Abstract
In October 2015, President Pranab Mukherjee undertook a six-day three-state visit to the Middle East. His was the first presidential visit not only to Israel and Palestine but also to the Kingdom of Jordan since India gained Independence in 1947, thereby underscoring prolonged Indian neglect of the region. Moreover, since the visit of President Pratiba Patil in November 2010, there was no visit by the Indian President, Vice-President or Prime Minister to any Arab country.
On December 12, Saudi Arabia held its third municipal elections and the first one since Salman took over as the King. As promised by King Abdullah in 2011, for first time women were allowed to take part in the election both as voters and as candidates. Even though two-thirds of the members were elected this time as against half in 2005 and 2011, the popular participation was not high and only 20 female candidates were elected.
The execution of popular Qatif-based cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr on charges of sedition, disobedience, and inciting violence in early January marked a new phase in the Saudi policy toward its Shia minorities and precipitated into a major regional crisis. Protesters in Iran attacked Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad. This led to Saudi Arabia breaking off relations with Iran and closing down the latter’s mission in Riyadh. A number of key Arab allies such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE rallied behind Saudi Arabia and recalled their ambassadors from Tehran. The war of words has been escalating, with both calling for the economic and political sanction and boycotts. Some Saudi-watchers also attribute Nimr’s hanging to political struggle between Mohammed bin-Nayef, the Crown Prince, and Mohammed bin-Salman, the Deputy Crown Prince and king Salman’s son.
The region is still reverberating with the Nuclear deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was concluded on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries, namely Britain, China, France, Russia, the US, and Germany. The agreement, the most comprehensive, detailed and intrusive till date, brings to a closure the 12-year-old Iran file that drew international concerns over proliferation. By agreeing to curtail and limit its proliferation activities and accept intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tehran has managed to address international misgivings. The diplomatic resolution of the controversy has also ended the frequent speculations and suggestions for impending military attacks against the suspected Iranian nuclear installations. The absence of a credible and effective military option did not inhibit some leaders from pressing for a military solution to the problem. With the sole exception of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, most Middle Eastern leaders have welcomed the deal. Despite its earlier reservations, at least in public, even Saudi Arabia has come to terms with the JCPOA.
As part of the deal, on July 20 the UN Security Council terminated all its previous resolutions regarding the nuclear controversy and paved the way for the removal of prolonged international sanctions against Iranian agencies and individuals. The deal would also result in the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the West, estimated between US$100 to 150 billion.
It is wise to be cautious. Knowledge is progressive and can never be reversed. Unlike individuals, nations are not governed by moral self-righteousness but hardcore realism. Iran would not be an exception to this pattern. Hence, its commitment to reduce the number of centrifuges or the quantity of enriched uranium would be valid so long as such constraints serve larger Iranian interests. More importantly, the possible lifting of sanctions, especially against its oil and gas industry, comes at a time when the global oil prices are falling. From a high of US$110 in June 2014 they were trading at less than US$30 in early January 2016, and this is also adversely affecting the global gas prices. The members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are already producing more than their quota of 30 million barrels per day. The entry of Iran and its determination to meet its full quota of 3.6 million barrels per day will only push the prices down. This would not be good news for Iran and its reconstruction plans on the back of the removal of sanctions.
Falling prices are bound to affect fragility of the oil producing Arab countries. These rentier economies relied heavily upon their oil wealth to maintain a welfare state arrangement that granted little political space to their citizens. The Gulf monarchies sought to withstand the Arab Spring primarily through economic largesse. The falling oil prices are already causing budget deficits to richer countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and are forcing smaller ones like Bahrain to rely on the economic assistance from their richer neighbors. The nuclear deal and the impending entry of additional Iranian oil into the market will have additional pressure on the prices.
Thus, given its importance, this special issue on Iran Nuclear Deal looks at its complexities and consequences. Scholars who are based in or associated with Jawaharlal Nehru University took their time out to look at the deal through their respective vantage points and specializations to make this special issue. While Chintamani Mahapatra, Srikanth Kondapalli, Savita Pande, Samuel Rajiv and Nansi Paulraj look at the impact of the nuclear deal upon specific countries, Arun Viswanathan and Girijesh Pant examine its implications for nonproliferation and energy concerns respectively. This special issue winds up with a brief chronology and a list of resolutions by the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Commission prepared by Alvite N.