Abstract
Simmering intra-Gulf tension exploded on 5 June 2017 when some Arab countries accused Qatar of collaborating with terrorism and undermining their internal stability through the Al-Jazeera network. Led by Saudi Arabia, for the second time in three years, Bahrain and the UAE broke off diplomatic relations with Doha. While Oman continued to stay out, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah emerged as the key mediator. Unlike the past, the Saudi-led move was followed by a similar action by Yemen, Mauritania, Maldives, and Libya, while Jordan downgraded its ties with Qatar. On 10 June, they came out with a list of 59 individuals and 12 groups whom, they accused, were supported by the emirate. This was followed by a list of 13 demands on 12 July with a 10-day deadline to “mend” the fences. A spate of accusations and counter-accusations ensued and the lack of clarity from Washington only made matters worse.
Intra-Arab tension is neither new nor unprecedented. In 1965, American political scientist Malcolm H. Kerr used the expression “Arab Cold War” to depict the tension between Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and various Arab leaders. Indeed, political rivalry between the republican regimes represented by Nasser and Arab monarchies precipitated into the June war of 1967, often seen as the burial ground for secular Arab nationalism. The region has been grappling with political differences, ideological disagreements, power struggle, and hegemonic ambitions. Most often, they were glossed over by other issues such as the Arab–Israeli conflict or the Arab fears vis-à-vis Iran.
The Qatari crisis highlights not only trust deficit among key players but also the absence of a regional arrangement for settling political differences. With the Arab League and the Gulf remaining passive onlookers, the region had to look to the outside world to resolve the crisis. The Trump administration still struggling to shoulder the responsibility commensurate with a global power, the crisis lingers on.
On the positive side, the Islamic State’s last stronghold in Mosul, Iraq had fallen to the Iraqi forces on 10 July 2017 and in line with its attitude toward Islamic and non-Islamic holy sites, the retreating ISIS forces had destroyed the Grand Mosque of Mosul, more popularly known as Nouri mosque. It is, however, too early to claim “victory” over the extremist forces. Unless the military victory is followed by a political campaign against religious extremism and radicalism of different hues, it is only a question of time that the ISIS is resurrected under a different name and an even more radical leader.
As expected, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s stand-alone visit to Israel in early July attracted considerable media attention not only in both the countries but also in different parts of the world. His decision to skip Ramallah during the visit did not go unnoticed. However, contrary to pre-visit media hype, there was no announcement of any big-ticket military deals and Prime Ministers Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu were keen in establishing a good personal rapport conducive for future cooperation. The expected visit of Israeli Prime Minister to India in the coming months would see the fruits of Modi’s historic visit to Israel.