From Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Putin: Has Moscow’s Policy in the Middle East Come Full Circle?

Communist Ideology and Communist Parties as Negative Factors

Perhaps, the most important difference between Putin’s policies and those of his Soviet predecessors is that Communist ideology no longer plays a role in the formulation of Moscow’s policies in the Middle East. While some Western observers of the Soviet Union have downplayed the importance of Communist ideology in Soviet policy-making, it should be remembered that the regime itself was legitimized on the basis of Communist ideology, and when that ideology eroded during the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union collapsed (Kaiser, 1991). In addition, as part of its Communist ideology the Soviet leadership supported Communist parties throughout the Middle East. On balance, one could argue that such parties were net liabilities to Moscow’s dealings with nationalist leaders in the region who were suspicious of the Communist parties because of the potential threat such parties posed to them.

In addition, Moscow’s felt need to champion the Communist parties led to a clash between Khrushchev and Egypt’s Gamal Nasser who banned the Egyptian Communist party, and who forced Khalid Bakdash, the leader of the Syrian Communist party into exile when Egypt and Syria unified into the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Similarly, friction over the Sudanese Communist party was a factor in the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat in 1971 (Freedman, 1982, p. 62). In addition, it should be pointed out that Middle-Eastern leaders were not above manipulating the USSR using their Communist parties to entice Moscow to give them economic aid and political support as when, following the Left-wing Ba’athist coup in Syria in 1966, the Syrian Ba’athist leader, Salah Jedid invited Bakdash to return from exile and appointed a Syrian Communist to a cabinet post (ibid., p. 26). Finally, it should also be noted that the atheistic component of Communist ideology was a barrier to close relations between Moscow and such Islamic conservative countries as Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Iran whose leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, advised Gorbachev to drop Communism and convert Russia to Islam.

Russia and Israel

A second major difference between the Soviet and post-Soviet eras lies in Russia’s relations with the State of Israel. Under the USSR, diplomatic relations were established with Israel in 1948 and Moscow gave the newly established Jewish State both military aid (via Czechoslovakia) and diplomatic support during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949. During his paranoid period in 1952, Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, but they were restored in 1953 after Stalin’s death. During 1953–1967 period, diplomatic relations between the two countries were complicated both by the USSR’s support to Israel’s enemies, such as Egypt and Syria, and by Israel’s pressing the USSR to allow its Jewish population to emigrate to Israel (Govrin, 1990). In 1967, relations were broken by Moscow during the June War as Israel defeated Soviet allies Egypt and Syria as well as Jordan, and they were not fully restored until the end of the Gorbachev era in 1991, although beginning in 1989, Gorbachev allowed the mass emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. Under Yeltsin, the Russian–Israeli relations improved but they were not fully developed until Putin came to power (Freedman, 2014).

Under Putin, the first leader of either the Soviet Union or Russia to visit Israel, bilateral relations blossomed. Jewish emigration to Israel continued to flow (as it had under Yeltsin) and was now joined by non-Jewish Russian tourists who found the atmosphere conducive to their visits, with Russian Orthodox churches, especially in Jerusalem, and Russian language newspapers and television stations available throughout Israel. Indeed, before the Russian economic downturn of 2014, some 600,000 Russian tourists visited Israel. Military cooperation, which had begun under Yeltsin, developed further as Israel sold Russia a drone system following the poor performance of Russian-made drones in its 2008 war with Georgia, cultural ties deepened, and trade increased to over three billion dollars annually (more than Russia’s trade with Iran) as Moscow developed a major Interest in Israeli high-tech products. Then, when Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made frequent visits to Russia to ensure that the Israeli air force would have freedom of movement through the skies of Syria—now defended in large part by Russian SAM-400 and SAM-3000 air defense systems—to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from establishing military positions near the Golan Heights and to prevent Iranian weapons convoys from getting to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

All was not halcyon, however, in the Russian–Israeli relationship. While bilateral relations were very good, Moscow’s regional policies, especially its support for Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas—all of which were dedicated to Israel’s destruction—were highly problematic for Israel. Overall, however, Russian–Israeli relations under Putin were far better than Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union had been.

Saudi Arabia: New Friend?

Another major change from Soviet times was the improvement of Moscow’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Putin had a number of goals he wished to achieve with the Saudis. Initially, as the war raged in Chechnya, he sought to cut-off Saudi funding to the Chechen and other Islamic rebels in the Caucasus. In a related move Putin sought to demonstrate Moscow’s respect for Islam by condemning what he termed were the anti-Islamic Charlie Hebdo cartoons and by having Russia join the Islamic Conference with observer status (Kozhanov, 2016). Putin also sought to exploit Saudi Arabia’s unhappiness with the USA over its invasion of Iraq because that allowed the majority Shia in Iraq to take power from the Sunnis. As relations improved, Putin made a visit to Saudi Arabia in 2007, the first Russian leader to do so, seeking investments in the Russian economy, and both before and after the visit he agreed to limited sanctions against Iran, which was Saudi Arabia’s main adversary in the Middle East (Freedman, 2001a).

Relations were to deteriorate in 2011 after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, with Moscow backing the Assad regime and Saudi Arabia the Sunni opposition. Several developments during the war, however, were to ameliorate Russian–Saudi relations. First, US President Barack Obama appeared to the Saudis to tilt to Iran in the Saudi–Iranian conflict, a feeling reinforced by the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran in July 2015. Second, several months after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Russia intervened militarily in Syria to prop up the seriously weakened regime of Bashar Assad. By late 2016 Russia, with the help of Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shia militias had turned the tide of the war. By now King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had died, to be replaced by King Salman, with Salman’s energetic son, Mohammed bin Salman (later the Crown Prince) playing an increasingly important role in the Saudi government and appearing to want a deal with Moscow. In addition, by late 2016, both Russia and Saudi Arabia faced the same problem—a sharp decline in oil prices which had fallen to below US$40 per barrel.

The two countries took the lead in convening a conference in October 2016 to cut oil production in order to raise prices. The effort was successful as by mid-November 2017 oil prices had risen to US$65 per barrel although part of the increase could be attributed to the conflict between the Iraqi government and its Kurdish minority. In addition, while the newly elected US President Donald Trump—and his strong anti-Iranian rhetoric—were warmly received in Riyadh, Trump’s “America First” discourse raised questions in Saudi Arabia as to whether the US could be trusted to protect Saudi Arabia against Iran.

Second, the Saudis had to be flabbergasted by the contradictions in the Trump Administration, especially over the Saudi-Qatar conflict, with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson calling for a mediated end to the conflict while Trump asserted that he strongly supported the Saudis. Under these circumstances, the Saudi leadership, and Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman in particular, seem to have desired what might be termed a “reinsurance policy” with Moscow, and Putin was only too happy to oblige. By the summer of 2017, it had become increasingly clear that the endgame of the war in Syria was in sight, and by drawing closer to Moscow, the Saudi leadership may have sought to influence the final outcome of the war.

Thus, in October 2017, King Salman journeyed to Moscow to seal the newly improved Russian–Saudi relationship. In addition to agreeing to closely consult on energy issues, and discussing the situation in Syria, the king signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase Russia’s sophisticated SAM-400 air defense system, along with anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and Kalashnikov rifles. The two countries also signed a one billion dollar agreement to jointly develop energy resources (cited in Isachenkov, 2017). Both sides gained from the warming of relations, but Russia appeared to gain more. By selling the SAM-400—assuming the deal goes through as the USA, following the announcement of the agreement, belatedly committed itself to sell the Saudis the THAAD anti-missile system—Putin got another customer for the sophisticated anti-missile system, one of the high-tech exports which the Russian leader had been pushing.

Moreover, by emphasizing the closeness of the Saudi–Russian relationship, Russia could demonstrate that it was not only close to the Shia alignment of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime and was hence more acceptable as a Middle East mediator. Finally, Putin may have hoped that with the visit of King Salman to Moscow, and the signing of numerous agreements, he had begun to drive a wedge between the USA and Saudi Arabia, thus weakening the Middle East position of the USA.

While the most important changes in Russian policy toward the Middle East were with Israel and Saudi Arabia, there were also significant changes in Moscow’s policy toward Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and Libya and these will be discussed below.

Iran: From Tactical to Strategic Allies?

In the case of Iran, during Soviet times relations were mixed. While Khomeini called the USSR the “Little Satan,” Moscow did sell arms to Tehran, including during the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–1988. Relations did not really improve until Yeltsin’s time, but even then they were uneven. Iran kept a low profile during Russia’s wars against the Moslem Chechens, and Moscow not only sold arms to Iran but also agreed to build a nuclear reactor for Tehran at Bushehr. However, under the Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995, Russia promised to end all arms shipments to Iran by 1999 and not to sign any new arms agreements. When Putin took office in 2000, one of his first acts was to abrogate the Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement and he signed additional arms sales agreements with Tehran.

Yet, there were problems in the Iranian–Russian relationship, especially during Putin’s first two terms (2000–2008) as Russia’s President. Moscow repeatedly delayed shipments of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor in an effort to get Iran to be more forthcoming about its nuclear program. For this reason, and to elicit support from the Sunni Arabs (refer to previous section), Moscow agreed to some mild sanctions on Iran in 2007. In addition, while Putin agreed to sell the SAM-300 anti-missile system to Iran, his successor as Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, suspended the sale as part of his effort to improve relations with the USA, which also included, for the first time, serious sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program (Freedman, 2011, p. 147).

The strained Russian–Iranian relationship was to change for the better with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war as both Putin, who returned to the Russian Presidency in 2012 and the Iranians strongly backed Syria, thus reinforcing their own relationship. At the same time Iran, perhaps because of memories of past Russian occupation of Iranian territory, did not support the Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine. However, Putin strongly backed Iran during the JCPOA negotiations, and even before the agreement was signed in July 2015, agreed to send a more advanced model the SAM-300 to Iran. It was not until Russia’s military intervention in Syria in the fall of 2015; however, that Russian–Iranian relations hit a new high as the two countries cooperated both on the battlefield and in diplomatic settings to aid the Assad regime. Iran allowed one of its airfields to be used by Russia to bomb Assad’s opponents, although Iran’s permission was withdrawn after the Russians made their use of the Iranian base public (Khimshiashvili, 2016).

Russia and Iran also entered into negotiations on a major weapons sale to include T-90 tanks and Sukhoi aircraft, although those weapons systems could not be delivered until UN sanctions were lifted in 2020 (Surkov, 2016). On the economic front, once the JCPOA agreement sanctions were lifted, Moscow appeared concerned that Iran would choose Western products over Russian ones. Indeed, Iran’s Rouhani’s government opted for Boeing and Airbus civilian aircraft rather than the Russian Sukhoi SSJ-1000 Super jet. This appears to be the reason that the original bilateral swap deal between Iran and Russia—500,000 barrels of oil per day in return for US$1.5 billion per month in Russian goods fell through (Bodner, 2017).

However, with the advent of Donald Trump, and his extreme anti-Iranian rhetoric, Western banks were hesitant to deal with Iran, and the swap deal was reintroduced in May 2017, albeit in a more modest fashion—100,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day in return for US$3.6 billion in Russian goods (railroad equipment, heavy machinery and aero-space technology) and cash (ibid.). Thus when Putin visited Tehran in early November 2017, Russia and Iran signed an agreement on joint oil and natural gas development projects worth US$30 billion (Majidar, 2017). Such a deal was important for both Russia and Iran. For Russia, it is getting more expensive to produce oil and natural gas domestically, and because of Western sanctions, more difficult to drill in the Arctic and in deep water (Thornhill, 2017). Hence, by assuring itself of a long-term supply of oil and natural gas, the Russian energy balance is enhanced. For Iran, it guarantees not only a market for some of its energy exports but also investments both in the development of new oil and gas fields and in the rehabilitation of older fields. This is a solid start on the estimated US$200–300 billion dollars that Iran needs to develop its energy infrastructure and dwarfs the US$4 billion that the French company Total has planned to invest in Iranian energy.

Finally, while, at least until the time of writing (November 15, 2017), Iran and Russia have cooperated closely in Syria; as the end game in the Syrian civil war approaches, the interests of the two countries might diverge. While Russia seems to prefer a federated Syria based loosely on the deconfliction zones, with Russia holding onto its new airbase at Khmeinim (for which it received a 49-year lease extension in July 2017) (Moscow Times, 2017), and its expanded naval base at Tartus; both Iran and the Assad regimes want to regain “every inch” of territory now held by its opponents. How that conflict will work itself out remains to be seen and will certainly affect the Russian–Iranian relationship.

Turkey: A New Ally?

During the Soviet era, Moscow’s relations with Turkey were strained, primarily because Turkey was a strong NATO member. Turkey and Russia did reach an agreement in the 1980s under which the former agreed to purchase natural gas from the USSR, and in 1997, during the Yeltsin era, an agreement was signed, whereby Russia would construct a natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea (“Blue Stream”) to provide a large amount of natural gas to Turkey. There were, however, problems in Russian–Turkish relations during the Yeltsin years, primarily over clashing ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia where most of the inhabitants were of Turkic ancestry. Nonetheless, once Putin took office he resolved to improve Russian–Turkish relations and sent then Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, to Turkey in October 2000 to sign a number of agreements. During his visit Kasyanov stated “Our main mutual conclusion is that Russia and Turkey are not rivals but partners and our governments from now on will proceed from this understanding” (Freedman, 2001b, p. 50).

During the next 15 years, relations between Turkey and Russia followed the trajectory of Kasyanov’s comments and rapidly improved. Russia agreed to build a nuclear reactor in Turkey at Akkuyu to help it meet its electricity needs, Russian tourists, already regular travelers to Turkey during the Yeltsin era, flocked to Turkish beaches, trade between the two countries reached US$ 25 billion per year and Turkey became dependent on Russia for almost 60 percent of its natural gas imports. Indeed, Russia planned to build a second natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea (“Turkstream”). While there were problems during this period—Turkey took a dim view of the Russian invasion of Georgia, its subsequent annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine, and its support of Armenia against Azerbaizhan in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict; relations, particularly in the economic area continued to improve, even as both took opposite positions in the civil war in Syria, with Turkey supporting the anti-Assad forces. However, the positive Turkish–Russian relationship rapidly deteriorated when, in November 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian plane that had strayed into Turkish airspace. Russia put the nuclear reactor deal and plans for the “Turkstream” natural gas pipeline on hold; Russian tourists stopped coming to Turkey, thus striking a major blow at the Turkish tourist industry; Turkish agricultural exports to Russia were sharply curtailed; Putin allowed the Syrian Kurdish PYD—which Turkey viewed as an enemy due to its close contacts with the PKK against which he was fighting in southeast Turkey—to open an office in Moscow; and the personal relationship between the two leaders rapidly deteriorated as Putin complained that Erdogan had stabbed Russia in the back by shooting down the Russian jet.

By the middle of 2016, however, Erdogan came to the conclusion that Turkish policy had led the country into regional isolation. Not only did it have poor relations with Russia, but also it had serious problems with Israel, Egypt, and Iran as well. Under these circumstances, Erdogan apologized to Putin for shooting down the Russian plane and switched from a position of opposing Russian policy in Syria to one of cooperating with it, particularly by cohosting (with Iran and Russia) the Astana talks that were aimed at reaching an agreement to end the war in Syria. The main reason for Erdogan’s policy change on Syria was his fear that the Syrian Kurds were consolidating their position along Syria’s northern border with Turkey, and he sought to prevent the linking of the various Kurdish enclaves in northern Syria, by force, if necessary. Consequently, his main goal in Syria now was stopping the Kurds rather than ousting Assad from power. But to mount an invasion of Syria, Erdogan needed Putin’s blessing as Russia controlled almost all of Syrian airspace. He apparently got the Russian concurrence during a visit to Russia in early August 2016, and the invasion of northwestern Syria followed soon thereafter. The Russian–Turkish relationship were also strengthened by Russia’s rapid support for Erdogan following the abortive July 2016 coup attempt against him. With the Erdogan apology, and the Turkish leader’s change of policy on Syria, Russian–Turkish relations quickly recovered. The nuclear plant deal and the Turkstream pipeline were back on track, Russian tourists returned to Turkey and Turkish agricultural exports, with the temporary exception of tomatoes, again flowed to Russia.

Meanwhile, as Russian–Turkish relations were improving, the USA–Turkish relations were deteriorating. Erdogan blamed the USA for supporting the abortive 15 July coup, and for not extraditing to Turkey the Turkish cleric Fetullah Gulen, whom Erdogan blamed for masterminding the coup. Other irritants in the relationship included the US trial of a Turkish–Iranian and the indictment of a former Turkish minister for their involvement in a plot to smuggle material to Iran in violation of the US sanctions against that country. Another major irritant was the US support for the Kurdish PYD in Syria, as an ally in the US effort to defeat ISIS there. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s mass arrests of college professors and Turkish civil servants for alleged participation in the abortive coup led to a sharp deterioration of relations between Turkey and the European Union.

The end result of these developments was the turn of Turkey away from its NATO allies and toward Russia, a decision underscored by its decision to purchase the Russian SAM-400 air defense system, a decision that angered Turkey’s NATO allies (Gall, 2017). While there have been some questions about the deal—particularly whether Turkey will get access to the inner mechanisms of the SAM-400’s, the symbolism of the sale was the critical issue. Indeed, if Putin can pull Turkey out of NATO, or even give the impression that it was in the process of doing so, it would be a major achievement for his foreign policy. Still, much depended on what would happen in Syria. Moscow, like the USA, continued to support the PYD and even invited a Syrian Kurdish delegation to a peace conference in Sochi, much to the displeasure of Erdogan. As in the case of Iran, the future of the Russian–Turkish relations may ultimately depend on what transpires in Syria.

Egypt: Turning Toward Moscow?

Just as in the case of Turkey, the Russian–Egyptian relationship were helped by US mistakes. During the Brezhnev era, Moscow lost a major position in the Middle East when Anwar Sadat, Gamal Nasser’s successor, moved Egypt from the Soviet to the American side in the Cold War, and Moscow lost major airbases along with a naval base in Alexandria and weapons contracts as well. After Sadat was assassinated in 1981, neither the Soviet leadership nor Putin was able to make major inroads with Sadat’s successor Hosni Mubarak who ruled Egypt until he was ousted in 2011 in the Arab Spring, as US President Obama stood by, choosing not to help America’s long-time ally. After first a military and then an Islamist-led government under Mohamed Morsi, General Fattah al-Sisi, took power in Egypt in what might be termed a “popular coup” as millions of people took to the streets in Cairo demanding Morsi’s ouster.

The USA did not quite know how to handle the new situation and decided to partially interrupt the supply of weapons to Egypt, including the helicopters which Egypt needed to counter the growing ISIS insurgency in the Sinai Desert. Putin saw his opportunity and offered to sell arms to Egypt, and after Sisi’s visit to Russia, Putin was warmly welcomed in Egypt. Moscow offered to sell Egypt naval helicopters—ironically for the MISTRAL helicopter carrier which Egypt purchased from France after France refused to sell it to Russia because of the Russian annexation of the Crimea and intervention in Ukraine. Russia and Egypt also carried out joint naval and ground exercises, and, perhaps even more important, in October 2016 Egypt voted for a Russian resolution on Syria at the United Nations—the only Arab and Moslem state to do so (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2016). While the terrorist attack that brought down a Russian charter plane flying back to Russia led to a sharp drop in the flow of Russian tourists to Egypt, the two nations have moved much closer since Sisi took office, despite the renewal of US arms supplies to Egypt.

As in the cases of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Moscow’s improved relations with Egypt can be used by Putin to demonstrate that it is not wedded to the Shia alignment of Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad regime, but has broad contacts throughout the Arab world. It should also be noted that in the ongoing crisis in Libya, as will be shown below, Egypt and Russia are cooperating in supporting General Khalifa Hafter, and this reinforces the very much improved Russian-Egyptian relationship.

Iraq and Libya: Temporary Losses for Moscow?

During the Soviet era, Iraq and Libya were close allies of Russia, although occasionally difficult ones. The ousters of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 and Muammar Kaddafi in Libya in 2011 were therefore costly to Russia. First, in the case of Libya, almost US$9 billion in economic and military contracts were lost, as were between US$1 and US$2 billion dollars in Iraq’s oil for food program. The situation in both countries which followed the ouster of their leaders has not yet proven propitious for Moscow. In the case of Libya, chaos has so far prevailed after the ouster of Kaddafi, and although, as mentioned above, Russia backs General Hafter who heads one of the factions in the ongoing Libyan civil war. Moscow hopes perhaps that he will either emerge dominant or at least be the defense minister in a national unity government and resuscitate the arms deals that Kaddafi had signed with Moscow. The situation in Libya is still too fluid for Moscow, as of yet, to have any real expectations of rebuilding its position in that country. In the case of Iraq, while Moscow did sign an arms deal with Nouri al-Maliki when he was prime minister, Iraq’s main arms supplier remains the USA. In addition, when Haidar al-Abadi became Iraqi Prime Minister in 2014 after ISIS swept through large parts of Iraq, a development that was due, in large part, to the mistakes of al-Maliki, the Russian-Iraqi relationship became troubled, especially in 2017.

By the Fall of 2017, Moscow, in an effort to facilitate a Hezbollah-ISIS prisoner exchange, was instrumental in helping a convoy of ISIS fighters and their families travel from Lebanon to the Syrian–Iraqi border, from which some of the ISIS fighters moved into Iraq—much to the consternation of Abadi, if not to the more pro-Russian Maliki. Russia’s signing of a major oil and gas deal with the Kurdish Regional Government on the eve of the Kurdish vote for independence also rankled al-Abadi who was highly critical of the Russian action (Fay, 2017). In sum therefore, Russia’s relations with both Libya and Iraq, at least at the present time, can be said to be much worse than they were under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Putin’s Syrian Conundrum

Syria has been an arms recipient of Moscow since the 1950s, and when Sadat moved Egypt to the American camp in the 1970s, the Soviet–Syrian relationship grew much closer. Indeed, Syria was one of the few Arab countries to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and was richly rewarded with Soviet arms for its position. During the Gorbachev era, however, Soviet–Syrian relations cooled considerably as Gorbachev told Syrian President Hafiz Assad that he would have to settle Syria’s differences with Israel politically, and not by war (Freedman, 1991). Under Putin, relations began to recover and in 2005 Putin, on a visit to Syria, both forgave 73 percent of Syria’s US$13.4 billion debt to the former Soviet Union, and signed new arms deals with Bashar Assad who succeeded upon the death of his father in 2000 (Freedman, 2011, p. 132).

The Russian–Syrian relationship grew much closer during the Syrian civil war which erupted in 2011. Russia first helped with weapons and with diplomatic support at the United Nations Security Council when it vetoed a number of resolutions condemning Syria and prevented the first and second Geneva peace conferences on Syria from succeeding (Freedman, 2017). Russia also lied regularly about the Assad regime’s use of poison gas against its foes.

Then when it appeared during the summer of 2015 that Assad might fall due to the successes of the Syrian opposition which by then was composed both of Jihadi and non-Jihadi elements, Moscow intervened militarily, establishing an airbase in Syria to bombard Assad’s foes. While Moscow claimed that it was intervening in Syria to fight ISIS, the vast majority of its attacks were against the non-Jihadi elements of the Syrian opposition. Russia carried out its attacks not only from its airbase in Hmeinim but also from the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas as well as, if only temporarily, from an Iranian airbase. Russian air strikes coupled with ground attacks by Iran, Hizbollah and other Shia forces turned the tide of the war, and by the Fall of 2017, Assad was clearly winning and the end of the war was in sight.

The Russian intervention in Syria accomplished a number of goals for Putin. First, it demonstrated that Russia stood by a Middle Eastern ally—in sharp contrast to the failure of the US to support then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at a similar time of crisis. Second, it demonstrated that Russia has the power to prevent a regime change by force, one orchestrated by the USA, as happened in Libya and earlier in Iraq. Third, it removed Russia from the position of relative diplomatic isolation to which it had been cast after its annexation of the Crimea and its intervention in Ukraine. As the diplomatic efforts of both John Kerry and Rex Tillerson demonstrated, there could be no solution to the Syrian crisis without Russia.

Fourth, as part of Putin’s efforts to demonstrate that Russia was again a great power, the intervention in Syria gave Russia the opportunity to demonstrate that it could project power, not only bombing the Syrian opposition from its new airbase in Syria, but also firing cruise missiles at them from the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas and bombing them from bases within Russia as well. A related benefit to Moscow may be the sale of its battle-proven weapons on world markets, although since the anti-Assad rebels have no serious anti-aircraft capability and a Russian SU-24 was shot down by an American-made F-16 over Turkey, how successful Russian arms sales on world markets will be remains to be seen. Fifth, Russia has acquired a major airbase in Syria (Hmeinim) and an expanded naval base at Tartus and has deployed both SAM-400 and SAM-300 air defense systems, which gives Russia control over a large amount of airspace in the center of the Middle East. A sixth gain, as mentioned above, is the reinforcement of relations with Iran.

To be sure much of the Russian success in Syria was made possible by the failure of the USA to take serious military action in that country to help the anti-Assad rebels, especially before the Jihadis became highly influential in the resistance in 2014. President Obama’s campaign mantra in 2012, “I got us out of Iraq, I’m getting us out of Afghanistan and I’m not getting us into Syria,” continued into his second term, despite Assad’s use of poison gas in 2013 and afterwards. President Obama saw the civil war in Syria as a quagmire, with no military solution, and despite calling for the ouster of Assad, Obama concentrated US efforts in Syria on defeating ISIS, a policy that has been continued by Donald Trump, although the new American President has agreed with Putin to set up deconfliction zones in Syria. However, the decisive Russian military intervention in Syria has demonstrated, at least so far, that far from being a quagmire for the Russians, military intervention in Syria has had a major effect, strengthening both the military and political positions of the Assad regime and placing it in a very strong position as the end in the Syrian civil war draws near. ¹

Yet as the endgame in Syria approaches, Russia faces a serious problem of choice. It would appear at the time of writing (mid-November 2017) that Russia has two main options. The first is to pressure the major players in Syria, both the opposition and the Assad regime, as well as Turkey and Iran, to agree to a loose federation, based more or less on the current deconfliction zones, with Assad as the titular leader of Syria until a final power-sharing arrangement is agreed upon either in Astana, Sochi, or, as the US prefers, in Geneva. One proviso of such an agreement would be that Russia would keep its airbase in Hmeinim and its naval base in Tartus.

The second Russian option is to back Assad’s goal of regaining “every inch” of Syria. While this would be more costly to Russia in terms of resources, such a policy would reinforce Russian ties with Turkey, which wants to eliminate the autonomous Kurdish zone in Northern Syria. It would also strengthen Russian ties with Iran which wants to eliminate, to the greatest degree possible, all opposition to Assad. The problem with this option, however, is that it would not only be more costly to Russia in terms of resources, but that it would make it more difficult to attract Gulf Arab and Western support for the reconstruction of Syria. It will be interesting to see which option Russia chooses.

Conclusions

In comparing the position of Russia in the Middle East under Putin to the Soviet position in the region under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, on balance it would appear to be much stronger under Putin. This is the case although Russia has, at least temporarily, lost its positions of influence in Libya and Iraq as a result of the ouster of Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein; it is in a much stronger position in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran and has recovered at least a modicum of its lost influence in Egypt. In part, this was due to Putin’s skillful diplomacy, and his willingness to take bold moves in countries such as Syria, but it was also due to the fact that Putin no longer had to act under the constraints of Communist ideology which limited relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia and Iran. Putin also benefitted from acts of omission or commission by the USA, as in the George W. Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq, President Obama’s unwillingness to get involved in the civil war in Syria and his inept handling of the aftermath of the coup that brought General Sisi to power in Egypt, and President Trump’s “America First” ideology and his heavy-handed rhetoric about Iran that helped drive the Gulf Arab States and Iran closer to Moscow.

On the other hand, Putin’s policy in the Middle East was not without its mistakes. Thus, Russia’s signing of energy deals with the Kurdish Regional Government alienated the central government in Iraq, and its ties to the Syrian Kurds were a continuing problem in the Russian–Turkish relations and appeared to contradict the Russian goal of pulling Turkey out of NATO. Finally, the outcome of the civil war in Syria could challenge some of Moscow’s gains in the Middle East. If Putin opts for a loose federation in Syria with autonomy for the Kurds and Sunni Arabs, he will satisfy the Gulf Arabs and the USA, but alienate Turkey and Iran. However, if he opts to help Assad regain “every inch” of Syria, Putin will satisfy the Turks, who do not want any Kurdish autonomy in Syria, and Iran, which wants to eliminate any possible opposition to Assad, but in the process would alienate the Gulf Arabs. It is not clear if Putin can have it both ways.