and proxy has been ‘notoriously unreliable’. In the case of al-Qaeda and Iraq, both failed to ally because they were afraid of ‘opportunism’ and ‘credible commitment’ (Bapat, Ertley, Hall, & Lancaster, 2007). Similarly, Venezuela and Ecuador failed to form a credible alliance with ELN and FARC (Forero, 2010; Kuffner, 2009) because of commitment problems. However, to maintain an amicable relationship, the past reputation, cooperation and prospects of interaction ahead are deeply connected (Kydd, 2007). Meanwhile, some scholars have termed long-term agreement between state and non-state proxy as doubtful (Davenport, 2000). Similarly, others have maintained that the ‘commitment’ of any non-state organisation is unpredictable (Walter, 1997). The presence of these issues in state-proxy alliance make it more complicated.

Furthermore, the state and proxy may have their separate interests and agendas that they may desire to achieve. They may have diverging as well as converging interests. The state and proxy are more likely to work together if their converging interests surpass diverging interests, or if they achieve a balance between both types of interests. Otherwise, their long-term alliance may face commitment problems (Byman, 2005a). Additionally, while the achievement of their combined objectives may potentially bind a state and proxy together, but the probability to achieve such objectives by the insurgent group (that is, the non-state proxy) is usually low (Abrahms, 2006). Past studies have also pointed that ideological narratives may help cement ties between the state and its non-state proxy, such as between Iran and Hezbollah (Byman & Kreps, 2010). But it is also a fact that ideological factors are often subservient to strategic interests (Byman, 2005a), which may ultimately separate the allying partners. Despite these kinds of perceptions, Iran and Hezbollah have maintained their alliance. However, Iran has manipulated Islamist narratives at times to make its proxy, Hezbollah, behave aggressively and adopt hardline ideological positions, which may have helped it to survive as a terrorist group (Stenersen, 2018).

Studies have consistently demonstrated that states tend to support non-state actors more in the context of rivalry than in the absence of rivalry. This strategy sometimes provides them with an opportunity to balance their adversaries (Saideman, 2002). Similarly, empirical studies have also established the fact that the presence of interstate rivalry increases the probability of state-proxy cooperation (Maoz & San-Akca, 2012). In the same vein, if states cannot project their military power against their potential rivals, or lack strategic military assets, then they tend to sponsor terrorist groups to make-up for this disadvantage (Byman, 2005b). Iran has more rivals than allies in the region because of its partisan involvement in several contentious regional disputes and its positional manoeuvring. Owing to this, Iran has been sponsoring Hezbollah to balance its rivals (Bahgat, 2006; Parsi, 2005), which may have contributed to the survival of this state-proxy alliance over a long period of time.

Analysing Cooperation and Trust

The practice of delegation plays a significant role in sustaining the relationship between cooperating parties. States and organisations delegate their authority to specific groups to carry out the mission on their behalf (Bradley & Kelley, 2008). For example, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund distribute foreign aid on behalf of their concerned members; similarly Iran delegates authority to Hezbollah. ³

In the absence of converging interests, cooperation and loyalty may be uncertain. In the case of Iran and AMAL in Lebanon, the diverging interests overshadowed the converging interests, which separated them. AMAL was relatively moderate, and Iran wanted to impose her radical ideology on it. However, Iran failed to bring AMAL under its ideological umbrella. Iran then tried to replace AMAL with a more conservative and loyal party within the same society, which could be her defunct mouthpiece (Kramer, 1993). Thus, Iran established Hezbollah as an alternative to AMAL to carry out Iran’s mission in the region. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was afraid of Iran’s notorious past behaviour, incredibility, lack of commitment and cooperation with AMAL. However, the theocratic regime in Tehran extended its support to Hezbollah to develop a strong and committed partnership. Tehran tried to solidify its position and ensured its commitment by raising revolutionary slogans and declaring Israel and the USA to be their common enemies. These Iranian narratives helped to further radicalise Hezbollah and brought the allies to a common platform. Hezbollah also integrated ‘fighting clerics’ in its guerrilla cells to sustain the fervour of the members (Jackson et al., 2005). Meanwhile, Hezbollah and Tehran unanimously agreed to form a committee of trusted clerics to establish a mutually beneficial relationship. Thus, the control switch of the alliance was handed over to trusted clerics from both sides, supervised by Iran’s supreme leader Khomeini. This strategy of managing the alliance helped to transmit the alliance’s ideological message to the leaders and fighters on both sides, which in turn helped to cement a cohesive Shia connection and build trust between Iran and Hezbollah. As the alliance progressed, Hezbollah leaders and Iranian government officials started meeting regularly to discuss their mutual interests (Wiegand, 2009), thus helping to consolidate cooperation and trust within the alliance.

The Iran-Hezbollah alliance has been ongoing for over three decades. During this time, their converging interests have succeeded in undermining their diverging interests to a great extent. Iran and Hezbollah have so far maintained a high level of trust, and Hezbollah has become a formidable frontline strategic asset of Tehran. Iran has been providing millions of dollars to Hezbollah annually. Besides financial aid, Iran has provided military training, technical assistance and weapons to Hezbollah. In return, Hezbollah, as a faithful agent, has promoted Iran’s foreign policy goals in Lebanon and the wider region most enthusiastically. It has also chastised Iran’s adversaries not only in the Middle East but also in Europe and Latin America. Furthermore, Hezbollah has acted as a force multiplier for the Iranian military (Norton, 2007a). Its campaign of attacks, bombings, hijackings and direct military confrontations with Israel in the 1990s and 2000s have helped Tehran achieve its strategic objectives in the Middle East without any direct military confrontations with neighbouring enemy states (Kızılkaya, 2019; Norton, 2007a). Iran has also adroitly crafted narratives that have helped to build a strong relationship with Hezbollah based on mutual trust and cooperation. The trajectory of the Iran-Hezbollah state-proxy cooperation is thus consistently moving upwards.

Hezbollah: A Non-state Actor

Hezbollah’s participation in parliamentary politics and its deep involvement in building institutions and providing social services have made it unique non-state actor. Hezbollah has sought to legitimise its role by participating in elections and helping to build an array of social welfare institutions. Iran’s sponsorship has further strengthened the organisation and transformed it into the most powerful non-state actor in Lebanon and the region. Does this mean that Hezbollah has morphed into a political force and cannot be considered a terrorist group?

To be sure, Hezbollah has never changed its narratives against its declared rivals, including Israel, the US and Arab states in alliance with the USA. Additionally, with Iran’s help, Hezbollah has equipped its fighting forces with modern weapons, missiles and rockets. Although the Lebanese government has not recognised Hezbollah as a legitimate military force and demanded that it disarm completely, Hezbollah has rejected the government’s demand. For practical purposes, therefore, Hezbollah has operated as a state within a state.

Hezbollah has attacked Israeli forces and civilians inside Israel and beyond Israel’s borders. In 1982, a Hezbollah member drove a car laden with explosives into an Israeli intelligence headquarter and killed 75 officials, including soldiers and Arab prisoners. During the 1990s, Hezbollah carried out an attack on the Israeli embassy in Argentina in which dozens of people, most of them Jews, were killed (Norton, 2007a). During the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah also devoted itself wholeheartedly to suicide attacks inside and outside Lebanon, which killed hundreds of civilians and troops.

After the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon, Hezbollah toned down its attacks against Israel proper for a while. However, the hostility against Israel and the targeting of Israeli civilians and soldiers in foreign countries continued (Norton, 2007a). For instance, during the 2000s and early 2010s, Hezbollah operatives with the assistance of their facilitators and supporters targeted Israeli civilians in several countries including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Greece, Jordan, Egypt and Europe (Levitt, 2013, pp. 1–8, 2015). The aim of these attacks was to inflict pain and suffering on the Jewish people and to terrorise Israeli society. Hezbollah’s attacks further inflicted considerable loss on Israel (Hamzeh, 2004). Additionally, Hezbollah’s engagement in regional conflicts on the pretext of fighting terrorists has resulted in attacks against civilian targets. Hezbollah has also developed close relationships with other non-state terror groups including the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Houthis. Hezbollah’s deep engagement in Lebanon’s domestic affairs has led it to commit many acts of terrorism, which had deeply destabilised the country. Taken together with its unwillingness to disarm its military build-up and consistent acts of aggression clearly indicate that Hezbollah is still a terror outfit. ⁴

Survival of the Iran-Hezbollah Alliance

The long-term survival of any non-state armed actor has always been problematic. Armed groups, such as the LTTE, the ELN and the FARC, often come to the surface and disappear without accomplishing their political objectives or become relatively weak over time and thus unable to execute their agenda. A key reason for this is that these groups failed to establish a reliable relationship with their state sponsors, and the sponsoring states were unable to fulfil their commitment. The failure to develop a reliable state-proxy relationship maybe because of (a) the proxy has lost autonomy over its activities and actions, (b) the proxy has lost access to resources previously at its disposal and (c) the state sponsor’s and the proxy’s diverging interests have overshadowed their converging interests and objectives.

However, Hezbollah and Iran have been able to maintain their alliance because Iran as the sponsoring state has ensured that Hezbollah retain autonomy over its activities and actions, that Hezbollah keeps full control over the resources that Tehran has consistently made available to the group, and that Hezbollah’s strategic objectives and targets (such as anti-Israeli rhetoric and propaganda, quest for regional hegemony, neutralizing threats from other regional non-state actors and rival states) align with that of Tehran. Additionally, along with the above factors, state-proxy alliance survival gets enhanced when the allies align along an ethnic-religious identity (Piazza, 2018); in such cases, the alliance becomes more cohesive if the aligning proxy group is ethno-religiously marginalised within its society. In the Iran-Hezbollah case, Hezbollah united and gave hope to the aspirations of the marginalised and impoverished Shi’i community with the support of Iran (Haddad, 2006). Thus, a strong social foundation of alliance cooperation developed between the alliance partners, which further strengthened the alliance.

Intimidation and Concessions

The civil war (1975–1990) made Lebanon a fractured country, and the government failed to deal effectively with the chaotic situation during and after the civil strife (Ghosn & Khoury, 2011), which pushed Lebanon towards more violence. This helped Hezbollah outmanoeuvre its political rivals, amass arms and become an active guerrilla force with the support of Iran and Syria. The party of God used terrorism as a weapon to eliminate its political rivals and to create a chaotic situation. In such an atmosphere, Hezbollah’s reliance on terrorism compelled Lebanon to grant political concessions because Hezbollah’s suicide attacks devastated the state structures (Pape, 2003). These concessions gave Hezbollah a spacious ground to increase its power and strengthen its relations with Iran.

The power to create political chaos may allow a non-state actor to coerce a government to come to the table for negotiations. However, for successful negotiations to occur, the past reputation of the disputants is important (Bapat, 2006). Without a credible reputation, negotiating parties would fail to reach an agreement. In the case of Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, during negotiations (national dialogue) the government and all other political factions demanded that Hezbollah disarm itself completely, but Hezbollah rejected their demands. The offer of the Lebanese government to negotiate and the subsequent failure of the negotiations provoked Hezbollah to behave aggressively and threaten the government of grave consequences (Clutterbuck, 2007). After the assassination of president Rafiq Harari, demonstrations and anti-demonstrations took place in Lebanon. Hezbollah-led demonstrators rejected the demands of the government and admired the role of Syria. Hassan Nasrallah even threatened to topple the government. Hezbollah’s actions created anarchy in Lebanon, and it was on the brink of civil strife (Salamey & Pearson, 2007). Lebanon today is still a divided and destabilised state. The current state of destabilisation provides an opportunity for Hezbollah and Iran to work together to fulfil their common goals.

If the state is incapable of undermining a non-state terrorist group, then the chances of its long-term survival increases. In the case of Lebanon, a deeply divided society, weak security structure and fragile economy did not allow the government to try and crush Hezbollah through force. Rather, Lebanon’s weaken economy compelled the impoverished youth to join Hezbollah, which could offer them a livelihood from funds provided by Iran (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Keen, 2012). Iran’s assistance to Hezbollah thus not only strengthened the group’s hands against the Lebanese government but also strengthened the Iran-Hezbollah alliance.

Hezbollah’s Autonomy Over Its Actions and Strategies

Non-state actors always calculate the costs and benefits of the support provided by the sponsoring states to ensure that they retain autonomy over their actions. If the sponsoring state guarantees the autonomy of its proxy, then the chances of the alliance’s and the proxy’s organisational survivability increases. Iran and Hezbollah have developed a reliable and confident alliance, which has survived for over three decades unlike other state-proxy alliances. A key reason for this is that Iran has ensured that Hezbollah would have maximum autonomy over its actions. However, Hezbollah’s autonomy to act independently of Iran does not mean that the alliance partners have diverging interests, but that their converging interests have superseded their diverging interests. For example, Iran and Hezbollah have declared Israel and the USA to be their common rivals. Iran has also allowed Hezbollah to act independently in several sectors: domestic politics within Lebanon, upgrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities, conducting of military operations and formulation of military strategies, policies relating to organisational hierarchy, institution building and provision of services, etc.

In the early 1990s, Iran and Hezbollah realised that without participating in the domestic politics of Lebanon, their struggle could be meaningless and they could not establish an efficient organisation. Hezbollah constituted a special committee to discuss the risks and benefits of participating in Lebanon’s domestic politics. The special committee concluded that participation in domestic politics would enable the organisation to promote its interests through legal constitutional processes, which would bestow legitimacy to the organisation and its political objectives. Participation in domestic politics would further enable Hezbollah to gain recognition as a legitimate political actor in Lebanon’s political system (Sela, 2015). Therefore, Hezbollah officially decided to take part in parliamentary elections (Samaan, 2017). Although it is often hard for a terrorist organisation to become an effective and legitimate political actor, Hezbollah fought hard for recognition as a legitimate political actor and compelled the Lebanese government to accept its demand (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2013). Hezbollah took part in the 1992, 1996 and subsequent parliamentary and municipal elections and won considerable seats, which gave it a strong foothold in the Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2000) and a legal umbrella to influence the legislative organ while being a part of it. This was a significant achievement for a non-state actor.

Hezbollah’s decision to take part in elections was endorsed by Iran and was a clear indication of Tehran’s willingness to give Hezbollah substantial autonomy. Moreover, Hezbollah’s leadership demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with other political parties in Lebanon and form political alliances of its own choosing. For example, Hezbollah formed political alliances with AMAL and other Christian parties—the March 8 coalition. Hezbollah also became deeply involved in interfaith dialogue with Christians in Lebanon (Sela, 2015), suggesting that the group enjoyed substantial autonomy of action. In the 2018 national parliamentary elections, Hezbollah-led coalition won a significant number of seats (Ajroudi, 2018), which enabled the group to play an indispensable role in Lebanon’s parliament. Thus, over time, Hezbollah has transformed from a non-state actor rejecting participation in the domestic politics of Lebanon to a flexible political party with significant autonomy for participating in elections and winning seats.

Hezbollah has done a remarkable job in building a formidable organisation to protect its core interests and legitimate status. This organisational structure was necessary for it to regularise its relations with the public and to politically strategise to achieve its objectives (Hamzeh, 1993). Participation in politics also provided Hezbollah with a regular source of income. Within a short time, Hezbollah became a formidable player in the parliament and an important political entity within Lebanon. Once it secured its political legitimacy within Lebanon, Hezbollah strengthened its ties with Syria, Iran and non-state militant groups like Hamas and Fateh and became part of the ‘rejectionist axis’ (El Husseini, 2010). With Iranian support, Hezbollah pushed ahead and started operating on three planes: ‘civilian, military, and political’ to fulfil the group’s various objectives (Azani, 2013).

States generally provide support to non-state proxies for both affective and instrumental reasons. However, sponsoring states may sometimes restrain their support for their non-state proxies for various reasons. For instance, a sponsoring state may be forced to stop supporting its non-state proxy in the face of heavy retaliation from the proxy’s host state; or, if the state-proxy alliance reaches breaking point and the state starts receiving blowback from the proxy, the sponsoring state may be forced to scale back its support. There have been several cases when sponsoring states stopped or scaled back their support to non-state terrorist proxies. For example, Iran stopped supporting attacks by the SCIRI and the Gulf Shia on Iraqi and US forces in the early 1990s; Syria used several Palestinian groups as political leverage while restraining support (Byman, 2005a, pp. 50–52). These sponsoring states stopped or restrained their sponsorship once they realised that the terrorist groups posed a threat to their interests.

However, the case of Iran-Hezbollah gives a different picture. Since its inception, Iran has been providing arms and missiles to Hezbollah, which has increased Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Despite its growing military influence in Lebanon and the region, Iran has allowed Hezbollah to stockpile sophisticated weapons, missiles and rockets (Sela, 2015). These weapons are under the complete control of Hezbollah, and Hezbollah has used them against rivals without the need for prior permission from Tehran. Even though Tehran is aware of the distinct risk that non-state proxies could turn their weapons at the sponsoring state, Iran has allowed and aided Hezbollah to improve its military capabilities.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s military structure is reasonably robust, and Hezbollah formulates strategies relating to military operations, policies to recruit foot soldiers and their incentives according to its security requirements. Hezbollah does not need to ask for formal permission to start a military operation or cross border skirmishes against Israel. After the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah continued its provocations and subsequently fought wars in 2006 and 2008. During the military operations Hezbollah formulated a remarkable military strategy and remarkably mobilised its forces against its most powerful foe (Kızılkaya, 2019). Hezbollah did not ask for formal permission to start military aggression against Israel. This might be because Hezbollah’s military actions against Israel enable Tehran to meet its strategic objectives. Similarly, Hezbollah concluded ceasefire agreements with Israel without any prior permission from Iran, for example, the cease fire agreement after the operation accountability (Norton, 2007a, pp. 83–84). Hezbollah has been using money and weapons according to its requirement without any pressure from Iran, and Iran has never tried to undermine Hezbollah to hold control over it. This kind of movement’s autonomous military power has made Hezbollah a potential fighting group and rational actor.

Iran has also allowed Hezbollah to make its endogenous characteristics more effective, and Hezbollah has remarkably converted itself into an effective group. The internal effectiveness has enabled it to utilise the provided as well as endogenously available resources more efficiently to enhance its effectiveness (DeVore & Stähli, 2015). These characteristics make it a unique group as compared to other non-state actors. Hezbollah has a well-coordinated policymaking body which is comprised of the religious clerics and military experts. Moreover, the effectiveness of its endogenous characteristics coupled with its aggressive external manoeuvre against their joint rivals have built confidence and given fresh air to their alliance, and Hezbollah has successfully extracted autonomy from Iran which has built trust, cooperation and empowered it to sit with the Iranian government as an external ally. Thus, Hezbollah has, to a greater extent, maximised its autonomy over its actions and activities, unlike any other non-state actor.

Hezbollah’s Control Over Its Resources

Does Hezbollah hold control over its resources and maximise them? Terrorist organisations prefer to exercise control over resources at their disposal and always try to maximise them. This is because the maximisation of resources enables non-state actors to gain more strength and achieve their specific goals and targets. If a non-state proxy retains control over the resources at its disposal, and maximise and utilise them for the group’s benefit, then the chances of cooperation between the proxy and the sponsoring state increases and both actors are likely to be reliable partners. The case of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance illustrates this dynamic.

In the immediate aftermath of its inception in 1982, Hezbollah tried to ensure its survival in Lebanon by fighting alongside other factions including AMAL. Hezbollah, however, soon outmanoeuvred AMAL and tried to project itself as the sole representative of the Shia community (Azani, 2009). Hezbollah invested in building an array of social welfare institutions as a strategy to meet its financial requirements, ensure its growth and survival, and to integrate the impoverished Shia community of Lebanon. The holistic and integrated institutions are embedded into religious as well as political framework (Harb & Leenders, 2005). Many of these well-organised and integrated organisations have started producing profit while adopting legal status and have improved the lives of impoverished people considerably (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad, 2009). This in turn created cohesion among the people and increased their attachment with Hezbollah.

Over the course of time, Hezbollah sought the consent and representation of the Shia community, and its own recognition within Lebanese society. Hezbollah thus became an active organisation with strong central leadership to coordinate actions. The leadership attracted interest not only from Iran but also from other sympathisers based outside Lebanon; these sources then started financing Hezbollah’s activities and missions. Iran believed that Hezbollah had become an active rebel organisation with an efficient and centralised organisational structure to carry out violent missions that could help Iran accomplish its political and foreign policy objectives (Wilner, 2018). It is believed that Iran provides over US$100 million per year to Hezbollah. Hezbollah also raises money by ‘taxing’ local people and charities, smuggling drugs and trading in minerals; it is believed to own several mining companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa (Levitt, 2005).

The inability of a non-state actor to maximise its resources may harm its effectiveness and even jeopardize its survival. The case of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrates this dynamic. During the 1970s and 1980s, the PLO was receiving an estimated $1.5 billion per year from sponsoring states. However, this massive inflow of aid corrupted the PLO leaders, who spent the money lavishly thus wasting it. This eventually adversely affected the organisation’s effectiveness and military prowess. Consequently, Israeli forces crushed the PLO brigade in their sanctuaries in Lebanon in the 1982 within a few hours (Creveld, 2002, pp. 288–299). In contrast to the PLO, Hezbollah has managed and utilised its resources more efficiently. This has allowed Hezbollah to gain in strength and popularity. Hezbollah’s military strength can be fathomed by considering the number of times it has inflicted a heavy blow on a military powerhouse like Israel. Hezbollah’s growing resources, popularity and military prowess have made a positive contribution to the Iran-Hezbollah alliance.

As the trust quotient between Hezbollah and Iran has grown, it has enabled Tehran to grant Hezbollah more autonomy of operations and to hold control over the resources which are at its disposal. Over time, Hezbollah has expanded its financial base within Lebanon. It has also expanded the various social institutions under its control by utilising its financial resources. Financial support from external non-Iranian sources has also swelled, and Hezbollah’s centralised system of leadership has managed and utilised these resources most effectively to feed its fighters, martyrs, widows and even common people without undue interference from Iran. Hezbollah’s growing financial and operational autonomy along with its growing military and political power has strengthened and reinforced its partnership with Iran, which has allowed the allying partners to pursue their common objectives more effectively.

The Iran-Hezbollah Ideological Nexus

Over the past three and half decades the Iran-Hezbollah ideological links have changed Hezbollah from a bumpy terrorist group to an arduous and aggressive guerrilla force. This ideological connection is based on the same philosophy and presumably has the same political objectives: the liberation of Palestine, the export of Iranian styled revolution and the countering of strategic rivals. These objectives have political roots, but they are also erected on an ideological narrative—the velayat-e-faqih—that both Tehran and Hezbollah have accepted (Milani, 1994). In the case of state-proxy alignment, states have been using persuasive techniques to push proxies to defend their strategic interests and to keep the alignment alive (Walt, 1985). If the allying parties have built an alliance based on ideological impulses but without a set of common interests, then the chances of alliance survival may become very thin. For example, the ideological alliance in Europe—the treaty of Munchengratz and Quadruple alliance—collapsed within a short period (Webste, 1951); the ideological alliance between Iraq and al-Qaeda also collapsed because of their diverging interests. However, the ideological alignment between Iran and Hezbollah has been a binding force in the presence of a set of common political and strategic objectives.

The artistically crafted Iranian ideology is based on absolutist principles and hard-nosed agendas. Iran has dragged her proxy into her ideological camp, and they are ideologically and philosophically connected and agreed upon to meet their common objectives (Ostovar, 2019). The ideological partners have identified some core interests—survival of Iranian clerical regime, anti-Israel stance, the liberation of Jerusalem and countering other regional actors—to strengthen their relations. The set of objectives have strengthened the ideological bond between them. The Iranian regime has been in a conundrum that the USA and Israel may ostensibly attack Iran to put an end to the clerical regime. This fear compelled Iran to assist and push its proxy, Hezbollah, as a frontline guerrilla force to check the aggression of Israel. The proxy’s role allows Tehran from getting directly involved while at the same time helping to advance its core strategic interests (Milani, 2009). Thus, Iran’s ideology has worked as a double-edged sword, ensuring the survival of the Iran-Hezbollah strategic alliance while infusing an emotional content in it (Coll, 2005).

Iran is a destabilising state and manoeuvres to extend its influence in the Middle East. Its positional machinate and ideological principles are strongly connected. Iran has been pushing its ideologically inspired proxy, Hezbollah, to meet, defend and advance its political agenda. But this scheme also advances the core strategic interests of Hezbollah. The allying parties have always reinforced their ideological narratives to mobilise the masses and attract more popular sympathy. But neither Iran nor Hezbollah have tried to impose their will on each other forcefully. In case of any conflicting debate, the parties take each other into confidence and decide whatever is best for them strategically. This ‘inextricable link’ between them (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 71) therefore ‘has been outstanding’ (Dalacoura, 2011, p. 82). However, the advice of the supreme leader of Iran counts a lot (Hamzeh, 2004, pp. 33–48) and Tehran has endeavoured to keep the ideological alignment active to promote her political agenda. Hence, ideological alignment has played an essential role in the survival of this state-proxy alliance.

Examining Anti-Israel Rhetoric and Chaotic Regional Structure

The Middle East has been a victim of many players for political reasons for a long time—colonialism, oppression, terrorism and internal feuds—which have wholly divided and devastated the region (Sørli, Gleditsch, & Strand, 2005). The incompetent leadership of the region never tried to fix but added much to the existing problems. The weak governance structures of the region also helped some dictators to be the master of the region while turning their weapons against Israel. For example, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt used the slogans of ‘Pan-Arabism’ and ‘Pan-Islamism’ to politically mobilise the Arab states against Israel and in favour of the Palestinians. Similarly, the Saudi, Iraqi and Jordanian monarchies allied against the rising Nasser but kept their guns trained against Israel. These developments gave momentum to interstate rivalries for the leadership of the Islamic world (Kerr, 1978). Growing interstate rivalries coupled with security threats in turn provoked Middle Eastern states to harbour and drive non-state actors (Findley, Piazza, & Young, 2012). For instance, the ever-increasing rivalry with Israel pushed Tehran to exploit the weaknesses of the Arab states and their military defeats against Israel (Matusitz, 2018). By raising anti-Israeli slogans and taking an aggressive stance against Israel after the Iranian Revolution, Tehran tried to solidify its leadership position in the region and in the Islamic world. The revolutionary regime in Tehran came to believe that an indirect armed resistance was the only option that could slowly bleed Israel to death, compensate for Iran’s military weakness vis-à-vis Israel, and allow Iran to assume a leadership position in the region and in the Islamic world by championing the Palestinian cause. Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah became deeply connected to this broad strategy. In return, Hezbollah ensured Iran of its loyalty.

Confronted with a variety of security challenges in the chaotic region, Iran has extended all possible assistance to its proxy, which has made Hezbollah a hostile and dangerous non-state actor hell bent on transforming the strategic landscape of the region. Additionally, the anti-Israel and anti-US rhetoric has deepened the commitment between Iran and Hezbollah. In the same vein, the revolutionary Khomeini’s statements about freeing Jerusalem (Ehteshami, 1995) gave momentum to the aggression of Hezbollah. Over time, the allying parties have declared that their joint armed struggle against Israel is legitimate and the only option. However, this military strategy has failed to compel Israel to change its position and policies relating to Palestine and the Middle East. This might be because of Israel’s strong military and a history of winning aggressive wars against the Arabs in the past. This intense rivalry but military weakness against Israel has been instrumental behind Tehran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah (Talmadge, 2008). Iran has shied away from direct military confrontation with Israel and instead explored the option of fighting Israel with other means such as Hezbollah. By using Hezbollah to attack Israel and keep it under pressure, Tehran significantly improved its strategic position vis-à-vis Israel in the 2000s (Osman, 2007). Anti-Israeli rhetoric and policy has, therefore, been a good driver for Iran with Hezbollah and contributed significantly to the survival of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance.

The Iran-Hezbollah Axis: A Joint Security

States often build alliances with non-state proxies to address their security needs and advance their strategic interests (Lake, 1999). While the arrangement may benefit both sides in terms of security and strategic calculations, it is also fraught with grave risks for both. The gradual increase in the power and capability of the non-state proxy may embolden it to give preference to its own geopolitical agenda over that of its state sponsor, thus adversely affecting the alliance (Morrow, 2000). The state may also come to see the non-state proxy as a tool to be used and discarded once its geopolitical objectives have been met; this may severely affect the durability and effectiveness of the non-state proxy. An element of distrust is thus embedded in state-proxy relations. However, if the state and the non-state proxy can develop trust in their relationship, then the longevity of their alliance would increase. In that scenario, the allying partners may combine their financial and military resources and jointly deploy their weaponry and conduct joint military operations, thereby promoting their security interests more effectively.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 has been a catalyst in uniting revolutionary-minded peoples in the periphery of Iran. Influenced by the ideology and message of the Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah in Lebanon emerged as a revolutionary organisation in the early 1980s and replaced AMAL as the most popular and militant voice of the people. Hezbollah’s rise and consolidation of power paved the way forward for cooperation with Iran. With Tehran’s political, financial and military support, Hezbollah became over time an aggressive fighting force and started manoeuvring in the region (Lamb, 2009).

Iran and Hezbollah have developed a reliable and trustworthy relationship, which has enabled them to neutralise the risks associated with such state-proxy alliances. The joint adventurism of Iran and Hezbollah in regional conflicts suggests that they have acted rationally while combining their resources, weaponry and manpower, which has enabled them to pursue their common strategic objectives effectively. This has increased their combined power, ensured their joint security and created security concerns among their rivals, including state and non-state actors in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s fighting force is well-trained, numbered in thousands and equipped with modern weapons. Moreover, Iran has also advanced its missile capability and other weaponry. This suggests that the allying parties have substantial military power, and they are on the same page when it comes to their combined security and strategic interests. This has potentially improved their military capabilities and manoeuvrability. Also, it has increased threat perception among their rival camps. In Syria, Hezbollah and Quds forces have been fighting together. Iran and Hezbollah’s deep involvement in the Syrian conflict suggests that they are more worried about the rise of powerful non-state actors in the region, which could undermine their combined interests. However, the stronger position of Iran-Hezbollah axis in Syria suggests that they are achieving their strategic objectives while ensuring their security. In sum, then, Iran and Hezbollah have overcome their diverging interests, and under the umbrella of converging interests they have substantially combined their resources, manpower and weaponry to advance their mutual security.

Iran’s Strategic Interests and Hezbollah

Over the past several decades, Iran’s interference through proxies in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states such as Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc., has helped to create a high degree of regional instability and generated fierce interstate rivalry. Moreover, Iran’s growing confrontations with Israel and pro-US Arab states have heightened the threat of regional war (Maoz & Mor, 2002).

Iran’s hostile interactions with regional foes and the USA has pushed Tehran to espouse a pragmatic, defensive and rational foreign policy (Barzegar, 2008; Ehteshami, 2002, p. 284). The most important component of this foreign policy is to defend Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at any cost. In line with this, the Islamist regime in Tehran believes that domestic cohesion would enable Iran to react to the ‘external pressures and opportunities’ in rather pragmatic ways in order to achieve its strategic and security interests (Akbarzadeh, 2014).

A second component of this pragmatic and rational foreign policy is to find ideological allies who may do Iran’s fighting and promote Iran’s geostrategic interests especially against regional rivals. But in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran found itself isolated and without trustworthy allies. It also found itself caught up in an 8-year long war with Iraq (1980–1988), which devastated its economy, stretched its meagre military resources morbidly thin and further diminished its regional influence. It is in this context that one must also view the Iran-Hezbollah alliance.

To Iran, Hezbollah is an important and trusted ally that has diminished Tehran’s isolation in the region over time and helped promote Iran’s regional geostrategic interests. Hezbollah’s involvement and clout in Lebanon’s domestic politics has helped Tehran to acquire an ally and foothold in a sensitive and strategic part of the Middle East (Alagha, 2011). Hezbollah’s aggression against Israel, which forced Israel to militarily withdraw from south Lebanon after years of occupation, has been instrumental in meeting their combined strategic objectives (Geist Pinfold, 2019; Samaan, 2017; Suechika, 2018). Moreover, the regional conflicts (such as Syria) where Hezbollah and Iran are directly or indirectly involved serve their joint strategic interests. It is for these reasons that Iran has steadfastly supported Hezbollah and worked tirelessly to create trust in the relationship, which explains why the alliance has endured for over three decades and still going strong.

Conclusion

State-proxy alignment can be considered highly unreliable and unpredictable because the allying parties often pursue divergent strategic interests and fail to develop trust in their relationship. This is why state-proxy alliances often fail to survive for long. However, Iran and Hezbollah have maintained their alliance for over three decades, despite Iran’s bad reputation and serious questions regarding credibility since Iran is generally considered as a source of instability in the Middle East. But its successful alliance with non-state proxies in general, and with Hezbollah in particular, has been the function of its diplomatic and political isolation, ideological commonality and common strategic objectives.

Tehran’s initial cooperation and partnership with AMAL in Lebanon failed because of a lack of commitment and untrustworthiness on Iran’s part. Taking advantage of the situation, Hezbollah successfully undermined its competitor AMAL, gained momentum and transformed itself into a revolutionary and resistive force under the patronage of Iran. Initially, Hezbollah demonstrated and consolidated its power by conducting suicide terrorist attacks against its adversaries. Hezbollah’s growing power and the effectiveness of its suicide attacks attracted Iran to extend its assistance. Subsequent wars with Israel and Israel’s military withdrawal from southern Lebanon increased Hezbollah’s prestige and fighting capabilities, which further gave space to the alliance and helped to build trust and cooperation between the allying partners.

The Iran-Hezbollah alliance has escaped collapse, unlike many other state-proxy alliances. The reasons may be multifaceted, but three important factors stand out. First, Iran has given Hezbollah complete autonomy over its actions and activities. Hezbollah has been actively and independently recruiting fighters, allocating salaries and pensions for them and their families, carrying out military operations and improving its military capabilities. Also, Hezbollah independently deals with domestic political issue within Lebanon. Second, Hezbollah has complete control over its resources. The revenue generated from institutions and contributions from Iran and other sources are in Hezbollah’s control and it has utilised these resources skilfully, responsibly and effectively. Finally, both Iran and Hezbollah have demonstrated their firm and sincere commitment to the alliance and stayed away from the politics of opportunism. They have worked hard to align their core interests and tried to take full advantage of regional chaos and instability to further those interests.

In conclusion, we argue that Hezbollah has now become a strong resistive force, unlike many other terrorist groups. Its growing power and achievements have attracted Iran to extend its cooperation, commitment and assistance to Hezbollah. The Iran-Hezbollah alliance is thus expected to continue and grow even more powerful in the foreseeable future.