The Evolution of Lebanese and Syrian State-to-State Relations

Introduction

The modern Middle East is the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I (WWI). As great powers started forming alliances to enter WWI, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria–Hungary in October 1914. Once it did so, the Ottomans lost little time in ridding themselves of the Mutasarrifya (political entity of Mount Lebanon established in 1860), and in June 1915, the Ottomans instituted direct rule, under the harsh military administration of Jamal Pasha (known as Jamal Pasha, the Butcher), based in Beirut (Harris, 2005, p. 38). The failure of the Gallipoli campaign by the Allies encouraged the British to look for Arab support to fight the Ottomans. The Arab revolt was funded and guided by the British, and it proved to be a successful endeavor as the Arab forces pressured the Ottomans from the southeast. In October 1918, the Allies (Dowling, 2005, p. 331) and the Arab forces entered Damascus (Lowry, 1996, p. 580).

As soon as Faisal—third son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca—reached Damascus, he established an Arab government. A few days later, he decided to extend his rule over Lebanon. Faisal’s decision to send his representative, Shukri Al 'Ayubi to Lebanon, two days after his takeover in Syria came in the wake of mayor of Beirut, Omar Da'ūq raising the Arab flag and pledging allegiance to the Arab Kingdom (Zamir, 1991, p. 404). In the first week of October, 'Ayubi proclaimed the establishment of the Arab government in the coastal area of Lebanon in the name of Sharif Hussein (Allenby, 1918). Regarding Mount Lebanon, 'Ayubi named Habib Al Sa'd, a member of the administrative council of Mount Lebanon, as governor of the autonomous region in the name of Sharif Hussein (Zamir, 1991, 405). On October 8, 1918, Beirut newspapers published Faisal’s proclamation of the establishment of an independent government in Syria with 'Ayubi as a military governor of Beirut (Clayton, 1918).

At no stage did the French accept Faisal’s claim to govern Syria, and after negotiations between Faisal and the French failed to reach a solution regarding the future of the region, the Syrian National Congress met on March 7, 1920, appointed Faisal as King of Syria which included Palestine freed from Zionists, and a Lebanon guaranteed with a special position (Longrigg, 1958, p. 98). In response, the Allies held a conference in San Remo, Italy, a month later, and France was given the right to mandate Syria and Lebanon (MardamBey, 1994, p. 9). Consequently, French troops started occupying all of Lebanon and Syria shortly after the San Remo conference (MardamBey, 1994, p. 9). The Syrian Parliament rejected the French mandate and pledged allegiance to King Faisal and his Arab Kingdom. Thus, the French General Henri Gouraud ordered his troops to crush the Arab government of King Faisal in Maysalun, near Damascus on July 24, 1920 (Tibawi, 1969, p. 330). Gouraud became the first High Commissionaire to rule Syria and Lebanon. The latter was officially created as a state with its current recognized international borders on August 30, 1920 (Longrigg, 1958, p. 123), by incorporating the Beka', Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and southern Lebanon. Syria was recognized in its current borders in 1937 after incorporating the Alawite district (north east) and the Druze district south of Syria (Longrigg, 1958, p. 224). Regarding independence, Lebanon was declared independent on November 23, 1943, while Syria celebrated its independence on the day the last French soldier left the country on April 17, 1945 (Ziadeh, 1956, p. 92).

The Lebanese–Syrian relations represent a complicated case in state affairs. Few scholars, however, have studied the evolution of the two countries’ relationship. The aim of this article is to evaluate the relationship between Lebanon and Syria and trace the changes in their relations. The article will demonstrate three different stages of Lebanese–Syrian affairs: the first stage is one of fellowship where the two countries recognized each other’s sovereignty and right to exist independent of the other. During this stage, Lebanon and Syria cooperated thoroughly to gain independence and overcome minor economic and political problems which neighboring countries usually face. The second stage is represented as the Ba'ath party’s dilemma toward Lebanon. In this stage, Syria became a regional power motivated by its pan-Arab program and ideology which undermined the Lebanese sovereignty. Syria invested its influence in Lebanon to enhance its position in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and its dominant status over Lebanon under the Ba'ath explains the success of the regime to control all aspects of Lebanese affairs. The final stage is the Lebanese struggle between freedom from Syria and the latter’s attempt to regain control after its withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005.

Lebanese–Syrian Fellowship

The new created states of Syria and Lebanon were challenged by nationalists in Syria and some factions of the Lebanese Sunni community (Zisser, 2000, p. 12). Initially, the Arab nationalists organized themselves around Prince Faisal’s government, and their movement aimed at uniting natural Syria, which they believed was culturally and socially homogeneous and political advanced to govern itself (Ziadeh, 2006, p. 89). When the mandate was established at the expense of Faisal’s government, proponents of greater Syria were either expelled or subdued. Some of the expelled found refuge in Egypt, where they established political parties to pursue their goals, like the Syrian Party of Unity (Hizb al-Ittihad as-Suri) which called for the creation of a republic from Taurus and anti-Taurus Mountains to Midian in northwestern Arabia (Pipes, 1990, p. 53). Another party called the Syrian National Party (Hizb al-Watani as-Suri) promoted the idea of creating Greater Syria governed by a parliamentary monarchy (Pipes, 1990, p. 53). Inside Syria, the People’s Party (Hizb ash-Sha'b) called for the unification of Syria within its natural confines, and the Party of Syrian Union (Hizb al-Wahda as-Suriya) shared similar views (Pipes, 1990, pp. 52–53). Moreover, notables from main Syrian cities also demanded the establishment of Greater Syria. Most importantly, the Syro-Palestinian Congress, established in 1921, claimed that it spoke on behalf of Syrians, Palestinians, and Lebanese, raised the issue of Greater Syria with the French authorities (Pipes, 1990, p. 53).

The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Sunni population rejected Greater Lebanon until the rise of a new Sunni elite in the 1930s (Salibi, 1965, p. 169). This encouraged Syrian elites to perceive Lebanon as part of the Syrian political entity. However, the Sunnis accepted the reality that Lebanon could not be incorporated into Syria due to the objection of the Lebanese Christians. Moreover, Sunnis began to accept the new realities after successfully making their way to the top within the Lebanese system (Zisser, 2000, p. 13). This coincided with the 1936 Syrian–French treaty which contained a clause recognizing the independence of Lebanon as a separate state (Zisser, 2000, p. 15). Thus, Sunni acceptance of the new regional order was signaled in their integration in the Lebanese system and in the Syrian–French treaty. Consequently, after resolving the issue of Lebanese existence, Lebanon and Syria began looking into ways to gain independence.

In Lebanon, Sunnis cooperated with the Maronite Christians and reached an agreement in 1943 that became the cornerstone of Lebanese political affairs. The agreement was mainly conducted by Bshara Al-Khuri as representative of the Christian community and Riad Al-Solh representing the Muslim community. It is known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” or “National Pact,” which states that the Christians would not seek foreign protection or intervention in Lebanon while the Muslims would accept the current borders of Lebanon, its sovereignty and relinquish any claim of unity with any Arab country. The National Pact was expressed in the government’s mission statement in 1943 (al-Hajj, 1961, pp. 139–140). As a consequence of the National Pact, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon were united behind their government in the quest for independence. At the same time, the Syrian government was also involved with Lebanon in its struggle for independence. Lebanon and Syria cooperated closely to achieve independence and they were engaged in a series of negotiations with the French authorities together (Frangieh, 2004, p. 98). The French were realizing that harmony and cooperation between Lebanon and Syria would hinder French influence in any negotiations, so they tried to deal separately with each country (Frangieh, 2004, p. 98). However, the two countries maintained a unified strong front in negotiating with the French (Frangieh, 2004, p. 98). Political independence of the two countries in 1943 was followed by full independence in 1946, when the last French soldier left Syria and Lebanon on April and December of 1946, respectively.

Lebanese and Syrian cooperation boosted feelings of brotherhood between their citizens. After independence in 1943, Syrian opinion-makers wrote about the newly Lebanese government with great enthusiasm. President Bechara Khuri was described as a politically mature statesman and an example of honesty and honor, while Prime Minister Riad el-Solh was characterized as a man of jihad and had struggled for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, Syria, and the Arab nation (Chaitani, Y, 2007). In addition, when Riad el-Solh visited Damascus in the month of October 1943, Syrian elites described Solh’s visit as the first instance in which Damascus received an independent Arab Lebanon (Chaitani, 2007, p. 17). Moreover, in an attempt to show the genuine commitment of the two states to respect each other’s sovereignty, the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents responded in a joint declaration to the Jordanian King who called for the creation of Greater Syria (Abou Khalil, 1991, pp. 21–22). In the declaration issued on August 28, 1947, both Presidents disapproved the Jordanian proposal and condemned the Jordanian attempt to interfere in the affairs of Lebanon and Syria (Abou Khalil, 1991, pp. 21–22). With respect to their economies, Lebanon and Syria agreed on establishing the Higher Council of Common Interest to extract revenues from the customs, airports, ports, license, and others to distribute the revenues between themselves (Markaz al-Tawthī'q, 1986, p. 13).

Cooperation between the two countries continued in their quest to oppose French influence in the region as both countries objected to the French military reinforcement in the two countries. As a result, the nationalists in Lebanon and Syria called for protests and strikes in major cities, especially in Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo. Clashes were soon reported between the protestors and French forces as the protests extended to other parts of Lebanon and Syria. The bloodiest of these clashes was in Damascus where French forces were successfully repelled by the demonstrators (Ziadeh, 1956, pp. 82–83). The clashes were a political disaster for the French government. The Allies condemned the use of violence by the French government which was heavily criticized for its action (Churchill, 1959, p. 564). At the military level, Lebanon and Syria created their independent national armies and incorporated parts of the French-made “Special Troops” composed of Syrian and Lebanese soldiers (Ziadeh, 1996, pp. 299–300).

On October 7, 1944, the Lebanese government achieved a breakthrough in Arab affairs. While the independent Arab countries at that time met in Alexandria, Egypt, to agree on the establishment of the League of Arab States, the Lebanese delegation succeeded in convincing the Arab delegations to include an article that confirmed Lebanese sovereignty and independence. Article Four of the protocol states that the Arab States represented in the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the

… independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States [Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt] have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon’s adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. (Alexandria Protocol, 1944)

Consequently, as the Syrian delegation accepted the article, the Syrian government accepted Lebanese independence and sovereignty according to its borders proclaimed in 1920. This meant that Syria relinquished any claim on the Beka’ Valley, Tripoli, or southern Lebanon. This article was the cornerstone in the Lebanese–Syrian affairs. Moreover, this clause is more important than the Syrian–French treaty of 1936 because it was concluded when Syria and Lebanon became independent. The main reason for the Syrian acceptance of Lebanese independence and sovereignty is best explained by Raghid el-Solh who believes that the emergence of the new national rule in Lebanon and its policy of independence and Arabism satisfied the Syrian elite to the extent that they abandoned Syria’s old claims in Lebanon (el-Solh, 2004, p. 213).

The Lebanese–Syrian honeymoon was over by 1948 as a serious of problems started to surface. Despite that, the problems were resolved in a spirit of respect and cooperation. It is important to note that the essence of the problems were economical and not political. The first disagreement was when Lebanon signed a monetary agreement with France on February 4, 1948 which Syria rejected (Frangieh, 2004, p. 100). Consequently, the two countries dissolved the Syrian–Lebanese Central Bank and each state established its central bank with its own currency, namely, the Syrian lira and the Lebanese lira. Later in 1950, Syria withdrew from the Lebanese–Syrian Customs Union due to former’s rejection of economic unity with Syria (Frangieh, 2004, p. 100) but an economic agreement was reached three years later (Frangieh, 2004, p. 101) to facilitate economic investment and transportation of goods between the two countries.

Regarding international affairs, the Lebanese government took a series of controversial decisions in the second half of the 1950s which isolated it from its Arab neighbors. President Camille Chamoun refused to join the Syrian–Egyptian–Saudi alliance in 1955 because he believed this alliance would hinder Lebanon’s independent foreign policy (Goria, 1986, p. 39). He pursued his own foreign policy by visiting Ankara in April 1957 and issuing a joint communiqué with the Turkish government supporting the pro-western Baghdad Pact (Goria, 1986, p. 39), thereby making Lebanon the only Arab country to endorse the Eisenhower doctrine (Alin, 1994, p. 49). This was the first incident where Lebanon turned away from Syria and the Arab world in international affairs. Relations between Lebanon and Syria suffered with the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in January 1958. This short lived union between Syria and Egypt was perceived by Lebanese Christians as a threat to Lebanon’s independence. They feared that some Muslims might officially ask the UAR to incorporate Lebanon to the newly established political entity, just like the demands of the Lebanese Sunni elite to incorporate Lebanon to Syria in the aftermath of WWI. Relations became much tense in 1958 during the short civil unrest between groups loyal to Chamoun and the opposition movement which was supported by the UAR. The crisis ended with an Egyptian–American agreement to bring Army Commander Fuad Shihab to power instead of Chamoun. Shihab reinstalled the Arab trust to Lebanon and improved relations with the Syrian government.

At the diplomatic level, there was a setback. The two countries did not consider establishing diplomatic representation until 1961. Syria’s Prime Minister at that time, Khalid Al-Adhmi, declared his country’s intention to establish diplomatic representation. However, Syria was intimidated by with Lebanese free press and freedom of speech which were considered as possible sources of subversive activity against Syria (Frangieh, 2004, p. 102). In addition, diplomatic representation was not established due to a series of military coups that took place in Syria which eventually gave rise to the Ba'ath party that undermined Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.

The Ba‘ath Dilemma

Until 1963, one can say that Lebanese–Syrian relations were not perfect but were not bad either, despite the short period of antagonism following Lebanon’s adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The watershed in the Lebanese–Syrian relation was the rise of the Syrian Ba'ath party in 1963. The ideology of Ba'athism came into existence in 1947 (Rabinovich, 1972, p. 6) by two Sorbonne educated teachers, namely, Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox, and Salah ad-Din Bitar, a Sunni Muslim (Rabil, 2003, p. 27). In 1942, Aflaq and Bitar abandoned their teaching positions to write the ideology of the Ba'ath (Delvin, 1991, p. 1397). It was based on three pillars: Arab unity, freedom, and socialism (Rabil, 2003, p. 27). Aflaq wrote in 1940: “the nationalism for which we call … is the same sentiment that binds the individual to his family, because the fatherland is only a large household and the nation a large family” (Aflaq, 1963, p. 45). Article one of the party’s constitution drafted in 1947 clearly stated that “the Arab fatherland is that part of the globe inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches from the Taurus Mountain, the Pcht-i-Kouh Mountains, the gulf of Basra, the Arab ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the Atlantic ocean and the Mediterranean” (Documents, 1963, p. 236).

Relating the concept of Arab unity to this article, the Ba'ath ideology discarded national borders of Arab countries and definitely rejected Article four of the Alexandria Protocol which has to do with Lebanese sovereignty and independence. Therefore, since the Ba'ath ideology did not recognize borders, it simply subordinated the will of the people to choose the type of government they wanted in their countries. Ba'athism was a manifestation of hardcore cultural nationalism in the Arab world. Furthermore, Article one of the Ba'ath Constitution of 1947 says: “Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny” (Documents, 1963, p. 172). This article reflects the totalitarian nature of the Ba'ath ideology which imposes its own perception of statehood all over the Arab world regardless of the will of its people.

The Ba'ath party consolidated power in the early 1970s. At that time Lebanon was in the middle of turmoil between Muslims and the Christians. Ba‘athists in Syria exploited the situation to advance their ideological claims in the region. They interfered in Lebanese affairs and played a crucial role in subordinating the government by supporting different militias. The Lebanese–Syrian relations witnessed a metamorphosis from fellowship to domination whereby Syria controlled all aspects of life in Lebanon. Military purposes defined the relations between the two countries as Lebanon was ripped apart by the civil war. During his 30-year tenure President Hafez al-Assad paid only one official visit to Lebanon on January 7, 1975 (Deeb, 2003, p. 8). During that visit he made it clear that Lebanon and Syria were one people and one nation (Deeb, 2003, p. 8). For Assad and the Ba’ath, Lebanon as an independent entity does not exist. Consequently, toward aiding the Christians in the civil war, in June 1976 Syrian troops entered Lebanon and started to advance step-by-step toward the capital. Kamal Joumblatt, the leader of the Lebanese National Movement (a coalition of Lebanese leftist parties), predicted that Lebanon would either be annexed by Syria or rule indirectly and undermine the Lebanese democratic institutions (Marius Deeb, 2003).

The Ba’athist perception of a unified Arab world forming one political entity with Damascus at its center gave way to Assad’s approach regarding Syria and Lebanon: “One people in two countries” (Sha'b Wāhed fi Dawlatain) (Ellis, 1999, p. 6). This slogan reflected the mentality of the Ba'ath that scared Lebanese elites from a possible Syrian annexation. As far as we know, only President Suleiman Franjiyeh was ready to accept unification with Syria. Assad told Kamal Joumblatt that Franjiyeh was ready for unification between the two countries if Syria requested it (Joumblatt, 2002, p. 38). For Joumblatt, he believed that Lebanon is geographically a part of Syria, but the fact that the two countries had different political systems—Lebanon’s parliamentary democracy as opposed to Syria’s Ba'athist dictatorship—constituted a major obstacle that prevented unification. Joumblatt told Assad that if Syria becomes democratic, then he is ready to press forward for a unification scheme, but in the current form (that is, the 1970s), Joumblatt refused to be part of what he called “the great Syrian prison” (Joumblatt, 2002, p. 62). Bashir and his elder brother Amin Jumayel also rejected any sort of unification with Syria. Bashir charged that Damascus kept troops in Lebanon to make the country part of Syria, and Amin accused Assad of wanting to annex Lebanon (Pipes, 1990, p. 142).

Indeed, unification with Lebanon was impossible. Lebanon had witnessed only three political assassinations from 1943 until 1975: Riad al-Solh, Nasib al-Matni, and Kamel Muruwwi. However, during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1991), directly or indirectly Syria was involved in the following assassinations: Kamal Joumblatt, Riad Taha, Salim Al Lauzi, President-elect Bashir Jumayel, Dani Chamoun, Mufti Hasan Khaled, President-elect Reneh Ma’awad, and others (el-Husseini, 2012, p. 193). Syria sought political assassinations because those politicians disagreed with Syria’s policy in Lebanon, and because the Ba‘athists ruling Syria did not believe in democracy, they sought to eliminate opposing figures rather than talking to them.

Syria controlled Lebanon by the use of terror and made sure that no party would achieve victory over the other. It also ensured that Israel would not expand its influence to counter Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon. After 1978, the Maronites broke up their alliance with Syria, and they developed relations with Israel instead. Bashir Jumayel, leader of the Lebanese Forces, established an alliance with Israel for two main reasons: to oust the Syrians from Lebanon and to use the Israeli influence to become President. Jumayel succeeded in convincing Israel to support the Lebanese Forces (Gross, 1990, p. 134). Furthermore, his alliance with Israel provided the latter with an additional motivation to invade Lebanon in 1982 and install a friendly government headed by Jumayel (Yaqub, 2013, p. 22). Thus, when Israel invaded, it supported Jumayel’s bid for presidency and provided security for the Parliament Members to attend the session for Presidential elections to ensure the victory of Jumayel (Hudson, 1997, p. 110). Hence Israel won the first battle for Lebanon, but later with the assassination of Bashir Jumayel in September 1982, Syria started to gain the upper hand vis-à-vis Israel.

After the assassination of Bashir, it was agreed that his elder brother, Amin, would become president. The Israeli army kept its units around Beirut, in the Mountains and in the western Beka' and southern Lebanon. They used military pressure to oblige Amin to sign a peace treaty with Israel on May 17, 1983 under American auspices. This treaty was completely rejected by Syria, and it was the second time that Lebanon had departed from its pro-Arabist policies and Syria in international relations (the first time being in 1957 when Lebanon endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine). In retaliation, the Syrian regime provided military support for the Muslim opposition to pressure the Lebanese government to abandon the peace treaty. Hence the war of the Mountains took place in 1983 and the battle of west Beirut in February 1984. The success of the Muslim opposition in those two places obliged President Amin Jumayel to withdraw from the peace treaty on March 5, 1984 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

From 1984 until 1991, the conflict in Lebanon was supervised by Syria, and the Syrian regime protracted and oversaw the Lebanese civil war until the implementation of the Taif agreement. The Tishreen newspaper in Syria made it clear that there would be no solution in Lebanon without Syria’s approval (Khuwayri, 1981, p. 129). In short, the agreement between different confessional groups in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia, would not have happened without Syria’s consent. The Lebanese civil war was brought to an end theoretically in the summer of 1989 (Khalaf, 2002, pp. 54–55). General Michel Aun rejected the Taif Agreement and was prepared to start what he called a “liberation war” against Syria in 1990. Aun’s rejection of the Taif agreement gave Syria the most precious excuse to invade the Presidential Palace where Aun was taking refuge. It also gave Syria the right to extend its power and control Eastern Beirut, the Christian dominated part of the capital which had been opposing Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon since 1978. On October 21, 1990, Syrian airforce and troops attacked the Presidential Palace. Aun’s troops fought for a few hours until he surrendered and sought refuge in the French Embassy, leaving his troops at the mercy of the Syrian troops, which looted the Presidential Palace and took classified documents from the Ministry of Defense (Deeb, 2004, p. 179). Syria had secured the American green light to oust Aun and establish order in the country by siding with the international alliance against Saddam Hussein. It appeared that in return for Syria’s participation in the war against Saddam, Syria had won the right to mandate Lebanon and transform it into a vassal state, and that is how Syria treated Lebanon over the next 15 years.

Lebanon as Vassal State of Syria

Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon was motivated by its Ba’athist ideology and Assad’s vision that Syria should reserve for itself a patronship role over Lebanon since the latter is smaller in size (Dawisha, 1984, p. 229) and its socio-political structure fragile. In addition, Syria claimed that southern Lebanon forms a natural defensive frontier that could be used to stop or delay an Israeli attack against Damascus (Dawisha, 1984, p. 229), and since Lebanon is unable to protect its southern borders, Syrian troops should be stationed in Lebanon for this purpose. While this myth was circulated to convince the Arab Leaders of the need to keep the Syrian military in Lebanon, it disregarded the fact that it was easier for Israel to march toward Damascus from the Golan Heights which is closer to the Israeli borders and the terrain easier for Israel to launch an attack, rather than attacking from the mountainous region of Mount Hermon and Jabal ash-Shaikh. President Hafez Al Assad, however, capitalized on this myth and declared that “it is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon’s security in its broadest sense and Syria’s security” (Kramer, 1983), thereby abolishing any concept of Lebanese statehood and independence from Syria.

After the Taif agreement was implemented, Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon was complete. The Western world has given Syria full control over Lebanon as a prize for Syria’s participation in the Operation Desert Storm against Saddam Hussein in the wake of his invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Since the Taif agreement and until the withdrawal of Syria’s troops in 2005, Lebanon was a vassal state to Syria. To legitimize its hegemony without intimidating the West, Syria obliged Lebanon to sign a series of treaties which were in the best interests of Syria. The two most important treaties are the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination signed on May 22, 1991 followed by the Defense and Security agreement signed on September 1, 1991.

In the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, part 2 of Article 5 states that common destiny and common interests between Lebanon and Syria shall be a factor in guiding the inter-Arab and international foreign policy of the two states (Treaty of Brotherhood, 1991). The fact that Syria had bound Lebanese destiny to its own is a sign that reveals how the former had been dealing with Lebanon as a vassal state. This article was crucial in the evolution of Syrian–Lebanese relations whereby Syria started to refer to Lebanon as Qutr (Rabil, 2003, p. 129), or province according to the Ba’athist ideology. In part 3 of the same article, Lebanon and Syria agreed to commit to support each other in matters pertaining to its security and national interests (Treaty of Brotherhood, 1991). Article 2 of the Defense and Security Agreement states that the two countries “ban all military, security, political, and media activity that might harm the other country” (The Defense and Security Agreement, 1991). Since Lebanon is a free country with a free press and freedom of speech, this article had allowed Syria to exercise its authority over the media and grasp the Lebanese security apparatus with an iron fist. That is why in the early 2000s, a Lebanese TV station named MTV (Murr TV) was shut down because it challenged Syria’s authority in the country (Stevenson, 2007, p. 162). The MTV also interviewed other Lebanese politicians who were critical of Syria’s role in the country and to avoid losing its control over the media, Syria ordered Lebanese authorities to shut down the TV station and any other station that would challenge its authority in Lebanon.

At the regional and international levels, Lebanon has never voted in support of any action against Syria, whether in the League of Arab States (LAS) or in the United Nations, including recent resolutions by the two bodies that condemn the use of violence by Syrian troops against civilians since the onset of civil war in early 2011. The fact is that Syria interfered in appointing Lebanese diplomats, especially those assigned to represent Lebanon in the United Nations and also senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. For instance in 2005, after the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1559 demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops (Syrian troops) from Lebanon, Mohammad Issa, Secretary General of the Ministry of Affairs and Emigrants, objected and said that “Syria had warded off radicalism and violence, fed by the violence exercised by Israel against the Palestinians.” Issa was defending Syria’s interest in Lebanon because he was given the seat of secretary general of the ministry because of Syrian influence. Ironically, Issa had forgotten how the Syrian troops crushed the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon during the years 1976–1977 and later in the mid-1980s (Hirst, 2010, p. 114). He also disregarded Yitzchak Rabin’s comments on the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, when he thanked the Syrian army for killing more Palestinians in the first two weeks of its intervention than the Israeli army had managed to kill in years (Economic and Political Weekly, 1976).

The Syrian domination over Lebanon was strong and solid. However, some Lebanese politicians had the courage to challenge the Syrian iron fist policy in Lebanon. The struggle between Lebanese politicians opposing Syrian hegemony in Lebanon reached its climax after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. While the assassination was perceived as an attempt to subdue the opposition to Syria, it had a reverse effect whereby the majority of Lebanese rallied behind the opposition in its quest for Lebanese sovereignty and independence.

Lebanon and Syria after 2005: The Search for Lebanese Freedom

The assassination of Hariri was a watershed in the Lebanese–Syrian relations. In previous assassinations of politicians, the outcome was typical: the subordination of the victim’s political group. Examples of which are the assassination of Kamal Joumblatt in 1977 which eventually subordinated the Lebanese National Movement; the assassination of Mufti Hasan Khaled in 1989 which subordinated the Sunni opposition to Syria; and the assassination of President Reneh Mouawad which eventually subordinated all the Lebanese national institutions.

On February 14, 2005, a big car-bomb explosion in Beirut led to the death of Hariri and 21 Lebanese citizens. The Syrian government predicted that the Lebanese opposition would be tamed by eliminating one of the most important figures in the Lebanese, Arab, and Muslim world. At that time, Hariri was operating behind the scenes to form a strong coalition against Syrian domination, an opposition that would eventually lead to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Hariri did not declare his opposition to Syria publically like Walid Joumblatt or the Qornet Shahwan grouping, a Christian opposition group composed of parliament members, intellectuals, and partisans of the Lebanese forces (Iskandar, 2006, p. 180). It is hard to argue that Syria had nothing to do with Hariri’s assassination. At the end of 2004, Hariri was summoned to Damascus to meet President Assad. For 45 minutes, Assad and his aides insulted the Lebanese Prime Minister and accused him of treason. During the meeting, Hariri suffered from a nose bleed due to high blood pressure (Blanford, 2006, pp. 92–93). Assad apparently threatened Hariri that the latter would face severe consequences if he did not vote for a three-year renewal for Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who was Syria’s most loyal ally. Assad told Hariri in the meeting: “I am Lahoud and Lahoud is me. If your friend [French President Jacques Chirac] Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I would sooner break Lebanon on your head and the head of Chirac than break my word” (Blanford, 2006, pp. 92–93). A foreign diplomat warned Hariri that the Syrians had managed to prepare 20 car bombs around Beirut in case Hariri’s bloc in the Parliament would not vote for a three-year renewal for Lahoud. Syria’s insults, humiliation, and intimidation by the Prime Minister of Lebanon in this terrorist-like way reflected the Ba‘ath dominant status in Lebanon (Blanford, 2006; Nisan, 2015).

The United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) observed that the truck used in Hariri’s assassination was seen in a camp outside Damascus, and evidence of recordings of Rustum Gazale (Head of Syria Military Intelligence in Lebanon) and others wishing to eliminate Hariri (Iskandar, 2006, p. 203). In another report, the UNIIIC stated that the Lebanese–Syrian security agencies laid out the plan for assassinating Hariri, using illegal and extorted funds to finance their plan (UNIIIC, 2005). When Detliv Mehlis presented his report to the UN Security Council, many Lebanese and Syrian political figures accused him of being subjective and biased; however, Mehlis had the unanimous support of all seven international prosecutors in his team (Harris, 2013, p. 16). Mehlis was successfully leading the investigation toward the suspects who had a role in Hariri’s assassination, and consequently he received a large number of threats against his life and an arrest warrant by the Syrian government on October 2010 (Harris, 2013, p. 22).

Hariri’s case was not the end of Syria’s involvement in threatening and coercing Lebanese politicians. Several leaders of opposition to Syrian influence were assassinated afterwards: Samir Kaseer (Journalist), George Hawi (Politician), JubranTwaini (MP and owner of An-Nahar newspaper), Pierre Jumayel (MP), and Antoine Ghanem (MP). Former Lebanese Minister of Defence Elyas Al Murr and journalist Mai Shidyaaq miraculously survived the assassination attempts against them. A couple of investigators in Hariri’s case from the Lebanese security forces were also targeted: Colonel Samir Shehadeh survived an attempt on his life two weeks before Mehlis submitted his report to the UN Security Council in October 2006 (BBC, 2006), but Captain Wissam Eid was not lucky enough as he was assassinated in 2008. Wissam Eid, a military investigator in Hariri’s murder, analyzed the call records of all the cell phones that had registered with the cell towers in the immediate vicinity of the Hotel St. George, where the massive blast had torn a deep crater. Once Eid had those records, he began thinning out the hundreds of phones in the area that morning, subtracting those held by each of the 22 dead, then those in Hariri’s entourage, then those of people nearby who had been interviewed. He found the phones the hit team had used (Macdonald, 2010), which eventually led to his assassination for getting close enough to solve the mystery of Hariri’s case.

The hasty Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon on April 30, 2005 did not put an end to its influence in Lebanese domestic affairs. Syria had Hezbollah as its major ally, and Hezbollah had proved ready for mobilization to protect Syria’s interest. In fact, Syria and Hezbollah have common interest in the region. A weak Lebanese state means that Hezbollah can preserve its army and use it for internal political aims. In May 2008, Hezbollah militants stormed west Beirut and tried to control the mountains overseeing the southern suburbs (Hezbollah’s stronghold) and the Shouf district in Mount Lebanon, a reaction that the government failed to predict, according to Minister of Media at that time Tariq Mitri (Interview with the author, 2014). While they succeeded in controlling west Beirut, they failed to take the Mountains and Shouf as they were repelled by Druze townsmen (Nicholas Blanford, 2008). This was a reaction to the government’s decision to destroy the private communication lines of Hezbollah on May 6, 2008 (al-Jazeera, 2008). Moreover, a weak state means that Hezbollah can monopolize the decision of waging war against Israel and oblige the Lebanese government to back them and pay for damages, just like in Israel’s Second Lebanon War in July–August 2006 (ash-sharqal-awsat, 2009).

After the Taif agreement, Syria had succeeded in weakening the Lebanese government, undermining its presence and by dealing directly with political parties in Lebanon at the expense of sovereignty of the Lebanese state. In addition, it was not until October 2008 that the two countries managed to have diplomatic representation (The Guardian, 2008). This was an important step to correct the anomalies in the relations between Lebanon and Syria. However, Syria still has a strong influence in Lebanon mainly due to the presence of Hezbollah and its alliance with Michel Aun who provides Christian support to the militant party.

The conflict in Lebanon between the pro-Syrian supporters and opponents can be seen in the official position of Lebanon toward Syria after the rise of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. Hezbollah, Michel Aun, and other minor groups in the March 8 alliance argue that the Syrian crisis is nothing but a military action by Islamic Takfiri militants who are waging a terrorist war against the Syrian regime (The Daily Star, 2013). Moreover, Hezbollah has been sending its militants to fight in Syria on behalf of the Syrian regime (Associated France Press, 2013). On the contrary, the March 14 alliance believes that the events in Syria represent a people’s revolution against the police state created by Assad and the Ba’ath party (The Daily Star, 2013). However, Lebanon’s foreign policy is still crippled by Syria’s influence. In one instance, the Lebanese Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour, a member of the Amal Movement (headed by Nabih Berri, Speaker of the Parliament) and a pro-Syrian diplomat defied the orders of the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minister Najib Mikati to recall the Syrian ambassador in Lebanon and investigate the Syrian attacks on Northern Lebanon in February 2013 (al-Liwaa, 2013). The Syrian army killed Lebanese citizens who happened to live on the Syrian–Lebanese borders, and Syria claimed that its military actions on the Syrian–Lebanese borders were against militant groups who infiltrate the borders to fight in Syria (al-Liwaa, 2013).

The second instance is when Mansour called for the return of Syria to the League of Arab States in March, thus defying the orders of Lebanese President and Prime Minister who wished Mansour to maintain Lebanese neutrality in the Syrian conflict (al-Watan, 2013). A third instance is when the Lebanese President asked Mansour to submit a complaint against Syria in the United Nations which the latter refused to do, so the Lebanese President had to write a claim himself and send it to the United Nations instead (al-Joumhouriya, 2013). The acts of defiance to the highest political authority in Lebanon represented by the Lebanese Presidency were not only manifested in Mansour’s action; prior to that the Syrian ambassador in Lebanon publically objected to the President’s claim against Syria’s actions in the borders (al-Rai Media, 2012). The ambassador looked as if he was giving the Lebanese President a lesson in diplomacy when he said that Lebanon should not submit a claim against Syria because claims are between enemy states, and the President should be asking for coordination with the Syrian government instead (al-Rai Media, 2012).

Conclusion

It is true that Lebanon and Syria have strong bonds socially, politically, and economically. However, it is crucial for the two countries to cooperate genuinely rather than exploit each other. Syria has to accept Lebanon’s sovereignty, democracy, and multi-party political system. Moreover, it should bear in mind the fact that Lebanon is a consociational democracy, which means that Syria cannot favor one group over the other or else the internal political balance between different confessional groups in Lebanon will be disrupted. As for the Lebanese, the rise of the opposition in Syria should not be exploited to pressure or isolate Hezbollah internally because the latter will be more radicalized and may mobilize its supporters for a showdown at any time. In addition, considering that the Syrian opposition is an overwhelming Sunni–Syrian opposition, the isolation of Hezbollah will take the form of a Sunni–Shiite struggle which will definitely make Lebanon vulnerable against such a sectarian conflict. From its part, Hezbollah must understand that intervening in Syria will lead to severe repercussions in Lebanon, and the Sunni-dominated city of Tripoli and other Sunni areas have become radicalized. In order to build better relations between Lebanon and Syria, Lebanese political parties must refrain from intervening in Syria and should follow the lead of the Lebanese government which represents all communities.

Part of the future of Lebanese–Syrian relations will depend on the outcome of the war in Syria. It is more likely that if the opposition wins the war and the Ba’ath party is ousted, then its relations with Lebanon will become stronger and dominated by a genuine spirit of brotherhood. If, however, Assad ends up wiping out the rebels, Lebanon will pay a heavy price for this outcome. Definitely Bashar Assad will seek revenge from those who have been supporting the opposition, like Hariri’s Future Movement and sympathetic supporters of the revolution like the March 14 alliance. Others like Joumblatt will also pay the price for turning against Assad after the revolution started.