Iranian Nuclear Agreement: Understanding the Nonproliferation Paradigm

Abstract

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was successfully negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 comprising United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, and Germany on July 14, 2015. The result of multilateral diplomacy spanning over a decade, the agreement resolved international concerns about the military nature of the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement expands the scope and nature of international safeguards and verification of the Iranian nuclear program. It physically blocks both the plutonium and the uranium route that Iran can pursue to build nuclear weapons. These measures increase the lead time available to the international community in case Iran decides to build nuclear weapons any time in the future. In sum, the agreement successfully alleviates global concerns about Iran building a nuclear weapon, builds trust between Iran and the West, and opens up the possibility of collaboration to tackle the challenges faced by the region as a whole.

Keywords

Iran nuclear program Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran and P5+1 negotiation Iran and IAEA safeguards Iran nuclear fatwa

The international community heaved a sigh of collective relief when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded on July 14, 2015 after intensive negotiations that spanned over 2 years between Iran and the P5+1 comprising United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, and Germany. The agreement was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by way of the UNSC Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015 (United Nations Security Council, 2015). By any standard, the agreement is an important one as it delineates a roadmap of sorts for resolving the concerns surrounding the Iranian nuclear program.

The agreement has generated a lot of debate and has its share of supporters and detractors. It is prudent to keep a few crucial facts in mind while analyzing the agreement and its implications. First of all, the JCPOA and the Iran and P5+1 talks were only about the Iranian nuclear program and did not encompass the wider regional crises in the Middle East and the Iranian role in these crises. This was the result of a decision which was taken during the Bush administration (2000–2008) to limit the talks with Iran only to the nuclear issue. Therefore, though the agreement has wider regional implications in how the crises in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq will pan out in the future, the P5+1 talks were narrowly focused on the Iranian nuclear file.

The second point to keep in mind is that in any multilateral diplomatic negotiation, two extremes are possible. At one end is the ideal, perfect agreement and at the other end is the flawed or imperfect agreement. More often than not, the agreement that the negotiating parties are able to sign off on lies somewhere between these two extremes and can be described as a practical or the best possible agreement under a given situation. The success and sustainability of any agreement is assured by ensuring that the gap between the ideal and practical is as small as possible. The “best possible agreement” has to account for competing national interests of the negotiating parties and domestic pressures that shape or limit the negotiators’ choices. As this article highlights, all parties to the JCPOA made significant compromises and none of them walked away from the deal completely happy with the agreement. This is an important sign that the agreement falls close to what can be described as the golden mean or best possible, practical agreement.

Appreciating the Drivers

To understand the July 14 agreement between Iran and the P5+1 powers and place it in the proper context, it is imperative that one appreciates the drivers of the Iranian nuclear program and the factors which shape Iran’s negotiating strategy with respect to its nuclear program. These drivers can be narrowed down to security concerns, domestic politics, and factors such as prestige and personality factors (Sagan, 1996).

Security Drivers

The 8-year long Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and the fact that Iran was caught unaware and left without an appropriate response to the Iraqi surface-to-surface missile attacks is deeply ingrained on the Iranian psyche (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 56). The futility of conventional arms when compared with nuclear deterrence was also another lesson the Iranian leaders took away from the War. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then the Speaker of the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) stated in 1988, that “unconventional weapons were ‘decisive’ in the Iran–Iraq War and Iran should fully equip itself both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons” (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar, 2005, p. 298). This coupled with the realization of how close Iraq came to building nuclear weapons (Hymans, 2012, pp. 79–123) influenced the internal debate in Tehran on whether a nuclear weapon would provide greater security to the regime. Another fact that influenced Iran’s behavior was the stark difference in how the international community dealt with a nuclear North Korea as opposed to an Iran or Libya without nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Iranian leaders saw nuclear weapons as a guarantor against regime change.

In the past, there have been statements made by several high-placed Iranian officials and political leaders in support for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1988, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander General Yahya Rahim Safavi reportedly stated that “Iran needed to reconsider its participation in international conventions banning WMD in light of the threat posed by Israel” (Chubin, 2006, p. 56). Clifton W. Sherrill writing in The Nonproliferation Review argues that by building nuclear weapons, Iran could hope to counter the Iraqi threat by employing mutual deterrence (Sherrill, 2012, p. 37). In this context, it is interesting to note that with the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003 following the US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran too halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall 2003 as noted in the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (National Intelligence Council, 2007, p. 5).

However, senior leaders like the then secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and now president, Hassan Rouhani, and former foreign minister and current head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, have argued against building nuclear weapons as they see this as leading to a worsening of the overall regional security situation. Writing in The Washington Quarterly, Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak argue that analysts have generally seen the regional neighborhood and possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, Israel, and Russia as driving the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. They state, “Iran has no historical enemies; existential threats; or giant, hostile neighbors requiring it to compensate for a military imbalance with a nuclear program” (Chubin & Litwak, 2003, p. 105). In 2004, explaining Iran’s decision against possessing WMD in an interview to Al Jazeera, the then secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani, stated:

Our decision not to possess weapons of mass destruction is strategic because we believe that these weapons will not provide security for Iran. On the contrary, they will create big problems … our possession of these weapons will force these countries to seek the support of big powers. Consequently, regional security will worsen. This will not serve our national security. (Chubin, 2006, p. 57)

Iranian leaders have repeatedly pointed out to the fatwa issued by the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In an interview to Gareth Porter of Foreign Policy, Mohsen Rafighdoost—former minister of the IRGC throughout the 8-year Iran–Iraq War, IRGC Commander, and personal bodyguard and head of the Supreme Leader’s security detail—stated that the Supreme Leader forbade development of both chemical and nuclear weapons even in face of Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities. Rafighdoost stated that the Supreme Leader described WMD as haram and forbade any efforts to build such weapons (Porter, 2015). However, this argument suffered a blow in light of the 2007 US NIE that assessed with a “high confidence that Iran halted its nuclear program in 2003 … till fall 2003 Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.” Further, the NIE states that the regime’s decision was to engage with the international community, suspend enrichment, and sign the Additional Protocol, given the international pressure and scrutiny following the exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared work (National Intelligence Council, 2007, p. 5).

Scholars like Ali Ansari have stated that though Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, even his fatwas are “not seen as the last word on anything in the fractious world of Iranian politics.” He argues that fatwas have no legislative basis and leaves considerable room for maneuver (Ansari, 2012). Moreover, even the Supreme Leader has been sending out mixed signals in his public statements on the issue. In a February 2013 statement, Khamenei stated, “We believe that nuclear weapons must be eliminated. We don’t want to build atomic weapons, But if we didn’t believe so and intended to possess nuclear weapons, no power could stop us” (Erdbrink, 2013). This has led to continued doubts about the fatwa in the West, more importantly on how these guidelines could change in light of exigencies (Tabatabai, 2015).

Iran in all likelihood wanted to put in place an option or what Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran term as a hedging strategy by building the various elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. As the 2007 US NIE brought forth, Iran had not made a political decision to build a nuclear weapon. Evidence for this was the lack of an accelerated effort to build a nuclear weapon in case such a decision had been taken even with an overt nuclear test. Thus, in all likelihood, the regime wanted to put in place all the components required for a non-weaponized deterrent, thereby hedging its bets against any eventualities (Bowen & Moran, 2014).

Speaking before the Senate select Committee on Intelligence in February 2011, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper alluded to Iran’s hedging and stated:

We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. (Clapper, 2011, p. 4)

However, this is not to say that the Iranian regime would not have authorized the building of a nuclear weapon if for instance, the US and its allies had conducted aerial strikes on Iran (Kroenig, 2012). In the larger scheme of things, having the elements of the nuclear option in place enabled the Iranian regime to use the nuclear program as a bargaining chip to strike a deal which would open up the doors for Tehran to play a larger role in the region (Chubin, 2006, p. 14).

Prestige and Self-reliance

Beginning with the Shah’s period (1941–1979), Iran saw the nuclear program as an indicator of its capabilities and a means of developing its scientific and technological capabilities. Shah, in fact, invited the US and European companies to invest heavily in the Iranian civilian nuclear program. Given Iran’s geographic location, the US saw it is a major ally in the region with US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger referring to Iran as “the lynchpin of stability in the Middle East” (Mousavian, 2012, p. 40). Pentagon officials argued for breaking the impasse over exporting reprocessing technology to Iran as this issue was “poisoning other aspects of the US–Iran relations resulted in the Ford administration backing down from its opposition to the export” (Mousavian, 2012, pp. 50–51). Moreover, self-reliance was important for the regime and it viewed the nuclear program and efforts to acquire the complete fuel cycle from nuclear mining, milling, enrichment, and reprocessing technologies as a means to build up national prestige and self-reliance (Chubin, 2015).

Khamenei’s statement makes the regime’s thinking and the importance it attaches to such technology quite apparent. He stated, “Iran has advanced nuclear technology including enrichment and this is very important … the bullies of this world know full well that we do not have nuclear weapons. However what has made them anxious is the Iranian nation’s access to nuclear technology” (Chubin, 2006, p. 27). Similarly, Seyed Hossein Mousavian—former head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s supreme National Security Council—in his memoir Iranian Nuclear Crisis stated, “Tehran… contends that the main reason for the current standoff is to keep Iran dependent on the industrial powers and to impede the country’s economic and industrial progress” (Mousavian, 2012, p. 195). While speaking at the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference held at Brussels in November 11–12, 2015, Mostafa Zahrani—Director of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs-supported Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS)—made an important point. He described the election of a reformer like Rouhani in June 2013 presidential elections as indicative of the peoples’ desire to be treated with dignity by the international community and a ground swell of support for change (Zahrani, 2015).

Among others, analysts like Mark Fitzpatrick have questioned Iran’s pursuit of enrichment capabilities on the basis that it does not make economic sense for Iran to produce enriched fuel when it can purchase them from external sources at much lower cost especially given the size of its nuclear program (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p. 18; Fleitz, 2015). These arguments do not hold much sway with the Iranian regime as their thinking has been shaped by their history and in particular the Iran–Iraq War experiences. As Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran argue, the regime associates scientific advancement with modernity and as a vehicle for the projection of international influence and status (Bowen & Moran, 2014, p. 38). This in turn has made self-reliance an important driver of Iranian policies as Tehran does not want to rely on external supplies for critical components or material due to fears that they could easily be denied to them at any time in the future.

Domestic Politics

Third and equally important aspect of the Iranian nuclear program is how the Iranian nuclear program is used by the regime to further nationalistic sentiments in the country. In 2010, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium to about 20 percent U-235 on the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian regime always seeks to reiterate the link between the “nuclear program and the nationalist self-perception of greatness” (Bowen & Moran, 2014, p. 39). Clifton W. Sherrill writing in The Nonproliferation Review made an insightful observation pointing to the general domestic consensus and lack of any criticism on Iran’s nuclear program. Sherrill stated that Iran’s nuclear weapons pursuit was useful for building domestic support for the regime. During the 2009 presidential elections, though other candidates criticized the Ahmadinejad administration on many issues, they mostly stayed away from attacking the nuclear program and did not go beyond questioning the government’s stance on negotiations (Sherrill, 2012, pp. 41–42). Thus, despite the Iranian political scene being dynamic, fluid, and marred by factional politics, the nuclear program had largely provoked little disagreement. Shahram Chubin writing in Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions stated that the nuclear issue had become a litmus test of nationalism from which there were few dissenters (Chubin, 2006, pp. 30–31; Jones, 2011, p. 108).

Contextualizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The conclusion of the JCPOA on July 14, 2015 (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015) was possible after more than a decade of sustained diplomatic dialogue and 2 years of sustained negotiations among the Iranian regime, the five permanent members of the UNSC, and the EU. The road to the JCPOA traversed through the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the parties in Geneva on November 24, 2013 (Joint Plan of Action, 2013), followed by the April 2, 2015 political accord at Lausanne which laid down the broad parameters for the JCPOA agreement that was concluded in July 2015 (“Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 2015).

The JPA was an interim deal that Iran and the P5+1 agreed in November 2013 and was the first step toward the July 2015 comprehensive agreement. The agreement was criticized for recognizing Iran’s right to enriching uranium (Dahl, 2013; “Iran right to enrich recognized: Zarif,” 2013) and for allowing Iran to accumulate additional fissile material and for not placing any curbs on Iran’s research and development (R&D) efforts on uranium centrifuges. However, a closer analysis of the text points to the several important achievements of the November 2013 agreement which includes curbs on Iran’s enrichment, placing additional inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stalling any further progress, and initiating dialogue between Iran and IAEA on the Arak Heavy Reactor (Joshi, 2014). The main points of the November 2013 interim agreement are highlighted below.

Stockpile of Near 20 Percent Uranium Hexafluoride Gas

The November 2013 JPA dealt with the issue of 20 percent of enriched uranium of which Iran had stockpiled about 196 kg. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to retain half the stockpile as working stock of 20 percent uranium oxide for fabrication of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and dilute the remaining stock of 20 percent UF₆ to no more than 5 percent (Joint Plan of Action, 2013, p. 1).

Uranium Enrichment

Iran agreed not to enrich uranium over 5 percent for the next 6 months.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor

Iran agreed not to make any further advances at the Arak Heavy Water Reactor and submit an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and work with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the Arak reactor (Joint Plan of Action, 2013, p. 2).

Expanded Access to International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectors

As opposed to weekly or biweekly access to IAEA safeguards inspectors, Iran agreed to provide daily access to inspectors to its facilities at Fordow and Natanz (Davenport, 2015). Iran agreed to allow IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and mills, centrifuge production facilities, workshops, and storage facilities.

Despite several rounds of meetings and multiple extensions, the negotiators needed more time to iron out their differences and consult with their principals, given the importance of issues under discussion. As a result, the negotiators decided to make public the key parameters of the JCPOA on April 2, 2015 at Lausanne. The statement of broad parameters puts forth “elements that form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written.” It also reiterated the interim nature of the document stating that “important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” (“Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 2015).

It is equally important to place the July 2015 JCPOA agreement in the correct context. The agreement was possible due to a multiplicity of factors. These range from Hassan Rouhani being elected as president in the elections held in June 2013 (Dehghan, 2013). The economic hardship caused as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iran by the US and the embargo imposed by the EU on imports of oil and gas from Iran beginning July 2012 had a major role to play in the regime’s decision on the negotiations on the nuclear program (Dicolo, 2012).

The Nuts and Bolts

As the history of nuclear weapons has shown, countries have used two routes to stockpile weapons-grade fissile material to build nuclear weapons. The first route is to enrich uranium to weapons grade, generally close to 90 percent enrichment of Uranium-235. The IAEA defines highly enriched uranium (HEU) as uranium with an assay of 20 percent or more of U-235. Plutonium can also be used by countries to build nuclear weapons. Weapons designers generally prefer plutonium (Pu-239) with less than 8 percent of Pu-240. However, the IAEA defines all plutonium—other than plutonium comprising 80 percent or more of the isotope Pu-238—as a “direct-use” material, that is, “nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosives components without transmutation or further enrichment” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972, Para 36.c, 37.a.i, 37.a.ii., 37.a.iii).

The most significant achievement of the JCPOA is that it restricts both the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing routes to nuclear weaponization which were available to Iran. It significantly lengthens the break-out period from 1–2 months to 11–12 months in case Iran decides to build nuclear weapons (Samore, 2015, p. 29). This gives the international community more time to take any remedial action in case Iran decides to reverse course and pursue a weapons path.

Curbs on Uranium Enrichment

In November 2013, at the beginning of the negotiations which resulted in the JCPOA agreement, Iran was operating a total of 19,480 centrifuges of which 18,472 were of the first generation IR-1 centrifuges and 1,008 were of the second generation IR-2. Iran was carrying out enrichment at Natanz and Fordow. It had a total of 10,357 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5 percent U-235 and 410.4 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20 percent U-235 (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2013, p. 4, Annex II).

The Iranian regime has held that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) membership under Article IV, Para 1 assures the “inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968, Article IV, Para 1). Iran has held that enrichment facilities are a part and parcel of these inalienable rights and has linked it to self-reliance and advancement of its national scientific and technological capability. On the other hand, the US, the West, and several UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010) have called on Iran to stop its enrichment activities (United Nations Security Council, 2010, p. 1). Partly, this problem is created as a result of the fact that though the NPT assures its members the right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it does not clearly outline what such activities entail (Vishwanathan, 2014, p. 24). Therein lies the rub and the source of differences.

The July 2015 JCPOA places several restrictions on Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Iran has in essence agreed to dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges and about one-third of its operating centrifuges. The number of centrifuges will reduce from a figure of 19,480 of November 2013 to 6,104 as part of the JCPOA. In the past, Iran has always described uranium enrichment as a “red-line” which is not negotiable and its negotiators have described it as “national will and is the establishment’s decision. Nobody can end it” (Chubin, 2006, p. 67). Despite this, Iran pledging to undertake such a drastic reduction in its enrichment capacity is an important concession.

Under the JCPOA, restrictions have been placed which will result in reduction in the type and number of centrifuges, capping the level of enrichment, reduction of number of facilities, elimination of uranium stockpile, and limiting R&D activities on centrifuges and enrichment. The details of these restrictions are detailed in the following sections.

Reduction in Number of Enrichment Facilities

For 15 years, all enrichment-related activity in Iran will take place only at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant which will have a maximum of 5,060 IR-1 type centrifuges (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 27, 29, 29.1, 29.2). Under the agreement, Iran will cease all uranium enrichment and enrichment R&D activities at Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP). Fordow can have a maximum of 1,044 IR-1 type centrifuges which will work to produce stable isotopes for medical and research activities (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 46, 46.1, 46.2). The centrifuges at Fordow will not produce any uranium for a period of 15 years.

Reduction in Number and Type of Centrifuges

For 15 years, the maximum number of centrifuges Iran can operate will be capped at 6,104 of IR-1 type. This is a drastic reduction from 19,480 centrifuges in November 2013. The agreement has stalled further addition of centrifuge capacity which were being added at a rate of around 700 centrifuges/month before the agreement (Bohlen, 2015, 59). Iran will have about 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and 1,044 centrifuges at Fordow for producing stable isotopes. Iran will also remove around 1,000 IR-2m type and other advanced centrifuges from cascades under the agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 27, 46).

Level of Enrichment and Uranium Stockpile

Prior to the agreement, Iran had a stockpile of low-enriched (up to 5 percent) UF-6 amounting to 7,154 kg and 196 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20 percent. As part of the JCPOA, Iran cannot have any stockpile of 20 percent enriched UF6 and can have a stockpile of up to 300 kg of 5 percent enriched UF6. The agreement caps the maximum level of enrichment to 3.67 percent for a period of 15 years (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 28).

Uranium Testing as well as Research and Development on Centrifuges

The JCPOA addressed a major criticism of the JPA/interim deal of November 2013 for lacking any restrictions on Iran’s R&D efforts on centrifuges. The July 2015 agreement places strict restrictions on R&D efforts with respect to centrifuges. For 15 years, uranium testing can only take place at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, while mechanical testing can take place at the PFEP and the TRR (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 40). Iran will convert the Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP) into a nuclear, physics, and technology center where international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. No Uranium enrichment or related R&D effort will be carried out at the Fordow enrichment facility for a period of 15 years (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 44, 45).

Under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to carry out uranium testing only with IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 types of centrifuges. It can carry out mechanical testing only with IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, and IR-8 types of centrifuges but will require approval for carrying out mechanical tests on new models. Iran is prohibited from pursuing any R&D on other forms of uranium separation, such as gaseous diffusion or laser separation (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 32, 43, 81) for a period of 10 years.

Curbs on Plutonium Production

The JCPOA has effectively blocked the plutonium route for building a nuclear weapon by way of a redesign of the Arak heavy-water research reactor. As part of this redesign, the power level of the reactor will be reduced from 40 MWth to 20 MWth. The second important design change will affect the type of fuel loaded into the reactor. Instead of natural uranium (0.7 percent U-235), the redesigned reactor will operate on low-enriched uranium (3.67 percent U-235) (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, sec. Arak Design: Fundamental Principles, Para 82). Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies and will store all the existing natural uranium pellets till the redesigned reactor becomes operation at which point they will either be converted or exchanged for natural uranium (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Annex I, Para 9, 10). It will not accumulate heavy water for 15 years and will export all additional heavy water to the international market (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Para 10). In continuation with the November 2013 interim deal, Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor. Importantly, Iran has also agreed to ship out all the spent fuel from the redesigned reactor for the lifetime of the reactor.

The above steps in essence block all possibilities for Iran to pursue the plutonium route for building nuclear weapons. Given that the Arak reactor (IR-40) will be under monitoring, any attempts by Iran to change the reactor’s design will be time consuming and will also be detected well in time. The Belfer Center’s report on the JCPOA estimates that redesigned Arak reactor will produce uranium worth one-sixth of one bomb per year as opposed to 1 to 2 bombs worth of plutonium per year that it was capable of producing had it been operationalized under the original design (Samore, 2015, p. 22).

Verification Measures under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Is Cheating Possible?

There are many critics of the deal who vociferously argue that the JCPOA is a bad agreement. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on October 1, 2015, stated that the Iran agreement “doesn’t make peace more likely. By fueling Iran’s aggressions with billions of dollars in sanctions relief, it makes war more likely” (Netanyahu, 2015, p. 1). Several commentators and former diplomats have noted that Iran is unlikely to change its strategic behavior as a result of the agreement. Another point of concern is the limited duration (10–15 years) of many of the major restrictions under the agreement (Bohlen, 2015, p. 61; Tertrais, 2015, pp. 69, 70). Others argue that the agreement will end the best of sanctions, thereby unlocking supplies of money and technology while making very large concessions on the nuclear front to Iran (Moore, 2015).

Before we take a look at the nature and scope of the monitoring and verification mechanisms under the JCPOA which will make any hiding or diversion difficult, it is important to make sense of the fairly large monitoring and inspection responsibilities that the IAEA will have to carry out for verifying Iran’s adherence to the provisions of the JCPOA. The IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano in his August 14, 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors stated that the estimated cost of verification and monitoring activities in Iran prior to Implementation Day will be €0.96 million per month. Amano pointed out that about €9.2 million will be required every year to support IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities in Iran (“Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the IAEA Director General,” 2015, p. 7). In a press briefing, Amano stated that the IAEA would require “a substantial, but not a dramatic” increase in IAEA inspectors and analysts for supporting the implementation of the JCPOA (World Nuclear News, 2015).

Extensive Monitoring under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The inspection and monitoring regime put in place by the JCPOA has been described by Mark Fitzpatrick as NPT plus and Additional Protocol plus (Fitzpatrick, 2015). Under the agreement, Iran agreed not to conduct activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. Such proscribed activities involve designing, developing, acquiring, fabricating, or using (i) computer models to —simulate nuclear explosive devices; (ii) multi-point explosive detonation systems; (iii) explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras, and flash x-ray cameras); and (iv) explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 82, 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.4). Fitzpatrick describes the JCPOA as a major breakthrough for the nuclear nonproliferation regime as till date the NPT “never explicitly granted the IAEA the right to verify nuclear weaponization work that does not involve nuclear materials” (Fitzpatrick, 2015, p. 49).

In addition, the IAEA will monitor mining and milling activities in Iran for a period of 25 years (Davenport, 2015, p. 17). This will provide the agency with a very clear picture of the amount of fissile material in the country, thereby significantly improving fissile material accountancy. As part of transparency and confidence building measures, Iran will also have to declare details of stock of uranium ore concentrate for 25 years. In addition, the IAEA will monitor “containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including online enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years” (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 14).

Iran has agreed to curb its R&D efforts. All its R&D efforts with regard to uranium centrifuges will take place only with specific type of centrifuges (IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8) and only at the PFEP at Natanz. Only IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, and IR-8 types will be involved in mechanical testing of centrifuges which will take place only at the PFEP and at the TRR (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 32, 40). In addition, Iran has agreed “not to engage in activities, including at the R&D level which could contribute to the to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities” (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 16). Iran’s procurement efforts too will be monitored under the agreement with states having to seek prior approval of the UN Security Council for sale of “all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology” contained in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List of nuclear and dual use items (“Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the IAEA Director General,” 2015, p. 89, Para 6).

Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1

One of the most significant achievements of the JCPOA is that Iran will begin provisionally applying the IAEA Additional Protocol from Implementation Day which took place on January 16, 2016. Importantly, the statement which was issued on the Adoption Day (October 18, 2015) also mentions that Iran will fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015a). The full implementation of modified code 3.1 by Iran is significant because this will ensure that Iran will have to inform the IAEA of any new planned facility as soon as the decision to build it is taken rather than 6 months before introduction of nuclear material into the facility (Davenport, Kimball, & Thielmann, 2015, p. 30).

It is significant that the modified code 3.1 will remain in force as long as Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA remains in force. This essentially means that Iran will have to adhere to these obligations as long as it continues to be a member of the NPT. Under the agreement, Iran will seek ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol only on Transition Day which will fall in October 2023 (8 years after the Adoption Day) which is when the US and the EU will lift the second tranche of sanctions (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Para 34.iv, 64, 65). Iran wanted to put in place this staggered timeline of safeguards implementation so as to secure itself against any changes in American foreign policy toward Iran and the nuclear agreement following US Presidential elections in 2017.

Iran Obligations under International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards and Additional Protocol Are Permanent

Many critics of the deal point to the short duration of the restrictions on Iranian activities (Tertrais, 2015). However, such criticism misses the point that the Iranian obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol are not linked to the JCPOA. These obligations and monitoring and inspections by the IAEA will continue till such time that Iran is a member of the NPT and are not linked in any way to the expiry of the JCPOA. These will ensure that the IAEA continues to monitor and verify Iran’s nuclear activities and declarations under its safeguards agreements even after the JCPOA expires.

Timely Responses to International Atomic Energy Agency Inspection Requests to Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Another unique aspect of the deal is that the agreement puts in place a mechanism to ensure timely response by Iran to requests by the IAEA for providing access to its inspectors. It is important to note that such a mechanism is not available under the Additional Protocol as it is implemented in over 121 countries across the globe. It in essence goes over and above the provisions currently available in the Additional Protocol.

Under the JCPOA, if the IAEA raises concerns about undeclared material, activities at locations which are not declared under either the comprehensive safeguards agreement or the Additional Protocol, it can request for Iran’s clarification on these issues. If Iran’s response does not resolve IAEA’s concerns, it can make a request for a challenge inspection. A challenge inspection requests access to an undeclared facility with the aim of verifying the absence of undeclared activities or material. Within 14 days from such a request, Iran has to provide the inspectors with access or can propose an “alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns” (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 77, 78). If the issue is not satisfactorily resolved, then it will be referred to the Joint Commission for consultation where within 7 days the Joint Commission would by consensus or by a majority vote of five out of its eight members would “advice on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA’s concerns.” Iran would be given an additional 3 days to comply to the Joint Commission’s advice (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, sec. Annex I, Para 78). Thus, the JCPOA provides Iran with a maximum of 24 days to take action from a formal IAEA request for challenge inspections.

Despite the fact that this 24-day deadline does not exist in any safeguards agreement or the Additional Protocol currently implemented by the IAEA in any country, there was the concern that it would afford enough time to the Iranian regime to make modifications to the facility under question. Former IAEA Deputy Director Olli Heinonen states that this period might be enough to cover up activities at smaller covert facilities (Gertz, 2015). Concerns were raised that such modifications or structural changes might defeat the purpose of inspections by the IAEA personnel. However, as former IAEA inspector Thomas Shea notes, given the long half-lives of uranium, plutonium, and other fissile material products, it is likely that IAEA will be able to pick up small traces of presence of such material (Tharoor, 2015). In addition, US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz has said that US Department of Energy had carried out experiments using limited amounts of uranium that proved that “It is essentially impossible, certainly with confidence, to believe that you’re going to do this kind of work with nuclear materials and be confident at having it cleaned up” (Dixon, 2015). Moreover, satellite surveillance will pick up structural readjustments carried out by Iran in such facilities reducing chances of Iran’s success in any such effort.

As brought out in the above paragraphs, the JCPOA is significant as it goes beyond the provisions laid out under the NPT, IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, and the Additional Protocol. The JCPOA is NPT plus because it enables verification of four nuclear weaponization activities which do not involve nuclear materials (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, para. Annex I, Para 82, 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.4). The agreement has been described as Additional Protocol plus as it includes monitoring of uranium mining and milling; centrifuge manufacturing, R&D, and storage; spent fuel; and puts in place a time-bound mechanism (24 days) for responding to challenge inspection requests from the IAEA with respect to undeclared activities and facilities. The above provisions, in addition to regular monitoring by the IAEA, ensure that Iran will not be able to carry out any proscribed activities without being detected by the IAEA.

An Innovative Model: Snapback of Sanctions

The JCPOA apart from being a comprehensive agreement is an innovative agreement. The negotiators have taken into account history of Iranian actions and the regime’s responses to requests from the IAEA as well as global geopolitics realities while authoring the comprehensive 159-page document. An important reflection of such innovation is seen in the design of snap back sanctions in case differences crop up which cannot be resolved. Under the agreement, if the Joint Commission detailed in the preceding paragraphs is not able to resolve the dispute of access to undeclared facilities, the matter could be brought before the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Parties to the agreement can also directly refer the matter to the UNSC.

The UN Security Council Resolution 2231 states that any party could bring complaint of “significant non-performance” directly to UNSC following which the Security Council has to adopt a resolution to continue sanctions relief within 30 days. In case at the end of 30 days no such resolution is passed, all previous UN sanctions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) will be reapplied (United Nations Security Council, 2015, Para 10, 11, 12). Such a mechanism in essence finds a work around for the possible veto exercised by the permanent members of the Security Council—which could block or delay the adoption of such a resolution—and makes the adoption of the resolution imperative to continue sanctions relief.

In case either party to the agreement believes that the other is not meeting their commitments under the JCPOA, the matter is referred to the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, Para 36). The issue is then discussed by the Joint Commission and/or the Foreign Ministers for 15 days following which the matter is resolved to the three-member Advisory Board. The board as apparent by its name provides a non-binding opinion within 15 days and is comprised of one member from each side of the dispute and one independent member. The opinion of the advisory board is considered over the next 5 days by the JCOPA Joint Commission. At the end of 30 days, if the matter is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant, it can “treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance” (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015, sec. Preface, Para 36, 37).

Conclusion

The enabling conditions for the agreement largely lie in the changed domestic political situation within Iran and US. It is highly doubtful that the JCPOA would have become reality if Hassan Rouhani and President Obama were not leading their respective countries and had not remained committed to making this deal possible. This situation however is a double-edged sword because changing domestic political situations could also impact the future successes and survivability of the agreement. This is especially important given the fact that the JCPOA is a political agreement and not a treaty. That having been said, one should remember that the JCPOA is not a bilateral agreement but a multilateral agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1. Therefore, it is unlikely that the agreement would unravel even if the new American administration that comes to power in the US following the 2016 Presidential elections is not very supportive of the deal. Even if the incoming US administration was to walk away from the deal, it is unlikely to find support from the EU, Russia, and China especially if the American move is seen as a unilateral action and not in response to a corresponding development in the Iranian nuclear program.

Under the JCPOA, Iran worked with the IAEA between August 2015 and December 2015 to prepare and submit the report on Iran’s past nuclear weaponization-related activities which are popularly termed as Possible Military Dimensions (PMD). As per the deadline outlined by the JCPOA, the IAEA’s report was presented and adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on December 15, 2015. Front loading the PMD issue though necessary to build trust and ensure that the agreement is sustainable over the long term was definitely a risky proposition. However, the fact that Iran provided answers to the concerns raised by the IAEA and worked to resolve the concerns to the satisfaction of the parties concerned is an important indicator of the commitment of the Iranian regime to the nuclear agreement.

The IAEA report on the PMD issues states that till 2003, Iran had an organizational structure in place which could support a range of activities that were relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. These activities ranged from neutron components for an explosive device, to detonator development, to hydrodynamic experiments, to neutron initiator development, to modeling and calculations, to fuzing, arming, and firing system. After 2003, though there were some efforts toward this end, they were not carried out in a coordinated manner. The IAEA’s report also states that post-2009, there have been “no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015b, Para. 87, 88).

One issue of concern is that the report notes that “any quantity of nuclear material that may have been available to Iran under the AMAD Plan (nuclear weapons program) would have been within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015b, Para 32). This is bound to raise hackles and further questions whether Iran could squirrel away nuclear material for any future weapons program within these nuclear material accountancy uncertainties. Given that the IAEA is already begun monitoring Iran’s mining and milling activities since the November 2013 interim deal, the Agency is likely to get a better fix on Iran’s overall fissile material production and stockpile. Importantly, the IAEA’s report does mention that it has not found credible evidence “of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015b, Para 88). The report of the IAEA, confirming the steps taken by Iran as outlined under the JCPOA, led to the beginning of the implementation of the JCPOA on January 16, 2016. The Implementation Day has signaled the intent of the P5+1 and the international community at large to move ahead leaving the PMD issues behind them.

Another issue which could cause future hurdles and roadblocks for the implementation of the JCPOA stems from the fact that the IAEA is not party to the JCPOA. In fact, on July 14, 2015, the same day the JCPOA was signed, the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chiefs Yukiya Amano and Ali Akbar Salehi signed the road map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Iran and the IAEA therefore will conduct further negotiations on Inspector Access and Visa issues. In the past, Iran has restricted or delayed providing access to the IAEA inspectors and has stated that it will allow access only to citizens of countries who have diplomatic relations with Iran. Given that the number of inspectors and analysts working on Iran is likely to increase in the future, this is an important issue which could prove to be a bottleneck in the future.

The final concern is that Iran will seek ratification of the Additional Protocol from the Majlis only on Transition Day (when the EU and US will lift the second tranche of sanctions) which falls in October 2023. Such a mechanism had to be adopted because of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s insistence that the sanctions on Iran should be removed at the same time when Iran accedes to the Additional Protocol. Thus, if the agreement crumbles between now and 2023, Iran would not have ratified the Additional Protocol but would have benefited from partial relief of sanctions. However, such is the imperfect nature of international negotiations and multilateral diplomatic agreements and a risk that the parties involved will have to take.

Despite these concerns, the July 2015 JCPOA is a watershed agreement and has put the international community on the path to addressing the concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and reintegration of Iran into the international mainstream. The agreement has also blocked the physical paths available to Iran by way of the plutonium or HEU route toward building a nuclear weapon. As a result of the JCPOA, the Iranian break-out time needed for building nuclear weapons has grown from 1–2 months to 11–12 months. This will provide the international community the lead time needed to take remedial action in case Iran decides to pursue the path to building nuclear weapons.

The agreement, thus, is largely successful in addressing concerns about past Iranian weaponization efforts and restricting the routes available to Iran for stockpiling fissile material needed to build a nuclear weapon in the future. However, the agreement goes about doing so in a transparent manner, transcends the existing monitoring and verification regimes, and gives equal opportunity to Iran to redress the concerns raised by the international community including its own concerns in a dignified manner. In doing so, the JCPOA has highlighted the importance of diplomacy in addressing important global challenges and has opened up the doors for possible collaboration between the West and Iran in resolving the multifarious challenges faced by the region as a whole.

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