Abstract
23 March 2018! This became an important day in the emerging diplomatic landscape of the Middle East. On that day an Air India flight from New Delhi landed in the Ben-Gurion International airport just outside Tel Aviv. Otherwise normal issue became historic when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia allowed the Indian national carrier to fly over its airspace while heading for the Jewish State. The Arab Boycott of Israel is as old as the history of the latter, and some of the rudimentary boycott measures were practiced even before 1948.
However, aviation was different and many Asia-bound flights from Europe stopped over in the Lod Airport as it was called then. When senior-most Israeli diplomat Dr Walter Eytan flew to meet Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in early 1952, he stayed overnight in Karachi airport before reaching New Delhi. Things began to change in the early 1960s when as part of the secondary and tertiary boycotts, Arab states denied their airspace to flights to and from Israel. This meant that, flights touching Israel would have to take circuitous alternative routes incurring additional costs and time overruns which often made such flights economically unattractive. In the initial years, peace agreements compelled Egypt and Jordan to use the services of feeder airliners linked to their national carrier to circumvent the dilemma; Air Sinai and Royal Wings which flew to Israel were the subsidies of Egypt Air and Royal Jordanian, respectively.
Seen in the wider context, the Saudi decision to grant flight rights to Delhi-Tel Aviv route underscores the changing diplomatic landscape. Though El Al—Israel’s official carrier—is not happy with this ‘partisan’ treatment of India, the move indicates the transformation in the Indo-Saudi relations.
Likewise, in April, Aramco—the world’s largest oil company—signed a memorandum of understanding with a consortium of three state-owned Indian oil companies to build a US$44 billion oil refinery in the state of Maharashtra. Aramco would hold 50 percent of the stakes in the refinery. With a production capacity of 18 million tons per year, the project would consume 1.2 million barrels of oil per day with at least half of them coming from the Kingdom. When it materializes, this would be the largest single investment in the country and also the first energy-related long-term investment. Indeed, despite the galloping demands, much of the Indian oil imports are spot purchases, primarily due to price considerations. The agreement comes amidst speculations of possible Indian investments when the initial public offering of Aramco becomes available.
These developments come against the backdrop of growing uneasiness between India and Iran. The nuclear deal enabled both countries to engage more forcefully and in India’s role in the development of the Chabahar port not far from the Gwadar port that China is developing in Pakistan. The visit of President Hassan Rouhani in February was expected to smoothen some of the rough edges in India’s investments in Farzad B gas fields. Then came the Iranian announcement of a possible Chinese partnership in the Chabahar port. Though logical from the Iranian viewpoint, this also highlights Iranian tactlessness over Indian sensitivity. International relations are no longer a zero-sum game, but Iranian diversification plan would undermine pro-Iranian voices in India.
Saudi Arabia appears to be capitalizing on the uneasiness in new India over Iran. For long it has been the largest supplier of oil to India and meets about a sixth of its annual imports. Through a long-term partnership in the refinery, the Kingdom is presenting itself not only as an alternative for Indian investments in the energy sector but also a dependable partner. In other words, India’s relation with the two major powers along the Persian Gulf is taking an interesting twist; while one is dithering Indian investment, the other is more than happy to invest billions in the Indian energy sector. We are passing through more interesting times!
Moreover, China’s growing engagement with the Middle East manifested through its political, economic and energy engagements have spurred the other Asian power, Japan to pay more attention to the region and its strategic importance. Though energy security remains the prime driving force, Japan is equally interested in the regional stability and progress, manifested through its technical and financial assistance to countries like Jordan and a more active role in the Palestinian institution-building process. At the same time, there is paucity of scholarly debates and discussion regarding the Japanese Middle Eastern relations and toward bridging this knowledge gap, my colleague Professor Srabani Roy Choudhury has guest edited this volume.