Mulling the Contours of India’s Taliban Policy: Past,Present and Future Prospects

Phase 1: 1990–1996

Soviet and American (proxy) departure left behind the debris of factional infighting among various mujahideen groups which quickly devolved into a civil war. The surviving government of Najibullah, did not last long under the advances made by various groups. Eventually, the Peshawar Accords, crafted by Pakistan placed Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami in power in 1992. This did not necessarily quell the ongoing conflicts between various mujahideen groups and Rabbani was forced to flee in 1996 with the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul. Of note here is the role Pakistan played in the rise to power of both regimes. Not only had it been deeply engaged in fuelling the war in Afghanistan serving as a conduit for American action but remained embedded as a strong influencer.

During these years, Delhi, it appears was not necessarily averse to engaging with the pro-Pakistan mujahideen. Both Bhadrakumar (2011) and Paliwal (2015), make the case that while there appears to be a general presumption that India was anti-engagement, it was in fact open to dialogue. Bhadrakumar referencing the Rao (Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 1991–1996) doctrine elaborates on some of its core policy guidelines. First,

… we should deal with all mujahideen groups without fear or favor and contact should be established with anyone and everyone willing to meet us despite the militancy of their Islamism. Two, we would deal with whosoever was in power in Kabul and focus would be on cultivating a friendly government that was sensitive to India’s vital interests and core concerns. Three, dealings would strictly be with the government in Kabul, no matter its proximity with Pakistan or its security agencies. Four, we would neither arm any Afghan group nor ostracize any—not even the Wahhabi group of Ittehad headed by Rasul Sayyaf to which Jalaluddin Haqqani owed allegiance at that time. Five, we would focus on the people-to-people relationship, tap into the reservoir of goodwill toward India and meaningfully contribute to Afghanistan’s economic welfare within our capabilities and resource… (Bhadrakumar, 2011).

Similarly, Paliwal (2015) building on Bhadrakumar’s observations persuasively argues that foreign policy circles in New Delhi were torn between a preference for engagement grounded in some of Rao’s guidelines and an understanding of the mujahideen as ethno-national entities, and those that formed the anti-engagement coalition, stressing security threats and focusing on the nature of the mujahideen, especially Taliban, as religious fundamentalists. Paliwal argues that the policy discourse circled around engagement and anti-engagement, understanding engagement as ‘… as a process whereby two political entities are involved in non-coercive diplomacy and have existing channels of interaction, either covert or overt.’ (p. 5) It does not imply diplomatic recognition or granting legitimacy to the other party, though it does imply refusal to use military means. Anti-engagement on the other hand, ‘… implies partisan political support to one group over the other.’ (p. 5) It allows for use of coercive force and ending diplomatic contact. While there is little evidence to suggest that engagement principles were actively applied during this phase, India did retain its diplomatic presence in Kabul and hosted Rabbani and other mujahideen commanders, those avowedly against India, en route to Indonesia for the Non-Aligned conference in September of 1996. This, after India had pulled its mission out of Kabul after attacks on it and severed all connection with Afghanistan. Ostensibly, this visit was a refuelling halt requested by the Rabbani government (Bhadrakumar, 2011). While there is a hint here of dialogue, we are not made aware of the discussions, though shortly thereafter, India did support Rabbani’s government in exile and its opposition to the Taliban. Thus, as India grappled with the unfolding events, differences in perceptions of the nature of adversaries and the appropriate means of dealing with them, tipped in favour of anti-engagement, which began to emerge more forcefully with the resurgence of the Taliban by the end of 1996 and in the years that followed. Even then, notes Paliwal, the tension between these two policy frameworks never quite withered. Irrespective of the policy debates, India’s presence during this phase of Afghan politics is minimal at best. Having withdrawn missions from the country and severed contact, it left the ground open for Pakistan to continue extending its already considerable hold on mujahideen groups and on Afghan politics.

India’s policy preferences could potentially be explained by the dire economic situation in India, the lessons of intervention in Sri Lanka, the pragmatic, cautious nature of Rao as the Prime Minister of India, and the fact that India had only seriously begun to grapple with the nature of Jihadi organisations and their potential ramifications by the end of the phase when we do see the shift (Paliwal, 2015). At the international level, there was a vacuum of sorts—both the Soviets and Americans had retreated, one had collapsed and the other had accomplished its mission of dislodging the Soviets, albeit leaving the field ripe for a civil war. Despite the vibrant policy contestations noted by Paliwal (2015) the fact remains that India’s policy was distracted and only began to take shape after 1996.

Phase 2: 1996—2001

By late1996 Taliban had managed to ensconce itself in Kabul and came to constitute the governing regime, no matter how contested. While other mujahideen groups also coalesced around religious beliefs, the Taliban evoked stronger reactions from India and other states as it was seen to be a more aggressive fundamentalist organisation. From India’s standpoint, the Taliban was seen as the creation of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and ambient relations between the regime and Pakistan meant that the strategic depth that Pakistan so aspired for vis-à-vis its relations with India, was within reach. Further, a deeply Islamic regime is suspect in the eyes of New Delhi, as it has the potential to stoke anti-India sentiments and action in Indian Jammu and Kashmir as elsewhere. Taliban’s support for anti-India terrorist organisations such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in terms of safe havens did not make relations easy (Mishra, 2021). It did not help that Mullah Omar made a statement supporting Jihad in Kashmir (Willington, 2001). Domestically, the government in India had now come to be dominated by the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was more assertive of its Hindu roots and Kashmir policy, resulting in increased support of the anti-engagement coalition. That, Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkey, Central Asian states and the US similarly considered the Taliban with concern only made the Indian policy option more appropriate (Paliwal, 2015, pp. 28–29).

Thus, in India, the policy discourse shifted distinctly and firmly in the direction of anti-engagement. India joined Russia and Iran to curtail the growing power of the Taliban by militarily (covert) supporting groups inimical to it, specifically the Northern Alliance (or the United Front) led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. Paliwal (2015, p. 21) hints that at least initially such intervention was made by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and did not have political clearance. The policy crystallised in September 1995 with the capture of Herat by the Taliban—interestingly these states were at the forefront of opposing the Taliban when other states were hardly paying any attention. India’s support to the Northern Alliance took the form of airlifting non-military supplies to Massoud’s troops via Iran, supplying money (amount unknown), spares for the air force and ground radar. As early as the beginning of 1996, ‘around 30 Indian technicians were reportedly maintaining Massoud’s MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft… and transport helicopters, while military advisers assisted alliance forces by providing tactical advice on operations against the Taliban. Massoud also reportedly benefited from Indian high-altitude warfare equipment’, as well as a field hospital at a base in Farkhar operated by 25 Indian army doctors and nurses (Withington, 2001). Not only was India supportive of groups opposing the Taliban internally, it maintained diplomatic contact with Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jamaat-e-Islami, who had established a government in exile (Paliwal, 2015, p. 10). As expected, India severed all contact with the ruling regime in Kabul (though (Paliwal, 2015, p. 13) notes that between 1992 and 1996 there had been four such closures), supported UN resolution 1076 condemning the Taliban’s human rights record, particularly its treatment of women and denied it legitimacy.

And yet, the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC814 and its forced landing in Kandahar by Pakistan-based militants forced the Indian government to engage with the Taliban that functioned as mediators. After 8 days of negotiations, the hostages were released. India’s attempts at armed intervention were prevented by the Taliban militia which surrounded the plane, though the Taliban also refused the plane to take off elsewhere. Paliwal argues that this was a diplomatic opportunity that was lost on both sides—in his reading the Taliban saw itself as a neutral broker between the two parties and while the Indian spokesperson acknowledged the Taliban’s assistance, nothing came of it. That said, the missed moment of potential dialogue was not emblematic of India’s actions vis-à-vis Taliban—rather the second and third (partially) phases bridged an aggressive anti-Taliban strategy.

Phase 3: 2001–2021

Political fortunes of various Afghan parties shifted again by 2001, when the Taliban was effectively evicted from Kabul, though it could never be completely marginalised. This situation was the consequence of American and NATO military intervention in Afghanistan, a reaction to the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 and the presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and its close linkages with the Taliban. India was supportive of the US/NATO-led intervention and even though it was a marginal player at the Bonn Conference in 2001, its support of the non-Pashtuns of United Front was active (Paliwal, 2015, p. 30). Eventually, Western-backed regimes of Hamid Karzai (2001–2014) and Ashraf Ghani (2014–2021) established quasi-democratic governments in Afghanistan, though they could never demolish Taliban as an insurgent force, which had already begun creeping alarmingly back by 2006. Both leaders made overtures to the Taliban and sought to reconcile and integrate them into governing institutions, incentivising them to return to the political mainstream, especially with the Taliban’s strong resurgence. This necessary shift in Afghan politics was internationally legitimised at the London conference in 2010.

India, engaged most extensively with Afghanistan during this phase, keen to shore up its relations with political factions that were cautious of Pakistan and wary of its close relations with the Taliban. It is reputed to have been the largest regional donor and the fifth largest in the world, contributing US$3 billion toward various mega and minor projects. It strengthened diplomatic engagement and security cooperation (training Afghan intelligence and security personnel) and focused its attention on infrastructure development and capacity building: engaging in the construction of symbolic institutions such as the parliament, but also key trade infrastructure such as the highway to Chabahar port in Iran, Salma dam, roads and highways, electrical infrastructure, schools and hospitals. During Manmohan Singh’s visit to Kabul in 2005, India showed its inclination to provide more meaningful support to minor projects that would have more of an impact on the lives of ordinary citizens in the sectors of health, education and women’s empowerment (D’Souza, 2013). According to D’Souza, Indian assistance was unique in that the Indian government worked with the governmental institutions in Afghanistan and sought to strengthen their capabilities, rather than through a parallel network of international organisations structure that was the dominant mode of assistance by Western states. India’s strategy involved a focus on development, economic stability and provision of basic needs in support of the more moderate political regimes in power, though D’Souza also comments that India’s capacity-building projects ended up being capacity substituting as infrastructure projects lacked long-term sustainability (Souza, 2021). This was also intended to erode the base for the Taliban, though as Paliwal (2016, p. 477) observes, ‘New Delhi was closely watching Taliban movements and searching for ways to build political constituencies in the Pashtun hinterlands along the border with Pakistan’. Paliwal (2015, p. 32), also informs us that India covertly engaged with certain Taliban and pro-Pakistan factions including Hekmatyar, the Quetta and Peshawar Shura between 2005 and 2006, though in the end, it had no network on the ground.

During this period, India could not have been unaware of the gradual rise in power of the Taliban and the efforts of the Afghan government backed by international agreements, to reintegrate Taliban leaders and foot soldiers into the government, through institutions such as the Afghan High Peace Council established in 2010. It is telling that India went on to sign a strategic partnership with Afghanistan shortly thereafter in October 2011 and its commitment only increased with time. This can be seen as a sign of acquiescence on India’s part, a pragmatic recognition that the existing regime’s survival depended on the integration of the Taliban and the hope that such integration would make the Taliban more mainstream and moderate. This anyway was the consensus in Afghanistan and outside. India appears to have rationalised these changes by stating that the resolution of Afghanistan’s problems was to be led and determined by them as they sought best.

However, despite the best of intentions, things fell apart. Afghanistan’s problematic governance was rife with corruption under the Karzai and Ghani regimes, flagging Western interest, increased violence and drone attacks by US and NATO forces, and acceptance of the re-emergence of Taliban as a political entity requiring negotiated agreements (US–Taliban agreement in Doha in 2020 that excluded the Afghan government being the exemplar), the imminent departure of Western presence all lead to the collapse of the Ghani regime and Taliban’s return to Kabul. India was back to its old conundrum of having to deal with a fundamentalist regime.

Phase 4: August 2021–2022

In August 2021, the Taliban rolled into Kabul. This was both a surprise and yet seemingly inevitable. Over the years there had been a gradual recognition that the Taliban had been far from vanquished. This recognition was evident in the various attempts to engage the Taliban by the Afghan government, reports of formal peace talks between the US and Taliban in 2013 (Graham-Harrison, 2013), the US-Taliban agreement to refrain from attacking each other’s forces, and finally the diplomatic engagement between the US and the Taliban in Doha. While the agreement was allegedly to ensure a more diverse government and an avoidance of conflict, the American decision to retreat from Afghanistan under the Trump and Biden administration, enacted in the latter, certainly unleashed a chain of events, wherein the Taliban moved swiftly and currently dominates the political scene. But the ease with which it grabbed power has not been reflected in its governance experience. Taliban is in a desperate financial condition given that public expenditure was primarily dependent (75%) on international funding which was blocked, given that Western nations froze close to US$9.5 billion of the Afghan Central Bank funds. In the months since its take-over, Afghanistan is teetering from one crisis to another—a severe winter, extensive food and medicine shortage, earthquake and unstable law and order situation. These events have not dislodged the Taliban from the helm at Kabul.

While the initial impulse may be to leave Afghanistan to its fate, given the disastrous intervention in the last several decades, this decision has some grave consequences. Consequences not just for the people of Afghanistan who are not only at the mercy of a brutal political regime and barely able to survive, but also the potential for civil war, refugee crisis the situation may generate in neighbouring countries, fear of increased political radicalism seeing that Islamic State (Khorasan) has found a foothold in Afghanistan and opium trade. For India, the situation is even more delicate, to put it mildly, because of the potential influence this situation grants to Pakistan and increasingly China. The growing nexus between the two states and their capacity to influence Taliban certainly enhances India’s security threat perceptions. While Pakistan has been a strong presence in Afghanistan, China’s engagement is new and concerning. Taliban has been on India’s mind whether in power or out. While there are strong reasons for India’s wariness, it cannot ignore the Taliban nor go against it, engagement seems unavoidable but of what sort? India’s current actions can be split into several dimensions of interaction; direct dealings with the Taliban, regional dialogue, humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and India’s position at international forums like the UN as it deals with the unfolding events.

As things stand, no state has granted Taliban diplomatic recognition though some states have engaged in diplomatic conversations or have facilitated diplomacy between the Taliban and other states. Here Qatar and Pakistan certainly come to mind, though China too has invited Taliban delegates, as well as Russia and Norway. While India has not invited the Taliban, it has covertly engaged with the Taliban in Doha on 31 August 2021 (Haider, 2021), where the Indian Ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met with the senior Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. Indian diplomats led by J. P. Singh, the Special Representative of India for Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, were rumoured to have met the Taliban delegation led by Afghanistan’s deputy prime minister Maulvi Abdul Salam Hanafi during the Moscow gathering in October the same year, though India did not confirm these talks (Joshua, 2021). While India has shrouded these meetings in official ambiguity, the fact is that India has been present at the Intra-Afghan dialogue or the Afghan–Taliban talks that began in September 2020. India’s external minister S. Jaishankar attended the inaugural event, as did a delegation from the Ministry of External Affairs led by J. P. Singh (Haider, 2021). India also would not have been unaware of the talks between the US and the Taliban that had been underway and had concluded in an agreement on 29 February 2020. The shift in power balance could not have come as a surprise to the Indian government. In this regard, it is difficult to understand India’s refusal to acknowledge its dialogue with the Taliban in which it clearly was engaged. What is noteworthy, is that India did not support the Panjshir resistance (Ahlawat, 2021)—a clear sign that its opposition to the Taliban would not take the form of covert support for resistance movements. This may well have been the case because unlike the last time around, there was not only acquiescence to the Taliban’s power as seen through various agreements, but also India’s erstwhile partners Russia and Iran were now in the process of negotiations. Having supported opposition groups for several years, India’s inaction appears a pragmatic recognition of the ineffectualness of this strategy under the current circumstances, more so given the lack of international resistance. Taliban’s inevitability requires a different tack. More recently the pace of interaction between India and Afghanistan seems to have picked up. On June 2, senior Indian officials travelled to Kabul and by the 23, India had reopened its diplomatic mission (Mir, 2022). Afghanistan’s foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi expressed gratitude and urged the resumption of projects and diplomatic engagement. Not only is the humanitarian aid coordinated with the Taliban, but India is also working with other UN agencies such as WHO, WFP and UNICEF (Chaudhury, 2022). It is believed that this direct engagement on India’s part was facilitated by the Taliban’s willingness to pursue Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and al-Qaeda and to prevent anti-India activity. An interesting turn of events for sure, given that these organisations have been allies of the Taliban and backed by Pakistan. Whether the Taliban can withdraw support or be able to control these organisations, is another matter—prospects appear difficult (though not impossible) given the presence of other hard-core organisations (al-Qaeda and ISK) and their capacity to draw the faithful.

India has not only engaged in diplomatic interactions, secretive and otherwise, it has also sought dialogue and consensus at the regional level. In November 2021, India held the Third Regional Security dialogue thus seeking to display its interest in Afghanistan, build consensus among participating members and address the emerging humanitarian crisis. The Delhi Declaration signed by eight attending states expressed its concerns regarding terrorism, financing radicalisation and urged the establishment of an inclusive government in Kabul that would replace the interim Taliban rule, promoting national reconciliation. Several points of note emerge. First, Pakistan and China declined the dialogue. Pakistan was hosting its own ‘Troika-plus’ meeting with the US, China and Russia, to which the foreign minister of Afghanistan had been invited. The snub and the timing of the meeting are telling. Second, while India still is mulling its relationship with the Taliban, other countries have been more proactive. Turkmenistan for instance sent a ministerial delegation to meet with the Taliban and Uzbekistan accorded the visiting deputy prime minister the full protocol while engaging in dialogue about trade, transit and railways. Russia and Iran still have their embassies and have not shaken off their diplomatic presence—in fact, their diplomatic engagements have only increased (The Hindu, 2021). Third, it is interesting that there is a reference to the Taliban as an interim government in the declaration, suggesting that the Indian government prefers to consider its presence as a temporary arrangement. Given India’s not-so-secret unofficial meetings with the Taliban, this seems an interesting position for India to assert. It is not yet clear how the Delhi declaration allows India to exert influence in the region, though it is certainly a space for coordination among the attending members, irrespective of the proactive approach of other nations. India continues to engage in regional forums with Russia, Iran, Central Asian states and China as evident in the fourth regional security dialogue in May 2022 at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, where India asserted historic ties and its humanitarian assistance and issued a call for counter-terrorism and respect for women. No longer was there a reference to the Taliban as the interim regime (Financial Express, 2022).

In international forums, particularly the United Nations, India has been actively involved in crafting responses in the United Nations Security Council as it currently holds the non-permanent seat for a 2-year term and is chairing important committees of the Council; the Taliban Sanctions Committee, Libyan Sanctions Committee and UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. On 22 December 2021, the Security Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 2,615, providing for a humanitarian exemption to the sanctions established in 2011 and 2015, the latter concerning individuals and entities associated with the Taliban. While the resolution clarified that providers must make reasonable efforts to ensure that no benefits accrued to individuals or entities specified in the sanctions list in resolution 1988 (2011), it was supportive of payment of funds and provision of goods and services. The resolution also required a review after a year and a 6-monthly report by the Emergency Relief Coordinator. India’s representative, T. S. Murti, noted that the humanitarian assistance must be based on ‘neutrality, impartiality and independence disbursed to all regardless of ethnicity, religion or political belief; and reach the most vulnerable first, including women, children and minorities’ (United Nations, 2021). India had supported 2,593 (August 2021), that while attentive to the humanitarian crisis and the critical events at the Karzai International Airport, had also urged the necessity of upholding human rights, especially of women, children and minorities, and encouraged an ‘inclusive, negotiated political settlement’. It had also stated the need to ensure that Afghan territory would not be used to launch attacks or provide safe havens to terrorists (UN, Adopting Resolution 2593 (2021), Security Council Condemns Deadly Attacks in Afghanistan, Calls for Combating Terrorism, Upholding Human Rights, 2021). For India, it was important that the resolution referenced entities that were under the sanctions, specifically Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Bhattacherjee, 2021). India, it appears was not very pleased with the resolution in December and its representative asserted the need to be guided by the provisions of resolution 2,593 (Subramanian, 2022). Besides, while India did vote for resolution 2,615, it along with some other nations had sought a clearer delineation of humanitarian aid to ensure that it did not end in the hands of the Taliban and wanted a 6-month extension for skirting sanctions and a review at the end of it. However, the final resolution did not place any time limit and did not include any provisions for preventing the misuse of funds. The final resolution had the support of China and Russia which had argued against placing any time restrictions and had abstained from resolution 2,593 (Subramanian, 2022). It is reported that India, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, along with France had some sharp differences over the proposal though eventually the proposal was passed unanimously.

The issue of humanitarian aid is also tied up with the question of US$9.5 billion of financial assets of the Afghan Central Bank Reserves primarily held by the United States, which were frozen after the Taliban took control in August 2021. While the initial request for their release came from the Taliban, China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, and others also have called for their release. Most recently the Secretary-General of the UN, made a plea, arguing that ‘freezing temperatures and frozen assets are a lethal combination for the people of Afghanistan’ and stating that funding should be allowed to pay for the salaries of public sector workers and to help ‘Afghan institutions deliver healthcare, education and other vital services’ (UN, 2022). The US government has finally weighed in on the matter and on 11 February 2022, released US$3.5 billion to be used for aid while reserving another US$3.5 billion for claims made by victims of 9/11, against the Taliban regime. While there are concerns about the Taliban’s appropriation of funds, the Biden administration intends to funnel the money through international aid organisations (Kelemen, 2022). While these decisions by the United States are problematic for many reasons, what is interesting is India’s silence on this issue. That said, India has been active in providing humanitarian support, evident in its shipments of wheat, basic medicines and COVID-19 vaccinations in 2021 and 2022 (The Hindustan Times, 2022). Some of these shipments required transportation through Pakistan—a problem since India-Afghan trade is restricted to one-way transit through Pakistan. It appears that Pakistan which had earlier refused the transit of goods from India, did so at the Taliban’s behest upon a request made by the interim foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi (Jamal, 2021).

To understand India’s responses to the Taliban, one must understand the Taliban’s actions as well. Currently, the Taliban is interested in presenting itself as an acceptable regime, seeking to meet some of the expectations of the international community of states. Taliban is also a fragmented entity, rife with factional struggles between the moderates and hardliners. It is also not the same entity it was so many years ago—its survival instincts have led to potential reaching out to opposition leaders such as Ahmad Massoud (son of the Panjshir leader Ahmad Shah Massoud), Ismail Khan (governor of Herat) and perhaps even ex-vice president Amrullah Saleh (Malhotra, 2022). In keeping with the international focus on human rights violations, especially of women and children, the Taliban have recently announced that girls will be allowed an education, though these announcements tend to vary. And yet, there is no certainty that these promises will be adhered to, certainly after the Taliban gains a firmer foothold as a governing regime. As for India, the Taliban appears not to be dismissive of India. Irrespective of previous misgivings and lack of Indian invitations, it has been willing to engage in third party states. It has also invited India to continue investment in Afghanistan (Mishra, 2021). Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, a senior Taliban leader recently said that India is ‘very important for this subcontinent’ and that the Taliban would like to continue Afghanistan’s ‘cultural’, ‘economic’, ‘political’ and ‘trade ties’ with India ‘like in the past’ (Jamal, 2021). Taliban is well aware of the support India has offered and continues to offer in terms of the provision of humanitarian aid. But this budding relationship, if it can be called that, is inevitably coloured by the presence of Pakistan.

While much has been written on the Pakistan-Taliban nexus, this nexus is not that simple. Paliwal (2016) examining the foreign policy behaviour of weak states in a turbulent geopolitical environment, argues that we can best understand Afghanistan’s policy as being Pakistan friendly or Pakistan averse and that despite the weakness of the state, its elites including the Afghan Taliban, understand the importance of balancing India and Pakistan. He notes that the shifting ethnic and religious alliances between groups in Afghanistan and these states show that there is no necessary alignment and reflect its independent agency. Irrespective of the regimes governing Afghanistan, it has not budged on accepting the legitimacy of the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan. The recent brief spat on the border reinforces this position. Taliban have strongly objected to the fencing that Pakistan has undertaken of the 2,670 km international border and in December tore down the fences in the south-eastern Nimroz province, while also clashing along the Nangarhar province (The Hindu, 2022). More recently, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, was reputed to have informed Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf that Afghanistan will not allow its territory to be used for activities against other countries and further that it would like to hasten the completion of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline as well as the Central Asia–South Asia Electricity and Trade project (Malhotra, 2022). According to the International Crisis Group, ‘Taliban, in fact, at least initially appeared in some ways to be dictating Pakistan’s policy choices—forcing Islamabad to concede to at least some demands on cross border movement and pressuring it to reach it to reach a negotiated settlement with the Pakistani Taliban’ (International Crisis Group, 2022). The capacity of the latter group, also referred to as the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), to wreck considerable violence in Pakistan is very much a matter of grave concern for Pakistan (Ahlawat, 2021).

As for Pakistan, it is telling that Pakistan has not formally recognised the legitimacy of the regime, a contrast to its previous behaviour in 1996 when it was one of the three countries to recognise the Islamic Emirate and the last to sever its connection. It is however advocating for the Taliban through policy announcements, participation in bilateral talks and multilateral forums seeking the international community to engage with the Taliban, lift economic sanctions and provide humanitarian aid (International Crisis Group, 2022). As the ICG group notes, it is in the interests of Pakistan to exercise any influence it has, to moderate the actions of the regime, to shore up its own legitimacy and that of the regime as well, thus allowing both access to Western political and economic institutions and support of other states. While Pakistan has an advantage in having a regime friendly to it, such an ally may prove problematic if it continues to defy international expectations and there is regime collapse unleashing a cascade effect of refugee outflow, narcotics trade and increased radicalism. While India will certainly feel the effects of any such eventuality, so will Pakistan. Ahmed and Ahlawat note that while India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads in Afghanistan, they have much in common. Just as India is concerned about the influence of the Haqqani network that has been strongly anti-India, so also Pakistan has much to worry about Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Both states have security concerns that emerge from the spread of al-Qaeda in Asia and the Islamic State of Khorasan, which have expansionist plans and do not consider state borders as legitimate. Both countries face common concerns related to refugees, with Pakistan having three million and India 11,000. The drug trade is alarming. It is concerning that India seized a shipment of 2.7 billion worth of heroin coming from Afghanistan in September of 2021.

At the other end, China’s actions are worth paying attention to—while China has not granted formal recognition, it did host a Taliban delegation as early as July 2021, has continued diplomatic engagement and has actively pushed for humanitarian support (providing aid to the tune of US$31 million) and removal of sanctions in multilateral institutions like the UN. In many regards, China has been more proactive than India. It is also keen to ensure that the Taliban do not become a source of support for the Uighur dissidents, specifically the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and that its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is not threatened after having invested US$62 billion and finally is able to step into the vacuum left behind by the departure of the US and its allies. Given Afghanistan’s possession of vast reserves of rare earth minerals, China’s move is prescient, though its investment in the Mes Aynak copper mine in Wardak province remains stalled since 2008 (Murtazashvili, 2022).

While the Pakistan-China nexus regarding Afghanistan, is concerning, it is also worth ruminating on the more recent (June 2022) overtures between India and Taliban. Pakistan does not seem to have the same leverage it has historically had and is itself in dire straits given the political and economic turmoil it routinely faces. China does not enjoy the kind of historic relationship that India has had and India’s efforts in the last several decades in terms of capacity building from law and order to necessities certainly give it a stronger basis for building bridges. China’s engagement appears to have focused on capital-intensive projects, like the Belt and Road initiative and these may not have the same resonance in a war-torn country as the availability of necessities. Alarms about Chinese lending practices and their consequences, with the latest case being Sri Lanka also present a cautionary tale for Afghanistan. India should also capitalise on the fact that the Afghan population has a favourable opinion of India. While regimes governing Afghanistan have tilted in India’s direction and away and they matter, India has a unique advantage, vis-à-vis other states in terms of society-state relations. Even though one can hardly call this a sweet spot for India, the fact that two religious-based governing regimes, one Hindu (and internally anti-Muslim) and the other hard-core Islamist, have moved beyond secretive meetings to public diplomatic engagement is indicative of the pragmatism at both ends. While identities matter as constructivists have so persuasively argued, they may not be all-encompassing. India’s confident engagement may also stem from its control of Indian Jammu and Kashmir, which lost its special status and was integrated as two union territories under heavy troop presence in 2019. These policy transitions are in part reflective of global exhaustion, regional interstate dynamics (especially between India, Pakistan and China) and pragmatic recognition of the enduring presence of the Taliban by all parties concerned.