Abstract
The 18th Jordanian parliamentary election held on 20 September 2016 was unique in two respects: one, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) participated in it after boycotting two previous elections (2010 and 2013); and two, demand for economic and political reforms emerged as the most important issue cutting across ideological and political divides. The election was also a reflection of Jordan’s social and political complexities and its extraordinary demography and identity-based politics. The electoral process was largely recognized as free and fair, a significant accomplishment in a region where elections are nothing more than a legitimizing exercise for the regimes. Intense pre-election debates, enthusiastic participation of women and minorities, and transparency came against the backdrop of low voter turnout of 36 percent thereby underlining the challenges facing democratization in Jordan.
Parliamentary elections are not new to Jordan and can be traced to April 1929 (Table 1), less than a decade after Britain established the Emirate of Transjordan, carving out territories of Mandate Palestine east of the Jordan River. Elections were held intermittently but were suspended during 1961 and 1989 due to domestic and regional upheavals and challenges to the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom (Kropulu, 2014; Robinson, 2009). Its Arab neighbors did not offer any model for the monarchy to emulate. In that respect, it is important to reflect on the role of the 2016 election upon the society and its contribution to the process of democratization. It is essential to ask: who were the major players? What were the major demands? And what explains the return of the Islamic Action Front (IAF)—the political wing of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood—to the electoral battle? It is also important to contextualize the developments in Jordan vis-à-vis the political conditions in the wider Arab world, especially the calls for democratization reflected in the mass upsurge since 2011.
Election Years and their Special Characteristics, 1929–2016
Past Elections
Jordan conducted its first parliamentary election in April 1929, 8 years after the Emirate of Transjordan was established in 1921. It was based on the 1928 basic law or constitution with a unicameral legislative council. The elections produced a weak parliament as it did not have any opposition and there were no organized political parties and the 16 candidates who were elected won as independents and mostly had a tribal lineage. The tenure of the legislative council was set at 3 years, but an early election was held in June 1931 due to lack of fruitful deliberations. The second legislative council served its full term until the next election held in October 1934. After the fourth election held in October 1937, the tenure of the parliament was extended by 2 more years, largely due to political crisis and violence in the neighboring Mandate Palestine. Amidst the Second World War, election was held in October 1942, and as before, its tenure was extended until 1947. The first parliamentary election after independence in 1946 was held in October 1947 (The Jordanian Parliament, 2017).
The dynamics changed in the April 1950 election as a result of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the 1948 War. A large Palestinian population gained voting rights due to the Jordanian capture (1948) and annexation (1950) of the West Bank. This was the first time when some candidates disclosed their affiliation to political parties, but none could be elected due to electoral manipulation from the palace. Fresh elections were held in August 1951, partly due to the uncertainties following the assassination of the founder monarch Abdullah I by a Palestinian on 20 July. As a reconciliatory move, some candidates affiliated with the Jordanian Communist Party, Ba’ath Party, Arab Constitutional Party, and Umma Party were allowed to win.
A new constitution was adopted in 1952 leading to the introduction of a bicameral council comprising the Senate (Majlis Al-Aayan) and House of Deputies (Majlis Al-Nuwaab). However, due to political fault lines and electoral gerrymandering, over time, there were frequent changes and modifications in the electoral laws and the strength of the parliament kept changing (Table 1). Often the number of electoral districts was changed and ranged between 20 and 45. Likewise, the number of seats in the parliament underwent drastic changes; in the pre-independent years, it stood at 16, was raised to 40 in 1952, increased to 80 in 1989, and was raised to 110 during the 2000s (Figure 1). It went up to 150 in 2013 but was brought down to 130 in 2016. Political considerations and not demographic shifts appear to be the prime motivating factor for the fluctuation in the size of the parliament (Obeidat, 2015). As of 2016, the Senate comprises 65 nominated members while the lower house has 130 seats, out of which 115 are elected and the remaining 15, reserved for women, are chosen to represent each of the 12 governorates and 3 Badia districts (IPU, 2016).
Notwithstanding the frequent changes, the Islamists and pro-monarchy liberals have dominated the electoral scene either as independents or when allowed as part of a political formations. For example, in the 1954 elections, both Umma Party and Liberal Party won one seat each and rest of the 38 seats were taken by the independents (Nohlen et al., 2001). Subsequently, elections were held in October 1956, and for the first time, political parties fared well. The National Socialist Party emerged as the largest block with 11 seats. Another 11 seats were won by independent candidates, while the Arab Constitutional Party won eight, Muslim Brotherhood got four and Ba’ath Party and Liberal Party won one seat each (ibid.). This was the first time when Muslim Brotherhood contested the elections.
In the elections held between 1961 and 1989, political parties were banned, and the contestants ran as independent candidates. The proscription of political parties can be attributed to a host of reasons including the rising influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and his pan-Arab appeal and popularity; Arab Cold War between republican and monarchical regimes; spate of assassination attempts against King Hussein; Arab military defeat in the June War of 1967; Jordan losing the West Bank to Israel; and Palestinian efforts to overthrow the Hashemite rule and resultant Black September massacre of September 1970 (Shlaim, 2007).
Indeed, November 1989 is marked as a turning point in the history of elections in Jordan and often recognized as the harbinger of multi-party electoral process. The election took place against the backdrop of the First Intifada and the subsequent Jordanian “disengagement” from the West Bank on 31 July 1988. The Muslim Brotherhood won 22 out of the 80 seats in the House of Deputies and emerged as the largest bloc. The voter turnout also improved and reached 53.1 percent (Table 2). It is regarded as the most important election in Jordanian history as the 22 years’ proscription on political parties was lifted and candidates were allowed to campaign independently (The Jordanian Parliament, 2017).
Election Results, 1989–2016
According to a Freedom House report: “In 1989, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan launched the Arab World’s most promising experiment in political liberalization and reform. A well-educated professional class, a history of political participation, and a cooperative Islamist movement all gave Jordan a comparative advantage in expanding rights and inclusion” (Moore, 2006, p. 215).
Since 1989, each election for the lower house of the parliament has been held under a new electoral law, which suggests that Jordan is in a trial-and-error mode in evolving a monarchy-led democracy (Gastoutor, 2016). The election held in November 1993 witnessed the emergence of the IAF—the political wing of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Founded on 8 December 1992, the IAF won 17 out of the 80 seats and emerged as the largest party (Table 3). There was also a marginal improvement in the voter turnout which reached 54 percent (Table 2). However, an overwhelming majority of 60 seats went in favor of independent candidates while the Jordanian Democratic People’s Party, Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, and Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party won one seat each.
IAF and Jordanian Parliamentary Elections
Major parties including the IAF boycotted the November 1997 elections due to the introduction of “one-person-one-vote” electoral system, which according to them was biased and favored the tribal population loyal to the monarchy. Hence, independents won 75 out of 80 seats. Meanwhile, partly to pacify the IAF and induce its participation, a new Election Law was introduced in 2003 whereby the electoral districts were increased from 20 to 45. In a significant move toward improving female participation, for the first time, six seats were reserved for women. Similar measures were taken toward the religious minorities; thus, nine seats were reserved for Christians and three for Chechens and Circassians (Table 1). To accommodate these measures, the strength of the House of Deputies was raised from 80 to 110. However, despite criticisms, the “one-person-one-vote” system was retained. The changes in the election laws did not affect the outcome as independents won a majority 88 seats followed by IAF which won 16 seats. The most significant aspect of the elections was the turnout which reached 58 percent, the highest in the Jordanian history (Table 2).
The following election held in 2007 witnessed a significant departure in terms of participation of women, especially the number of women candidates. Out of the total 885 candidates who contested for the elections, 199 were women, that is, 22.4 percent of the total candidates, and this was four times more than the previous election (BBC, 2007). Even though the IAF boycotted the 2010 election alleging discrimination, seven IAF members defied the boycott to contest as independents, albeit unsuccessfully (Hussein, 2010). The IAF took disciplinary measures against them leading to their expulsion. While the voter turnout stood at 53 percent, for the first time, about 250 international observers were invited to observe the elections (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2016). The Washington-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) reported that 2010 elections were a “clear improvement” from the earlier ones held in 2007 (National Democratic Institute [NDI], 2013).
Amidst the widespread popular protest in many Arab countries, the next elections were advanced to January 2013. Prior to this, a new electoral law was passed which allowed the voters to cast two ballots, one for the candidate in their constituency and one for the party lists under proportional representation (BBC, 2012). In addition, the total number of seats was increased to 150 out of which the number of seats for political parties under the list system was raised from 17 to 27. The women quota stayed at 15 and the remaining 108 legislatures were directly elected under the “first-past-the-post” system (BBC, 2013). An Independent Election Commission (IEC) was also established in 2013 (NDI, 2013). After the dissolution of parliament in May 2016, a new electoral law was passed, and “one-person-one-vote” system was replaced by proportional representation; hence, the September 2016 election was the first when proportional representation system was followed after 1989 and number of seats in House of Deputies was reduced to 130 (IEC, n.d.). Voter turnout was lowest in the Jordanian electoral history (The Jordan Times, 2016).
Demographic Fault Line
Jordan’s road to democratization has not been smooth and has been hampered by wars, internal turmoil, and the influx of waves of refugees from the neighboring countries. Shortly after gaining independence from Britain in May 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom was dragged into the Arab–Israeli conflict. The territorial ambitions of King Abdullah I, the first Hashemite monarch, led Transjordan (renamed Jordan in 1949) to capture and subsequently annex the West Bank (Gallets, 2015). Resultantly, Jordan accepted a large Palestinian refugee population and granted them citizenship.
As most Palestinian refugees were granted citizenship after the annexation of the West Bank, Jordan underwent a demographic shift in favor of the Palestinians thereby creating a major fault line. While Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel during the June War of 1967, it was burdened with a large Palestinian population who held Jordanian passports or residency permits. King Hussein’s formal renunciation of Jordanian claims to the West Bank in July 1988 did not resolve the demographic dilemma facing the Kingdom. Since then, the demographic divide between the Jordanians of Palestinian origin (West Bankers) and Jordanians of Transjordanian origin (East Bankers) has become a major source of sociopolitical competition and friction. The Black September massacre of 1970 also left a lasting impact upon the Hashemites regarding the motives and intensions of the Palestinian leadership, especially the Palestine Liberation Organization (Gallets, 2015; Squire, 2013).
After 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, the Hashemite leadership at first sought to lower the influence of Jordanians of Palestinian origin by giving them meager representation in parliament. The monarchy counterbalanced this representation by leveraging the tribes and the manipulation of the boundaries of the electoral districts (Ryan, 2012). In addition, it introduced “one-person-one-vote” electoral system prior to 1993 elections. Though regarded as the most democratized form of election, this arrangement came under criticism as in the Jordanian context it meant discrimination as it granted larger representation to electoral districts with a smaller population. In other words, when given a chance to vote for only one person, people tend to vote for their kith and kin owing to tribal loyalty.
The gerrymandering favored the tribal inhabited rural areas over the urban centers which have a large Palestinian population (Freedom House Report, 2012). Though Palestinian held senior positions in the government including the prime minister (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2017), the one-person-one-vote system resulted in the West Bankers contending a second-class status. There was criticism that they are not favored in public sector jobs while the East Bankers are preferred solely on the basis of their ethnicity and hence the demand for equal representation for Jordanians of Palestinian origin (Christopherson, 2013; Rowland, 2009; Ryan, 2012). Though politically marginal, the Palestinians made a mark after economic liberalization as private businesses flourished among the West Bankers (Christopherson, 2013; Gallets, 2015). This in turn led to a feeling of disadvantage and insecurity among the East Bankers, and hence, both sides demanded free and fair elections.
The Election of 2016
The 2016 election is important when seen in the context of the regional turmoil; the mass upsurge, state repression, and violent rebellions in many Arab countries; democratic backsliding especially in Egypt; and most importantly the rise of Jihadi terrorism that threaten regional stability and state integrity in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Though the demand for political and economic reforms also resonated in Jordan, the country did not descend into turmoil due to the cautious handling by the monarchy. In 2016, however, the situation in Jordan remains fragile due to demographic fault lines, demands for political reforms, dwindling economic growth, and the influx of a large number of refugees from neighboring countries. For decades, Jordan has been grappling with a huge number of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, and the turmoil in Syria had a huge negative impact on the Jordanian economy. Tension in the Palestinian territories over the vexed peace process, political instability in Egypt, regional tension over Iran–Saudi rivalry, falling oil prices and hence a drop in economic aid to Jordan from oil-rich Arab countries, and threats posed by ISIS and its supporters within the country have severely undermined Jordanian polity. Taking these into consideration, the Jordanian election acquires manifold significance.
The domestic context of conducting an early election was to seek a fresh mandate after announcement of the changes in the electoral law in May 2016. According to the new law, the electoral system was changed to proportional representation; electoral districts were reduced to 23 from 45; and adult suffrage was lowered to 17 years to accommodate more voters. The King dissolved the lower house of the parliament on 29 May 2016, after the resignation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, who had been in office since October 2012. Hence, elections took place within a span of 3 years after the previous one (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
Key Issues
There was, however, no significant change in key issues and actors as far as the Jordanian electoral process is concerned. Since the advent of liberalization and privatization that threatened Jordanians mostly the East Bankers, the tribal loyalists of the crown feared that the welfare mechanism would be withdrawn. There were periodic protests regarding the privatization and in April 1989, anger over the failure of the state rentierism exploded into riots. In order to pacify the population, to soften the blow of economic cutbacks as demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and to ensure nominal representation for them in the decision-making process, the regime decided to liberalize the political system (Rowland, 2009). It was under these circumstances the first multi-party elections were held in November 1989.
In 2016, like in previous elections, the popular demands were economic in nature, were mostly localized, and hence were favorable to tribes. A weak economy, rising prices, administrative and financial corruption, poverty, and unemployment have emerged as the major political issues and resonated in the elections (International Republican Institute [IRI], 2016). According to the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI), the government was set to increase taxes on some goods to help reduce a spiraling budget deficit. In November 2016, gas prices went up by more than 6 percent, with part of the increase to be used to help narrow the deficit.
An opinion poll conducted by IRI in 2014 revealed that about 61 percent of the people surveyed favored stability and security in the country than other indicators; 36 percent felt that Jordan was going in the wrong direction because of high prices, corruption (14 percent) and poor economic conditions (12 percent). The Syrian refugee crisis (Kumaraswamy and Singh, 2016) has also become one of the fears in the mind of the Jordanians and 13 percent of the respondents cited it as the single biggest problem facing the country in 2013, and this figure rose to 30 percent in 2017. More than two out of five Jordanians (43 percent in 2013 which increased to 53 percent in 2017) support closing the borders to Syrian refugees, while nearly a third (32 percent) agreed with limiting the number of refugees. Overall, Jordanians believe that the influx of Syrian refugees has significantly affected real estate prices, job opportunities for Jordanians, and the quality of public services (IRI, 2016, 2017).
Voters’ Choice
Despite these issues resonating in the public discussions, a majority of the voters tend to cast their ballots based on familial, tribal, ethnic ties, or for local development. As a result, nationalistic feeling appears to be missing. A survey conducted by Phenix Center for Economics and Informatics Studies revealed various reasons for the respondents for voting and for not voting (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2 suggests that around 32.6 percent of the respondents favored their relatives or tribal members, while 24.8 percent voted for candidate because of shared views. While Figure 3 reveals that 30.5 percent of the people were dissatisfied with the performance of the elected representatives of the previous parliament and hence did not want to go for polls, and 25.7 percent cited lack of trust in the electoral process for not wanting to vote. In an IRI poll conducted in April 2016, 87 percent of 1000 respondents said the outgoing parliament did not accomplish anything worthwhile and more than half said they were somewhat or very unlikely to vote.
Hence, in the Jordanian case, political agenda is not an important factor. The parties have more or less tended to adopt the same set of issues while individual candidates come up with localized agendas. For instance, during 2016 elections, a debate among candidates belonging to nine party’s candidates rarely went beyond generalities such as calls for lowering unemployment, eradicating and addressing corruption, and educational and economic reforms. Only one of the candidates from Ma’an list, Mohammed Numan, campaigned for separation of state and religion (IRI, 2016).
Key Actors
Tribes
Tribes form the backbone of the Jordanian society and polity. Making up about 40–57 percent of the population (Rowland, 2009), they are staunch allies of the Hashemite monarchy and the latter heavily depend upon their loyalties. This has its legacy since the formation of Transjordan when Abdullah I befriended and unified warring tribes in the new emirate. This was possible because of Emir’s Hashemite descent and through co-opting the tribesmen into the Jordanian army and, finally, through securing public British guarantees of military support for the Transjordanian army (Muhammad, 1999, p. 13). Transjordanian tribes who were mostly nomadic and seminomadic were brought into mainstream and were promised good positions in the government (Muhammad, 1999, p. 14). Hence, they are one of the main actors in the Jordanian elections, and through gerrymandering of constituencies, they are always over-represented in the elections. This is apparent by the fact that the regions where they are in good numbers have more number of seats than the urban areas where the Palestinians are demographically dominant (Table 4).
Gerrymandering in Jordanian Elections through Allocation of Seats, 2016
The favoritism is visible in the demarcation of tribal areas as three separate Badia districts, namely, northern, central, and southern districts. These new districts were carved out of Mafraq governorate which had a total population of 549,948. Out of these 346,262 people reside in the Badia region, the number of seats allocated for this region is 12 (the three electoral districts getting four seats each) while the other half of Mafraq governorate with a population of 203,686 got only five seats. Moreover, only “nomadic” (specifically Bedouins) and “seminomadic” tribes reside in the Badia region, whereas the “sedentary” and “semi-sedentary” tribes reside in the urban areas and their actual number is difficult to estimate, but they are also favored when it comes to politics (Muhammad, 1999). For example, in 2008, Jordan Center for Social Research conducted an exit poll which suggested that many tribes in the urban areas contested against each other in 2007 parliamentary elections. Some of them are as follows:
In Amman fourth District, there were four “Hadeed” and three “Huneity” candidates competing.
In Amman sixth District, there were seven “Abbadi/Manasir.”
In Amman seventh District, there were six “Ajramis.”
In Irbid fifth District, there were eight “Obaidat,” seven “Malkawis,” and three “Rousans.”
In Irbid eighth District, there were four “Alawnehs” and three “Qur’aans.”
In Irbid ninth District, there were three “Azzams.”
In Zarqa second District, there were nine “Zawahrehs,” ten “Khalylehs,” and three “Ghweiris.”
In BeduWasat District, there were six Al Fayez’, four “Khraishas,” and four “J’bours” (Jordan Center for Social Research, 2008, p. 16).
Therefore, since the first elections held in 1929 independent candidates, mostly tribes, have been the principal winners in Jordan. The condition only slightly changed due to introduction of multi-party elections and the tribal domination continues. The recent election only vindicates this pattern and independents have won 95 out of the 130 seats or 73 percent of the seats (The Jordan Times, 2016).
Minorities
Granting of a fair representation of all the actors of the society especially of minorities is essential for a successful democratic process. In the Jordanian context, minorities are represented to such an extent that sometimes the monarchy is accused of giving a disproportionally higher number of seats to them because of their support and loyalty (The Jordan Times, 2016). Reserving a fixed number of seats for them began in 2003 and has been an abiding feature of the Jordanian elections. Even though the total number of seats in parliament has changed, seats reserved for the minorities remained static. Nine seats are reserved for Christians and three for Circassians and Chechens combined. If one looks at the size of the minorities, it is obvious that they are over-represented. For example, Christians constitute only 3–6 percent of the population (Department of Statistics [DoS], 2015; Independent Election Commission, n.d.) but, nine seats are reserved for them. Same holds true for Circassians and Chechens who together constitute less than 1 percent but have three seats in the parliament (Department of Statistics, 2015; Obeidat, 2016). Minorities are mostly located in the urban areas but are scattered (Table 5).
Number of Seats for Minorities in 2016 Elections and Their Spatial Location
IAF
As of 2016, Jordan has 31 recognized political parties which were founded over time and the IAF remains the most organized party in the country (The Jordan Times, 2016). Since its founding on 8 December 1992, the IAF had boycotted three parliament elections held in 1997, 2010, and 2013 and when contesting it also secured the maximum number of seats after independent candidates. In 2016, it joined hands with Christians and prominent national figures and formed the National Coalition for Reform (NCR) which won 15 seats, including 10 seats won by the IAF (Al-Khalidi, 2016a,b). This was far less than its electoral victories in 1993 and 2003 when the IAF fought alone and won 17 and 16 seats, respectively (Table 3).
Since the 1989 election, the Muslim Brotherhood has been active and co-opted by the monarchy. Though members of the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the first multi-party election held in 1989 and in 1992, the IAF was formed as the political wing of the movement with a membership strength of 350 (Shahzad, 2003). The IAF has enjoyed widespread support among the Jordanians of Palestinian origin as well as from the Palestinian refugees. Since the signing of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty in October 1994, the IAF has emerged as the principal force in the Anti-normalization campaign (Christopherson, 2013).
Though legal in the country, the electoral participation of the IAF has been uneven. The party has boycotted the parliamentary elections held in 1997, 2010, and 2013. Initially, the Palace-Brotherhood relationship was symbiotic to the extent that they were allowed to “fill the vacuum in the Palestinian camps and urban centers when the Palestinian factions were expelled after Black September in 1970” (Christopherson, 2013, p. 8). Permitted to build an extensive social support base, particularly among the Palestinian population, the Brotherhood secured a solid bloc in 1989 but as a protest against a new election law which they saw as a step away from democratization, the IAF decided to boycott the 1997 elections. In order to not withdraw completely from the political process, it participated in the next two elections held in 2003 and 2007 but its relations with the regime deteriorated primarily due to its support for the militant Palestinian movement Hamas as well as due to internal divisions and terrorist attacks on two Amman hotels in 2005 (Christopherson, 2013). The decision to boycott the elections in both 2010 and 2013 was again related to the one-person-one-vote election law, which limited the opposition’s ability to have a representation in parliament (Bank, 2011).
Prior to the recent election, in November 2015, the party split into two with reformists and non-reformists blocks. Seven members who called themselves as reformists left the party and joined National Initiative for Building (Zamzam) or Muslim Brotherhood Society, a new political party (The Jordan Times, 2015). With the change in the election law and return of the proportional representation system, the IAF decided to contest the 2016 elections. Pre-election surveys predicted at least 20 seats for the party but it could manage to get only 10 seats (The Jordan Times, 2016) (Table 3).
The participation of IAF in the Jordanian electoral system is critical because it is more liberal than the Islamist parties in some other countries. For example, they recognize democracy, pluralism, tolerance of other religions, and women’s rights as key to Jordan’s development process and do not support extreme revolutionary movements (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2013/2014). This is in contrast to Islamists in Kuwait (opposing voting rights to women) or Hezbollah in Lebanon (maintaining an independent militant force outside the state system). Out of 76 prime ministers who have served Transjordan and later Jordan nine have known Palestinian descent. They are as follows: Ibrahim Hashem, Tawfik Abu Al-Huda, Samir Al-Rifai, Husayn Al-Khalidi, Abdelmunim Al-Rifai, Mohammad Al-Abbasi, Ahmad Toukan, Kassim al-Rimawi, and Taher al-Masri. 1 They have served almost all the rulers of Jordan from Abdullah I to Abdullah II and have had multiple terms of service in the country (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2017).
Women
The participation of women in parliament is a key imperative for Jordan’s democratic development. Women’s participation in political decision-making is important for establishing a parliament that represents every section of the society. In Jordan, this understanding was acknowledged when a quota for female parliamentarians was introduced in 2003 allocating six seats for them and this was gradually increased to 15. However, after more than a decade, the representation of women is still weak. In 2013, out of 823 candidates who took part in the election, only 85 were women and this increased marginally in 2016 and out of 1,252 candidates, 252 were women.
An exit poll conducted by Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies in 2016 revealed that female voters were more enthusiastic about voting in the 2016 elections. Male voters “intending” to vote stood at 36.9 percent, whereas about 41 percent of the females “intended” to vote while 36.7 percent did not want to go for polls and 22.3 percent were “undecided” (Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, 2016).
According to Mona Christopherson, women have never had high chances of winning parliamentary seats in Jordan particularly under the one-person-one-vote electoral system wherein voters are supposed to vote for only one candidate and therefore they do not intend to use it on a woman because of socio-traditional prejudices and stereotyping regarding women. Because of this situation, women quota was introduced in 2003 and gradually the number was increased and distributed among different governorates. Currently, there is one female representative from each governorate as well as from the three Bedouin electoral districts called as Badia (Christopherson, 2013, p. 10). In the 2007 and 2010 elections, one female candidate made it to parliament outside the quota; whereas in 2013, three women won seats in direct competition with men, thereby raising the number of female representatives to 18 out of 150. In 2016, five women won beyond quota which increased the number to 20 in the 130-member House of Deputies.
Female candidates face several challenges, one of them being a lack of financial resources to run the election campaign as the campaign cost has been rising. The candidates have to pay to register their candidacy and have to secure funds for campaign material and staff. Social and religious restraints also play an important role in women’s ability to play a political and decision-making role in society. For example, a Fafo study conducted in 1998 found that one-third of Jordanian men did not support the giving of decision-making positions to women (Al Sharif, 2016). In 2016 elections, however, women were applauded for their work and most of them contested on the IAF list. This suggests their acceptance by the Islamist parties as well. Moreover, they appeared in all but six of the 216 party lists that took part in the election.
The new election law formulated in May 2016 was criticized by women’s associations for allocating only three out of 15 quota seats, to the country’s most populace governorates—Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid—raising further questions over gerrymandering that favored tribal districts at the expense of the capital, where nearly half of the eligible voters live. In all, 252 women contested and received a total of 266,000 votes, which is considered a new record for women in the Jordanian elections. On the other hand, only 32 percent of eligible female voters cast their vote while earlier in a Phenix Centre for Economic and Informatics Studies poll 41 percent women “intended” to vote as opposed to 36.9 percent of eligible men (Cuthbert, 2016; Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, 2016). Nevertheless, in terms of female representation in parliament, Jordan still lags behind other countries in the region, ranking 13 in the Arab world and 141 globally (DoS, 2015).
There are areas of decision-making like politics and law which have been discriminatory against women, and though the situation is marginally changing in recent years still much is to be done. If one takes a glance at the available statistics, only 18.9 percent of Jordanian women are judges and 23.7 percent are lawyers and in these two areas, there is a gender gap of 62.1 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively (Dos, 2015). With a gender gap is 64.2 percent in parliament, the cabinet is represented by only 17.9 percent females. Only 12 percent women are represented in both the houses of parliament. Local councils and labor unions are represented by only 27.8 and 21 percent women, respectively. Diplomatic corps has only 19.9 percent females while there are only 10.9 percent female ambassadors (Administrative Records from the Concerned Authorities, 2015; DoS, 2015).
Parliamentary Elections in 2016: Mixed Results
Under the new electoral law introduced in May 2016, the country was divided into 23 electoral districts, out of which Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa governorates were divided in five, four and two electoral districts, respectively. A total number of seats was reduced from 150 to 130 without any explanation or demographic logic. As Table 6 indicates, gerrymandering is relevant in Jordan. Urban centers witnessed intense competition than rural ones. For example, for 29 seats in Amman 356 candidates had contested, whereas for Badia region, 106 contested for the 12 seats (Table 6). Moreover, only 6 percent of the lists were affiliated with a specific political party, 11 percent had some party representatives, 39 percent were independents and 43 percent are based on tribal affiliations (IRI, 2016).
List of Electoral Districts, Seats, Electoral Lists and Number of Candidates
The September 2016 election reflects the complexity of the Jordanian society and its multiple and often competing identities. Tribal groups which form the backbone of the Hashemite power have been principle gainers in the elections and the 2016 elections was not an exception.
The most significant outcome has been the participation of the IAF which is considered essential for the legitimacy of the electoral process. Seen in this narrow context, the parliamentary election was a success. However, the IAF-led bloc, National Coalition for Reform (NCR) could win only 15 seats in the 130-member house, including 10 secured by the IAF. Eight other political parties—Zamzam (five), National Current (four), Islamic Centrist Part (five) and Justice and Reform Party (two)—together won 20 seats. The Ba’ath, Communists, National Union, and Al Awn lists have won one seat each (Table 7). The remaining 95 seats were won by independents mostly, belonging to tribes or minorities.
2016 Election Results
Though the IAF is the largest bloc in the new parliament, its ability to play a key role in the government formation depends upon the level of support it receives from various like-minded blocs and individuals. Partly with this in mind, the IAF had fielded Christians and women on its list and one from each group had won their seats (Singh, 2016; The Jordan Times, 2016). According to Oraib Rantawi, Jordan’s newly elected parliament is unlikely to lead to any political change because opposition forces remain a small minority in the parliament and challenged by conservative pro-government MPs. The majority of the newly elected lawmakers were either individuals with tribal affiliations or businessmen, as had been the case during the past two decades (Abuqudairi, 2016; Al Arabiya, 2016). Although the IAF is considered to be the largest party in terms of representation in the newly elected parliament, the group’s ability to pass new laws or revoke confidence in the government would be limited. Stronger blocs would emerge to strip the Islamists of the power to pass on new laws and policies (Abuqudairi, 2016).
International monitors who observed the elections declared it to be free and fair and it largely passed off without violence. At the same time, the voter apathy was palpable. Partly to encourage young voters, the voting age was reduced from 18 to 17 but out of the 4.1 million eligible voters only 1.5 million or 36 percent cast their ballot. This was a significant drop from the 58 percent voter turnout witnessed in 2013 elections despite the boycotted by the IAF. The apathy appears to be widespread and more pronounced among the youth. Despite the changes in the electoral laws which induced the participation of the IAF, the turnout has dropped to a historical low, which is indeed a matter of concern and raises serious questions about the democratic process. The election saw fair representation of women candidates.
Therefore, what could be the probable explanation for the voter apathy and lowest turnout? One could offer a few explanations.
Jordanians of Palestinian origin are no longer attracted toward the ideologies of IAF (Masalha & Hamid, 2017).
Elections do not address the real issues facing Jordanian citizens (Dekel & Parvol, 2013; IRI, 2016; Magid, 2016).
Citizens have lost trust in the electoral process (Magid, 2016).
Citizens do not feel that elections would bring any change (IRI, 2016).
A survey conducted in 2016 revealed that about 43 percent of the youth between ages of 17–30 years did not intend to vote (Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies). Observers identified continuing economic crisis and growing unemployment as the principle reasons. At the same time, the victory of a number of local lists indicates that the Jordanians are still preoccupied with issues of local governance than larger issues facing the country.
Conclusion
Elections in Jordan are a complex phenomenon and should be seen within the context of the formation of the state which legitimizes its support for and favoritism toward the Bedouins as they are regarded as the loyalists to the crown. However, the changes observed in every election suggest that Jordan recognizes the democratic values and wants to incorporate the same through political reforms. This is often indicated by the frequent change of electoral laws and system to accommodate as much actors in the society as possible. In this context, 2016 elections could be seen as a limited success because it accommodated most of the actors, namely, Islamists, women, minorities, independents, and tribes. However, the low voter turnout puts a question mark as about the apathy among voters. The reasons could vary from distrust in IAF; the Jordanians of Palestinian origin not wanting to point out the flaws in elections as they do not see any fair results; loss of interest in elections; or election agendas not being in congruent with the demands of Jordanians which are mostly economic in nature.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article is a part of the project on “Elections and Democratization in the Arab World” supported by Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and the author acknowledges the support from the University.
1.
Ibrahim Hashem served as Prime Minister (from October 1933 to September 1938, May 1945 to February 1947, December 1955 to January 1956, July 1956 to October 1956, April 1957 to May 1958), Tawfik Abu Al-Huda (from September 1938 to October 1944, December 1947 to April 1950, July 1951 to May 1953, May 1954 to May 1955), Samir Al-Rifaifrom (from October 1944 to May 1945, February 1947 to December 1947, December 1950 to July 1951, January 1956 to May 1956, May 1958 to May 1959, March 1963 to April 1963), Husayn Al-Khalidi (from 15 April 1957 to 27 April 1957), Abdelmunim Al-Rifai (from March 1969 to August 1969, June 1970 to September 1970), Mohammad Al-Abbasi (from 16 September 1970 to 26 September 1970), Ahmad Toukan (from 26 September 1970 to 28 October 1970), Kassim al-Rimawi (from July 1980 to August 1980), and Taher al-Masri (from June 1991 to November 1991).