Abstract
Hedging is a collection of tactics that includes bandwagoning, limited resistance and involvement. Put another way, it is an insurance position between the two simple tactics of balancing and bandwagoning. Many states, including India, have adopted hedging as a favoured approach since the end of the Cold War. In light of the US–China rivalry and shifting great power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, India continues to pursue a ‘hedging the bets’ strategy, despite the country and the United States enjoying stronger strategic ties—particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This article argues that as a rising power with its own ambitions to carve out a strategic space, India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific seeks to retain a free, open and inclusive regional order. In the short and medium terms, this means forming soft-balancing coalitions and limited hard-balancing relationships with the United States. Strategic hedging still dominates Indian strategy in a broad sense. Forming an alliance with Washington will alienate China and Russia, the two great powers India is attempting not to dissociate completely. India’s somewhat neutral position on the Russian war on Ukraine and reluctance to join active military alliances in the Indo-Pacific indicates that hedging has value for maintaining India’s strategic autonomy and aspirations for great power status in the twenty-first century. India’s continued engagement through institutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and G20 as well as increased trade with China and Russia suggest the pursuit of a hedging strategy in its relations with other great powers.
Introduction
In the twenty-first century global order, the Indo-Pacific expanse has emerged as a dynamic and strategically significant area, attracting the attention of major powers and shaping the geopolitical landscape. Countries all over the world are actively modifying their strategic outlooks and developing new policies to increase their influence in the Indo-Pacific area as it emerges as the global centre of strategic and economic gravity, while nations in the region attempt to handle this increased attention (Haruko, 2020; Paskal, 2021; Radjaradjane, 2022). The Indo-Pacific’s inherent characteristics, such as its interconnectedness, breadth and multi-polarity as a multi-player game, contribute to the region’s solution to the strategic challenge of navigating China’s grand power play and the more aggressive and unilateral features of US reassertion. At least four major powers—China, India, Japan and the United States—as well as numerous important middle players—Australia, South Korea, the nations of Southeast Asia and Europe, among others—have interests that intersect in the Indo-Pacific power narrative. Russia is also becoming more noticeable. Thus, the Indo-Pacific area is a multi-polar system, where the interests and agencies of numerous states determine the fate of regional order or disorder rather than that of one or even two powers, the United States and China (Medcalf, 2019; Suzuki, 2020).
The Indo-Pacific region is essential to American security and economic growth, as the country has long acknowledged. China is trying to become the most powerful country in the world by combining its economic, diplomatic, military and technological strength in order to expand its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Chinese aggression and coercion are widespread, but they are particularly severe in the Indo-Pacific region (The White House, 2022). The major world powers, including the US, Australia, Japan, India and the United States are now uniting through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and cooperative military exercises like the Malabar exercise, while China continues to play its cards. In order to guarantee a free and open Indo-Pacific area, some European nations, including France, Germany and others, are collaborating with the US and India and have developed their own perspectives on the prevailing geopolitical framework (Singh, 2023).
India’s geopolitical location enables it to be a major player in the Indo-Pacific, providing both opportunities and challenges. As a result, India has recognised the significance of developing a comprehensive and nuanced approach to navigate the complexities of the region. As a rising power with diverse geopolitical interests and security concerns, India seeks to safeguard its national interests while maintaining a delicate balance in the evolving regional dynamics. The geostrategic location, capability plus ambitions and the various threat perceptions remain as the key determinants in shaping India’s position in the Indo-Pacific region. Its population and expanding economic aspirations spurred a desire to participate more actively in the geopolitics and security architecture of the area (Bhatt, 2018; Ganapathi, 2019; Haruko, 2020; Tourangbam, 2021). India’s goal has been clear: to use the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical space to advance its interests by maintaining strategic autonomy and respond to changing security environment through hedging policies (Baruah, 2020).
Geopolitical Landscape of the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific region is an expansive geopolitical landscape spanning from the eastern coast of Africa to the western coast of the Americas encompasses vital sea lanes, valuable resources and strategic chokepoints. This dynamic and complex region serves as a vibrant hub for trade, economic activities and maritime security cooperation with diverse geopolitical, economic and security interests. German geopolitician Karl Haushofer used the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ in the 1920s in his essay ‘Indopazifischen Raum’, which is considered the earliest geopolitical declaration on the subject. With the publication of an article in the Maritime Affairs journal by renowned New Zealand analyst Peter Cozens, who looked back on 60 years of maritime developments in the Indo-Pacific region, the formal academic articulation of the Indo-Pacific concept started to take root in the twenty-first century (Khurana, 2019, 2023). Later, Khurana (2007) coined the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ to refer to the maritime region that encompasses both the Indian and Western Pacific seas and lines the littorals of East and West Asia in his article ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’.
India and Japan’s shared strategic objectives gave rise to the first conscious and political conceptualisation of the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’. But it was not until Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke in the Indian parliament in 2007 that the phrase truly took off. He referred to the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the ‘confluence of the two seas’ (Abe, 2007). In order to proclaim the United States’ pivot to the region and coin the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, Hilary Clinton authored an essay for Foreign Policy magazine in 2011 highlighting the important connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Clinton, 2011); the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deployed the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ for the first time in December 2012 at the India–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Commemorative Summit which legitimised the use of the term at the highest levels (Scott, 2012). Then, in its 2013 Defence White Paper, Australia embraced the term (Australian Government, 2013; Scott, 2013). In April 2019, it then released its Indo-Pacific policy. During the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore in 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented his country’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region. This was the first official usage of the term at the highest level in India. Since then, India has demonstrated its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region with a number of initiatives, including the Quad and the Malabar exercises. In 2019, the United States and the ASEAN released their Indo-Pacific strategy. In Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, New Delhi and think-tank circles, the phrase progressively acquired acceptance (Prasad, 2018; Thankachan, 2020; The White House, 2017). China has been sceptical of the idea ever since the Indo-Pacific concept has been articulated. China has responded with incisive and critical assessments to every development in the region. China lacks a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy and a statement outlining its goals and objectives in the area (Singh, 2023).
The meaning of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ gradually expanded, going from ‘geographical concept’ to ‘strategic system’ and ultimately to ‘time concept’ (the era of Indo-Pacific). Given its progression in strategic idea, connotation and mechanism construction, ‘Indo-Pacific’ is not a merely neutral word; rather, it is an attempt to create a super area under this strategy in order to impede the establishment of a new regional order with China at its centre (Bo, 2021; Pan, 2014). China’s primary concern is keeping this geopolitical idea from serving as a focal point for neighbouring countries and the region as a whole to unite against China (Heiduk & Gudrun, 2020). There are two main strategic explanations for the Indo-Pacific’s rise. The first explanation is linked to China’s expanding influence in the area. The second is the US alliance system’s relative deterioration and attempts at revival. China is expanding its influence over the area in a number of ways. They have demonstrated assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, constructing ports in the Indian Ocean region (also known as the ‘String of Pearls’) and pursuing connectivity projects via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Morgan, 2020; Singh, 2023).
China’s rise as a global power has had a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Its growing economic influence, military modernisation and assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea have raised concerns among other regional actors. This has led to a shift in the strategic calculations of countries in the region, prompting them to seek closer partnerships with like-minded states and strengthen their defence capabilities. The US’s relative decrease in the region is another indicator of growing Chinese influence (Singh, 2023). For the majority of the states in Southeast Asia, for instance, China is their biggest and most significant trading partner. Nearly equal proportions of ASEAN’s commerce were with the US, Japan and China in 2007—11%, 10.7% and 10.6%, respectively. China, however, started to take the lead in 2017 with 16.5% of ASEAN’s overall trade, while the US and Japan saw their share of trade drop to 9.5% and 9.0%, respectively (Hanada, 2019).
The Indo-Pacific becomes strategically important to the United States because it offers a more integrated approach to the region that is quickly becoming more prominent on the global map. Retaining power in the Indo-Pacific region is a key component of US grand strategy. Every nation’s grand strategy, but particularly that of the superpowers, entails safeguarding its internal borders while pursuing its larger security and economic goals, including prestige. US grand strategy, however, consists of additional components. In the first place, it entails preventing the emergence of new threats to the global commons as well as foreign hegemonic rule over important geopolitical areas of the world. The expansion of the liberal political order globally is the second objective. Maintaining an open economic system is the third objective (Tellis, 2015; Upadhyay, 2014).
The Indo-Pacific region is mentioned extensively in many joint declarations made in both bilateral and international collaborations. Through the implementation of regular naval drills, military logistics agreements with the US, France, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Japan and the UK as well as commitments to collaborate on a range of issues including infrastructure, connectivity, climate change, maritime domain awareness and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, the Indo-Pacific region has shown tangible collaboration and cooperation (Schottli, 2022). Washington has adopted a confrontational stance and the centre of its Indo-Pacific strategy is China containment. Conversely, while voicing their worries about freedom of navigation, ASEAN and European strategies have taken an inclusive stance in an attempt to overcome Chinese threat (Vashisht, 2023). However, the Indo-Pacific concept’s appeal also stems from the way important regional players—including the US, Japan, Australia and India—have framed it as a ‘free and open’ region with common ideals. Therefore, ‘freedom and openness’ stand as ideals that are essential to the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and act as a counterstrategy to China’s growing regional and global influence (Estrada, 2023).
Largely, the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific is characterised by a complex interplay of major powers, evolving strategic alignments and competing visions for regional order. The region’s significance in global politics and economics makes it a focal point for geopolitical competition and cooperation with implications for regional stability and the future of international system. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific turns into a platform for all powers to engage both the United States and China in their efforts to manage strategic competition within the emerging world order.
India’s Foreign Policy Towards Indo-Pacific
The pursuit of strategic autonomy has been the unifying theme of India’s foreign and security policies up to this point regardless of the political persuasions, compositions and leadership changes of these governments. There are several names for it: mostly from Jawaharlal Nehru’s coinage, ‘genuine non-alignment’ from the Janata government and more recently, strategic autonomy. In actuality, this has meant that India has maintained decision-making authority over other countries, avoided forming alliances, and increased its capabilities while cooperating with other nations when doing so served India’s interests (Menon, 2020; Monsonis, 2010). Since India implements its policies according to the conditions and timing of each situation, the core of its foreign policy has actually been hedging. India alternates between being friends with China and Russia and depending on the US and Japan. India’s foreign policy seeks to establish India as a major power capable of establishing international order on a global scale. In the Indo-Pacific region, it also seeks to establish a dominant position and demonstrate its relative presence by forming alliances with the US, Japan and other like-minded nations in opposition to China (Horimoto, 2017).
Foreign and defence policy establishments in India are beginning to acknowledge the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a new ‘regional’ identity (Doyle & Rumley, 2019). Although India has included the Indo-Pacific region in its foreign policy rhetoric since 2015, the region did not receive a formal framework for its Indo-Pacific strategy until 2018, following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La conference (Modi, 2018). The Indo-Pacific region has been at the crossroads of India’s cultural, economic and diplomatic interactions for centuries with deep historical roots. It forms the foundation for its contemporary foreign policy in the region. The key motivations and objectives of India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific include: protection of its maritime trade routes and interests in the Indian Ocean and beyond, safeguarding of its territorial security and integrity, leveraging the economic opportunities for its growth and development and contributing to regional stability (Kakoti, 2021; Mukherjee, 2019). Since China dominates the Indo-Pacific, India is developing strategies to counterbalance China and expand its influence, one of which is forming alliances. In order to establish a stable and peaceful environment, India’s regional strategy seeks to work with nations singly or in coalitions of three or more; nevertheless, these strategic alliances are not containment alliances. Given its vast geographic reach, which includes both China and Russia, India has more alternatives in the Indo-Pacific region for advancing its national interests without being unduly allied with one party. India’s foreign policy is based on strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and inclusivity, which are reflected in its Indo-Pacific strategies (Haruko, 2020; Lin, 2022).
India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is guided by its commitment to a rules-based international order, respect for sovereignty and adherence to international norms. India advocates for inclusive and transparent regional mechanisms such as the Quad and supports multi-lateral institutions like ASEAN to address regional challenges. Within this context, the pursuit of strategic autonomy and hedging policies in the Indo-Pacific has become essential components of India’s foreign policy approach. Strategic autonomy, as a guiding principle, allows India to independently formulate and execute its foreign policy decisions while maintaining flexibility and adaptability in response to evolving regional dynamics.
India’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy in Indo-Pacific Region
A policy that aims to achieve or maintain a significant degree of independence in domains designated as strategic is known as ‘strategic autonomy’. The goal is to maximise a nation’s autonomy in making decisions while operating within the parameters of an interdependent international system. In India, the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ refers to independence in both policy implementation and decision-making, encompassing the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy (Monsonis, 2010). India maintains the freedom to pursue its national interests free from any form of restraint from other states because it adheres to the policy of strategic autonomy in its interactions with the outside world. India’s strategic autonomy is rooted in its historical experiences, regional dynamics and the desire to safeguard its national interests. India aims to maintain its territorial integrity and national sovereignty while simultaneously addressing its core concerns, which are the nation’s socio-economic development and national sovereignty. India aspires to be constructive in both regional and international issues. Strategic autonomy is ‘the ability to take relatively independent decisions on matters of vital interest’, according to former foreign secretary Saran (2017). ‘A successful foreign policy is characterised by the expansion of the scope for such autonomy’. In actuality, this has meant retaining our independence in making decisions, eschewing alliances and enhancing our capacities while cooperating with others when doing so served India’s interests (Menon, 2017).
Within the discourse around the Indo-Pacific area, the notion of strategic autonomy is associated with two distinct ideas: first, the preservation of diversity and pluralism; and second, the idea of sovereignty and partnerships with the West (Prasad, 2018). Building a strong, assertive and influential position for India in the Indo-Pacific region by guaranteeing full strategic autonomy is one of the country’s major Indo-Pacific principles (Hongsong & Bux, 2021). During the Indian Prime Minister’s Shangri-La speech, four main points were made on problems, concerns and objectives. The ‘importance of partnerships and collaborations’ is the first. The second is to acknowledge the importance of strategic partnerships while simultaneously being aware of any ‘alliances of containment’. Third, to acknowledge that a substantial shift in global power is resulting in the emergence of a new security architecture. Fourth, India affirmed its support for regional organisations with ASEAN at the centre of its vision for the Indo-Pacific region, even as it acknowledged the new order (MEA, 2018a). Given the geopolitical complexities and power rivalries in the region, strategic autonomy allows India to make decisions that best align with its national interests and ensure its long-term security. India seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy by avoiding over-dependence on any single power while actively engaging with a range of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, Australia, etc. (Pant & Super, 2015).
India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific reinforces the importance of inclusivity and multilateralism in regional affairs. By maintaining its independence and asserting its interests, India can contribute to a multi-polar order in the region by engaging in various regional organisations and initiatives such as the ASEAN and the Quad, to promote dialogue, cooperation and rule-based order. Its approach provides a balancing force that prevents any single power from dominating the region, enhancing regional stability, encouraging collaborative solutions to common challenges and helping to prevent a potential power vacuum (Basu, 2020; Modi, 2018).
India’s Hedging Policies in the Indo-Pacific
International relations (IR) experts have appropriated the financial term ‘hedging’ to characterise certain occurrences they see in IR (Ciorciari, 2019; Yuzhu, 2021). ‘A set of strategies aimed at avoiding a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality’ is how Goh (2005) defines hedging. Rather, they foster a stance in the centre that prevents or minimises the need to select one side at the clear expense of another. Hedging, in practice, is made up of five elements that fall between pure bandwagoning and balancing: economic pragmatism is at the neutrality point; towards a greater degree of power projection; indirect balancing and dominance-denial; binding-engagement and restricted bandwagoning towards an increasing degree of power acceptance; adopting some or all of these actions at the same time (Kuik, 2008). Additionally, hedging is thought of as the third strategic option for maximising financial opportunity and strategic protection, after bandwagoning and balancing (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019; Yuzhu, 2021). Besides, hedging is considered as an umbrella strategy relying on engagement, soft balancing and limited hard balancing (Paul, 2014).
Hedging means acknowledging that action must be taken in response to a dangerous situation and acknowledging that this action may entail taking a position on particular subjects. Hedging may help India’s approach be a little more flexible than it has historically been in response to shifting conditions (Rajagopalan, 2017). Similar to countries in Southeast Asia, India likewise adopted a twin hedging strategy, gently balancing against possible Chinese aggression or disturbance of the status quo while maintaining a close relationship with China. The latter approach aims to maintain US involvement in the area as a counterbalance to Chinese influence in addition to modernising and acquiring military hardware (Goh, 2005; Paul, 2014; Tarapore, 2023).
India engaged in strategic hedging in its interactions with all the major powers to keep the balance of power tilted towards it. It seeks to maximise its interests by engaging with both China and the US while carefully managing potential areas of competition or divergence. Through its ‘Act East’ policy, it drew nearer to ASEAN and joined US-initiated geostrategic frameworks like Quad in an effort to counter China. It worked with China and joined institutions that China formed, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as a buffer against the USA. India wants to avoid offending its more powerful neighbour by acting as the centre of the United States’ pivot to Asia, which the Chinese see as a containment strategy. India also wants to gain economically from collaboration with China. A persistent worry about US dependability stems from its connection with Pakistan as well as its susceptibility to China during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Though it has expressed alarm over the spread of the Islamic State and its medieval ideology, New Delhi has joined with Russia, China and Iran in refraining from interfering in Syria’s civil war and has instead continued to support a process of institution building headed by Syria. It kept up its special links with Russia in order to protect itself from China and the US, both diplomatically and militarily, by acquiring energy resources and defence equipment from Russia. India’s complete membership in the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents its global collaboration with China and Russia, all of which are non-Western nations. By hedging and refusing to back American sanctions against Russia, India has similarly sided with Moscow over its activities in Ukraine. However, it has remained conspicuously silent on the subject of territorial integrity (Bo, 2021; Heiduk, 2022; Horimoto, 2017; Liu & He, 2023; Muraviev et al., 2022; Pant & Super, 2015; Singh, 2019). India seeks to establish a strategically balanced relationship with both the US and Russia. India maintains its long-standing strategic collaboration with Russia while also drawing closer to the United States in their strategic ties (Swaine, 2018).
India is on a multi-alignment route in the twenty-first century, forging its own path by fostering ties with allies in the Persian Gulf and Africa as well as with other emerging democracies like Brazil, in addition to the United States, Europe and Asian nations. Thus its Indo-Pacific policy appears to privilege breadth over depth in its external relationships, choosing a path of strategic autonomy (Lalwani, 2019; Twining, 2016). In light of the BRI project as well as the unsolved border disputes, India has regarded China as a threat to its security. India’s security cooperation with the United States, Japan and other neighbouring countries of China has also increased the threat perceptions of China towards India (Liu & He, 2023; Ye, 2020). In its foreign policy, India has been using strategic hedging to keep a cordial relationship with China while taking part in Quad (Sharma, 2023). The United States, Japan, Australia and India form the dynamic Quad or simply Quad. It attempts to tackle the long-term problems brought about by China’s ascent and the political and territorial demands that follow in the Indo-Pacific region (Deb & Wilson, 2021; Rossiter & Cannon, 2023). Given its size and stature, India can be considered an independent pole of power in the newly forming regional and global order. India is using ‘limited alignments and informal ententes’ in particular as part of its soft-balancing plan to contain China (Paul, 2018).
Three months after the Doklam stalemate in 2017, Washington unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy, which aims to integrate India into its broader Asia stance. China is in damage control frenzy as a result of the Indo-Pacific strategy, which aims to stop a genuine alliance between the United States and India from developing. China and India have been getting along more since the Doklam incident, partly because of Modi’s vocal rejection of the Indo-Pacific idea and his repetition of ‘strategic autonomy’ (Sun, 2020). However, the outbreak of conflict in the Galwan Valley in 2020 again seriously damaged the Sino-Indian relationship. With the rising trade deficit between China and India, the previously shared economic interests have been overshadowed by trade restrictions and disputes (Liu & He, 2023; Ye, 2020) but it is a fact that decoupling all economic ties with China is an illusion for India, just like any other country in the world (Pollard, 2023). India’s hedging strategy includes some overt military balancing against China in addition to significant dominance-denial and indirect balancing elements. There is also a lot of economic pragmatism in it (Lalwani, 2019; Twining, 2016).
For China, cooling down the territorial tension with India is crucial because the Washington government considers the territorial dispute as a good timing to restore its security relations with India, reinforcing the strategic cohesion of Indo-Pacific strategy (Ye, 2020). Although frictions have emerged from time to time between India and China, they were eventually managed each time in a manner that should not slip into an open confrontation (Li, 2023). However India actively embraces America’s Indo-Pacific effort and strengthens its strategic cooperation and coordination with the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. India simultaneously fully utilises America’s wedging technique to significantly broaden its diplomatic network. While prudently handling its strategic connections with China, India enjoys using the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to strengthen its position in those interactions (Swaine, 2018). But India actively embraces America’s Indo-Pacific effort and strengthens its strategic cooperation and coordination with the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. India simultaneously fully utilises America’s wedging technique to significantly broaden its diplomatic network. While prudently handling its strategic connections with China, India enjoys using the United States Indo-Pacific strategy to strengthen its position in those interactions.
India’s hedging policies aim to promote inclusive and rules-based regional architectures. Its engagement in regional organisations and initiatives allows for dialogue, cooperation and the development of norms and standards that enhance stability and mitigate conflicts. Since the very inception of the Indo-Pacific vision, India actively participates in regional organisations and initiatives to shape the regional order and at the same time they acted as the cornerstone of its hedging policies such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI), Quad, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and ASEAN centrality. Among these India has tactically using ASEAN centrality as the most effective hedging policy in its Indo-Pacific strategy. This focus on ASEAN centrality can be traced from the following discussion on various hedging policies.
SAGAR Doctrine
Sagar in Hindi means the Ocean. Prime Minister Modi introduced his vision of ‘SAGAR’ during his visit to the Seychelles in 2015. This was prompted by the realisation that the Indian Ocean shared a common home with its neighbouring states, the need to safeguard itself from threats, and a desire for peace, growth and stability in the region. SAGAR is described as a ‘doctrine that succinctly defines India’s vision to collaborate with the Indian Ocean region’ by former Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (Bhatt, 2018). Protecting land and marine territories, advancing cooperative action to address non-traditional security challenges, advancing economic and security interests in the littoral states, and working to advance maritime rules and norms are some of its main pillars (Prasad, 2018).
India’s all-encompassing marine policy, known as the SAGAR doctrine, is intended to protect its interests and guarantee its strategic independence within the Indo-Pacific area. India has adopted an open, inclusive and pluralistic ethos in order to safeguard its strategic interests. It has also appropriated the American, Australian and Japanese notions of a ‘rules-based order’, tying it into a more complex narrative about India’s rich maritime history, connections to ancient civilisations and the teleological quest that underpins India’s aspirations for economic growth (Guha, 2021). By strengthening India’s position in the Indo-Pacific to offset China’s influence, it acts as a hedging tactic. In order to strategically capitalise on India’s geographic location, the Indian government also introduced the ‘Sagarmala’ strategy, which intends to combine coastal maritime development with international port projects. India uses new multi-lateral organisations like BBIN (Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal), BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and the Ganga-Mekong Initiative to channel some of the projects it wants to undertake in the Indian Ocean region (Prasad, 2018).
India is aiming to link ‘SAGAR’, an externally driven policy, along with ‘Sagarmala’ as the prosperity of the country is progressively being linked to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region (Prasad, 2018). India’s complex SAGAR vision reflects its diplomatic exceptionalism and is founded on an understanding of the distinct reality of the shifting balance of power equations in the region (Saha, 2020). SAGAR urges nations to work together and coordinate their efforts in order to create a safe, stable and secure Indo-Pacific region. It creates a soft balancing in the region by gathering the support of small actors in the region which are not accepting Chinese hegemony in the region. Thus these policies help India to ensure its strategic autonomy and underscores India’s multi-faceted approach to hedging in the Indo-Pacific.
IPOI
In April 2019, the Ministry of External Affairs established a new Division for the Indo-Pacific due to the concept’s growing prominence in international discourse. This was done with two goals in mind: first, to contribute to the unification of the Indian government’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Indian Prime Minister in 2018 and second, to offer significant policy components and initiatives that support that vision. Asia–Europe Meeting, Mekong–Ganga Cooperation, India–ASEAN relations, East Asia Summit, Indian Ocean Rim Association and Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) are among the topics that the Indo-Pacific Division handles (MEA, 2020; Saha & Mishra, 2020).
The IPOI was introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 4 November 2019, during the East Asia Summit in Bangkok, Thailand. It is an initiative by India to collaborate with partners in the Indian and Pacific Oceans that is not dependent on treaties. The ‘SAGAR’ programme is expanded upon by it. Disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; trade connectivity and maritime transport; maritime security; marine ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing are the seven main pillars of the open international initiative known as the IPOI (ICWA, 2022; MEA, 2020). The IPOI draws on the architecture and mechanisms already in place for regional cooperation. IPOI does not intend to institutionalise itself, looks to be centred on norms based on fundamental common interests rather than shared beliefs and strives to be inclusive rather than exclusive (Estrada, 2023).
IPOI was founded on the foundation of India’s Act East Policy, which emphasises the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, and the Act West Policy, which emphasises the Western Indian Ocean. The primary objective of IPOI has been to secure stability, peace and prosperity of the maritime realm as an extension of India’s SAGAR vision while serving as a mechanism for developing cooperation among like-minded nations in their pursuit of a ‘free, open, inclusive, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific’ (Roy, 2022). Although the IPOI seems more like a framework and announcement than a formal policy declaration, its goal is to provide the Indo-Pacific architecture with a clear institutionalised structure and strategic direction. India is to be seen as a ‘rule-maker’ as opposed to a ‘rule taker’ and this will support New Delhi’s geopolitical posture (Lin, 2022). This policy demonstrates India’s goal of uniting all of its efforts in the Indo-Pacific region to become a more potent regional security force. India sees this region as the dynamics of power centre in the coming years thus it follows hedging strategy in the region through various ways while keeping its strategic autonomy as it is a domestically managed initiative.
Quad
In order to address matters of shared concern in the Indo-Pacific area, Australia, India, Japan and the United States of America formed the Quad in 2007. But the Quad disintegrated due to unclear goals and increasing Chinese pressure, which included submitting formal demarches. It resurfaced in 2017 with a renewed determination to restrain China’s strong claims and hegemonic overtures over the South China Sea and other disputed territories. With the first leaders’ summit in 2021 and the start of the yearly foreign ministers’ meeting in 2019, it has become an institutional heavyweight. The inclusion of India in the Quad is innovative, much like the idea of the Indo-Pacific. The US already has ties with the other three partners and these relationships are forged via the US’s military alliances (Muraviev et al., 2022; Schottli, 2022).
It has been widely reported that India was first reluctant to accept the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. Its reluctance stemmed from the necessity to retain its strategic autonomy and carefully manage its relations with China and Russia. India is totally dedicated to Quad, especially since the 2020 battle in the Galwan Valley. Additionally, New Delhi would rather not define the Quad only in terms of the military and defence. India expresses its confidence in the QUAD members and its willingness to conduct business with them in accordance with its policy of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy as well as its national interest (Jain, 2021).
The leaders of Quad engage in discussions regarding their perspectives on current global issues including emerging technology, infrastructure and connectivity, cyber security, maritime security and humanitarian aid. The goal of these nations is to guarantee and promote an Indo-Pacific region that is free from military and political domination while remaining open, prosperous and free. Through this strategic alliance, Australia, Japan, India and the US also subtly hope to restrain China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific (Radjaradjane, 2022). Despite the fact that China is the main and shared threat to the members of Quad, India tries to be cautious and views the Indo-Pacific region more as a security community than as a defensive alliance (Lalwani, 2019). Since the Quad removed overt references to the China threat and placed more emphasis on public goods delivery in the Indo-Pacific region, more countries have expressed interest in collaborating with the group. India has been particularly attentive to the Quad’s detractors from its allies, such as Russia and ASEAN, and is conscious that the alliance is not seen as an anti-China coalition (Mohan & Govella, 2022).
Because ASEAN countries perceived the Quad as potentially competing with rather than complementing ASEAN centrality and as a means of stopping Russia from getting further closer to China, India has been more cautious about presenting the Quad at the forefront of the Indo-Pacific (Lalwani, 2019). Furthermore, India is acutely aware of the ways in which superpowers such as the United States, may alter their strategic orientation in order to further their own agendas without considering the fallout for friends and partners. Consequently, Quad demonstrates that India will behave as it sees fit, serving its own national interest (Jain, 2021). India is able to maintain its strategic autonomy because of the Quad’s intrinsic flexibility, which allows for ample room for diplomatic manoeuvring (Saha, 2020). Furthermore, India views Quad as a hedging strategy to maintain its strategic independence within the Indo-Pacific area.
India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
IMEC was revealed by the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, India, Italy, the United States and the European Commission during the September 2023 G20 meeting in New Delhi (Rajagopalan, 2023). An eastern corridor connecting India to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel and a northern corridor connecting those Middle Eastern nations to Europe make up this vast trade and investment project. With the goal of enhancing connectivity and economic integration between Asia and Europe through energy infrastructure, railroads, high-speed cables and shipping lanes, IMEC will complement currently existing road and maritime transit networks. Forty percent of the world’s population and around half of the world economy reside in the IMEC member countries (Cafiero, 2023).
President Biden referred to this project as ‘historic’. It is the US’s reaction to China’s BRI, which it sees as a geopolitical initiative with an economic-developmental goal of expanding Beijing’s influence throughout Asia, Africa and Europe. The proposed corridor project, which would connect the Middle East, Europe and the Indian Ocean region, is a new sign of the growing geopolitical rivalry between China and India as well as the US over dominance in trade and technology on a regional and worldwide scale. Additionally, the US effort seeks to fortify India’s stance against China and develop the Middle East as a US sphere of influence in order to thwart China’s attempts to encroach there (ACRPS, 2023). But India perceives it as an initiative to diversify its economic engagements and reduce dependency on a single country or region. In addition, it can foster diplomatic and strategic ties along the route thereby deploying this initiative as a hedging policy to ensure its strategic autonomy in every realm of global geopolitics.
ASEAN Centrality
One of India’s most important foreign policy pillars and the cornerstone of Act East Policy is its alliance with the ASEAN. For more than 50 years, the consensus-based ASEAN region has devoted itself to promoting peace, development and prosperity in the area. Consequently, India centres its Indo-Pacific vision of SAGAR around ASEAN (MEA, 2018b). India has steadily increased its involvement with ASEAN as a complete partner in economic, commercial and security connections as well as its bilateral ties with the region. India has actively participated in military exchanges and defence diplomacy in recent years, and it has been a major player in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Three (Prabhakar, 2014). India and ASEAN have extensive political and security cooperation because they are key partners. India actively participates in a number of strategic and defence-related ASEAN organisations. These consist of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India now has far stronger bilateral defence connections with every ASEAN member as well as with the region (Ganapathi, 2019).
ASEAN provides a platform for India to engage with countries in Southeast Asia without taking sides in the broader geopolitical rivalries in the Indo-Pacific. By supporting ASEAN centrality, India aims to prevent the dominance of any single power and maintain regional stability (Gokhale, 2020). An ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ was adopted during the 34th ASEAN Summit, which took place in Bangkok in June 2019. ASEAN will continue to play a crucial and strategic role in the Indo-Pacific, according to the Outlook. India expressed its warm reception for the Outlook recommendations by highlighting the significant points of agreement with its own perspectives, particularly when it came to the naming of areas of collaboration and the principles (MEA, 2019).
The strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region is emphasised in the guiding documents of ASEAN and India, specifically the IPOI and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Through collaboration between IPOI and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the India–ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has strengthened India’s maritime strategy in Southeast Asia (Walia, 2022). In an area where the balance of power is precariously balanced and ever-changing, India has proposed that ASEAN centrality should serve as the cornerstone. India is committed to an inclusive security architecture for the Indo-Pacific region, based on respect for the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, equal access to the commons and its natural resources, and the resolution of problems through dialogue (Chinoy, 2020). Due to its strategic autonomy and commitment to its core foreign policy goals, India has positioned itself to effectively maintain the delicate balance in the region. ASEAN centrality and inclusivity are these pillars (Saha, 2020). According to India, there is no place for unilateralism or other aggressive actions that jeopardise peace and progress in a multi-polar Asia. Thus India advocated ASEAN centrality as key to a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific. This approach has enabled India to strengthen its strategic autonomy in the region (Chinoy, 2020).
Due to inherent internal contradictions, ASEAN has not been able to establish an effective regional framework to act as a balancer. The tiny size of ASEAN’s member nations in relation to the US and China is the reason for their lack of enthusiasm; they do not want to become embroiled in the US–China or India–China dispute. India understands this predicament. As a hedging strategy in the area, New Delhi has highlighted the importance of ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific vision (Kaura, 2018). At a time when ASEAN was intended to use its much-lauded regional ‘centrality’ to attempt and influence both China’s and the US’s actions, India stressed ASEAN’s ‘centrality’. But ASEAN has not been able to interact with either of the superpowers in a way that will probably significantly alter their actions (Beeson, 2022; Nabbs-Keller, 2020).
India and ASEAN have quite similar views to the Indo-Pacific region, which may result in a major strategic alliance. Both parties will be able to develop their strategic collaboration, particularly in areas of shared interests or concerns to create a win-win partnership, thanks to India’s pragmatism, impartiality and open ways to participation in the region (Lin, 2022). India has reaped benefits from its emphasis on ASEAN centrality. In a complicated region where one superpower is retreating and another is rising to prominence on the international scene, India and ASEAN are dependent upon one another. In terms of politics, security, culture, people-to-people interactions, economics and connectivity, India has performed well. By fostering goodwill and strengthening India’s soft power in the area, these initiatives help the country achieve strategic autonomy. This will give the Indo-Pacific region as a whole momentum for growth, development and security on a bilateral basis between India and ASEAN members as well as among other nations (Ganapathi, 2019).
ASEAN centrality is central to India’s hedging strategy in the Indo-Pacific. From Shangri La Dialogue 2018 to the latest ASEAN-India Summit 2023 India underlined India’s support for ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific (MEA, 2023; Modi, 2018). India’s commitment to ASEAN centrality is driven by its desire to preserve regional stability and prevent the emergence of conflicts that could disrupt its economic and strategic interests. By actively engaging with ASEAN, India aims to contribute to a peaceful and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific (Ganapathi, 2019). India is favouring ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific to effectively balance the role of great powers in the region. It is easier for India to ensure its strategic autonomy while dealing with ASEAN. By supporting ASEAN centrality as hedging policy, India is efficaciously navigating the geopolitical complexities of the region while safeguarding its strategic autonomy.
All the above examples of hedging policies show that India is focussing on multi-polarity to ensure its strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. Among all the hedging policies India is emphasising ASEAN centrality as a primary actor in keeping peace and security in the region to avoid single power play in the region. India’s hedging policies so far posits India into a safer zone in engaging with vibrant actors in the Indo-Pacific even though balancing each and every global power is a hectic task to ensure its strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a critical geopolitical and economic centre in the twenty-first century, attracting the attention of major global powers. India’s geographical location, growing economic influence and security concerns position it as a significant player in the Indo-Pacific. As a responsible and aspirational power, India recognises the importance of maintaining stability, promoting economic integration and ensuring freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region. India’s strategic autonomy and its hedging policies in the Indo-Pacific region have gained significant attention in recent years. As a rising global power, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy reflects its desire to safeguard its national interests and maintain a balanced position in the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. The pursuit of strategic autonomy and the adoption of hedging policies in the Indo-Pacific reflect India’s aspirations to become a leading regional power, promote a rules-based international order and secure its own national interests. By adopting hedging strategies, India’s seeks to strike a delicate balance between competing interests, maintain sovereignty, maximise opportunities, protect its strategic interests and contribute to the region’s peace, stability as well as development.
India’s strategic autonomy and hedging policies in the Indo-Pacific have garnered by a multi-pronged approach. On the positive side, India’s approach fosters regional stability, economic integration and the promotion of democratic values. It seeks to deepen its strategic partnerships and alliances with like-minded countries, engage in cooperative frameworks, enhance maritime capabilities and actively participate in regional institutions and initiatives. India’s engagement with countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian nations through various hedging policies demonstrates its commitment to promoting a rules-based order and addressing shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific. India also faces several challenges in pursuing strategic autonomy and hedging policies which comprise managing competing interests among major powers, addressing historical and territorial disputes and maintaining a delicate balance between engaging with China and countering potential security threats. India’s proactive role by maintaining strategic autonomy and its assertive approach through hedging policies reflect in its commitment to safeguarding interests in a complex and dynamic geopolitical environment and evolving role as a regional power in shaping the region’s trajectory. India’s hedging policies have proven itself to be strategically flexible and open to realigning its posture when necessary. Thereby India’s commitment to strategic autonomy strengthens its position in an emerging global order.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
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