Muslim in Australia: Celebrating National Days

Muslims in Australia

Despite the tendency to identify Muslims as ‘new’ entrants into the rich cultural mosaic of Australia, the fact remains that the Muslim presence and links with Australia predate European arrival with a special focus on links between fishermen from Macassar who would arrive on the northern shores in December for four months to catch trepan. These links laid the foundation for regular contacts and also resulted in sharing of language and culture between the Muslim visitors and indigenous population living in the Arnhem Land and neighboring areas (Jones, 1993). These indigenous communities borrowed words from the Macassans’ vocabulary and depicted their influence in their paintings. These informal contacts were replaced with formal induction of Muslims into the Australian landscape when camel drivers were brought from British India into the Australian continent. Starting with the arrival of three cameleers in 1860, the number was to exceed 2000 by the end of the nineteenth century. These cameleers, though wrongly identified as Ghans (or Afghans) came from Khyber Pakhtunkhwar (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province) of what later constituted Pakistani territory and played a significant role in providing the most reliable and efficient transport system between different Australian colonies. These cameleers left their imprint on the Australian landscape by building mosques and sharing their culture. Though not permitted to marry Anglo-Saxon women, they married women from the peripheral classes of the society as well as indigenous women. Their children could be identified as the first generation of Australian-born Muslims. Though some fathers took these children back to British India, others remained in Australia—a trend that is reflected in some indigenous Australians referring to their Muslim relatives and acknowledging their Muslim identity.

The growth in the number of Muslims in Australia, however, proceeded slowly until the 1970s when the Australian Government shelved the White Australia policy. Until then, the number of Muslims was estimated to be less than 3000 in 1921 and consisting of Afghans and others, especially Malays. These numbers increased with the arrival of Albanian Muslims after World War I, and those from Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Poland, Hungry, Russia, and Turkey after World War II, but Muslim immigration really increased after the mid-1970s when civil war in Lebanon resulted in the arrival of Lebanese Muslims in Australia. Thereafter, a series of global crises and developments, including the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991, the civil war in Somalia, Afghanistan, and growing militancy in Pakistan have contributed to the increased presence of Muslims in Australia.

The growth in Muslim presence can be seen in the data gathered in successive Census: by 1991 the census showed 146,600 Muslims were living in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1991). Of these, 51,321 or 35 percent were born in Australia, whereas the remaining Muslims traced their origin to 67 different countries, ‘making them one of the most ethnically diverse religious groups in the country’ (Bouma, 1994: 23). By 2001, their number in Australia had increased to 281,586 (or 1.5 percent of the total Australian population). This reflected a 40.2 percent increase since the previous Census in 1996. ¹ By the 2006 Census, 340,392 Muslims were living in Australia comprising 1.71 percent of the total population with a 69.4 percent increase since the 1996 Census (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). According to 2011 Census the total Muslim population of Australia consists of 476,300 or 2.2 percent of the total population. Of these 61.5 percent were born overseas and 39.5 are Australian-born Muslims (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The age profile of the Muslim community shows that it is relatively a younger community with 320,270 Muslims (or 67 percent of the total Muslims) being under 34 years of age. Of these 98,943 Muslims are under 14 years of age (Religions for Peace Australia, 2012). Essentially, therefore, the Muslim cohort in Australia is young and likely to be influenced by the waves of globalization like other younger generations around the world.

Most of the Muslims are concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria with Sydney and Melbourne as the two major cities accounting for a significant majority of the total Muslim population. The number of Muslims in other capital cities has also increased with Brisbane and Perth registering increase since the 2001 Census. These Muslims come from ethnically diverse backgrounds. After the largest cohort of Australian-born Muslims, those from Turkey and Lebanon constitute the two largest ethnic groups. Other countries contributing more than 30 percent of the Muslim population in Australia include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Bangladesh, Iran, and Fiji.

Muslims are relatively disadvantaged in the labor market: according to the 2011 Census, 4.5 percent of Australian Muslims were unemployed, a decrease from the 5.9 percent unemployment rate for Muslims in the 2006 Census. Though the downward trend suggests an improvement, proportional lack of access to labor market has been apparent in both 2006 and 2011 Census where the general Australian unemployment rate was only 3.4 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. The 2011 Census also revealed that

…[t]he average income level for Muslim households is substantially lower than the national average with more than 20 percent of Muslim households live on a weekly income of $299 or less. That is 2.4 times higher than the national record: just over 8 percent of households nationally. Australian Muslims are three times less likely to own their dwelling than non-Muslims and twice as likely to be renting. (Akbarzadeh, 2012)

It is, however, important to distinguish between Muslims who came as skilled workers and those who entered the country as refugees. Earlier immigrants, for instance, had higher skill levels and tended to occupy professional positions, but the refugee immigrants have been less fortunate. This probably explains why in 2001 Muslims from countries such as Iraq (69.0 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (61.0 percent), Afghanistan (58.6 percent), and Lebanon (57.6 percent) had very high proportions with incomes less than $15,600 indicating that a large proportion were unlikely to be in full-time employment. On the other hand, the highest proportion of those with incomes above $32,000 came from Fiji (26.6 percent), Iran (23.2 percent), and Pakistan (22.6 percent) (Gundry, 2007). Since then the fast economic growth in Australia and the willingness to employ educated youth from around the world has resulted in more professional Muslims arriving in the country.

Accessing Information in a Globalized World

The dynamics of Muslims accessing information that shapes their identities needs to be located in an historical context with reference to the organizational structures that have evolved since the 1970s to meet the needs to Muslims living as a minority. Prior to the end of the White Australia policy, Muslims had primarily relied on the mosques as the place for social interaction: children were offered religious knowledge on Sundays or other specified days with other members of the small community gathering to share ideas and plan activities for the community. However, during this phase, Muslims across different states also joined forces to create an organizational structure that could unite Muslims nationally. This resulted in the formation of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils in 1963 ‘as the national umbrella organization for Australian Muslims representing Islam and Muslims at a national and international level’. The structure built upon the assumption that locally established councils would be represented at the state and territory levels, and would be part of the national council (AFIC, 2013). With the head office in Sydney and branch office in Melbourne, the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) engaged Muslims nationally by holding annual national congress with participation from all states, territory councils, and societies. As the structures of AFIC were developed and modified, Muslims also continued to form local ethnically based organizations that drew upon membership from their countries of origin. This also gradually resulted in building of mosques that reflected the ethnic basis of those visiting the mosques. Together, these spaces provided the main source of information about issues facing Muslims and the possible reactions to developments across the world relevant to Muslims.

The increase in the number of Muslims, and technological developments bringing the world closer gradually shifted the sources of information and areas of operation for Muslims in Australia. At the very basic level, Muslims continue to rely on their family units and close social circles as the primary source of information about their world. But the construction of ethnically specific mosques, establishment of Islamic schools, and emergence of local study circles have expanded the outlets—or nodes of information—from where additional or even contrasting information can be accessed by the Muslims. While in the past, the number of Imams was limited; their numbers have increased (including young and locally educated Imams) along with the increase in the number of mosques, prayer places, and Muslim Students Associations and have provided new sources of information. A new trend of some youth leaving Australia to learn about Islam in established centers of Islamic knowledge has also emerged with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, India, Pakistan, and South Africa as some of the chosen countries. Upon return, these individuals acquire or assume the status of providers of authentic information on Islam. The process is further complicated by the ease with which people can access diverse interpretations of Islam via cyberspace, and the facility to watch language-specific religious programs on satellite television beamed from different Muslim-majority states.

The shifting sectarian complexion of Australian Muslim population has also added another element of diversity. In the past mosques provided a shared space for all Muslims irrespective of their sects. But with the increased immigration of Muslims from Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan (especially the Hazaras), the proportion of Shiite population has proliferated. Building upon the support provided by some wealthy Australian Muslims and groups in their countries of origin, these Shiites have slowly opted for establishing their own mosques. Organized along the lines of AFIC, they have established the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in Sydney. Though the extent to which it is operating is difficult to assess, its component organizations including Al-Jaafaria Shiite Islamic Centre in Sydney has actively created spaces for Shi`ite Muslims to connect. Their website, for example, provides information on schools and mosques but also connects newly arrived individuals regarding the closest places of worship (Al-Jaafaria, 2014). By distinguishing themselves from the Sunni majority, these organizations have emerged as alternative sources of sect-specific ideas on local and international developments.

The processes of information acquisition by Muslims, it is essential to note, have developed against the backdrop of increased focus on Islam and Muslims since 9/11. The terrorist attacks in the United States, followed a year later by those in Bali closer to Australian homeland created a sense of an Islamic threat to Australia. Though a number of groups working to build understanding across faith divides sprung up during this phase and greater activism on their part did ameliorate some negativity in the media and social space, the reality remains that Muslims have encountered relatively more discrimination since 9/11 than other religious communities. While women subscribing to the traditional Islamic dress code and men of Middle Eastern background have attracted most of this discrimination, there have been reports that even others who are less easily identifiable as Muslims were less successful in securing employment due to their Islamic names. Significantly, organizations have been established that categorically identify Islam and Muslims as a threat to Australia: the Q-Society, for example, categorically identifies itself as Australia’s leading Islam-critical Movement and declares that it has been established ‘in response to growing concerns about the discrimination, violence and other anti-democratic practices linked to Islam’. It also organizes series of lectures and meetings to raise its voice against Islam and a Muslim presence in Australia. In March 2014, for example, it organized the 1st International Symposium on Liberty and Islam in Australia in Melbourne. The media’s response to the Muslim presence in Australia has also been mixed: though a number of analysts and broadcasters have presented positive images of Islam, others have identified Muslims as the issue thus singling them out as the community to observe and watch.

Together, the internally accessed information through multiple nodes and the presence of a negative attitude toward Muslims in Australia have played a significant role in shaping Muslim responses to the wider community, and their own articulation of their identity as Muslims. These articulations, it is essential to note, build on the perception of exclusion practiced by the wider community vis-à-vis Muslims that is not always in line with the reality of views about Muslims in the wider community. Even though the level of exclusion is not as high as assumed and perceived, these perceptions provide the context in which local, national and international issues are viewed, understood and then reacted to. The dynamics of these reactions is further complicated by Muslims accessing global narratives on being Muslims in what is often portrayed in these narratives as an inhospitable climate. The end result is emergence of diverse opinions on being Muslim and Australian in the contemporary world. At the cost of simplifying an extremely complex phenomenon, we could broadly categorize Muslims along a spectrum of identities: on the one end are Muslims who feel included in the Australian community. They are not necessarily secular in their outlook, nor do they shun their religious identity. Instead, both religious and secular/liberal Muslims on this end of the spectrum feel part of the community while continuing to identify with the mainstream viewpoints in differing degrees. This identification does not exclude their ethnic-based friendships and social circles with some of them remaining active in both minority and majority spaces. Nor does it shape their views on being Australian-Muslims or Muslim-Australians. The preference for either of the two identifications is seen as merely validating their Australian identity as Muslims. In the middle of the spectrum are Muslims who feel excluded from the wider community. The degree of exclusion felt and perceived varies among these Muslims but they share a common feeling that the wider community is not accepting of them, and that they experience relatively more discrimination due to both their religious and ethnic identity. Once again, this sense of exclusion is not linked to secular/liberal or orthodox views among the Muslims: some secular/liberal Muslims also feel the sense of exclusion, for example, in the public space which they perceive emanates from the general negativity directed at Muslims. Effectively, therefore, even some Muslims actively participating in the economic and social spheres still feel that they are not fully accepted as Australians. This sense of perceived relative exclusion does not always result in them identifying themselves as Muslim-Australians privileging their religious identity. But it does contribute to them distinguishing themselves from the wider community as members of a minority community. The opposite end of the spectrum includes Muslims who could be labeled as the excluders: they shun the wider community and the socio-political context in which they live in Australia and privilege their Muslim identity over other, including Australian, identities. They stress that they are Muslim-Australians where their Islamic identity supersedes Australian identity. Interestingly, those occupying this end of the spectrum do not always exclude the wider community only: instead, some of these Muslims also label other Muslims perceived to be less pious as not worthy of engaging. The process of excluding ‘others’, therefore, extends to members of the Muslim community as well. This sub-set is also less categorical about their identification with a generalized notion of Muslim ummah. Instead, they prefer and justify socializing with only Muslims who follow similar Islamic practices as themselves. The group of excluders also includes Muslims who identify with a global sense of Muslim ummah, and focus on transnational Islamic identity transcending national boundaries. The result is their downgrading of their Australian identity in favor of a globalized Islamic identity.

The relative distribution of Muslims across this spectrum is not uniform: a small number of Muslims occupy the extreme ends of the spectrum. Most of the Muslims occupy the middle of the spectrum focusing on a mixture of their Muslim and Australian identities combined with degrees of perceived exclusion by the wider community.

The sense of inclusion or exclusion has implications for ideas of citizenship among Muslims in Australia. The sense of inclusion and identification with Australia as ‘home’ contributes to greater participation as citizens by Muslims in the social, economic, and political sphere. In a pattern similar to other religious and ethnic communities, this participation draws upon their ethnic social capital as well. For example, in Western Australia, young Pakistani candidates for state elections in 2013 obtained Liberal Party tickets but campaigned among the Pakistani/Muslim diaspora to secure support for their candidature. In contrast, the sense of absolute or relative exclusion can be detrimental to a sense of citizenship, including their participation in the social, economic, and political spheres. Significantly, the tendency to exclude ‘others’ and the adherence to a transnational Islamic identity can supplant the identity as Australian citizen and impact on how an individual or group of Muslims relate to the notions of citizenship in the country.

The question arises as to how these varying levels of identification with Australian citizenship linked to perceptions of inclusion and exclusion (and determined by the nodes of information used to shape views) are reflected in the views of Muslims in Australia on national days that have come to symbolize Australian identity? The next section aims to address this question.

Celebrating National Day in Australia

The discussion of Muslim engagement with Australian National Days needs to be located within the broader literature on their celebration in different countries. National Days on which to celebrate the founding of a nation state, or other significant national historical events, provide a locale for individuals and communities to express and celebrate their identity as citizens of the state, and their sense of belonging to the country. Foster argues with reference to the Canadian example that the national days, in addition to the formal and political speeches by leaders, provide ‘the non-official or “underground” forms of what it means to be [a citizen]’ (Foster, 2004). These ‘underground’ expressions ‘are found in the spontaneous forms of being together, forms of communing and celebrating together’. These forms can be seen in ‘the parades, the festival(s), the crowd milling at sites enjoying…cavorting just for the sake of it—to celebrate the communion’ (Foster, 2004: 47). This view of national days, however, is contested: Geisler argues that national days are ‘relatively weak and extremely unstable signifiers of national identity’ (Geisler, 2009: 14). Some citizens use these days as the locale to express their oppositional consciousness: the Quebecois in Canada, for example, express their opposition by playing down the significance of national days (Foster, 2004). Secessionist elements in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan actively discourage, and sometimes even threaten lives of, those who participate in such festivities.

Invariably, the acceptance or rejection of national days as expressions of citizenship is closely tied to the idea of nation and nationalism. Given the globalized nature of the contemporary world, nation as ‘imagined political community’ has been exposed to influences not known during the early conceptions of nationhood. This has posed challenges to the state and societies of ensuring that the ‘commonalities and boundaries of the imagined community’ are endowed with meanings that are shared by a significant majority. Specifically the immigration and addition of new citizens from overseas add to these challenges. With reference to celebration of national days, the challenge is not just to enthuse the new members of the polity about the days but also extends to an acceptance and understanding by the mainstream communities of new ways of celebrating and honoring events and days of national significance. Essentially, this includes both a promotion of a shared expression of identification with the imagined community—the adopted state—as citizens and engagement of new ideas of celebrating citizenship.

A preliminary exploration of Australian Muslims’ engagement with the Australia Day and the ANZAC Day celebrations suggest the relevance of these dual challenges for the Muslim and majority community in Australia. A mixed picture consequently emerges of the ways in which, adapting McAllister’s words, national days are ‘perceived, affected, resisted, rejected or adapted’ by Muslims in Australia (McAllister, 2012: p. 4).

Celebrating Australia Day

Australia Day (January 26) was originally celebrated to remember the British arrival on the continent in 1788. The day was celebrated to differing degrees in the colonies and later in Australia since 1901. The planned bicentennial celebrations in 1988, however, set in motion a trend to identify the day as a celebration for Australian national identity (Pearson & O’Neill, 2009). Since then the day has gained popularity as a celebration of Australian identity as a modern and multicultural nation: The National Australia Day Council (NADC), based in Canberra, along with partner organizations in each of the states and territories has played a role in popularizing the event. Celebrations across the country, announcements of the Australian of the Year awards on the eve of the Australia Day, and citizenship ceremonies now mark the day (McAllister, 2012). There has been ‘a rise in conspicuous celebration by local government, local businesses and the population’ (Lee, 2011). An unpublished market survey undertaken on behalf of the Australia Day National Network (2011) suggested that Australia Day is increasingly being considered important by a strong majority of those interviewed, with less than 10 percent considering it to be unimportant. Another poll conducted by Sydney Morning Herald in 2012 indicated that 71 percent of the respondents considered it appropriate to wish someone a Happy Australia Day. Though not conducted along scientific lines, such surveys do indicate that the day has acquired a status as worth celebrating. The day is also considered significant by ethnic minorities as evidence of their pride as Australians and their sense of belonging. There are, however, parallel contested views on the day as one marking the invasion of indigenous land that question the logic of celebrating it.

Muslim celebration of the Australia Day occurs against the backdrop of existing and slowly increasing Islamophobia in the country. Taking cues from international narratives questioning Islam’s relationship with democracy, some groups and websites have been critical of Islam and Muslims. In some cases, the criticism borders on vehement hatred. Though not specifically linked to the Australia Day, such Islamophobic ideas are often presented in nationalist terms that present Islam and Muslims as the other and worthy of being denigrated. This includes, for example, a Facebook group Australians against Muslim dominance that identifies itself as ‘A page for Australians that love this country and are against extremist Muslims destroying our country and disrespecting our values’. As the ideas of celebrating Australian identity become frequent closer to Australia Day, occasionally such strident criticism is combined with references to the Day. In early 2014, for example, such rhetoric was reflected in the following post: ‘On Australia Day, after drinking beer, eating pork and cursing Mohammad, we will burn 10 copies of the Quran (sic)…. Have a happy Australia Day!!!’ (The Anti Bogan, 2014).

There are also occasional tweets that identify Muslims as the ‘other’ and as not being part of the Australian community. In 2012, for example, former cricketer, Rodney Hogg tweeted: ‘Just put our my aussie flag for Australia Day but I wasn’t sure if it would offend Muslims…. So I wrote “Allah is a shit” on it to make sure’ (Wu, 2012). The tweet attracted angry responses from Muslims and non-Muslims who considered it to be unworthy of someone of Hogg’s stature to do this. In response to the reaction, he apologized and deleted the tweet (Wu, 2012). The frequency of such remarks specifically on Australia Day, it is important to point out, is limited but the occasional link presents Muslims as outsiders.

A similar limited attitude of questioning the Australia Day’s relevance to Muslims is present among some groups in Australia. For example, some Muslims have asked questions if it is permissible for them to celebrate Australia Day. The questioning can be understood with reference to the debates that have already taken place in other Western liberal societies on the permissibility of participating in political processes in the adopted homelands. Given that the Australia Day celebrates Australian national identity, the questions therefore are attempts to ensure that the celebration does not compromise Muslim identity of the participants in these activities.

Despite these reservations among a small section of the Muslim community, however, observations indicate that Muslims tend to participate in the celebrations in similar proportions as other members of the wider community. The list of activities generally include having a barbeque at home or with other friends and going to watch fireworks organized in all major cities. The willingness to participate is not limited to secular/liberal Muslims and extends to the majority of Muslims with only a small minority opting to reject it. Even some of the orthodox groups who query the permissibility of celebrating the day suggest that one could celebrate the day provided certain limits are imposed on the manner in which the day is celebrated. This implies that long as the Muslim identity, defined in terms of orthopraxy, is maintained by the Muslims, the Day could be celebrated. ²

Among those opposed to celebrating the day, some use religiously specific explanations: a post in response to questions on Muslim attitudes to the Australia Day, for example, elicited the response:

Australia Day is a nationalist celebration. Muslims believe that all people are descended (sic) from Adam and Eve, so nationalism does not make sense to us. We are all just one big family. An Australian is not inherently better than a Chinese or an African or anybody else. That said, Muslims are not allowed to celebrate any festivals except the 2 Islamic Eids (Aussiemuslims.com 2010).

This minority, it is important to note, do not necessarily explain their opposition in religious terms: for some the identification of Australia Day as the ‘sorry day’ by some indigenous community members is justification enough to distance from celebrating it as a sign of opposition to the arrival of British Fleet in 1788. The excessive focus on marketing by some organizations closer to the day has also been identified as a reason for rejecting the day. For example, another post in the response to the query claimed:

…we don’t need to celebrate Australia Day to be appreciative of the opportunities this country gives us. Yes, in some cases it is better than other countries, and in other cases, it’s not. Put aside the religious side of things, the way Australia was founded isn’t something to be proud of or to celebrate, and it’s exactly how I’ve seen it advertised on TV and other media outlets. It’s also become another huge marketing tool, and honestly that’s a huge turn off in itself.

Still others have favored the need to rename the day as Citizens Day in line with the ideas floated by some members of the wider community.

Beyond the celebration on the Australia Day and the exchanges in cyber space, Muslims have also been willing to participate in the process of nominating or being nominated for the Australians of the Year—the awards announced on the eve of the Australia Day. Both Muslim women and men have been nominated for demonstrated excellence in their field and significant contributions to the Australian community and nation. From 2011 to 2013, for example, six Muslims from diverse backgrounds were finalists in their respective states in categories of Senior Australians, Young Australians and Local Hero of the year. This included Ahmed Dini, Waleed Aly, Nouria Salehi, Yassmin Abdel-Magied, Samah Hadid, and Akram Azimi who was chosen as the Young Australian of the Year in 2013. ³ A similar willingness exists in terms of accepting the role of Australia Day ambassadors to participate in local Australia Day activities in towns and cities across the nation to inspire pride and celebration. ⁴

The participation in Australia Day activities in Australia is increasingly being supplemented with similar events being organized by Australian Muslims in their countries of origin. These activities vary in nature but the very fact that they are organized indicates a willingness and interest in acknowledging Australian identity on the day of national celebration.

The engagement with the Australia Day is equally reflected in the coverage of such events in ethnic media in Australia. A Pakistani web-based paper, Sada-e-Watan published from Sydney, for example, provides coverage of events held to mark the day and also publishes photographs of Australia Day celebrated in Pakistan by the Australian High Commission. ⁵

Celebrating ANZAC Day

The celebration of ANZAC Day presents a slightly different picture in terms of Muslim participation. ANZAC Day celebrates the sacrifices made by Australian soldiers during World War I when the Allied forces landed on the shores of what is now Anzac Cove, Galipoli, on April 25, 1915. Gradually the participation of soldiers and non-combatants in other conflicts has also been acknowledged in ANZAC Day celebrations that is ‘widely remembered in mournful and reflective ceremonies commemorating great sacrifice in war and, increasingly, the coming of age of a nation’ (Pearson and O’Neill, 2009). Though Australians have traditionally identified overt patriotism as an American trait (Pearson and O’neill 2009), the celebration and remembrance of ANZAC Day has gradually gained more significance with Australians visiting Gallipoli on April 25 each year to commemorate the sacrifices.

As in the case of Australia Day, ANZAC Day also occasionally provides space for Islamophobic views expressed by some members of the wider community. In 2011, for example, Jim Wallace, Managing Director of the Australian Christian Lobby, posted the following tweet that sparked criticism by members of the wider community and was quickly removed: ‘Just hope that as we remember Servicemen and women today we remember the Australia they fought for wasn’t gay and Islamic!’

The tweet was criticized by some for labeling gays and Muslims as not being Australian and also for being un-Christian. Jim Wallace quickly apologized and the tweet was removed. It did, however, indicate that some sections of the broader community excluded—even if unintentionally—Muslims as being part of the Australian nation (Benson, 2011).

A similar tendency to exclude the wider community and its national days is also evident among some Muslim groups. The celebration of ANZAC Day has attracted criticism in more recent years by members of Hizb ut-Tehrir who call upon Muslims to boycott the day. In April 2013, this found expression in an article published by the movement in Australia that stated that ‘[the ANZAC Day] is something Muslims should not actively or passively partake in’ (Hizb ut-Tehrir, 2013). Questioning the widely accepted notion that the Australian soldiers who fought at Gallipoli exhibited positive qualities of endurance, courage, humor, egalitarianism, ingenuity, and mateship, it maintained that the ‘Anzac spirit’ is ‘more mythology than history. It ignores indiscretions by the ANZAC Soldiers such as burning the belongings of locals in Egypt, brawling, getting drunk and rioting, and contracting venereal diseases due to time spent in local brothels’. Significantly, the ANZAC spirit was presented as having contributed ‘to the destruction of the Khilafah, manifest in Australia attaching and colonizing Muslim lands’. ‘In sum’, the article argued, ‘Anzac Day represents a nationalistic celebration, linked to the ideology of a disbelieving people, of events involving wars against the legitimate Muslim authority of the time. There is no justification whatsoever for Muslims to be actively or passively taking part in it’. Muslims were, therefore, warned that by participating either actively or passively, they were preparing for their ‘children and grandchildren doing the same for commemorations of the feats of Australian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan’.

These views have found support among some Muslims in Australia who have posted comments on the Hizb ut-Tahrir site addressing the wider community. For example, one post stated:

Dear Australians I cannot join you in your national celebration of ANZAC day, because you were then attacking the last remaining legitimate empire of the Muslims, which is my heritage, I hope you understand. And don’t tell me to go back to where I came from, your ancestors killed aboriginal ancestors and stole their children, and look how graciously they still let your offspring live in their country, and we just not partaking in a holiday, will you not be so gracious? (Badar, 2013)

Other Muslims do not share these views: particularly noticeable is the view held among Australians of Turkish background who have been on record that the Gallipoli campaign also enabled Turkish and Australian soldiers to appreciate that they were all humans engaged in a conflict. They also recount stories of their ancestors’ experiences of World War I in Gallipoli. Turgat Kacmaz, the son of a veteran who fought on the Turkish side in the Gallipoli, for example, mentioned that his father tasted chocolate for the first time ‘when the Australian soldiers threw some over from the trenches’ (Senelmis, 2013). Others question the interpretations provided by the Hizb ut-Tahrir and focus on Australian Muslims’ responsibilities as citizens.

National Days and Muslim Diversity—Concluding Comments

The diversity of Muslim engagement with Australia Day and ANZAC Day suggests that the sense of inclusion and exclusion reflects itself in different ways in which Muslims relate to, accept, adapt, or reject national days. It also suggests that the sense of citizenship and national identity as Australians is part of the overall Muslim experiences and views. The sense of citizenship and ownership of this identity, however, is partly shaped by the broader context in which Muslims live their lives in Australia (as in other western liberal societies). The slowly creeping presence of Islamophobia with the extreme views expressed in cyberspace adds to the sense of exclusion among some Muslims. At the same time, some Muslims also use national days combined with cyberspace to distinguish them from the mainstream community. It is interesting that despite this differentiation, they engage with those critical of Islam and Muslims as citizens. Essentially, however, the diversity reconfirms the limits of essentializing Muslim identities in Australia and elsewhere. It also suggests varying degrees of identification with national days celebrated in Australia.

Given the preliminary nature of this research, it would be useful to further undertake a detailed comparative qualitative research to assess the extent to which Muslims (and other minorities) relate to national days across the world, and the meanings they assign to these days in defining their identities.