Israel–South Korea Relations: The Military Dimension

Abstract

As Southeast Asia gains prominence in global geostrategic and geoeconomic environment, Israel’s overture to South Korea is not an exception. Despite prolonged frosty relations between Israel and South Korea between the 1970s and late 1980s, both have managed to strengthen military–security relationship after reopening their embassies in the early 1990s. Currently, their defense cooperation revolves around arms trade but is expanding toward joint ventures, coproduction, and upgrading programs. Arms export is an important component in promoting Israeli foreign policy goals. At the same time, South Korea requires constant defense upgrade as it faces a hostile neighborhood. Within this context, the article argues that military and defense relations are the driving forces in flourishing Israel–South Korea relations.

Keywords

Israel–Korea relations arms sales Israel’s foreign policy South Korea Israel US

Israel’s Arms Exports

Arms sales have always remained an important component of the Israeli foreign policy calculations and, in some instances, it even facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations. As a result, it is imperative to understand the basic reasons behind arms trade as an instrument of foreign policy which was prominently visible in the case of the People’s Republic of China (Shichor, 1994). Israeli foreign policy underwent a drastic change with the end of the Cold War; and, particularly, with the demise of Soviet Union, Israel began a rapid process of reaching out to the countries outside the Middle Eastern region. Asia, for Israel, posed both “opportunity and challenge” and acknowledging the region’s traditional importance, Aharon Klieman (1985) observed: “So great is the geographical spread of nations that it fits perfectly the Israeli formula of diversification” (p. 141). It was not only the prospects for arms sales and civilian cooperation but also a desire for “recognition and acceptance” amidst its regional isolation that propelled Israel to reach out to Asia (Abadi, 2004; Beit-Hallahmi, 1987).

The usage of arms sales as a tool of foreign policy by Israel should not only be looked from the commercial point of view, but also from the politico-strategic prism. This has been the case because of Israel’s limited political, economic, and diplomatic leverage, and most importantly, because of its continuous security challenges in the region. The role of arms exports in promoting foreign policy interests gained importance, particularly after the October 1973 War and the oil crisis, when many of the Sub-Saharan African countries snapped diplomatic ties with Israel (Oded, 2010, p. 133). The economic clouts of the oil-rich Arab countries had a major impact on Israel’s fortunes with Africa. This diplomatic setback faced by Israel made it turn toward other regions, and it found favorable prospects in Latin America, South Africa as well as in Asia. Alongside its sale of conventional weapons systems, like arms and ammunitions, its willingness to provide military technology and warfare training lured countries which faced some sort of internal problems or border disputes with their neighbors.

Notwithstanding its traditional defense-related ties with its Western partners such as the US and France, Israel has begun to give immense importance toward Asia. When one talks of its expanding military cooperation with the Asian countries, arms sales have been highlighted. Gradually, their buyer–seller relationship has been transformed to that of joint productions and collaborations. This is an indication of the maturation of their ties. Whether India, Singapore, or South Korea, Israel has undertaken several joint ventures (JVs), and they are mostly in the field of aerospace, missile and antimissile systems, and arms and ammunitions. For example, India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have such ventures with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI; Inbar & Ningthoujam, 2011, pp. 12–16; Kumaraswamy, 1998), and the same applies to Israel’s companies and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). There are several other Israeli defense firms which are supplying their products to several Asian countries. Besides India and South Korea, Israel has given utmost attention to countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, and Singapore primarily due to the changing regional and global politics. Defense relations with India and South Korea are visibly on the upswing, and economic relations with China are strong. In order to promote its “Look East” policy, Israel has also been expanding its interests in Japan (Ningthoujam, 2015).

There are factors responsible for this trend. In the recent times, the rising anti-Israeli political movements, such as Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) in several European countries including the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, and Ireland, are partly responsible for the foreign policy reorientation in Israel. Relations between Israel and the European Union (EU) are at an all-time low and both sides do not see eye-to-eye on a host of issues pertaining to the peace process, especially the continued construction and expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Some of the Israeli policies are also undermining the EU efforts to ameliorate the conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. While the EU considers its funding for some infrastructure projects in the West Bank to be “humanitarian assistance,” Israel claims it is “a political step designed to help the Palestinians to establish facts on the ground” (David, 2016). From time to time, Israel has even demolished some of these structures and caused considerable anger in Europe. As a result, relations between the two are cold.

Simultaneously, the decline of political ties with the US, its largest benefactor, during the Obama presidency (2009–2017) is also contributing to Israel’s overtures toward the Asia-Pacific. Washington’s willingness to conclude the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015 irked its strongest ally in the Middle East. Moreover, during 2014 Operation Protective Edge, Israel faced diplomatic setbacks as five Latin American countries—Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and El Salvador—recalled their ambassadors, and called for boycotting Israeli arms exports. This reflected poorly on Israel’s political standing. There have been certain improvements in the Middle East, although the Arab countries continue to remain hostile, at least politically, to Israel. It is no secret that there is ongoing tacit contacts and cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia over shared security concerns vis-à-vis Iran, but this does not guarantee an immediate improvement in the political ties between Israel and key Arab countries. Barring a few protests (particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia) over excessive use of force during military operations and the handling of the Palestinian issue in general, the East and Southeast Asian regions are relatively silent, with negligible anti-Israel rhetoric. It is this lukewarm response that has created a fertile ground for Israel to embolden its relations with these nations. In their bilateral relations, military ties have become one of the salient characteristics and Asian defense markets are lucrative for Israel.

While these conditions, to an extent, paved the way for Israel’s penetration into Asia, there are other factors which triggered its arms sales. The reduction in European defense budgets, the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and the impending drawdown from Afghanistan are some of the factors. Over the last few years, Israeli arms sales to Europe and North America have remained low, but 2015 witnessed a marginal increase, owing to the rise of terror-related activities. All this while, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained equilibrium, becoming the largest importer of arms.

According to Klieman (1985): “The military rationale for transferring Israeli weapons in effect served as the intermediate link between political and foreign policy incentives on the one hand, and economic motives, on the other” (p. 30). Moreover, current military modernization and indigenization programs, territorial disputes and internal discords, and rising phenomenon of radical extremism and related counterterrorism measures are some of the contributing factors for the growth in Israel’s arms exports to the Asian countries. The problem of aging weapons systems in this region particularly resulted in these countries seeking alternative means of both upgrades and imports (Bitzinger, 2015). The military–technological advancements achieved by the Israeli defense industry in upgrading and manufacturing a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems caught the attention of defense planners in Southeast Asia. For example, in July 2015, six M113 armored personnel carriers, upgraded by Israel, were delivered to the Philippine Army (Manila Livewire, 2015). A year earlier, Elbit System was awarded a contract worth US$290 million to an unnamed Asia-Pacific customer to perform upgrades on tank, and another US$85 million for upgrading (most likely Singapore’s) F-5 avionics (Nissan, 2014).

Along with the traditional customers, Israel’s arms have been sold to some of the ASEAN countries. Alongside arms transfers, upgrades and JVs are important patterns in arms exports. For example, Israel Weapon Industries established a production facility (at a cost of US$100 million) in Vietnam to help supply Galil ACE 31 and 32 assault rifles to the Vietnamese Army (Israel Defense, 2014). In 2014, the two countries signed agreements to establish a “formal framework” to upgrade their bilateral defense relations, including promotion of future technology transfer and industrial cooperation and to this effect, Israel established a defense attaché in its mission in Hanoi in 2015. Israel would be involved in upgrading Vietnam’s defense systems and technology. Between 2005 and 2015, Vietnam imported Spyder and Derby missiles and ELM-2288/ER and ELM-2022 air defense radars from Israel (SIPRI). Since the lifting of prolonged US arms embargo during President Barack Obama’s visit in May 2016, more traffic can be expected in the Israeli–Vietnamese arms trade (Harris, 2016).

Myanmar is mulling strengthening military ties with Israel. For the first time in 55 years, military Chief of Staff Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Israel in September 2015 to discuss the enhancement of security cooperation. He toured the naval base in Ashdod, air force base in Palmachim, and defense manufacturers such as IAI, and Elta and Elbit Systems (Cohen, 2015). The military might be purchasing the Israeli-made Super Dvora 3 fast patrol boats and Myanmar has already purchased 155-millimeter (manufactured by Soltam), Uzi submachine guns, 105-millimeter howitzers, and upgraded armored cars. There has been an ongoing arms trade with Thailand and, since 2000, the latter has purchased Searcher Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Python-4 missiles, Aerostar UAV, and the Elbit Systems—built ATMOS-2000 155-millimeter self-propelled gun (in 2014–2015; Dombe, 2015). A joint production of system between Elbit and the Royal Thai Army (RTA) looks likely.

A similar trend is found in the Philippines, which has already considered purchasing surface-to-air missiles (SAM), UAVs, and missile launcher systems. In January 2014, an agreement was signed for the purchase of 28 light-armored vehicles at the cost of US$19.7 million. The Philippines inked another order for three ELM-2288 radars from Elta Systems, worth US$56 million toward enhancing its surveillance capabilities in the West Philippine Sea (or South China Sea) and protecting its maritime boundaries. Israeli defense firms might continue to secure arms contracts as President Rodrigo Duterte announced his willingness to procure weaponry from the former (Manila Livewire, 2016).

These defense markets have contributed significantly to Israel’s arms-export revenues. Despite a slight decline in the volume of Israel’s global arms exports, the Asia-Pacific region (including Southeast Asia) has remained the largest purchasers of its weapons systems during the last few years. In 2012, arms deals worth US$1.6 billion were signed with European countries; weapons and military technologies worth US$1.187 billion were sold to the US and Canada; US$604 million to Latin American countries, and US$197 million to African countries (Cohen, 2013). During the same year, however, defense exports to Asia-Pacific alone yielded US$4 billion. This is a significant volume considering the fact that Israel established diplomatic ties with many Asian countries only in the early 1990s. Israel’s no-strings-attached policy regarding arms exports enticed the Asian customers and this has improved its credibility as a reliable arms supplier. In 2012, defense items such as radars, missiles, and air defense systems (including anti-aircraft systems) accounted for 49 percent of defense exports; naval systems accounted for 10 percent and 38 percent for the highlighted defence items; and communications systems accounted for the rest; and UAVs accounted for 3 percent of defense exports (Ben-David, 2013).

Although Israel’s global arms export values dropped by a billion in 2013, it managed to sell arms worth US$6.54 billion with the Asia-Pacific region remaining the main destination with supplies worth US$3.91 billion (Cohen, 2014). Owing to decline in worldwide sale, its exports in 2014 dropped to US$5.66 billion (Cohen, 2015). While Asia-Pacific region retained its status as the largest buyer of Israeli arms worth US$2.96 billion, Africa increased its purchase by 40 percent or to US$318 million during this year. Most of the deals were concentrated on “improvements to planes and aerial systems, as well as sales of electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems, armament, aerial defense systems and radar, and drones (UAVs)” (Cohen, 2015). Israel’s arms export during 2015 dropped further and stood at US$2.3 billion. Owing to a few megadeals and JVs announced between Israel and India (SIPRI Online Database, n.d.), the Asian share in Israeli arms exports could see a jump in the coming years. Besides aircraft and related systems upgrades, missile and antimissile systems, border protection equipment, early-warning systems (EWS), intelligence equipment, and military aviation components are the most sought-after items. Against this backdrop, the following section highlights the relations between Israel and South Korea, and indicates the nature of their military–security ties.

The Early Years

Israel and South Korea achieved independence in the same year, 1948, but they did not immediately forge official relations. It was only in April 1962 when both countries established diplomatic relations but Israel closed its embassy in Seoul in 1978, following a policy shift by South Korea in the aftermath of the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 (Cohen, 2006, p. 108; Levkowitz, 2013, pp. 21–22), although the official reason was budgetary constraints (Kemp, 2010, p. 142).

During the Korean War (1950–1953), Israel maintained a stance of non-identification toward the Cold War (Bialer, 1991; Shichor, 1994, pp. 188–208). However, its policy began to change when it confronted the anti-Jewish attitude of the USSR that “strengthening relations with the US was the only to safeguard its continued existence and long-term interests” (Cohen, 2006, p. 106). This reflected the growing influence of the US vis-à-vis Israel’s ties with South Korea. Even though North Korea and Israel went into diplomatic negotiations, the US vehemently opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (ibid., pp. 106–107). This was further complicated by Pyongyang’s desire to forge relations with the Arab states which eventually led to arms deals with the radical groups (Abadi, 2004, p. 124).

During the 1950s, Israel and South Korea maintained a very low profile and with their constant efforts, hopes for a better relationship began to resurface during mid-1960, particularly with the fall of the dictatorial regime of Syngman Rhee (Cohen, 2006, p. 107). The eventual breakthrough came on 10 April 1962 when Israel and South Korea announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. To many, this was possible because of a meeting in late 1961 between Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir and her South Korean counterpart Choi Dok Chin on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.

The oil crises in 1973 and 1978–1979 significantly influenced South Korea’s overture toward the Middle Eastern conflict. Following these crises, South Korea moved closer to the oil-rich Arab countries, namely, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman, with a motive to develop its infrastructures. The development of its economy and the increasing demand for oil heightened the dependence on these Middle Eastern countries. During the 1970s and early 1980s, South Korea imported 85 percent of its oil from the Middle East and the latter accounted for 73.4 percent of its natural gas imports (Levkowitz, 2012, p. 228). Owing to such cooperation, South Korea repeatedly expressed its support for the Palestinian people and even talked about the latter’s “right to self-determination” (Cohen, 2006, p. 108). The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinians, and called on Israel to withdraw from the “occupied territories, including Jerusalem” (ibid.). These developments further deteriorated the relations between these two countries. As aptly mentioned by scholar such as Alon Levkowitz (2014):

For many years, Seoul was concerned about the possible implications of the Arab boycott on South Korean companies if they traded with Israel. One political indicator of South Korea’s low-profile relations with Israel was Seoul’s decision not to open an embassy in Israel. From the Israeli perspective, South Korea in those years was neither a political nor an economic asset: trade between the two states was very limited, and Seoul was both unwilling and unable to advance diplomatic relations with Israel.

In the wake of the oil boom, a host of South Korean companies especially Hyundai, Dong Ah Industrial, Daewoo and many others entered the bourgeoning market of the oil-producing countries along the Persian Gulf (Levkowitz, 2010, pp. 2–3). Towards the late 1970s, many of these companies in the Middle East provided job opportunities to nearly 300,000 South Korean workers (Clifford, 1998, p. 118). Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the largest exporter of oil to South Korea. Between 1972 and 1979, the Middle East alone accounted for 12 per cent of South Korea’s export trade but this value dropped to 5.2 percent in 1986 because of the “collapse of the construction boom” in the former and the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) (Metraux, 1990, p. 189). Throughout the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other countries in the region bagged contracts over US$3 billion (Levkowitz, 2013, p. 15).

Owing to the intensification of cooperation between South Korea and oil-producing Arab counties, Israel–South Korea ties remained nadir for a prolonged period, which led to closure of the Israeli embassy in Seoul. A few are of the view that the policies adopted by Israel toward the Korean Peninsula were “subject to the dictates of the Cold War diplomacy” (Abadi, 2004, p. 123). Throughout the 1970s, a very limited interaction with Israel was maintained by South Korea and the latter was aware of the fact that improving its diplomatic and economic ties with the former would impact negatively on its relations with the Arab countries. The end of the Cold War, Kuwait crisis, and the Madrid Conference of 1991 had opened a new political process between the confronting rivals, Israel and the Arab states and Palestinians. Furthermore, with the intervention of the US, the South Koreans were made to feel the need to reengage its ties with Israel soon (Cohen, 2006, p. 109). The Israeli embassy was reopened in January 1992 and South Korea followed a similar move by opening its embassy in Tel Aviv in December 1993. South Korea’s structural reforms after its economic and financial crisis of 1997–1998, and the subsequent priority given its high tech and information technology enabled further enhancement of bilateral relations (Cohen, 2006, p. 105).

Political and Economic Ties

Since the reopening of the Israeli embassy, the bilateral relations have seen remarkable improvement. Political ties have improved with frequent visits in both directions. South Korean science and technology minister visited Israel in October 1993 and signed agreements with the Ministry of Science, aircraft industries, and other institutes (Cohen, 2006, p. 110). One of the earliest bilateral agreements between the two was signed in November 1994, and this was for a scientific and technological cooperation and came into force from the following year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, n.d.). Various other agreements were signed in the following years and were related to customs cooperation, air services, technical cooperation in the field of agriculture, telecommunications, etc. In 2004, both the countries signed another agreement on maritime transport (ibid.).

President Shimon Peres visited Seoul in June 2010 amid the Gaza flotilla debacle, along with Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and Communication Minister Moshe Kahlon. Discussions were focused on increasing economic and technological cooperation. Other significant visits included that of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) Byun Moo-geun to Israel in May 2010, followed by delegations of South Korea’s National Defense Committee and Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee in August 2010 and February 2011, respectively (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).

As a mark of strengthening political and economic relations, many prominent Israeli officials visited Seoul, and this included Minister of Science and Technology Sandberg in November 2003, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni in January 2007, Head of the National Security Council Dani Arditi in December 2008, Chairperson of Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee Tzachi Hanegbi in August 2009, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September 2010, and Director of Policy and Military Advisor of Ministry of National Defense Amos Gilad in January 2011. Looking into these visits, it can be argued that both the countries are interacting regularly to improve every aspect of the bilateral relations.

Shortly thereafter, in early 2011, an 11-member South Korean delegation was led by Lee Byung-suk, former chairman of the National Assembly’s Land Transport and Maritime Affairs Committee which also included Park Jin, former chairman of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee visited Israel (Cashman, 2011). Both the countries pledged to intensify their relationship on all fronts. One of the most important discussions was the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and if this happens, their trade, science, and technological cooperation would significantly increase. By the end of 2015, the bilateral trade reached US$1.7 billion, out of which US$578 was Israel’s exports to South Korea (Elis, 2016).

Economic relations remain to be the strongest connection between Israel and South Korea. Trade relations between the two flourished, with Seoul importing materials required in chemical industries, precious stones and metals, and electronic and optical devices, while Israel importing vehicles, textiles, and other consumer goods. Since 2005, both the countries have been working toward singing a FTA to boost their economic ties. In this context, both sides decided to generate funds worth millions of dollar to work more closely in research and development (R&D) in the private sector (Korea Herald, 2005). Ehud Olmert, who was the vice-prime minister at that time, also discussed cooperation in the field of biotechnology and nanotechnology, and in the information technology sector. In 2006, 300 Israeli companies concluded various economic deals with South Korea (Kemp, 2010, p. 142).

Their economic relations also extended JVs. This is significant for a country like Israel which has been facing various forms of international boycotts and sanctions through BDS movements in different parts of the globe. In 2010, Israel and South Korea agreed to enter into a JV worth US$150 million to promote and assist small- and medium-sized business. Considering their technological advancement, such venture would enhance their cooperation in advanced technologies. There was already a JV signed in 2001 for the “establishment of a joint South Korea–Israel Research and Development Foundation known as Koril R&D, which has since financed numerous technology projects between companies from each country” (Cashman, 2010).

It was estimated that in 2011, Israel’s exports to South Korea (excluding diamonds) stood at US$500 million while imports amounted to approximately US$1.1 billion (The Jerusalem Post, 2011). According to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the value of its exports to Israel during the year was about US$1.06 billion (mostly automobiles, mobile phone, and synthetic resin), while imports stood at US$700 million (and mainly consisted of semiconductor and spare parts for aircraft; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2010). It is worth recollecting that the South Korean automobile company “Hyundai has consolidated its position during the first quarter of 2011 as Israel’s best-selling motor vehicle brand” (Ben-Gedalyahu, 2011).¹

Tourism is another sector that has brought the interactions between them stronger. People from both the countries have exhibited the desires to know more about each other, and the food item Sushi is very popular in Israel. To make the matter more feasible with a smooth travelling option, Korean Airlines introduced regular flights to the Jewish state and the annual visitors from South Korea into Israel is significant.

The religion—Christianity—is another factor which has brought these two countries closer. In South Korea, nearly 29 to 30 percent of the total population identify themselves as evangelical Christians (Hazzan, 2016). Many of them are familiar with the places which are mentioned in the holy text of Bible, and as a result, approximately 40,000–50,000 South Korean Christian pilgrims visit Israel every year (Twersky, 2012). The South Korean community in Israel is constituted of nearly 300 families with a population of about 800 (Atkins, 2016). In order to cement the ties, the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, which gives largest donation to social and education projects in Israel, opened its South Korean office in Seoul in September 2012 (Eglash, 2012). This was one of the significant steps which were taken to mark 50 years of establishment of diplomatic relations between them. The Korean Christians are a “growing and often strongly Zionist community in Jerusalem” (Atkins, 2016).

Military–Security Relations

The military–security dimension of bilateral relations has gained significance over the past few years. It is widely believed that the military relations begun during the 1960s amidst the Cold War (Cohen, 2006, p. 108). As both the countries had close relations with the US, they tried to strengthen their security cooperation (Abadi, 2004, pp. 130–131). This aspect of the ties assumed great importance, particularly with Israel’s willingness to transfer its state-of-the-art weapons systems. Due to their long geographical distance, their cooperation mainly revolves around weapons and technological supply. Acknowledging Israel’s military industrial advancement, South Korea expressed its desire to purchase military hardware including drones, missiles, radar, and also possibly missile defense systems (Harel, 2011a). Seoul is planning to make Israel one of its main arms suppliers alongside the US and its desire to procure advanced weapons systems and technology has stemmed largely from its deteriorating relations with North Korea (ibid.).

Their military relations began on a humble note during the 1990s. Following their reopening of the embassies, discussions were held on ways to cooperate in the military–industrial sector. During their initial days, cooperation revolved around the Israeli export of weapons systems such as drones. Shortly thereafter, both the countries upgraded their military ties by signing various defense agreements pertaining to UAVs, aircraft industries, missiles, etc. (Melman, 2009; Ningthoujam, 2013).

As early as in 1996, Israel’s Elta Electronics Industries, a subsidiary of the Israel Aircraft Industries (now IAI), was one of the three companies approached by South Korea for the replenishment tender of four advanced early-warning aircraft amounting to US$1 billion (Marom, 1996).² For the South Koreans, the need for such sophisticated weapons systems arose due to its inability to detect a North Korea-origin submarine off its coasts. “Falcon” system mounted on a Boeing 767 aircraft was offered to South Korea.

The succeeding year had witnessed a major arms trade between Israel and South Korea. In mid-1997, it was reported that both the countries signed a contract worth US$32 million for the supply of Harpy attack drones to the South Korean army (Marom, 1997).³ This was to enhance its long-range attack capabilities in absence of any manned aircraft. For Israel, this was a stepping stone for enhanced unmanned aircraft transactions. In a quick succession in August 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Israel Military Industries (IMI) and a major South Korean concern, whereby both the military agreed not only to develop and manufacture, but also to jointly bid international tenders (Koren, 1997).⁴ At this juncture, both the countries also discussed an upgrade program for South Korea’s military and began exploring avenues for JVs.

In September 1997, Israel’s Rafael and the US’s Lockheed Martin outmaneuvered Rockwell to “provide The Republic of Korea Air Force with a stand-off missile for its Lockheed Martin F-16 and McDonnell Douglas F-4Phantom aircraft” (Flight Global, 1997).⁵ This deal proved advantageous for Israel as the The Republic of Korea Air Force selected the AGM-142 variant of the Rafael Popeye stand-off weapon over the AGM-130 (ibid.).⁶ The air force was also purchasing AGM-142B, also called as Popeye 2 for its F-16s. However, in January 1998, Rafael’s General Manager Yitzhak Gat expressed his concerns as to whether South Korea would cancel the US$130 million transactions for the purchase of Popeye air-to-surface missiles (Marom, 1998). At this time, this Far East Asian country was undergoing an economic crisis.

In a move to forge better ties in the military aviation sector, in December 1998, South Korea offered IAI and a few Israeli companies a partnership in its aircraft industry. Under this proposal, a company would be formed where 60 percent would be under the Korean ownership while the remaining 40 percent would be held by the foreign partner (Koren, 1998). Alongside this, there were unconfirmed reports that IAI was negotiating with Korean companies for cooperation in the development of a fighter plane and a trainer (Koren, 2001). Major Israeli defense industries like IAI began realizing the lucrative defense markets of the East Asian countries, and therefore, decided not to retreat from those markets. Moreover, the 1990s was a period when Israeli arms sales to countries like India, Singapore, People’s Republic of China (PRC), etc. were on the rise.

The New Millennium

Since the onset of the millennium, Israel’s military exports to South Korea gained momentum. As both the countries have hostile neighbors, there is a greater demand for weaponry. This has enhanced their military cooperation, and highlights the degree of importance Israel attaches to the Korean market. Owing to the constant crisis with North Korea, the South wanted to enhance its early-warning capability. In February 2000, Elta won a tender to supply the South Korean national maritime police force with its ELM-2022 advanced naval patrol radar. Furthermore, amidst the Israel–China Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) controversy (Kumaraswamy, 2005), IAI sought to offer the same to South Korea by mounting it on an Airbus 310 platform (Marom, 2000). The deal was estimated at around US$1 billion. From this, it could be incurred that most of the military cooperation concentrated on Israel’s supply of defense equipment to South Korea, and particularly missiles, EWS, etc.

During early 2000, South Korea along with countries like India, Turkey, Japan, and the Great Britain expressed interests in procuring Arrow anti-missile defense systems manufactured by IAI (Melman, 2009). Till today, this wish remains unfulfilled as the sale of the anti-missile defense requires the explicit approval of the US which is substantially financing the project (Clarke, 1994). With such a leverage enjoyed by the US over Israel’s arms exports policy, the Washington has the veto power on the sale of such systems to countries by Israel (Klieman, 1985, pp. 167–188; Reiser, 1989, p. 219).

The Israeli–South Korean military relations not only revolved around weapons sales but also explored possibilities of cooperation in the aviation sector. Deviating a little bit from the sale of the aforementioned defense items, IAI and the Russian helicopter manufacturer Kamov offered to sell their jointly developed Kamov-52 helicopters to South Korea, in 2001. According to the Israel business daily Globes, “Kamov-52 is an advanced version of the Kamov-50, which includes Israeli avionics, such as night-vision systems built by TAMAM Optronics and Navigation-IAI. The upgraded helicopter can operate day and night in difficult weather conditions” (Marom, 2001a).⁷ Israel offered long-term maintenance for the helicopter. In the same year, Elisra also negotiated with South Korea’s aircraft industry to jointly develop a new attack helicopter. The Israeli firm was reported to have offered electronic warfare systems for 400 helicopters which were to be supplied to the The Republic of Korea Air Force (Marom, 2001b). Approximate cost of each electronic warfare system was estimated to be about US$1–1.5 million per helicopter, thereby taking the entire deal up to about US$400–600 million. Furthermore, IAI was reported to be negotiating with KAI for a partnership in a joint development project of a supersonic fighter and training aircraft, T50 (Marom, 2001c). This move had come about when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was planning to replace its outdated trainers such as Skyhawk and Zukit, and expressed an interest to buy 30–40 T50s.

Tellingly, both Israel and South Korea began exchanging military visits to cement their defense ties. In October 2002, The Republic of Korea Air Force Major General and head of military procurement Shin Bo-hyun visited Israel and met Israeli defense deputy director for general international relations Brig. Gen. (res.) Yekutiel Mor along with various defense industry leaders (Marom, 2002). During this visit both the countries decided to cooperate further, and their discussions mainly centered on the procurement of military systems and upgrading of South Korea’s existing military platforms. Israel earned its proficiency in upgrading outdated Soviet weapons systems, and had an advantage as many of its immigrants had already worked as engineers and technicians in the Soviet military industry (Inbar, 2009, p. 237).

In mid-2004, IAI and Kamov delivered seven search-and-rescue helicopters to the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). These helicopters were equipped with Israel’s state-of-the-art avionics, including navigation, radar, weather, land mapping, and mobile digital mapping. From this deal, the IAI had made US$15 million (Frisch, 2004a). In a September 2004 visit to Israel, a South Korean military delegation examined the possibility of purchasing four early-warning aircrafts manufactured by IAI (Barzilai, 2004).⁸ This deal was estimated to be over US$1 billion. It was during this visit that the IAI, after the approval from Israel’s Defense Ministry, expressed its willingness to transfer technology for the EWS. What remained to be a major source of hindrance was the presence of Boeing of the US that was competing for the same contract. Sensing such a stiff competition from Boeing and Thales of France, which was another bidder, Israel Livnat, Elta’s managing director, put his confidence eloquently in these words, “Our proposal will be higher quality, with the widest performance, and at a more competitive price” (Frisch, 2004b). In 2005, this particular initiative paved a way for an exchange of frosty words between Israel and the US as the latter was trying to stop this arms deal (Melman, 2005).

Similar to the Phalcon crisis of 2000 (Kumaraswamy, 2005), the US officials argued that the early-warning aircrafts which the Jewish state intended to sell to South Korea contained US-origin parts, and therefore required export license. Another interesting reason was that the US shares a strong bond with Seoul since the Korean War where many American soldiers gave up their lives while protecting the “sovereignty and independence from North Korea” (Melman, 2005). This had somehow made the US claim that South Korea is its most important ally and would not allow Israeli firms to compete with its own firms. As a result, Washington was believed to have applied great pressure on Seoul to offer the tender to Boeing. Moreover, it remained a time-taking process for Israel to obtain an American export license. Under such circumstances, South Korea hesitated to purchase the aircraft from Israel as it no longer wanted to disrupt and delay its defense equipment stocking plans (ibid.). It was in mid-2006 when the US firm was announced as the winner of the tender. The decision not to choose IAI was taken during a meeting of the South Korean DAPA which was chaired by Yoon Kwang-ung, the minister of defense. However, Elta had tried to achieve a breakthrough by hiring the services of General John Ashcroft, the former US Attorney, who lobbied the Bush administration on its behalf (Ran, 2006). If this deal would have gone through, it could have been the largest deal of the IAI during the time.

These developments have signified the influence of the US over Israel’s arms export policies. In many instances, the American involvement remained a grave concern for the Israeli defense establishments, and undermined credibility of its defense industries (Clarke, 1995; Kumaraswamy, 2006; Shichor, 2005). Despite the above loss, in August 2006, Elisra Group won a contract worth US$7 million to supply electronic warfare systems for ROKAF’s Sikorsky S-92 helicopters and Portuguese Air Force. Fortunately, the aforementioned row over AWACS tender did not brew any major rift in the Israeli–South Korean military relations. In the following year, in 2007, South Korean military ordered Skylark II tactical UAVs from Elbit Systems. The Skylark mini UAV has been designed for data collection, observation, and marking target missions beyond the range of 60 km. According to the Globes, this UAV’s “silent, electric propulsion system, allows for optimal performance during day, night and adverse weather missions. The system can be operated by a two-person crew” (Globes, 2007).

It has been believed that military relations between Israel and South Korea began to grow more from the late 2000 onwards. Both the countries clinched important arms deals such as radars, missiles, electronic warfare systems, etc. As early as in February 2009, Elisra group once again bagged a contract worth US$7 million for the supply of airborne electronic warfare systems to KAI for its FA50 light attack jets (Globes, 2009a). Under this deal, the Israeli would develop and produce prototype electronic warfare systems. In a quick succession, in March, the same firm won another contract to supply airborne electronic warfare suites for ROKAF C-130 transporters. The electronic systems which were to be supplied included protection systems against various radar-guided and heat-guided missile types (Globes, 2009b).

The robustness of their military transactions has been evidenced by these rapid deals without any visible hiccups. This is also a proof for Israel’s advancement in the field of defense productions, where many countries still prefer its state-of-the-art weapons systems. In one of the largest weapons deals, in 2009, South Korea’s military decided to buy Israeli-made Green Pine Block-B, or Oren Yarok, radar warning systems, worth over US$200 million (Melman, 2009). This system has a range of about 500 km which is considered adequate enough to cover almost the entire territory of South Korea, and could also protect from any incoming North Korean missiles.

Around the time when President Peres visited South Korea in 2010, Elta was reported to have sold its EL/M2083 helium blimp-borne radar worth US$57 million to an East Asian customer (Ankori, 2010), which many had thought to be South Korea. This is a phased array radar system that has the strength of covering hundreds of square kilometers of ground with an enhanced early-warning capability. Just before this, Elta also sold its EL/M2022 airborne marine reconnaissance systems to two Asian countries, most likely India⁹ and South Korea.

Taking their military relations to new heights, the IAI and South Korea signed additional deals for radar systems which would become a key component in the South countering threats posed by North Korea which has already possessed low-flying, short-, and intermediate-range missiles (Melman, 2009). In early 2011, South Korea was investing more resources into coastal warfare as it continues to face provocation near the disputed sea border in waters situated west of the Korean Peninsula (Harel, 2011a).¹⁰ As a result, the South Korean Navy had decided to arm its forces by procuring more advanced maritime surveillance and precision strike systems to defend against the growing asymmetrical littoral threats by the North (Sung-Ki, 2011). Alongside this, Elisra again won a contract to supply the ROKAF airborne electronic warfare suites and missile warning systems for its CN-235 transporters. The approximate estimation of this deal was US$29 million (Globes, 2011).

Such a continued program of their military relations are an indication of the success enjoyed by these Israeli firms in this East Asian country, and is also a recognition of Israel’s technological edge in the field of electronic warfare and EWS. This has proved to be quite advantageous for Israel as it has begun searching for new military partners, especially at the time of economic recession and its growing political isolation. In a move to make its presence felt more visibly in East Asia, Israel’s Rafael has already opened its new marketing office in Bangkok. With this development, there are possibilities looming large of a JV between Rafael and two South Korean companies (Katz, 2011a).

As both the countries exhibited willingness to expand the defense cooperation, the vice-commissioner of the South Korean DAPA Kwon Oh-bong visited Israel in June 2011, and toured the defense industries, and met senior officials. During this visit, the South Korean leader talked about turning Israel into a main arms supplier of South Korea (Etsion, 2011). After his visit to the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Kwon expressed his interest in the Iron Dome rocket interception system. Furthermore, both sides discussed potential collaborations in security R&D.

Shortly thereafter, South Korea inked a US$43 million deal with Israel’s Rafael for the purchase of 67 advanced Spike Non Line of Sight (NLOS) rockets, mainly to protect the front-line area which was attacked by North Korea in 2010 (Haaretz, 2011). This rocket carries the potential of flying up to 15–20 km and hit any hidden targets and in May 2013, these precision-guided missiles were deployed in Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong Islands in the Yellow Sea (The Jerusalem Post, 2013).

An Unexpected Hiccup

Beginning from the late 2010, in an effort to intensify their military–aviation cooperation, South Korea began to endorse its T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer to Israel Air Force (IAF). IAF was looking for a replacement of its aging A4-Skyhawks which they have been using to train their pilots. For this, South Korean defense officials visited Israel to push for the deal and discussed potential future cooperation between their defense industries (Katz, 2011b). Unfortunately, this particular bid opened a crack in the otherwise very promising relationship. This had started when South Korea learned that Israel was leaning toward purchasing Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi-made M-346 training aircraft as its replacement. The issue became a hiccup in their military-related relationship.

Unconfirmed political factor seemed to be one of the reasons for Israel’s preference for the European aircraft. It was believed that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi made great efforts to persuade his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu to pick M-346 (Harel, 2011b). Furthermore, owing to its growing diplomatic isolation in the region, Israel attached great importance in preserving ties with Italy. Alongside this probable reason, both the countries discussed a “barter deal” for supplying two state-of-the-art Israeli-made AWACS planes (UPI, 2011) which are based on the G-550 Gulfstream platform. The deal by Italy was estimated to be US$700–800 million.

South Korea had major concerns right from the beginning when Israel and Italy started to negotiate for the trainer jet. As explained by an Israeli defense official:

Korean colleagues are worried about Israel’s pending decision on the IAF’s next jet trainer, because picking the M-346 will greatly reduce the chances of marketing the T-50 to other countries, including the US, Chile, and the United Arab Emirates, which are still deciding whether to procure the jet. The IAF’s reputation opens doors worldwide, and it is sometimes enough for a sales rep to hint that Israel has bought their product to get deadlocked talks moving again. (Azulai, 2011)

Moreover, South Korean officials were worried that if they could not get order for its T-50 trainer, the production line of this major item would be weakened, which also carried high risk of mass layoffs in the KAI.

It should be noted that even during the initial stages, the South Koreans were still very hopeful that Israel would decide to purchase the Korean product. They even exhibited readiness to undergo rapid conversion of the trainer so that Israel could combat effectively any threats from the surrounding adversaries. Unfortunately, in early February 2012, Israel announced its preference for the Italian-made jets, leaving the offer provided by Korea. If this deal would have been clinched, which was for about 30 aircrafts worth over US$1billion, it would have marked Israel’s first procurement of a jet from a country in the Far East, and would have been a demonstration of the technological advancements South Korea has achieved. Many South Korea officials considered such Israeli acts as “unfair” (Egozi, 2012a).

Despite Seoul’s threats to cancel defense deals with Israel over this issue, there has been no evidence of deterioration in bilateral ties, and defense-related cooperation continues to grow.

Defense Cooperation Revived

With the exception of Seoul’s verbal displeasure (Egozi, 2012a) over Israel–Italy jet deals, there was never a notable decline in Israel–South Korea military relations. There were, however, initial concerns that this issue could impact the defense cooperation between the countries. That said Israel and South Korea were quick in exploring new avenues for further cooperation.

During the heights of the jet debacle, Elbit Systems was offering KAI a system package for the naval version of the Surion helicopter (Egozi, 2011). This is a twin-engine helicopter designed and developed by a joint cooperation between KAI and Eurocopter. Furthermore, this Israeli firm established another JV with South Korea’s aviation services provider Sharp Aviation K. Inc. and called it as Sharp Elbit Systems Aerospace Inc. (SESA) (Globes, 2013). Under this JV (SESA), Elbit would own 19 percent of the venture with an option to increase it to 50 percent. SESA, which is based in Seoul, would not only offer maintenance, repair, and manufacture of advanced military aircraft avionics but would also “conduct R&D of systems and avionics for existing and future projects, such as the Korean Light Attack Helicopter and the Korean Future Fighter development projects” (ibid.). With such developments, more opportunities for cooperation in the aviation sector are likely to grow, which can also prove to be mutually beneficial for both the countries.

Further adding to the growing military ties between Israel and South Korea, it was reported that the US and Israel were planning to offer the South Korean government their jointly developed Arrow ballistic-missile defense system (Opall-Rome, 2011). This attempt for the possible transfer of such sophisticated weapons systems could be considered as flexibility exhibited by the US regarding Israel’s weapons sales to a third country. If the deal goes through, it is likely to exceed US$1 billion. Furthermore, the missile defense system carries the potential to counter any low-flying, short, and intermediate-range missiles incoming from North Korea. However, no breakthrough has been witnessed, particularly due to the fear of the South Korean officials of a possible backlash from neighboring countries, including China.

In April 2012, a new avenue for a potential cooperation has opened up between Israel and South Korea. Keeping aside the bitter experience of the jet deal, the latter offered Israeli Navy new surface vessels built by Hyundai shipyards (Egozi, 2012b). For the Israeli Navy, this is a timely offer as it faces threats due to an increased Iranian activity in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as to protect the recent discovery of gas and oil fields off its coast. In addition to this, both the countries discovered another area of cooperation in the field of DNA casualty identification for the fallen soldiers (Egozi, 2012c). South Korea has already developed this mechanism to identify their casualties based on DNA. Both the countries, having surrounded by hostile neighbors, need such techniques to avoid delays in identifying their killed and badly wounded citizens. For this, South Korea is likely to transfer the methods to Israel (ibid.).

In another milestone project, in June 2012, Elbit Systems won a US$62 million contract to upgrade C-130 transport aircraft of the The Republic of Korea Air Force. The project which is a joint cooperation with KAI is likely to run for four years (Israel Defense, 2012). With the upgrade, the existing analogue cockpit of the aircraft will also be converted into a glass cockpit by the Israeli firm using its advanced digital display systems (Globes, 2012). South Korea hoped to add the Rafael-made Iron Dome missile defense systems to its defensive capabilities (Egozi, 2012d). The acquisition of sophisticated defensive equipment would give South Korea a significant advantage in the case of any missile attacks from its hostile neighbor. Israel has already deployed this system to defend against the rockets fired by militants from the Gaza Strip toward its southern cities, such as Beer Sheba, Sderot and Ashkelon (Lappin, 2013).

In a reciprocal move, Israel planned to procure four offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) worth about US$400 million from South Korea, and they would be utilized to defend drilling platforms, pipelines, and other strategic assets in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (Defense News, 2013). These ships would be fitted with Israeli-developed subsystems such as radar, electronic warfare, command and control, and other self-defending capabilities. Such moves are likely to enhance a two-way trade between Israel and South Korea, and could also trigger further deals for the latter’s local firms.

The military ties which have been dominated by arms trade continued to flourish during 2014 and 2016. A few important deals pertaining to South Korea’s purchase of Israeli-made missile systems and radars were clinched. There is an increasing demand for these items due to the surreptitious nature of the North Korean troops and their military capabilities along the borders. To secure its territory and counter threats originating from across the borders, South Korea needs to enhance its defense capabilities. In early 2016, to facilitate more cooperation in these fields, a MoU was signed between IAI and South Korea’s manufacturer, Hankuk Carbon, for the joint development, production, and marketing of vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) UAVs. Both these manufacturers are known for their longstanding experience with such products (Lappin, 2016).

Given the comprehensive nature of the military–security relations, the future cooperation also looks very promising.

Diminishing Constraints

No relations, particularly with Israel, are devoid of limitations. That would depend on few factors, and since the 1980s, the interference of third party—the US—is both an advocate and obstacle (Klieman, 1985, pp. 167–188; Steinberg, 1983, p. 301). This was mostly due to the Cold War calculations. Apart from the US factor on Israel’s technology transfer to South Korea, no major constraining factor has undermined their bilateral relations. However, few pro-Palestinian groups in South Korea are not very happy with the burgeoning of relations with the Jewish state, especially the defense cooperation (Jeong-Ju, 2010; Palestine Monitor, 2012). It was against such background that the visit to Seoul of the Israeli President Peres in June 2010 was reportedly downgraded to a “working visit” from that of “state visit” (Haaretz, 2010). This happened in the wake of the Gaza-bound flotilla incident in May 2010 in the Mediterranean Sea. Even during the 2014 Gaza crisis, there were protests in South Korea but this did not result into any harsh politico-diplomatic reactions from Seoul (Tartaglione, 2014).

Nevertheless, an important concern is the Chinese factor (Suk-hee, 2012). There were reports of a plan to forge stronger military cooperation between South Korea and China, particularly on matters related to a mutual logistical support treaty (Yonhap News Agency, 2012). Cooperation in this area remains very less-developed since early-2000 when general-level military talks were halted. In a move to strengthen their military ties, in June 2013, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jung Seung-jo visited Beijing and met his Chinese counterpart Gen. Fang Fenghui, chairman of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff (Yonhap News Agency, 2013). Despite these attempts, nothing concrete had happened so far. Moreover, tension loomed large between South Korea and China over Seoul’s announcement in July 2016 that it would deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (Lee, 2016).

The US factor in Israeli–South Korean arms trade will be likely when Seoul and Beijing agree to enhance their military cooperation. In that circumstances, which is unlikely anytime soon, the US will monitor closely the types of weapons systems transferred by Israel to South Korea. During the early 1990s and mid-2000s, Israel was accused by the US for its alleged transfers of military technologies to China believed to be containing American-origin components (Kumaraswamy, 1996, 2005). Considering the vulnerability due to its heavy dependence upon the US, Israel would not like to repeat the blunders it made with China due to which it lost its lucrative defense market. In the near future, it will, however, be a completion if the US and other mega European arms manufacturers start to provide Seoul with systems and subsystems similar to those manufactured in Israel. In the words of one, “… the United States would always bring pressure to bear on South Korea to limit its purchases of Israeli military equipment and know-how … this is due to pressure by American companies who actually control South Korea’s sale of military hardware” (Abadi, 2004, p. 131).

Considering the regional geostrategic dynamics, Israel will have to carefully tread in its arms sales to the region. But compared to exports by mega vendors, namely Russia and the US, Israel’s share is not significant. Armed forces in Southeast Asia still prefer military items and technologies developed by these two powers. As observed by expert like Richard A. Bitzinger (2015, p. 11):

In turn, Asia-Pacific militaries will likely find Russian armaments to be an ever more appealing alternative to Western weapons systems. Russian weaponry is increasingly competitive when it comes to capability, quality, and costs. Particularly in the relatively open arms market that is Southeast Asia, therefore, Russian armaments should find an increasingly receptive welcome.

This, in other words, means that there are chances for competition amongst the arms suppliers, including Israel. This will be likely in the field of missiles, antimissile systems, radars, avionics, and UAVs, where Israel’s expertise is widely acknowledged. For now, this is a domain which is seemingly secured by the Jewish state.

Conclusion

The gradual rise of military–security cooperation between Israel and South Korea is happening at a juncture when the former is searching for alliances in Asia. Their ties in this sphere, in all, likelihood will flourish. Similarities in their problems with their respective immediate neighbors will remain the binding force. Most importantly, the bilateral relationship is inevitably going to be driven by these close defense ties and shared national security challenges. Israeli arms sales to South Korea will be beneficial for its defense industries as this will help in diversifying its revenue sources. There are still a wide range of mutual benefits both countries can gain, be it in defense, technological cooperation, or in bilateral trade.

Footnotes

1.

According to this source, “Hyundai delivered 13,129 cars in January–May 2011, 14.5% more than in the corresponding months of 2010.”

2.

The two others were the United States’ Boeing and Sweden’s Ericsson.

3.

According to this report, “the Harpy is an autonomous, fire and forget system which does not require further navigation after launching. The drone is used to neutralize radar systems, enabling manned aircraft to move deep into enemy territory without exposure to missiles.” Its length is 2.5 m. and delta-shaped.

4.

South Korea, whose annual military turnover was about US$1.2 billion during the mid-1990s, was ranked top-priority by Israel’s Defense Ministry in 1997.

5.

According to this report, “South Korea will purchase the Israeli missile from a jointly owned Rafael/Lockheed Martin production plant in the USA. The acquisition will be funded through the US Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales arrangement.”

6.

The deal with Rafael and Lockheed Martin was estimated to be about US$120 million.

7.

There were US’s Boeing, Sikorsky, and Bell which were contending for the same bid.

8.

According to this report, “the Republic of Korea Air Force delegation has evaluated the early warning system that IAI installs on the Gulfstream jets acquired for the Israel Air Force.”

9.

For recent developments in Indo-Israeli defense relations, see Inbar and Ningthoujam ().

10.

South Korean government decided to increase its annual defense budget by 25 percent.

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