Abstract
There is never a dull moment in the Middle East. Even by its own standards of instability and unpredictability, the region is facing unprecedented challenges and is witnessing profound transformations. A century after the Sykes–Picot agreement, the region is undergoing a new cartography. Unlike the earlier occasion, this time divisions, partition, and even impending disintegrations are not due to external interference or grand designs of the colonial powers. The redrawing of the Middle East is largely the handiwork and result of internal tensions over ethnicity, religious, and political ideologies as well as the failure of the nation-building project of the post-Ottoman Middle East.
The rapid expansion of the amorphous Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, often known in the Middle East by its Arabic acronym Da’ish, is an unprecedented development. Since 2011, when it ventured into the Syrian civil war, areas under its direct control and indirect influence have expanded considerably. It is not only challenging Iraq and Syria but elements influenced if not identified with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been posing challenges to Jordan, Lebanon, and of late to the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Its presence is felt not only in the Arab Middle East but also among Muslim communities in Western countries, such as, Australia, Britain, France, and the US. The ISIS is proving to be a major attraction for a number of Western-born Muslim youth, including girls and women.
The ISIS is different from anything the world has ever witnessed. Unlike the communism and later on the Islamic revolution in Iran, the ISIS is both violent and xenophobic. Not just the minorities, even Muslims, whose Islamic credentials are questioned by it, have faced the wrath of ISIS fighters. Its puritanical view of the faith has been unacceptable even to the Wahhabis as well as to the Salafis. The fighters and their supporters ironically justify the intolerance and brutality in the name of Islamic teachings. As a result, since the September 11 terror attack, the ISIS has emerged as the new catalyst for Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments in some Western societies.
There are other problems. Wrought by sectarian divide and violence, some of the Middle East states are on the brink of collapse and possible disappearance. There appears to be no end to the violence that haunts countries, such as, Iraq, Libya Syria, and Yemen. Neither internal leadership nor external powers have a viable strategy to bring down the level of violence and brutality unleashed against women, children, and minorities. Lacking vision, most countries and leaders do not go beyond blame game and narrow immediate interests. Even under an unlikely event of a peaceful resolution of some of their problems, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Yemen will not be the same and the Middle East will not be the same.
The Middle East witnessed an intensification of sectarian divide which is not only confined to the traditional hotspots, such as, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq but also spread to other countries, such as, Syria and Yemen. Even those who denied the Shia–Sunni divisions in the past have increasingly admitting and commenting on the sectarian dimension of the Saudi–Iran political contest in the Persian Gulf region. The willingness of both these Islamic powers to test their influence and dominance has largely contributed to the Yemeni crisis. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to pursue a military option vis-à-vis the civil war in Yemen has not been accepted by Iran which threw its weight in support of the Houthi militia.
There are internal changes in some countries. Egypt’s experiment with democracy was abruptly curtailed when the military intervened to depose President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 and this was followed by former army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who was elected President in June 2014. The return of the military is an ominous development for the democratization of the most populated Arab country. Likewise, Saudi Arabia witnessed the change of leadership when Salman became king following the death of his half brother Abdullah in January 2015. The latter dominated the Saudi and regional political scene ever since he became the de facto ruler after King Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke in November 1995. Through deft handling he managed a number of internal tensions and external challenges and initiated reforms, primarily in the education and social sectors, but the pace of reform was slow.
Since taking over the reign, King Salman has been making far too many changes. For the first time in the history of the kingdom, he deposed a crown prince and named his son as the second deputy prime minister and hence third in the line of succession. Working on the model initiated by Abdullah, he consolidated the succession to the third generation as both Crown Prince and Deputy Crown Prince are the grandchildren of the founder King Ibn Saud. He has marginalized or clipped the powers of some of those close to or appointed by Abdullah and, in a rare move, accepted the resignation of Prince Faisal, who has been the Saudi Foreign Minister since 1975. Above all, Salman has plunged the country into a military confrontation with Yemen, both to contain growing Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula and to reestablish Saudi domination in the region.
Changes of a different nature are taking place in Israel and Turkey through elections. Much to the disappointment of pollsters and critics, Benjamin Netanyahu bounced back in the March 2015 Knesset elections with Likud emerging as the largest political party. However, the rightwing coalition government that he managed to cobble in May has the support of only 67 lawmakers and is vulnerable to internal pressures and early elections look a real possibility. Ideological cohesion also impedes the Israeli government from pursuing any meaningful negotiations with the Palestinians. For their part, the Palestinian leadership is continued to be divided with Gaza Strip and West Bank function as two distinct entities.
The elections in Turkey proved to be a warning to the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; Justice and Development Party (AKP) that ruled the country since 2003. Recep Tayyip Erdogan narrowly won the presidential elections held in August 2014, and his attempts to transform Turkey into a presidential form of government received a setback following June when AKP failed to secure a simple majority, let alone two-thirds majority needed to make Turkey into an executive presidency.
There are, however, some rays of hope. Popular protests that began in Tunisia in December 2010 have forced some Arab countries to seek political legitimacy through elections. The process has been slow and even uneven as witnessed in Egypt with military regaining its primacy but the changes are distinct. Even monarchies are receptive to popular participation in choosing their leaders. The debacle suffered by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt partly resulted in Ennahda adopting an accommodative and nonconfrontationist position vis-à-vis the secular opposition. This resulted in the country adopting a new constitution that has no direct reference to Sharia. Other countries are less fortunate and are struggling to find a middle path that satisfies their diverse population.
For long discussions on political participation focused exclusively on the three no-Arab countries, namely Israel, Iran, and Turkey. In the entire Arab Middle East, elections were nonexisting or were not more than a state-sponsored propaganda exercise. The absence of a real contest and the exclusion of women as candidates as well as voters diminished any interest in the so-called elections.
Elections have become a novelty to the Middle East, and even monarchies are beginning to recognize the importance and relevance of popular endorsement and legitimacy. Since early 2014, for example, various elections were held in Algeria (April 2014), Iraq (April and July 2014), Egypt (May 2014), Syria (June 2014), Libya (June 2014), Tunisia (October and November 2014), and Bahrain (November 2014), and a number of other elections are scheduled in other Arab countries. In recognition of the democratic experiment currently underway, from this issue, Contemporary Review of the Middle East will be devoting a section on the elections in the Middle East. Focusing on individual countries, this would examine the context of these elections, agenda, level of participation and their contribution to the democratization process of the Middle East. By themselves elections do not indicate the popularity of democracy but are a key component of legitimacy and accountability. Unlike the past, some of these elections are free and fair and have multiparty participation and require close scrutiny and understanding.
The Middle East is passing through interesting times.