Abstract
Abstract
The dialectic relation between sociocultural changes and political developments in the post-revolutionary Iran is discussed in the article which shows how the social policy of the governments has changed under this relation. The 1979 Islamic Revolution brought about a wave of tendency toward a specific discourse that can be called “downtrodden discourse” wherein the poor and deprived are the center of attention, and the resources of society are mainly mobilized in the direction of improving their economic and social conditions. Furthermore, the eight-year Iran–Iraq War (1980—1988) strengthened this discourse, and the new political system relied on the lower class of the society to push the war forward, stabilize the foundations of its power, and solidify its ideology. After the war, Iran had three governments with three different approaches toward social policy. During the era of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), no special attention was paid to social policy since economic growth and development was the focus of the government activity. Under Mohammed Khatami (1997–2005), special attention was paid to comprehensive social policy, but due to internal political and social tensions, his government failed to implement its codified social policy. Although Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) intended to pay special attention to social policy, the actions taken by his government not only failed to reduce poverty but they also pushed the significant part of the middle class below the poverty line.
Keywords
Introduction
The modern history of Iran might be realized by two interrelated issues, namely, the encounter of Iran in its totality with modernity and a myriad of challenges facing the nation-state building to achieve the governance of people. These challenges not only have influenced cultural values and general beliefs and have changed the economic structure of the society, but they have also influenced the behavior of the government and its policies toward the society.
The influence and effect of the West on Iran were intensified from the second half of the nineteenth century, and this influence threatened the local economy and market leading the merchants to self-awareness and class integration. On the other hand, by the advent of Western liberal thoughts and tendencies, it formed the intellectual stratum placing it beside the traditional market middle-class against the government. Consequences of these two trends were that the already weak relations of the nation-state weakened further. But, the Qajar kings (1794–1925) embarked on the partial and courtier reforms rather than concentrating on the society and performing comprehensive reforms at the national level, and they strengthened themselves against the society rather than strengthening the society against foreign governments. Abrahamian believes that the Qajar state domination over the society was the sign of the weakness of the society rather than the strength of the government (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 47, 50).
Near the end of the Qajar dynasty (1905–1911), the constitutional movement was one of the first actions brought about by different social forces to limit the power of the king and to replace personal decisions made by rulers, who could implement their personal decisions, whatever they were, over the country, with the constitutional law. But, the weakness of social classes and the lack of coordination among them, as well as the lack of clear objectives and means to attain goals, made the popular uprising go downhill. As we see, the trend of consolidation of power resources and formation of the authoritarian autocracy accumulating in Reza Shah himself started after the Qajar dynasty. With the establishment of a national and pervasive army, the government of Reza Shah stemming from a system based on the tribal manipulation changed into a system based on a powerful army of court and bureaucracy (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 141–149).
Reza Shah also tried to adjust the civil life of people. He determined the results and the formation of the sixth to thirteenth parliament elections in person by preparing a list of candidates for the interior minister to send it to all governor generals. Concerning the style of living and religious ceremonies, he also pretended to be a religious man in the beginning and declared two great wishes of having access to peace and security for the people and execution of Islamic divine laws in his lifetime when dethroning the Qajar dynasty and coming into power. At the beginning of his reign, he banned the sale of alcohol and recommended that women have to observe chastity, but he finally turned to “unveiling” and determination of the type of urban residence wear for women. Although, Reza Shah performed remarkable services for the country and was able to form a stable government as compared to his predecessors in developing communication roads, spread of sanitation, and public education, as well as the establishment of comprehensive security, his government did not enjoy much strength as compared to the Western stable political structures. That was because he did not have powerful class bases and any social supporters; in other words, his government was not based on deep-rooted civil institutions (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 135–136, 149; Kamali, 2002, pp. 151–153).
Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah started his rule under unstable political conditions in the form of tribal leaders’ challenges and the empowerment of opposition groups. Initially, he also achieved his goals by the state control and creating fights among tribes and groups. Moreover, by rebuilding the army that had been disintegrated due to foreign invasion, he formed a political police and expanded bureaucracy to control all arteries of Iranian society and establish his autocracy. Mohammad Reza Shah paid his attention only to the socio-economic renovation while disregarding the political development, and this in turn led to the destruction of institutions leaving behind a disconnection among the government, people and the nation-state (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 435–438).
Of the actions taken by the Shah leading to an increase in general dissatisfaction and separation of a large number of people from the government, one can point to:
In the direction of controlling the increasing inflation resulting from the Shah’s economic policies; 250,000 shops were closed, and 31,000 merchants were imprisoned up to the middle of 1976 under the pretext of combating against overcharging. In 1976, the Hegira calendar was changed into the imperial calendar so that people had to connect themselves with the kingdom. The struggle against the clergy, and the government’s attempt to take on the religious duties of the clerics, infuriated the religious elite. Closure of 70 percent of newspapers and publications as well as efforts made to force the intellectuals to cooperate with the regime.
According to Nikpey, the former mayor of Tehran during Pahlavi’s reign, the Shah personally made most of the economic and political decisions without having to respond to anyone (Amjad, 2001, pp. 166–167, 188). In fact, the Shah, having relied on huge oil revenues that had multiplied in the 1970s and reduced his demand for class support and tax revenues , became the sole initiator of economic policy and the sole judge of the country’s politics.
The recent two centuries of Iran are indicative of the absence of the concept of “social policy” at the governmental and societal levels. Social policy is one of the factors linking the government with the society since by making decisions concerning the distribution of rare resources and interference in the solution of the current problems and issues, the government helps the promotion of its citizens’ lives (Alcock, Daly, & Griggs, 2008, p. 3; Bambra, Fox, & Scott-Samuel, 2005, p. 190). Social policy in its strong concept is applied to conditions and a set of actions and targeted interferences that the government prepares for the welfare and social support while considering citizenship and human rights as its priority (Kamkar, 2003; Moeini, 2003, p. 106). In other words, social policy encompasses the policies, plans, programs, and strategies of the government to encounter social problems and promote social welfare (Walsh, Stephens, & Moore, 2000, p. 7).
Such a model of policymaking can be considered the product of success of a society during the process of nation-state building and a kind of democratic policymaking. There is usually a dissociation between the state and the society in the failed nation-states based on the dualistic “we–they” policy instead of building one consolidated sociopolitical unit. In such systems, policies are usually communicated and decided from top to bottom on the basis of the discretion of the government. Besides, since the political system usually fails in its regeneration in daily formalities and from the collective actions of citizens, it changes all domains even the most personal ones including the domain of religion and/or relations among individuals into a security issue (Sharifi, 2013). Here, there is a weak concept of social policy since many of the policies adopted are the products of efforts made by the state to regenerate it by assisting the controlled order, along with limited and engineered social improvement.
Since every social system consists of subsystems in relation to one another and they are affected by each other’s change and developments, the political subsystem cannot codify and execute its policies while ignoring its sociocultural changes. In a sense, the 1979 Islamic Revolution was a reaction to the political obstruction during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. The general sense of social improvement was an industrialized Iran with Western culture in which technocrats and those who had studied in the West were agents to take Iran to the gates of modern civilization, when the majority of Iranian society was still traditional and religious. People especially rejected the cultural policies of the Shah so that under the effect of internal conditions (e.g., the decline of the domestic economy since the mid-1970s, the emergence of revolutionary Islam, cross-class coalitions against Shah, etc.) and international developments (Western economic crisis and the dispute with Mohammad Reza Shah over oil prices, experience of open political atmosphere under the influence of President Jimmy Carter’s pressures, and the ending of the Western confidence in the Shah in the fight against the danger of spreading communism) they dethroned the Shah in a comprehensive movement enveloping all people to establish a new system.
Distribution Percentage of the Budget for Social Affairs in Terms of the Main Classification of the Cost (1971–1979)
Islamic Revolution and Policies of the Downtrodden
Many authorities consider the accelerated modernization of the last decade of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, along with other factors, the underlying background for the Islamic Revolution in February 1979. Changes brought about in the economic and living pattern of people along with their enhanced level of political knowledge encountered a type of political obstruction imposed by the government fighting against the demands of citizens to participate more in their political life ultimately resulted in the revolution (Bayat, 2010, p. 162).
In 1973, the quadrupling of oil price brought a fortune to Iran affecting all aspects of its society and speeding up social changes. The fifth development plan was codified and implemented during 1973–1977 on the basis of such income, and the budget for education, health, and social welfare were 15–20 times more than the previous plans. Table 1 shows that the welfare budget in 1971 was 55 billion Rials, while it was 644 billion Rials in the last year of the Pahlavi reign that is in 1977 (Messkoub, 2012, p. 318).
Some Indexes for Social and Economic Changes in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt
Rodee et al. believe that in the first half of the 1970s, changes brought about in the economic, social, and political fields of Iran made the social and political demands of people overtake the traditional–political institutions and Iran’s political elites encountered new realities which ended in the revolution (Rodee et al., 1983). In fact, in the process of modernization from the 1960s to 1970s, social inequalities followed by an increase in the ability to understand these inequalities resulted in an increase in the feeling of relative deprivation by citizens. In addition to the Shah’s actions and international conditions, a situation was created that this feeling of relative deprivation penetrated to all levels of society, especially among the middle-class leading to protests and dissatisfactions which were out of the government’s control and ultimately led to the change of the regime (Rafipoor, 1998, pp. 103–104).
In the process of the formation of revolution, there were not only new elites who entered the battleground, but elites and traditional representatives of the society such as clerics also played an essential role in the victory of the revolution, and an unprecedented unity was created between these two groups to dethrone the Pahlavi regime (Banuazizi, 1987, pp. 305–307; Kamali, 2002, p. 288). In fact, with regard to the pervasiveness of the anti-Shah movement and the diversity of the number of groups participating in the revolution, it can be said that the 1979 revolution was an attempt to rebalance the social system again, but a balance that both the new and traditional elites would have an active role in to push their demands forward. This demand is very well expressed in the most basic slogan of the Islamic Revolution, that is, “independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic” which has encompassed demands of all different groups.
At the beginning of the revolution, different social forces freed from the constraint of the previous system of domination got involved in quarrels with some political forces over coalition to push their goals forward, or they directly took action using the emerging atmosphere. One of these groups was the slum and poor urban dwellers. Due to the enforcement of land reforms alongside industrial development and urban sprawling over the years of 1970–1980, approximately 2 million villagers migrated to cities (Hoogland, 2002, p. 26). Moreover, due to extensive migration to cities during 1977–1983, the population of cities increased by 40 percent (Dorraj, 2000, p. 294).
Part of these emigrants could settle down in the south of Tehran and gradually merged into the urban texture, but a significant portion settled down in suburbs in poor homes, and some were able to occupy a section of urban land. There were approximately 50 poor neighborhoods and slum dwellers in Tehran until the mid-1970s. Some of the poor took advantage of the revolutionary atmosphere and occupied some of the vacant or unfinished homes making the new government face with one of the most challenging social issues (Bayat, 1997, pp. 25–36). Authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran were able to manage this movement which had been changed into a social movement and withdrew occupiers over 4–6 years.
The rapid growth of urbanization over the 1960s and 1970s prepared the background for the formation of a middle-class that sparked the revolution and then made other groups and classes follow them. The revolution of 1979 took place precisely in the year when for the first time in the history of Iran the urban population crossed over 50 percent, and urbanization became the dominating social life for Iranians (Orcad, 2001, pp. 69–70). As we observed in Table 1, Iran not only had witnessed unprecedented leap during 1960–1976 for the growth of economic indexes, development in the use of mass media, an increase in relationship with the outside world, and the use of modern cultural products, but it was also considered the pioneer country among the regional countries. These changes modernized many parts of Iranian society on the one hand, but on the other hand, they brought about an increase in the feeling of social deprivation. An increase in demands and expectations of different classes including the new poor dwellers in slums and marginal areas of the government in the 1970s were progressively leading to a rise in social and class conflicts (Bayat, 2010, p. 165). Lack of proper accountability to the demands of the urban poor and the middle-class people amassed the demands dangerously and made the Pahlavi regime surrender to some of them at the final months of its tenure.
Examples of some of the retreats made by the Shah can be followed through the headlines of Ettelaat newspaper. It is noticed that only in October that is 4 months before the victory of the revolution, the Shah embarks on various retreats which affected the inflammability of the heat wave of the revolution and increased the confidence of different political currents:
This action was a retreat against the urban margin dwellers and the poor.
While the flood of revolution was imminent, such a retreat was no longer of any use for the government. Ayatollah Khomeini, as the most critical and effective anti-Shah personality, announced that “whatever is devised by the system of the present government should be removed from the life of Iranians” (Ettelaat, 1978, October 30) and “there will be no peace in Iran unless the Islamic Republic of Iran is formed” (Ettelaat, 1979, January 7). Imam Khomeini announced the principles of the Islamic Republic in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Safir, at the end of January 1979 (Ettelaat, 1979, January 20).
In the beginning years after the victory of the revolution, a full-spectrum challenge started between the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini and other groups on the realization of the principle of the Islamic government. The happenings of the beginning years showed that the unity of the traditional and modern elites of the society had been merely tactical, and after dethroning the Shah they were these traditional elites who were able to impose Islamic discourse on the society by setting their rivals aside.
Eisenstadt (1964) believes that modernization releases some potential, but prevents the realization of other potentials. Accordingly, the low and traditional classes were able to present themselves as the major supporters of the revolution in the future due to the generated revolutionary atmosphere and help the continuity of Islamic Republic, and it was in line with this direction that Ayatollah Khomeini called it the revolution of “downtrodden” or “barefooted”; in contrast, the new middle-class that played a vital role in its victory was subdued by the conditions after the revolution. The power of religious discourse was so powerful that it was expected to spread worldwide or at least spread to the regional countries. Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the revolution, also stood up against nationalism by announcing the export of revolution to all Islamic countries since according to him “nationalism” would place Iran against other Muslims (Ettelaat, 1980, August 10).
Following the establishment of Jihad of Construction in June 1979, some Muslim committed forces who called for fundamental changes delivered services to villages within the framework of this organization. They constructed many bridges, schools, homes, mosques, hospitals, and public bathhouses in the first years and many villages enjoyed purified water and electricity (Amjad, 2001, p. 243; Dorraj, 2000, p. 293). But, due to the internal conditions, the outbreak of Iran–Iraq War, and Iran’s strained relations with the outside world especially with the West that isolated Iranian society and on the whole, it can be said that the speed of modernization was reduced, and industrial development and economic growth suffered seriously; the relations of the government with the society gradually turned to its classic model in the process of the history of Iran. The occurrence of war once again subdued the civil society to the central government and made the birth and creation of a new government face fundamental problems after the revolution.
Eight-year War Period: War Economy and Coupon Policy
The outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 significantly affected the society and policy of Iran. We reviewed the first 2 years of war concerning the reasoning brought about in the previous section and the lack of full integration in the government at that time, and now we embark on the remaining 6 years of war and the situation of Iranian society over this period.
One of the specifications of the society involved in war in any part of the world is the coordination of the performances of different sectors of the society with war conditions that is the economy is changed into a war economy. The policy sphere tends to be univocal and censorial, and the culture of war, resistance, and dedication spread through the society. During the Iran–Iraq War, about 40 percent of the government’s budget was spent on supplying the needs of war (Amjad, 2001, p. 245) that is the stoppage of many developmental projects and the depression of industrial and commercial sectors.
One of the effects of the 8-year war was the massive displacement of population and the internal or external migration. Due to the unstable political and social conditions resulting from the revolution between 1977 and 1980 and before the outbreak of the war, about 100,000 Iranians emigrated only to the USA (Ghabraee, 2006) and the war not only reversed this trend, but it also perpetuated it. Of course, between 1999 and 2002, that is over the period of the presidency of Khatami when the social conditions of Iran improved a little, and the government adopted a more moderate policy toward those living abroad, about 100,000 Iranians returned home (Ghabraee, 2006). But, in contrast, especially during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, the wave of emigration soared again.
One year after the war, the government decided to organize the economy and social policy based on the current realities and concerning the phenomenon of the war. Therefore, the first development plan after the revolution was codified. Up to the middle of the 8-year war, the government was able to push its defined projects and plans forward based on oil. But since 1986, due to the fall in oil prices in less than $ 10 a barrel and the drop in Iranian exports, the government has faced a financial crisis and many plans and programs have ceased to exist. (Azimi, 2001, pp. 15–18). The per capita revenue of the country during 1978–1989 reduced by 45 percent, and the government was hard pressed even to supply food for its citizens. After the release of the policy of birth control, the growth rate of the population of the country suddenly soared leading to more demand for food. Meanwhile, the government’s funds during the war period were almost half, or sometimes even less than halved, and the government, by adopting socialist policies and distributing foodstuffs and food coupons, tried to serve all people in the Iran. The consumption of wheat over this period increased from 5.9 million tons to 10.6 million tons forcing the government to increase the import of wheat from 1.2 to 5.3 million tons (Ehteshami, 1999, pp. 17–18).
Over the beginning years of the war, the plan of the “development of health-therapeutic network” was codified, ratified, and implemented. This plan covered axes such as public health, food supply, correction of feeding patterns, providing hygienic water, mother and child health care and hygiene, vaccination, and immunization against infectious diseases (Qarakhani, 2013, pp. 220–221).
Although the speed of modernization in the society was reduced due to the war, and with the closure of the country’s doors to the outside world, Iranian society was in a state of isolation, however, in some areas some of the modernization processes went ahead. For example, the necessity for mass mobilization for the war and also providing a force to support the newly established Islamic system obliged the government to seriously consider the provision of services to villages. In addition to providing health services, the government had to make serious efforts to enhance education and spread modern mass media. While, according to the census of 1983, about 67 percent of families owned black and white televisions and 6 percent owned color televisions (Naficy, 2000, p. 268), in 1996, out of the total of 12.3 million families in Iran, only a little more than 1 million families were devoid of radio or television (Rabiei, 2001, p. 200). Of the other reasons for the development in the use of radio and television in villages and among traditional groups was the so-called Islamization of TV programs that the more religious and traditional groups were the main addressees. In this way, broadcast programs have corrected some misconceptions of these groups and promoted their social and political awareness (Talab, 2002, p. 268).
Although health budget increased more than 40 percent relative to the average annual 31 percent in the 1970s, the housing, urban, and suburban development budgets were reduced from 20 percent of the total budget to about 7 percent during this period (Messkoub, 2012, p. 325). This reduction brought about the stoppage of many development projects, closure of factories, and/or working below their capacity. The economic crisis resulting from the prolongation of the war and the coupon-based public food supply, all acted as a brake for development.
In spite of the slowdown of the development and the reduction of the government’s revenue over the 8-year war, due to the adoption of the policy of society-axis taken by the government and application of social policy based on free public education, extensive health programs, and an increase in the government’s expenditures in social service sector through direct and indirect subsidy, the level of income inequality was reduced and the health conditions of the citizens gradually improved (Babakhani, 2008, p. 257). In conclusion, it can be said that the most critical problems and barriers for providing services over this period were the shortage of machinery, technical and managerial limitations, and lack of suitable infrastructure, and more important than all these was the shortage of the required credits (Qarakhani, 2013, p. 223).
Construction Period and Economic Growth Priority: Pressures on the Urban Poor People
After the end of the war and the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini, Rafsanjani became the president at a time, when the major ports of the country were destroyed due to the war, the most critical income source of Iran that is the production of oil encountered intense reduction due to the damage to refineries, and the per capita income was reduced by about 40 percent from the time of the revolution. In general, problems such as unemployment, inflation, budget deficit, excess dependence on oil, and reduction in agriculture self-sufficiency were the most important challenges faced by Rafsanjani. Along with the modifications of two development plans, he made efforts to push forward the policy of détente with the outside world, borrow money from the International Monetary Fund, reduce the government’s expenditure and privatization, modify policies such as reduction in government’s subsidies, impose single rating of currency, reduce the money in circulation and promote exports so as to mobilize the ill and paralyzed economy of the country.
The policy of Rafsanjani was to hold the mother industries, mines, and banks in the hands of the government and leave the small ones for the private sector (Dorraj, 2000, pp. 294–297; Keddie, 2004, pp. 54–57). This policy led to an increase in the debts of the country, and the pressure of his economic plans on the poor and merchants made the political forces supporting merchants resist against him. As a result, he was compelled to retreat from many of his policies and surrender to a compound and eclectic policy consisting of a subsidy system and a governmental tenure, along with a policy of economic modification and privatization.
One of the macro-policies adopted in the first and the second 5-year plan drafted and implemented by Rafsanjani’s government was to stop the introvert policies based on the self-sufficiency in agriculture; instead, he diverted his attention to the strategy of industrial development and an increase in exports. But, contrary to the expectation of authorities, the money obtained from the release policies found its way to land and housing as well as developing apartments and magnificent shopping areas in Tehran instead of its use in productive investment (Keddie, 2004, p. 56). Following the policies mentioned earlier, the trend of migration to urban areas accelerated so that the urban population from 54.8 percent in 1986 reached 61.3 percent at the end of final years of the second term of Rafsanjani (Rabiei, 2001, p. 134).
During the presidency of Rafsanjani, known as the construction period, policies concerned the reconstruction of ruins left after the war in the first stage, and then it concerned industrial development and an increase of exports that profoundly affected the social context and culture of people apart from their achievements and failures. In this course, contrary to the export development strategy that was targeted, by increasing imports of various goods into the country - For example, in 1991, it nearly quadrupled compared to 1988 and tripled in comparison with 1987 - as well as by creating free trade zones and massive propaganda for people to travel to these areas and shopping and recreation in them, as well as the construction of modern business centers that would offer luxury goods and fashionable clothes and fashion, The culture of anti-consumerism in the war period has gradually been abandoned and materialism has become popular amongst the people (Rafipoor, 1998, pp. 197–207). Reduction in the purchasing power of lower classes and also of the new middle-class, along with need creation for consumerism, accelerated the value gap between the dominating culture and the informal culture of people. The growth of education and higher education, as well as the expansion of mass media, was also among the factors that contributed to the depth of this gap.
One of the successful policies during the presidency of Rafsanjani was the growth of higher education in Iran. Over the period of construction, in addition to an increase in the number of students attending the government higher educational centers, we witnessed other types of higher educational institutions such as Islamic Azad University, Payame Noor University, and so on that spread quickly with many branches in the most remote areas of the country. By taking students from big cities to smaller ones which were away from the great centers of population and industry, these same centers introduced values and new norms to these regions. This issue brought about a dissatisfaction among some of the inhabitants in the first stage, but ultimately, in addition to the economic benefits, they gradually got accustomed to the presence of these centers and the cultural patterns introduced by these newcomers. Since Rafsanjani was one of the leading members of the board of trustees of Azad University, he closely supervised the development of these educational centers and encouraged them. In the years that followed, the number of students at Azad University outnumbered those of its government counterparts (Statistical Centre of Iran, 2002).
A new political force, known as the secular intellectuals and religious intellectuals, emerged out of the new middle-class in the 1990s; the dominance of commercial capitalism over economy, an increase in class gap, a reduction in the purchasing power of the middle-class along with ideological and traditional positions of the government in cultural–social area, and the limitation of policy-making and taking political positions to clerics, Islamic Conservatives, bazaar merchants and their allies put the new middle class in a serious constraint and separated them from the government more than before. The new middle-class confronted the cultural–social policies of the government and asked for more political participation through its subsets and allies such as secular intellectuals, religious intellectuals (being after the combination of Western and Islamic intellectual traditions) and some student organizations and reformers within the government (Bashiriyeh, 1999, pp. 130–142).
After the presidency of Rafsanjani, it was noticed how teachers whom one of the writers called “the eternal loyal of Revolution” gathered in front of the parliament for their salaries several times and seriously protested against the government. Ultimately, after 20 days of protest and taking sanctuary in front of the parliament, the parliament retreated, and it was decided that their salaries be increased by 25 percent and 30,000 of the contractual teachers be hired to solve their problem (Husseini, 2001). This event was a great victory for a part of the new middle-class. Of course, the government of Hashemi had felt the gradual need of the society for reforms. Therefore, “efforts made for the governance of law and reinforcement of the participation of people” was one of the goals among the 10 goals of the second plan of the Rafsanjani government (Beheshti, 2000, p. 199). It is worth mentioning that the approach based on gradual reforms influenced the speed of social changes and their consequences, that is, the victory of Khatami in the next presidential election.
Regarding the high-class levels, it can be said that they at least enjoyed the economic policies of the construction period and were able to travel to destinations such as Kish and Dubai through facilities provided for traveling abroad. They also enjoyed the facilities of places outside the center with more social freedom along with diverse cultural commodities. The influx of diverse consumable commodities such as different types of fashions and clothes, along with the improvement of their economic situation, also enhanced their satisfaction with the policies of the government compared with the period of war and the beginning of the revolution that made them politically passive and even advocates of the government.
But, the lower class of the society was in a contradictory situation. They were, on the one hand, in reasonable conformity with the government due to their ideological beliefs for the economic policies of the government such as coupon policy in economy and penetration of Islamic discourse during the wartime, but on the other hand the economic modification policies over the period of construction made them more hard pressed. During 1991–1993, the rate of inflation swayed between 30 and 59 percent annually greatly reducing the living standard of the low class (and the new middle-class), and labor unrests were witnessed in 1992, 1994, and 1995 in several big cities (Keddie, 2004, p. 59).
Economic pressures came down to the lower class of the society while Rafsanjani’s government did not have a coherent policy to provide social services to them. Its lack of attention to codify a coherent policy can be followed up by changes emerged in the second development plan that it has implemented, and compared to the first plan the share of public affairs and social affairs declined by 2.7 and 16.8 percent, respectively. By contrast, the share of economic affairs increased by 71.8 percent (Ghadiri & Najafi Kani, 2003, p. 116). Although the social policy of Rafsanjani was ineffective in protecting the urban poor and even reducing the economic pressures brought to the middle class, economic growth and industrial development led to the expansion of the middle class and its return to political equations after a decade of overcoming the downtrodden discourse. In the period between 1996 and 1986 and due to the government’s actions, the unemployment rate of women dropped from 25.4 to 12.3 percent, while the literacy ratio of employed women rose from 64.3 to 79.9 percent, surpassing the literacy ratio of employed men (Heidari, Anjani, & Saroukhani, 2015, p. 28). During this period, the population policies of Rafsanjani’s government led to an increase in the age of women’s marriage and the life expectancy of men and women, as well as in the decline in the fertility rate. In addition, from 1986 to 1996, 2 years before the end of the construction period, the country experienced a significant increase in access to sanitary water (from 50.05% to 71%), domestic electricity (from 64.59% to 88%), and sanitary baths (from 17.48% to 37%) (Heidari et al., 2015, p. 29).
In the overall assessment, the construction phase can be divided into two periods. The first period that is the first term of the presidency of Rafsanjani was merely a transitional period from the war-stricken social atmosphere and confused economy to a more balanced social atmosphere of economic orientation based on the production and the industrial development. During the second term of the Hashemi Presidency, and getting away from the years of war, technocrats replaced populist officials of the war period and the ground for opening up social freedoms was provided. Hashemi and his associates understood that without having open social space and recognizing the private sphere and the right to determine the lifestyles of individuals, economic development and constructive interaction with the international community are not possible. Increasing the level of literacy and the development of higher education, urbanization, and most importantly the expansion of the use of new communications devices such as satellites that bring new values into the community, all have increased the demand for people to enjoy such a space.
The high ratio of the young population, who were less after the spiritual values and more after the worldly gains and material demands compared with their counterparts of the war period and revolution, made the government adopt more open sociocultural policies. But, the pressure imposed by a sector of the sovereignty and the resistance of the traditional and religious groups of the society prevented the government to take serious actions. The government that had invested all its concern in the economic programs considered the cultural domain and society of second-degree importance and preferred to at least remain silent in these areas and ultimately surrender to the continuation of the existing trends by dramatic run and fight.
Social Policy of Khatami: Success in Codification and Failure in Implementation
The seventh presidential elections on 23 May 1997 brought about such results that severely affected the society in all aspects. Not only was the number of voters participating in the election very high (79% of eligible voters), but also Khatami won the election by winning 20 million out of 30 million votes cast, 69 percent of the total votes (Kalantati, 2001). This amazing victory was the outcome of the profound changes brought about in the Iranian society over 8 years of the construction period that was now able not only to prove itself through the election but also to find a way for faster and increasingly more continuation of its movement. The analysis of Khatami’s vote basket can support the perception of changes taken place in the Iranian society.
The educated were one of the important groups who voted for Khatami. On the basis of the three polls conducted, the first was carried out in the middle of April 1997, the second in the late April, and the third 4 days before the election in Tehran; it was found out that the educated people not only showed more participation relative to others, they also persuaded others to vote for Khatami. In general, the advocates of Khatami propagated 1.5 times more than others for their desired candidates (Rabiei, 2001, pp. 181–183). Data are indicative of efforts made by parts of the society for a change from the perspective of participation in elections.
The urban dwellers also showed more propensities to the victory of Khatami in the election. They, who always felt the policies of the government and the pressure and limitations resulting from it more than those living in suburbs and had more information about the candidates and their programs, considered the consequences of each candidate’s victory and paid more attention to the consequences of the victory of opponents; while, those living in suburbs preferred candidates those with religious beliefs, with Hezbollah morale and the support of a majority of clergymen (Rabiei, 2001, p. 191).
The youth were of the other major groups of voters for Khatami. It is interesting that Khatami obtained more votes in towns with more ratio of the youth (Rabiei, 2001, pp. 187–188). The approach of the youth to Khatami was the product of their keeping more distance from the conservation and limiting actions of the previous government, such as deprivations, psychological failure, economic pressures, uncertainty, unsafe future, and increasing unemployment. The youth, like the women who strived hard to obtain equal rights like men to determine their own covering and in general the right to determine their own lifestyle over two decades after the revolution, were present at the society level in the form of silent social resistance and peacefulness; they now demanded a serious correction of affairs that they had found in the presence of Khatami through the ballot box (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 2001). Ethnic and religious minorities also actively entered the scene of the election and generally voted for Khatami (Kalantati, 2001, p. 168; 2005, p. 7).
But what were the features of Khatami and how he functioned through the discourse that apart from the religious and ethnic minorities the groups of mostly urban people who more than others were exposed to modernization were attracted to him and how he made the new middle-class accompany him more than others and be his significant advocates?
Khatami was the first among the high-ranking authorities of the country who employed the so-called expression of “civil society” (Zaydabadi, 2005). By bringing up this plan before and after his presidency, he was after the realization of goals such as “the rule of law” and “toleration” for diverse tastes and even for opponents. He talked about the normalization of relations with the West and the necessity for rapprochement, and even after gaining power he took advantage of every opportunity to bring up his views and insisted on them until the last minute (Banuazizi, 1999). Compared to his principal opponent, Nategh Noori, the analysis of the content of Khatami’s slogans in his presidential election is clearly indicative of his mental atmosphere that was more coordinated with the needs of the youth, women, minorities, the blacked outs from politics, educated, and on the whole the new middle-class.
In an overview of Rafsanjani’s presidency period, it can be said that due to the social and density developments of the last years of his presidency and relative openness in social atmosphere of that period along with quality changes in the Iranian society from 1995 onward, Khatami, the head of the government of reform whose most crucial social base was the new middle-class and social forces who were mainly urban and educated, came to power. In response to voters who brought him to power, the government of Khatami adopted more open policies in the sociocultural area.
In response to changes and social demands and also with regard to inflation, high cost, and widespread poverty, the government of Khatami codified the third development plan in which it particularly paid attention to specific axes such as reduction in the government spending, expansion of private sector, participation of people in economic activities, social justice, decentralization, public access to data, protection of environment, export development strategy, attention to cultural changes of society, free health services, and access to food (Management and Planning Organization of Iran, 2003). In his second term, Khatami tried to codify and pass the fourth development plan, the most advanced and the most expertly devised one after the revolution, in the parliament. Of course, after the termination of Khatami’s presidency, Ahmadinejad removed the general focus governing the plan and deleted many of its axes and clauses or implemented it on the basis of his taste.
Among the axes of the fourth development plan, one can point to the knowledge-based economic growth in interaction with the world economy, conservation of environment, spatial planning and regional balance, health development, food security and social justice, government renovation, and promotion of the effectiveness of the sovereignty (Management and Planning Organization of Iran, 2004). It is observed that in the fourth development plan, at least on paper, the government was moving toward a real and modern social policy and was moving from a quantitative approach to the indexes of development and growth to a comprehensive development (Shirzadi, 2010). Concerning the internal competitions and conflicts, along with external pressures, the trend was not so effective, and an increase in the rate of different types of damages, social problems, and more widespread poverty in the society showed that development plans implemented were not so successful.
Along with the movements mentioned, problems like increasing unemployment especially among educated young people, problems of marriage for them, drug addiction, an increase in other social problems, reduction in religious and ethical adherence, and individualism not only changed the face of Iranian society, but it also changed the relation and type of interaction with the government. Therefore, at the end of Khatami’s term and in the middle of the ninth presidential election when Ahmadinejad was ultimately elected, the effect of these changes on the slogans and speeches of candidates was evident in that they tried to show themselves updated. Candidates coordinated themselves with diverse social demands and did not boast about their value-orientation as they did in previous elections. Candidates put greater emphasis on the follow up of social demands and improvement of economic conditions of people. The influence of Khatami’s nature and discourse over his 8 years of presidency on these candidates was evident in their actions and speeches as well as in their slogans.
By following a détente policy with the West, Khatami tried to attract many great corporations such as Total and Shell to Iran, and in following Rafsanjani’s industrial development he embarked on the renovation of rusty industries. But, if we have a general look at the Iranian society, we perceive that his success was also limited since there was no comprehensive policy especially concerning the poor urban people, and actions taken were not so effective. For example, the economic growth along with the government’s policies caused the urban poor classes to enjoy the most average increase in income among different classes (Bagheri & Kavand, 2008, p. 189), but it did not mean an improvement in their living conditions. At the end of Khatami’s term, in spite of an improvement in the enjoyment factor of the urban society in communications and energy indexes and in many other indexes such as housing, education, and tourism, the situation of urban dwellers worsened (Akbari & Amini, 2010, p. 121).
On the basis of the Iranian Statistics Center, at the end of the first term of Khatami’s presidency there was no literate men in 56.9 percent of families with the lowest income docile (absolute poverty line), and that meant the continuation of poverty cycle for such families. Apart from illiteracy, the unemployment factor had an undesirable effect on the quality of the poor which was more unfavorable for female-headed families. In 2003 that is in the middle of the second term of Khatami’s presidency, the female-headed families formed 9 percent of all the urban and suburban families of which 70 percent of these women were “inactive without income” and were very susceptible to inflation and existing expensiveness (Athari, 2005, p. 114).
In 2001, that is, in the middle of the 8-year term of Khatami, the three groups of costs for property indexes were “absolute poverty line,” “middle class,” and “high class” with 84.3, 88.2, and 93.3 percent for property owners, respectively; while these ratios were 54.3, 68.7, and 79.1 percent, respectively, for urban families (Athari, 2005, p. 114). As it is observed, the rate of owning property in villages is more than that in cities, while the urban dwellers have always been more exposed to pressures resulting from inflation and recession than villagers. As a result, at the end of Khatami’s presidency term, the urban dwellers were severely under pressure of inflation, and half of the urban poor people who were deprived of property and suitable economic conditions were attracted to Ahmadinejad with his people-oriented personality and simple-life appearance.
In a summary of the Khatami period, it can be noted that Khatami, in comparison with the previous and next governments, could create more economic stability and keep inflation at a lower level, with an average inflation rate of 14.2 percent (Mostafavi, 2017, p. 88). Increasing transparency in various fields, both political and economic, helped improve the index of corruption in this government, and reducing transparency in the Ahmadinejad period has led Iran to drop 60 places in the global corruption rankings (Mostafavi, 2017, p. 88). The détente policy of Khatami with the great powers has opened the door for large and multinational corporations to return to Iran. Under these new conditions, Iran’s long-term economic prospect seemed promising. During the presidency of Khatami, despite the economic pressures, the middle class strengthened politically and socially and became a reference group in cultural and social arenas. Regarding the poor people, special support policies were included in the fourth development plan (Aram, Hosseini Haji Bakandeh, & Mousavi, 2017, pp. 117–118; Bouroojerdi, 2016, p. 8), but after the presidency of Khatami many of those policies were abandoned by Ahmadinejad or implemented in a different form.
Government of Ahmadinejad: Populist and Poor-oriented Policies
Apart from the lack of coalition of reformists and serious support of some sectors of the sovereignty for Ahmadinejad as well as the defeat of reformists and Ahmadinejad’s coming to power, there was also a social and class background. A significant sector of the new middle-class who was the silent majority that voted on 23 May 1997 and in several other elections to empower reformists, now withdrew from the election scene once more. Over the 8 years of Khatami’s presidency, his opponents were able to slow down the speed of reformists by their effective levers of power. By increasing political tensions with reflections in social and cultural areas and by showing the government as an incapable and inefficient government, they gradually dissuaded some parts of the followers of reformists from voting in several elections at the end of Khatami’s term, and they and forces close to them participated in voting by a ratio of about 30 percent participation or less in megacities such as Tehran and Esfahan and were elected for the city councils and the parliament. The weaker presence of the silent majority was not ineffective in the victory of Ahmadinejad.
On the other hand, over the presidency of Khatami, the economic policies of Rafsanjani continued as before and put the urban low class under pressure, and the drop of oil price to US$8 per barrel at the beginning of Khatami’s presidency followed by the closure of many industrial units and an increase in unemployment reduced their quality of life and the rate of enjoyment of different facilities and services to a lower level than before (Akbari & Amini, 2010). Therefore, due to the protesting atmosphere emerged from the incident of Tehran University dormitory on 9 July 1999 and the following 2 years, the riots of urban low class, especially in large cities, confronted the government with serious challenges. It seems that these groups seriously participated in the ninth presidency election and voted for Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad, with a people-oriented feature and by a tenacious defense of the poor and deprived, criticized the overspending and wastefulness of the previous governments and considered his most important goal as the realization of “justice” in society. He rarely used the lexicons of Khatami such as “freedom” and “democracy.” He even used the term “Islamic Government” instead of “Islamic Republic” in the beginning. Ahmadinejad tried to reconstruct the conditions of the beginning of the revolution after coming to power. He called himself “the second Rajaee” 3
The simple-living president of the first years of the Revolution emerging from a poor family who was killed in the bombing of the prime minister’s office on 30 August 1981, along with the prime minister and several other ministers.
The victory of Ahmadinejad was indicative of more separation among the class lines. It was observed that the most prominent artists and also the university professors, as well as prominent experts, stood against Ahmadinejad and explicitly supported his opponent during the electoral campaigns; a sample of these supports can be observed in Shargh newspaper dated June and July 2005 and especially within the 1 week between the two legs of elections. The initial speeches of Ahmadinejad after holding the office of the presidency were responses to these campaigns. While Khatami delivered his speeches in Tehran universities and specifically addressed intellectuals, young people, and university students, Ahmadinejad delivered his first speeches in a religious public place, that is, in the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad among the people present there and emphasized justice and compassion.
To underscore the gradual classification of political campaigns in the country and the consequences of classifications made by the governments holding office and before addressing the issue of policies adopted over this period, a review of a section of speeches of the head of the staff committee coalition, “the good fragrance of service” (coalition of the supporters of the Islamic Government), who was present in the election of the Islamic urban and suburban councils in December 2006 in Tehran with the name of the sister of the president in his list that is Parvin Ahmadinejad can be justifiable. In the gathering of Tehrani citizens at the threshold of the election of councils, he said:
Today, our people are so conscious that they do not let the rich confiscate them and their votes by deceiving and holding office. You have elected a government that acts against the will of the parties and capitalists. Now, some groups want to seize the councils from you and create a group to stand against the government and revenge on the government. (Iranian Student’s News Agency [ISNA], 2006)
As it is inferred from the aforementioned speech, the head of the coalition staff committee of the “good flagrance of service” fully brings up the issue from the stand of the supporter of the low classes and in spite of the claim of his group who consider themselves as non-faction and non-dependent on any group or political trend have been supported by the dominant sector of the government from the beginning.
One of the weak points of governments like Ahmadinejad’s is their eclectic and populist policies. It has been observed in developing countries that when leaders confront real problems, they move to a “pragmatic pattern” which can be implemented (Nowzari, 2004, pp. 112–115). By adopting tough stances against the West, Ahmadinejad considered the Islamic pattern as the solution to development and considered general and vague concepts such as, “social justice” and “equalities,” as well as paying particular attention to the deprived and the oppressed, as the feature of his government. Although he considered the return to the values of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as the goal for his government and promoted the poor-oriented discourse, he also ultimately moved toward the capitalistic economy like all the governments after the Iraq–Iran War.
As soon as Ahmadinejad came to power, he followed policies whose main addressees were the deprived people of the society. Making quick, emotional, and inexpert decisions with no regard to the opinions of experts and prioritizing his own decisions while underscoring Islamic justice and the necessity for prioritizing the deprived were of the features of his government. In this regard, several months after his presidency he started his first provincial trip on 9 November 2005 to South Khorasan that was one of the most deprived provinces of Iran. These trips that included all the provinces of Iran were repeated three times until the end of his presidency. Writing letters to the president even for the most trivial needs of daily life was one of the essential aspects of these trips. In the governor-generalship of each province, a team was assigned to read and filter the letters of people to be processed. Although some small loans were granted gratuitously, on the whole, a considerable sum of money was distributed resulting in an unprecedented increase in cash at the level of the society.
High price of oil simultaneous with Ahmadinejad’s term of presidency gave him excellent maneuverability of power, and the reduction in the oil price and a reduction in currency made his government to be hard pressed for money, so that in the third term of his provincial trips, the direct spending on development projects and on the demand of people was stopped, and the credit was only devoted to cultural and research projects and research related to the field of culture.
Here, it is worth mentioning that most policies and programs of Ahmadinejad in the area of social policy which are all directed to the low-income level must be examined. On 16 May 2006, the supreme administrative council ratified the formation of “the fund for employment, marriage, and Mehr Imam Reza housing.” This fund was formed by the merge of the fund for loan without interest for the development of suburban occupation, youth marriage saving fund, and the fund for the support of occupational opportunities with the goal of paying loads to young people, homeless poor people or those living in old houses, people of 18–50 years of age with ideas for occupation and/or employers who can provide a job for a jobless person. The regulations for this fund was ratified on 23 July 2007 and according to paragraph 9 of the regulations, several ministers in addition to the chairman of the central bank and the head of management and planning organization formed the board of trustees, headed by the president. About 3 million couples borrowed from this fund until 2009 (Parliamentary Civil Commission, 2015).
In November 2006, the council of ministers ratified regulations for increasing Iranian household wealth through the expansion of cooperative sector share on the basis of the distribution of “equity share.” The original idea of this plan was that the state-owned shares would be a source of income for the government, and the government wanted to grant a part of its income to urban poor people such as families dependent on Imam Khomeini Relief Committee and to welfare organizations. The disabled, female-headed families, supervised children, the heads of unemployed families, seasonal and simple workers, veterans of Iraq–Iran War with no job and income and disables were of the goals of this plan (Omrani, 2013). Regarding the manner of the distribution of the equity share, it was decided to grant these shares with 50 percent discount within a 10-year installment to the two low strata of the society. The most important problems and deficiencies of the plan can be enumerated as the problem of identifying the real needy people, conspicuous and inconspicuous transfer of these shares to the middlemen, an increase in propensity to consumption, rush in transfer, privatized companies sustaining loss, and failure to repay the price of the stock (Parliament Civil Commission, 2015).
One of the controversial plans of Ahmadinejad was the “Mehr housing plan.” The government was able to pass the plan in the parliament on 14 May 2008, and on 8 December of the same year it was communicated to cities with a population under 25,000. The implementation of this plan was assigned to Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation. The main idea of the plan was to adopt the policy of “zero land” to omit the price of land from the final value of real estate. About 60 percent of the value of real estates in Tehran and 45 percent of the value of those in other cities were the price of the land over the recent decades (Ministry of Road and Urban Development, 2014). Provision of social housing with this approach led to the construction of houses on the border of towns and partly outside cities in unsuitable locations. In addition to ignoring social, cultural, and security issues in relation to the plan, the allocation of funds was not done appropriately, the government embarked on the construction of great complexes exceeding its power mainly with low standards and some faced the problem of ownership of land (Parliament Civil Commission, 2015).
Perhaps, none of the actions of Ahmadinejad was as controversial as the “targeted subsidies plan.” The implementation of this plan simultaneous with the sanctions of the United Nations imposed on Iran over its nuclear case increased the prices between two and three times over 2 years and marked the unprecedented stagflation in the country. This plan was one of the paragraphs of “economic development plan” that Ahmadinejad promised to the people of Iran in his speech on 11 February 2008 on the occasion of the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, and less than 2 months later he underscored it on his new year’s greetings. The primary goal of this plan was the distribution of direct subsidies earned from the income resulting from the release of the price of energy carriers to people. Equitable distribution of the income of the country, empowering the poor, and targeting subsidies were the ideal goals of this law (Nabavi & Amini, 2010, pp. 271–274) that was ratified by the parliament on 5 January 2010, and 1 week after that it was ratified by the guardian council and was implemented as of 19 December 2010 by the government. In spite of the warning from many economic experts, this plan was implemented (Dini, 2010; Nabavi & Amini, 2010).
On the whole, the implementation of this plan reduced the production level of the country, increased the costs and prices of goods and services, and reduced consumptions (Ahmadpour Borazjani & Sabouhi Sabouni, 2015; Naji Median & Sotoodeh Niakarani, 2015; Nematollahi, Shahnoushi, Javanbakht, & Kakhki, 2015). One of the other failures of this plan was the deposit of an equal amount of money for the entire citizens who had registered in the plan. The direct subsidies were deposited with no regard to whether the people were living in cities, villages or provinces, and their income, while the deposited amounts had very different effects on the quality of the life of these people. For example, a poor Tehrani citizen needed more money than a villager or the one living in a small city (Abdoli & Shirdel, 2010, p. 149).
Although a negligible amount of inequity and the ratio of families below the poverty line were reduced during the period of Khatami, under Ahmadinejad poverty and inequalities showed an increasing trend. In 2004 that is 1 year after the end of Khatami’s tenure, the number of families suffering from absolute and relative poverty in urban regions was 1 and 2 million, respectively; in 2009 that is after the end of the first 4-year term of Ahmadinejad, these were 1.3 and 2.5 million families, respectively (Athari, 2005).
On the basis of the existing and official statistics, 0.87 and 4.7 percent of the urban and suburban population were living below the severe poverty line in 2012, respectively. Over the same year, the absolute poverty line for an adult in an urban area was 3,950,000 Rials, and in a suburban area it was 2,500,000 Rials, meaning 33 percent of the urban and 40 percent of the suburban population were below the absolute poverty line. At the end of the Ahmadinejad’s government and as a result of sanctions and a sudden increase of currency rate, as well as the unprecedented stagflation in the country, the absolute poverty line for a family of four in urban area was 9,700,000 Rials, and in suburban area it was 7,000,000 Rials; while, the minimum monthly wage and salary set by the government was only 4,870,000 Rials indicative of unbearable pressures of life faced by the workers and the poor people in urban and suburban areas (Ministry of Cooperation, Labor, and Social Welfare, 2013, p. 3).
The comparison of situations of absolute poverty based on provinces was also indicative of an increasing gap among different sectors of the country and the existence of critical conditions in some provinces. Of the urban population in Tehran, Zanjan, and Esfahan, 20, 26.3, and 27.9 percent were below the absolute poverty line in 2012, respectively; this ratio was 72.5 percent in Illam province. In provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan and Ghom, 63.1 percent of the population was below the absolute poverty line (Ministry of Cooperation, Labor, and Social Welfare, 2013, p. 3). Regardless of the political commotion, the axial goal of the policies of Ahmadinejad’s government that is the reduction of poverty and empowerment of the poor was right and proper, but the content and manner of the codification and implementation of these policies and their contradiction with realities of the society and international system ultimately resulted in making the low-income class poorer and reducing the quality of their life.
Discussion and Conclusion
It was observed in the present article how the governments in charge tried to develop and implement special social policies in line with the existing social changes and political atmosphere after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In the inflamed atmosphere of the first years after the revolution and over the 8-year war, the poor were ultimately in the spotlight so that the governing clergymen could consolidate their ideology and establish a new political system. In the years after the war that is under the governments of Rafsanjani and Khatami, the urban poor and deprived people were ignored a little, and economic and political developments were prioritized.
The empowerment of Ahmadinejad was a returning wave, and at least at the government level it was a return to the discourse of the first years of the revolution. A part of this process was due to the different nature of the supporters and voters of Khatami and Ahmadinejad. Contrary to the new middle-class formed after the construction period, especially in big cities supporting Khatami, the low-class strata found a way out of the extensive social poverty and unorganized economic conditions in Ahmadinejad. After coming to power and in response to votes cast by the social structure of his supporters, like any other populist government, Ahmadinejad turned to striking, emotional, less expertized, and idealistic actions. The formation of Mehr Reza fund, distribution of equity share, implementation of Mehr housing plan, and payment of direct subsidies, as well as tuning to provincial trips and direct contact with people, were of these policies.
One of the chances for Ahmadinejad was the unprecedented increase in oil revenue from 2005 to follow his policies. Of course, incompetency of the government to correctly use the resources obtained faced the economy with a situation called “Dutch disease” by economists. By injecting the windfall to the society as well as the unwarranted intervention and inexpertness confronted the country with unprecedented stagflation making the low and the middle class its main victims (Raghfar & Ebrahimi, 2008, p. 32). An increase in capital flight, the exit of the biggest oil companies from the oil industry of Iran, and the adoption of six resolutions against Iran at the Security Council for the nuclear controversy during the presidency of Ahmadinejad made the middle and the low class poorer.
The most significant case of economic corruption during Ahmadinejad was publicized, that is, a government that pretended more than other governments to be the cleanest government with an emphasis on Islamic and ethical principles. Any social policy that considers the reduction of poverty should also consider the reduction of corruption, an increase of transparency, and responsiveness of the government, simultaneously. Evidence shows that countries with the highest level of poverty are those with the highest level of corruption (Mehregan & Mohseni, 2012, p. 47). By the serious entrance of the military sector to the economy during Ahmadinejad’s term, the level of transparency was reduced leading to the weakening of the private sector. The combination of this situation with the stagflation of the final years of the government of Ahmadinejad, on the one hand, increased unemployment, and on the other hand it had an impact on the social problems and increased the level of damages. Successful social policy can only pave the road from codification to implementation process when all the components of the country act coordinately and transparency, competition, the rule of law, and relative peace and quiet rule over the economic and political atmosphere of the society.
One of the causes of the failure of the governments after the revolution in the formation and implementation of the social policy has been the incompetence of unity and solidarity in the managerial structure of the country, lack of transparency, and economic rent-seeking of Iran. Historically, social forces and elites of the Iranian society act against each other and play attritional and erosive roles (e.g., refer Krusinski, 2011, p. 47). Only when a powerful and efficient ruler who enjoyed the power to control different social currents in addition to high managerial power and could establish friendly relations with the outside world has been able to contribute to the development and growth of economy and welfare of people. Concerning the present conditions of the Middle East, the existing inconsistencies and contradictions, it seems that until an unknown time, the revenue of these countries is spent on the establishment and maintenance of authoritarian regimes and confrontation with each other, and a great part of the revenue is spent on military and security sectors. In these conditions, public education, health and sanitation, poverty reduction, environmental protection, enhancement of women conditions, and similar issues are of the second priorities for the government.
At the height of the economic crisis on 29 November 2011 and the need of Iran for foreign investment, it was observed that a protesting gathering was formed in front of the British embassy and embarked on the temporary seizure of the embassy, and as a consequence the Britain closed its embassy in Tehran for 4 years. These movements greatly effectuated an intense reaction from the side of Europe against Iran. Such cases show the existing contradictions between the factional priorities and real priorities of people in Iran. Now, the highest living standards are seen in countries with the least tension in their relations with the world, and they have adopted diplomacy instead of confrontation and slogans as their foreign policy.
Apart from these issues, one of the problems that has to be on the agenda of the government and any social policy is the issue of aging population dominating the population structure in less than two decades. According to the present estimates, about 26 percent of the population will be within the age bracket of 55–74 in 2032. Over this period, 5 percent of the population will be over 75 years of age. Therefore, adoption of specific policies to encounter the issue of aging in future and to meet the urgent needs of the elderly seems necessary (Mirzaee & Moshfegh, 2011, p. 19); especially, the study of the existing trends show that family support for the elderly is declining (Motee’ Haqshenas, 2012, p. 102).
It should be noted here that if the best policies are codified, but politicians do not act aligned and integrated, the implementation of policies will reach a deadlock. The government also requires significant financial resources for the implementation of efficient social policies. Of course, it is worth mentioning that improvement of the foreign currency resources, if not expended as was done during Ahmadinejad’s government, can promote the quality of the implementation of social policies and the costs allocated (Qarakhani, 2014, p. 79). Détente with the outside world, the improvement of business conditions, the attraction of foreign investment, dismantling the economic rent, and enhancing the transparency and responsiveness in all areas can provide the required conditions for the promotion of the living quality of citizens. Now, and after decades of change and development in the social policymaking system of Iran, unfortunately, oil is still a reliable source for the policymakers so that with no regard to the existing realities, they want to impose prescribed and slogan-driven policies in line with their specific interests on the logic of policymaking.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.