Abstract

Turkey has been experiencing transformation since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (JDP), one of the parties that replaced the Virtue Party (VP) (Fazilet Partisi) which was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1999, came to power. Although the cover of the book, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: Urban Poverty, Grassroots Activism and Islamic Fundamentalism, suggests that it is solely about the JDP, Kayhan Delibas focuses on the changing dynamics of the Turkish politics, in particular the strategies and electoral successes of the Welfare Party (WP) (Refah Partisi) and the VP in the 1990s. The book aims to analyze the changes in the voter preferences and roots of electoral successes of ‘pro-Islamic’ parties in the 1990s. The book was the product of the author’s field research including two empirical cases during election campaigns in Keçiören and Mamak, the subdistricts of capital Ankara.
Besides the preface, the book consists of eight chapters. Delibas searches the dynamics of ‘pro-Islamic’ parties, in particular WP and VP and their ‘unprecedented rise’ in Turkish political life (p. 1), and the determinants of electoral success in the 1990s. In the first chapter, he sets the outline of the book and describes the WP’s and VP’s organizational structure. He emphasizes the ‘grassroots activism’ of the two parties as a key factor in their electoral successes (pp. 28–31) and correlates the fall of mainstream parties and a rise in ‘pro-Islamic’ parties in 1980–2002 in the next chapter. He argues that center-right and left parties failed in satisfying the voters in this era. On the contrary, WP and VP were the parties that established an efficient party organization and had hardworking party members organizing even in the smallest part of the districts, down to the subdistrict level. The grassroots activism of the WP and VP attracted the voters’ attention, especially in the rural areas.
Delibas highlights the institutionalization of ‘Islamic movements’ to the political party in Chapter 3 and illustrates that the roots of the ‘Islamist parties’ date back to the early 1970s with the establishment of the National Order Party (NOP) (Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan and its successor, the National Salvation Party (NSP) (Millî Selâmet Partisi), in 1972. He contends that both NOP and NSP shared the same view that ‘the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been caused by the abandonment of Islamic civilization in favor of Western civilization’ (p. 78). Hereby, NSP’s political ideology was based on the National View (Millî Görüş), protesting the Turkish western-oriented modernization process. In elections, these parties enjoyed popular appeal in rural areas because of their appeal to discontents, those suffering from income injustice, and a lack of trust of traditional politicians. After the 1980 military coup, the WP replaced the NSP. Delibas claims that unlike its predecessors, WP adopted a new political line that was based on the harmonization of traditionalist and modernist norms. Additionally, WP converted the party structure from cadre-based party to mass party (pp. 81–89). Toward the 1990s, WP began to rise at both local and national levels, with a new party composition. According to his empirical findings, in particular in VP’s term (replaced by WP), the political ideology began to shift to center-right (pp. 90–91). Beyond this argument, his claim that VP adopted a liberal policy rather than the ‘traditional National View’ (pp. 93–94) means the general belief that ‘religious and Islamist fundamentalist movements as never-changing’ does not make sense (p. 101).
In Chapter 4, contrary to traditional perception of Islamic movements as ‘rural, traditional, and anti-modern phenomena’ (p. 102), Delibas argues that ‘Islamic movements are the product of the process of modernization and rapid urbanization’ (p. 128). He implies that the rapid urbanization in particular big metropolitans such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, called as gecekondu, changed demographic structure of the cities and resulted in social, economic, and societal problems. The failure of the ruling/mainstream parties to satisfy the needs of these districts and WP’s and VP’s successes in face-to-face activities during electoral campaigns culminated voting change, and WP and VP began to gain important voting numbers in both local and general elections in Turkey with a new social, economic, and political solution called ‘Just Order’ (Adil Düzen). In the 1994 local elections, WP gained the two important mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, and in 1995 general elections, it became the number one party with 21.38 percent share of votes. Delibas explains the electoral success of WP and VP in terms of ‘grassroots organizations’ (p. 135) and a membership composition well integrated with women, as the unique party (p. 138). His empirical findings (in Chapter 5), of his field research in 1999 and 2000, illustrate that ‘religion, ideology, collective positive incentives including moral integrity, and finally political dissatisfaction’ motivated people to become a member of WP/VP (p. 173). The WP and VP enjoyed this political participation and motivation because they had the mass member and grassroots activities, which played a critical role in electoral success.
In terms of membership composition of the two parties, his findings (in Chapters 6 and 7) show that an important percentage of the WP and VP members are married and have three kids. Regarding education, 1–5 percent of them have graduated from religious-based (İmam-Hatip) schools, which positively affected party participation. Delibas’ research yielded surprising results in terms of grassroots activities. Contrary to the common belief, WP and VP used not only religious facilities, such as mosques, but also mass public (nonreligious) areas, house meetings, teahouses (kahvehane), which is a highly popular public area in Turkish societal life, and even pubs (pp. 230–232).
Delibas argues that the roots of the electoral success and the rising political support of WP and VP can be explained by their strong membership structure, effective party organization, in particular local, voluntary face-to-face canvassing, and political activities. He interestingly argues that the ‘pro-Islamic’ parties (in particular WP and VP) gradually shifted their political axis from the conservative to a liberal model in Turkey. Especially in VP’s term, party membership composition consisted of not only people who pray five times a day but also more liberal and secular people, such as unveiled women. He explains this political change as the correct reading of political reality and the world of globalization by policy makers of WP and VP.
Delibas’ empirical findings and arguments illustrate that the rise of WP and VP (JDP since 2002) goes beyond the classical argument based on Islamic fundamentalism or revivalism. He points out that although mainstream parties suffered from the weak party organization and party identification, WP and VP had a well-structured activity in all areas of the country (in particular local), hardworking party members throughout the year, and a comprehensive electoral campaign (as he called ‘grassroots activism’) with face-to-face, door-to-door party propaganda as well as visual and print media campaigns (pp. 258–280). He also argues that in comparison with the US and the UK, WP and VP members worked harder and were more active than the US and the UK’s party activists during electoral campaigns (pp. 254, 284).
Although there are no major faults or omissions, the book needs some updates and corrections. For example, the ‘24 January’ decisions (p. 121) should be dated to 1980 rather than 1979. In terms of gaining state funding for political parties in Turkey, the requirement of the total votes has been changed in 2014 from 7 percent to 3 percent (p. 247). The book attributes successes in the 2002 and 2007 general elections to WP, even though in reality it was JDP that won the elections (p. 261). The author uses the Libyan political party name ‘Justice and Development Party’, though the name ‘Justice and Construction Party’ is more commonly used (p. 265). Finally, the book states that Abdullah Gül has been the President since 2007, but Recep Tayyip Erdoğan succeeded him after the 2014 elections (p. 267).
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: Urban Poverty, Grassroots Activism and Islamic Fundamentalism makes an important contribution to literature over the last 25 years of the political life of Turkey. It is easy to read, grounded in the author’s field research, and highly recommended to all researchers, readers, and students who are interested in Turkish domestic politics. His investigation of the 1990s political movements in Turkey provides a model and suggests a need for a similar study of the JDP from 2002 through today.
