Mamlakhtiyut from Across the Ocean: Ben-Gurion and the American-Jewish Community

Abstract

The concept of Mamlakhtiyut, defined by Bareli and Kedar as the Israeli version of republicanism, has shaped Israeli political system and civil culture from the 1950s onward. This article examines how this inter-Israeli concept affected David Ben-Gurion’s inter-Jewish policy toward the Jews of the Diaspora during the constructive era of the first year of statehood. The discussion focuses on the journey of Ben-Gurion to the USA during the spring of 1951 and the launching of the Bonds campaign as an alternative Israeli fundraising tool. The study of the journey’s context and a deep analysis of Ben-Gurion’s speeches during the journey demonstrate the importance of the Mamlakhti approach in the setting of Israel–Diaspora relations. I argue that the Mamlakhti-republican discourse was needed by both sides to deepen the relationship during the 1950s, point its deep influence on both policy and discourse, and suggest that today too it may foster the discourse and reframe some of the fundamental subjects that divide Israel from the Diaspora.

Keywords

David Ben-Gurion Israel–Diaspora relations fundraising UJA Bonds republicanism

Introduction

The concept of Mamlakhtiyut is the key to understand Israeli political discourse and civil culture.¹

This article was written as part of the research hub “World Jewry: Views from Israel” at the Center for Israel Studies (CIS) in The Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism. I would like to thank Prof Ofer Shiff and Prof Avi Bareli who encouraged me to approach this project, and Prof Nir Kedar, Dr Natan Aridan, and Dr David Barak-Gorodetsky, who assist along the way.

For many years, researchers have struggled to understand this concept’s ever-changing meanings and the connection between its different appearances. In the past decade, however, Bareli and Kedar reexamined it and offered a new understanding of the concept based on a profound reading of David Ben-Gurion’s writings and the connection between Mamlakhtiyut and Republicanism (Bareli, 2007; Bareli & Kedar, 2011; Kedar, 2009).

According to their writings, Mamlakhtiyut can be understood as the Israeli version of the “modern democratic republican theory” (Bareli & Kedar, 2011, pp. 28–89).²

It is important to note that they interpret Republicanism in the context of political theory, rather than in the context of any specific historic example. Nevertheless, their interpretation of the concept is Europocentric and may contradict American Republicanism as it was portrayed by Appleby (1985), for instance. The usage of the term in this article will follow Bareli and Keder understanding.

First and foremost, it requires that the state’s center be favored over political and ideological subcenters. Within this context, during the country’s early years, the state aspired to take over organizations formerly employed by partisan and political frameworks in the fields of security, education, and welfare. In a consequent manner, the Mamlakhtiyut aspires to create a political ethos shared by all the central groups of Israeli society, which establishes the Jewish-Israeli metanarrative and is used as its raison d’être. In this context, it also defines the boundaries of the collective and creates hierarchies in accordance with the group’s position in relation to that very ethos. In addition, the Mamlakhtiyut constitutes a republican call to civil action for the common good, at the expense of personal, group, and political interests, and therefore, stresses the singular value and uniqueness of Jewish sovereignty, which distinguishes Israel from other Jewish centers.

In this article, I aim to examine how the perception of Mamlakhtiyut affected Ben-Gurion’s policy toward the Jews of the Diaspora. As a republican theory, the immediate target audience of Mamlakhtiyut was the citizens of Israel; however, as I will argue, it deeply influenced Israel–Diaspora relations as well. The discussion will focus on a unique and, so far, unresearched historical junction, Ben-Gurion’s first visit to the USA as a prime minister, during the spring of 1951.³

Among the previous studies that analyzed his trip, it is worth mentioning Feldstein (2006), who discussed it in light of Ben-Gurion’s uneasy relationships with the ZOA. Lately, I have analyzed the Israeli outlook on this trip, and published the personal diary of one of the soldiers who participated in it (Sherzer, in press; Sherzer, 2019).

This month-long visit was accompanied by the exceptional enthusiasm of both American Jews and Israeli citizens alike and was widely covered by the press. During his trip, Ben-Gurion traveled coast-to-coast between Jewish concentrations and at its peak led a parade of 200 Israeli sailors in central New York, with some accounts reporting over one million people coming to greet him (Sherzer, 2019).

Using this visit, I seek to demonstrate the important place of Mamlakhtiyut in the shaping of Ben-Gurion’s approach to the Diaspora and eventually try and evaluate its influence on the way Israel–Diaspora relations were designed from the 1950s onward and its relevance today. By arguing that, I do not intend to claim that Mamlakhtiyut was the only factor in the shaping of the Israel–Diaspora relationship, but to stress that this relationship is deeply connected to the inter-Israeli political discourse, influenced by it and affected on it. Thus, I seek to describe the journey not only to depict an early example of long-distance nationalism, but to shed light on the complex connections between the motherland founding ethos and its relations with its diasporas.⁴

For a definition of the term “long-distance nationalism” see Glick-Schiller (2005). She briefly discusses Diaspora–motherland relations at pp. 574–576.

This article shall be comprised of two main sections. The first will analyze the journey’s background and will focus on the Mamlakhti-republican character of the Development Corporation for Israel (Israeli Bonds) and the discourse change it offered. The second part shall analyze the Mamlakhti messages that arose in Ben-Gurion’s speeches. In conclusion, I will discuss the meaning of Ben-Gurion’s journey and speeches within a broader historic context and contemplate its relevance to the current state of affairs.

The US Visit as a Mamlakhti Journey

The two “official” objectives of the journey were to strengthen the ties with the American administration and to launch the Development Corporation for Israel (Israeli Bonds) fundraising campaign (Sherzer, in press). Eventually, the second objective became far more important. Upon his request, Ben-Gurion met with American officials, but the Administration refused to treat him as an official guest and therefore, the journey was defined as “a private visit.”⁵

According to Esther Herlitz report, this fact highly influenced the nature of his visit in Washington, see BGA, item no. 145949, Esther Herlitz to the Israeli Consulates in the U.S., 7 June 1951.

Furthermore, Ben-Gurion failed to convince President Truman to change his attitude toward Israel, to directly include it in one of the American aid programs or to assist it in running future negotiations on reparations from the then West Germany.⁶

The context was Israel’s gradual shift toward the West Block. According to the transcripts of the meeting, it seems Ben-Gurion hoped to gain some benefits out of this transition, but faced an American indifference, see BGA, item no. 93662, A Memorandum of a Meeting Between David Ben-Gurion and Harry S. Truman, 8 May 1951.

The launching of the Bonds was directly connected to Israel’s severe monetary condition, which got to its peak during 1950–1951. The establishment was based on a simple economic idea: selling Israeli Bonds to Jews in the Diaspora in a way that combines investment with donation. As Lainer-Vos (2013) has shown, this is not an original Israeli model. However, as I will show below, the circumstances of its founding should be understood within the unique Israeli struggle to implement (and sometimes even to enforce) Mamlakhtiyut: while Israeli citizens were called to convert their identification with pre-state Zionist parties to the newborn republican institutions, the Jews of the Diaspora were called to convert their support of a pre-state philanthropic framework to a direct investment in a new state-owned body.

Before the Israeli Bonds were launched, Israeli fundraising was based on the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) mechanism—an organization that proved to be problematic from a Mamlakhti viewpoint for several reasons.⁷

This is not the place to address the differentiation between the UJA and the United Palestine Appeal (UPA), which eventually became the United Israel Appeal (UIA); this issue is succinctly dealt with in Haski-Leventhal and Kabalo (2009), pp. 32–34. However, for the purpose of this article it is important to note that the UJA was founded from the first place by Zionist and non-Zionist and therefore, did not see the assistance to Israel as its only goal.

First and foremost, the UJA was an independent and powerful Jewish-American organization, which did not see itself as subordinated to the new Israeli sovereign institutions and assisted Jewish communities outside of Israel as well. Moreover, donations raised by the organization were not turned over directly to the state, but to the Jewish Agency, and thus strengthened another subcenter. Although state institutions affected the money’s destination, their control was limited and it did not go into the state budget. Infights over the management of the Appeal tore apart the American-Jewish leadership and dragged Israel into the fray. In the end, executive positions were divided in a consensual manner according to an ideological-political key. All these confronted the Appeal with the new republican perception, which sought to deconstruct subcenters and fought against partitarianism and political-key representation in Israel. Under these conditions, the Appeal’s modus operandi looked like a relic of the Yishuv-style politics that Ben-Gurion’s Mamlakhtiyut had just tried to uproot.

The second problem was even more severe; as a result of its character the Appeal depicted Israel as yet another Jewish community that required the charity of the American Jews. Even though the Appeal’s mottos changed over the years, they did not express the sovereignty revolution that the founding of Israel formed. The UJA continued to raise donations under the banner of Jewish European refugees, and thus, for example, in 1950, used the slogan “to finish the job.” These kinds of slogans emphasized the continuity of the Jewish-American commitment to improving the conditions of new immigrants to Israel (and especially of Holocaust Survivors), but did not express Israel’s uniqueness or the Mamlakhti ethos by addressing the idea of the ingathering of the exiles (Kibbutz Galuyot).⁸

The description appears in a report by Moshe Prager headlined “On the Mistakes in Our Approach to American Jews.” I would like to thank Dr Natan Aridan for referring me to this source—kept in his private archive.

Furthermore, after over a decade of charity for impoverished Jews around the world, it seemed that these slogans have become far less effective, and sums raised by the UJA declined significantly (stock, 1995). Many saw this crisis as a fundamental problem, one of which is Haredi JDC man, Moshe Prager, who wrote a comprehensive report on the topic, in which he wondered⁹

Ibid. This is not the place to analyze Prager’s unique view of and relationship with Israeli leadership; it seems that his words are especially significant since his views were not greatly differed from those of the leading discourse of Mapai.

Is it dignified for the State of Israel to appear time after time with the plea: “Merciful Jews, have pity on us and on our children?!” Is it still effective and beneficial to tug the American Jew by his sleeve and say: “Your Yemenite, Moroccan, Tripolitan, Iraqi brother, seeks your mercy?!”.

Prager’s conclusion was clear: “The UJA crisis is structural-essential, rather than temporary.” The Appeal played an important role in recruiting the nation in a “time of crisis,” but was not suitable in recruiting American Jews to support “the supreme effort to revive the nation.” In other words, the Appeal did not express the Mamlakhti metanarrative of Israel’s sovereign ethos, which constitutes not only the reason for Israel’s existence, but also the main drive that enlists the support of Jews across the Diaspora. For economic reasons, Ben-Gurion did not want to relinquish the UJA apparatus, which enabled Israel to raise money in the USA according to American laws. However, he clearly aspired to develop a different kind of fundraising tool that will reflect the sovereign nature of the state.

From the very first moment, the Bonds were designed for this purpose. Foreign Ministry official Abba Eban compared the difference between the Bonds and the Appeal to the difference between “the concept of sovereignty and the concepts of reliance and dependency.”¹⁰

ISA, 2420/12–ג, Abba Eban to Moshe Sharet, 30 June 1952.

The Bonds’ executives were appointed by the state of Israel and funds were directly transferred to its budget. Although the organization’s management had disagreements with several Israeli institutes over the years, it is essentially a civil organization that obeys Israeli government directives. The Bonds’ narrative was also much more Mamlakhti in nature, as Eban clarified:

This institute has given the Hebrew people the vision of Israel’s financial independence and expressed the idea of independence and sovereignty in the field of financial thought. The so far prevalent concepts of dependence and acts of loving kindness (Gemilut Hasadim) in the relations between Israel and American Judaism are long gone … The Bonds denotes a very healthy relationship, an atmosphere of equality and mutual respect, and there is no doubt that the notion of a loan is far more accurate and far more in line with the concept of sovereignty than the other (notion of the Appeal).

This “atmosphere of equality and mutual respect” stands in the center of the Mamlakhti-republican call for action and reflects the change it seeks to create. In the inter-Israeli context, it aspires to develop a relationship in which the citizen becomes an active partner of the government in the working toward the common interest, and in the diasporic context it aspires to transform the Diaspora Jews from passive donors to active shareholders.

Dash-Moore (1996) showed in a micro-historical fashion how these notions found expression in the Bonds’ marketing in Miami and emphasized yet another aspect. Support of the Bonds was seen as a direct support of the Mamlakhti-republican vision of an Israel, untouched by political intrigue and ideological disputes, which, at the time, had overshadowed the works of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and the UJA. It seemed that the desire to strengthen that sentiment gave birth to the idea to utilize Israeli officials in launching the Bonds. In this context, some of the more well-known Israeli leaders arrived in the USA during the spring of 1951, including Golda Meir, Dov Yosef, Eliezer Kaplan, and the man described as “Israel’s symbol of independence”—David Ben-Gurion.¹¹

This is how Ben-Gurion was presented in press releases that were circulated throughout the USA by Israeli diplomats: BGA, item 93655, Israel’s Symbol of Independence, May 1951.

However, it would be inaccurate to understand Ben-Gurion’s month-long journey across the USA solely on this basis as he had other reasons to go, which also had to do with the implementation of Mamlakhtiyut. In the months before the visit, it seemed that Israel’s austerity policy was facing collapse and that the country may go bankrupt (Giladi, 2002, pp. 32–34). The austerity brought the Mamlakhti demand to prefer common interests over private interests to an extreme and demanded Israeli citizens to temporally forgo their financial freedom in favor of absorbing the big wave of immigration, which was defined as an urgent national need. The public’s cooperation with this policy in its primary stages was considered an identification with the Mamlakhtiyut; while its defiance and the developing black-market were perceived as sabotage (Sherzer, in press). The financial crisis resulted in a political one and in the local elections of November 1950, Mapai lost many of its powerful urban positions to the General Zionist Party, its main opponent (Ben-Uzi, 2008). In the spring of 1951, on the eve of his journey, Ben-Gurion stood at the first stages of a tough Knesset election campaign (to be held July 1951), which would put his policy to the test.

Even in this primary stage, the American Zionists were already deeply involved in this election. In April, American Zionist leader Abba Hillel Silver made a visit to Israel and the heads of the General Zionists rolled out the welcome mat for him and used his visit to flex their political muscles (Shiff, 2014). Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, was enraged at the visit and vehemently refused to meet with Silver. On the most basic level, he was probably displeased with the support provided to his political rivals; but on a deeper level, he saw this visit as a breach of the most fundamental principles of Mamlakhtiyut. Silver’s journey strengthened one of the political subcenters; instead of promoting the common republican interest, he chose to act on the behalf of partisan interests. Moreover, Silver did not internalize his marginal role as a noncitizen within the hierarchy created by the Mamlakhti ethos and saw himself as a legitimate political player in a foreign arena.

At the same time, Ben-Gurion’s Mamlakhtiyut was being challenged on another front: claims made by Yemenite immigrants about educational indoctrination in immigrant camps received the sympathetic ear of the religious public in Israel, who enlisted Orthodox North American elements in their fight. The height of the affair saw a big demonstration of Jews in Manhattan (23 January 1950), where Israel was accused of religious persecution and threats were even made of appealing to international authorities on the subject (Tzameret, 2002). This affair, which continued to occupy Ben-Gurion until 1952 and was the main trigger behind the upcoming 1951 election, once again blurred the republican hierarchy between citizen and noncitizen; even worse, it further distanced the republican vision of establishing a State Education system.

Thus, it seemed that Diaspora Jews did not internalize Mamlakhtiyut on at least two occasions, nor did they understand the essence of the change that took place in the transition between the voluntary society of the Yishuv and the sovereign state. From an Israeli point of view, they chose narrow political interests over the common interest and posed a very problematic example to the Israelis themselves. Therefore, Ben-Gurion’s visit to America held a great meaning, as he was the most unmistakable representative of Mamlakhtiyut and the very man who had coined it, a meaning that went beyond financial reasoning, important as it may have been. As I will demonstrate using an analysis of Ben-Gurion speeches from his journey, he utilized the stage he was given in order to allow his Mamlakhti perception to take root among American-Jews as well as among the Israeli public that followed him via the press.

Mamlakhtiyut in Ben-Gurion’s Speeches Throughout His Journey

During his journey, Ben-Gurion gave many speeches aimed at different audiences and his archives contain 14 speeches of various degrees of writing, many of which appear in multiple versions.¹²

For the sake of this article, I preferred the final English version (in case it was available); the description is based on the following documents—The speech upon departure from Israel: ISA, 2393/19—צח, The third Independence Day, 3 May 1951; the speech upon arrival to Washington: ISA,2393/18—צח, Statement Made by David Ben-Gurion at National Airport, 3 May 1951; the speech at the National Press Club: ISA, 6921/4—ג, Address by David Ben-Gurion at the National Press Club, 8 May 1951; the speech during New York’s mayor reception: BGA, item 87102, Text of Remarks by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion at City Hall Reception, 9 May 1951; the speech in a luncheon at Waldorf Astoria Hotel: ISA, 6921/4—ג, Speech of Mr Ben-Gurion for City’s Official Luncheon, 9 May 1951; the speech in the mass rally at Madison Square Garden: ISA, 6921/4—ג, Excerpts from Address by David Ben-Gurion at Madison Square Garden, 10 May 1951; the speech in Philadelphia: BGA, item no. 93669, Philadelphia Speech, 13 May 1951; the speech at Brandeis University: BGA, item no. 87107, Address at Brandeis University, 16 May 1951; the speech at Tulsa, Oklahoma: BGA, item no. 235183, Transcription of Tape-recording: Visit of Prime Minister and Mrs Ben-Gurion To Tulsa, Okla, 23 May 1951; the speech in Los-Angeles: BGA, item 87108, A speech at Hollywood Ball (Los Angeles), 24 May 1951; the speech at the ZOA conference: Ben-Gurion (1953, pp. 150–160); the speech at the farewell dinner: BGA, item no. 93675, At the Eve of my Departure (At a Farewell Dinner in New York), 30 May 1951; the speech upon departure from the USA: BGA, item 93676, Statement of the Prime Minister on the Eve of his Departure from the United States, 31 May 1951; the speech upon arrival back to Israel: BGA, item 93685, Upon Return, 7 June 1951.

At the beginning of his journey, he gave two speeches aimed at the general American public in Washington D.C. and these were followed by another three speeches in New York, ostensibly targeting the general American audience, but, in practice, clearly targeting American Jewry. Over the course of the next 2 weeks, he spoke in several additional fundraising events; his archive includes only three examples for such speeches (in Philadelphia, Tulsa and Los-Angeles), but it is clear that many other speeches were not preserved. He also made two prominent speeches after receiving an honorary doctorate from Brandeis University and in a meeting with ZOA leaders in New York. In addition, two other speeches were made in Hebrew and aimed directly toward the Israeli public, presenting the objectives of the journey and its achievement—on his departure and upon his return.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to differentiate between the speeches according to their target audiences. The press in Israel and the USA (mostly the Jewish press, but also the national and local ones) quoted the more prominent speeches extensively, some were broadcasted over the radio and incorporated into newsreels, and six of them were also edited, translated, and published in an official compilation of Ben-Gurion’s writings (1953,pp. 135–162). This way, the media brought the speeches to Israelis and American-Jews alike, regardless of the initial target audience.

An overview of the speeches allows us to trace five central motifs, which link them with the Mamlakhti worldview. The first motif presents the Mamlakhti-republican ethos as the main characteristic of the State of Israel, which sets it apart from any other Jewish community and establishes its centrality in the Jewish world and its importance in world history. This motif is first expressed via an element that was omitted; in none of his speeches did Ben-Gurion make a mention of the difficult situation in Israel to elicit pity or ask for assistance. While hardships were mentioned, they were incorporated into a new and sovereign framework of meaning, which reinterpreted them. For example, as he says in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington:¹³

The speech at the National Press Club.

Our tasks have not been accomplished without severe difficulties. The effort has made tremendous demands on our people. They (that is, the Israelis) have not flinched before them. They have shown a readiness to assume heavy burdens and a severe regime of austerity in their personal living. They have done so in the knowledge that the absorption of immigrants, or, as it is termed in Hebrew, the ingathering of the exiles, is the main object for which the State of Israel has been created and supreme test by which it will be judged.

Thus, the Israelis aren’t portrayed as living under harsh conditions of austerity, but as ones who chose the common good of immigration absorption over their own personal interests. The paragraph was not coincidentally placed and appears after the paragraph that describes the investment (rather than mere help) of American Jews in Israel’s financial future. This connection was made again in a speech given by Ben-Gurion during a luncheon in his honor upon his arrival in New York; immediately after presenting the Bonds’ fundraising goals, he described the Israelis as having willingly taken the “burden” upon themselves by opening their homes to new immigrants.¹⁴

The speech during New York’s mayor reception.

The subtext of connecting both subjects is clear: American Jews specifically invest in Israeli Mamlakhtiyut and direct their capital toward the greater ideal of the ingathering of the exiles, rather than toward the support of impoverished immigrants. In this way, their support of Israel becomes more significant than that of a passive donor, they become active shareholders who directly contribute to the country’s success. Of course, this message is not relevant only to American Jews who make up the addresses’ primary audience, but also to the Israelis who heard them through the media and could walk tall, thanks to the Mamlakhti framework.

In addition, this framework allowed Ben-Gurion to glorify the life in Israel, which found another expression in the recurring comparison between the State of Israel and the dawn of the USA. In his speech at Washington Airport, he claimed that “the spirit of pioneering is common to both our peoples,” and made a connection between Israel’s “conquest of the desert” and the American frontier.¹⁵

The speech upon the arrival to Washington

In his welcome speech at New York City Hall, he compared the great immigration that transformed the city into a world center, with the mass immigration to the State of Israel that will turn it into “a strong and reliable fortress of democracy and freedom.”¹⁶

The speech during New York’s mayor reception.

Likewise, Ben-Gurion described Mamlakhti life in the State of Israel as an exciting, creative, and visionary experience, unaffected by the harsh living conditions. As he stated in his Madison Square Garden address, in Israel, “there is austerity in consumption but no austerity in vision or construction.”¹⁷

The speech in the mass rally at Madison Square Garden.

This topic was more thoroughly developed when Ben-Gurion addressed a crowd of Jewish youngsters at Brandeis University¹⁸

The English version of this speech is missing its final pages, from which this quote is taken. Therefore, the text was translated from the printed Hebrew version (Ben-Gurion, 1953, p. 149).

It is a great pleasure to read Shakespeare, but none of us can imagine what happiness it was for Shakespeare to write … Creating new life is even bigger and richer than creating important books, and this blessed and precious adventure was given to the Jewish People in our generation. Those of you who are gifted with the urge to create will feel the magic of this inventive adventure, fall in love in it and become our partners in shaping the image of the State of Israel and its culture.

The American Jews were not required, therefore, to “carry the burden” of aiding a provincial Middle Eastern country preoccupied with the Sisyphean task of saving persecuted Jews; but rather to take part in a remarkable creation that would realize the vision of Israeli Mamlakhtiyut.

This point is closely linked with the second motif of the speeches; establishing the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora by identifying with the state center that expresses the republican ethos and common interests, rather than the subcenters that represent narrow interests. This motif is also primarily expressed through an element that was missing from the speeches, the American Zionists. Apart from his ZOA speech—which Ben-Gurion dedicated to criticizing their ways—he made sure to address the general Jewish public, rather than Zionists alone.

At the beginning of his journey, after his Madison Square Garden address, Zionist leader Emmanuel Newman still wondered why Ben-Gurion did not address American Zionists (quoted in Feldstein, 2006); however, it later became clear to everyone that this oversight was a part of a declared policy. This policy is clearly demonstrated in the speech Ben-Gurion gave upon his return, when, whenever he made mention of American Jews, he took the effort to add that he is referring to “Zionists and non-Zionists” alike.¹⁹

The speech upon arrival back to Israel. The same tendency can be found at his speech upon departure from the USA.

The place that Mamlakhtiyut held in the development of this approach is evident in Ben-Gurion’s speech to the ZOA about a week earlier on the eve of his departure, having already appeared in mass rallies across the country.²⁰

The speech, which was not utterly written in advance, has many quite different versions, all of which contain severe criticism of the ZOA. The following quotes are taken on the official version published in Visions and Pathways (Ben-Gurion, 1953, pp.150–160), unless otherwise stated.

“It is not Israel’s political debate and quarreling that appeals to masses of Jews,” he berated the occupants of the hall, “but the liberating enterprise performed by the state.” The words were spoken in regard to American Jews’ and, more specifically, American Zionists’ long-standing involvement in Israeli politics. While their engagement with Israel was based on taking a stand on various political issues, Ben-Gurion offered them a different kind of partnership and the speech’s rhetoric was constructed, so that it would lead to a clear and logical conclusion:

Diaspora Zionists in general, and American Zionists in particular, will be irrevocably in the wrong if, instead of joining with the general, unifying, and main efforts of establishing the state and the realization of Zionism–the demands of immigration, settlement, security, and Hebrew culture–they would also join in the divisive, the separative, and the controversial elements among the citizens of Israel. In this “identification” with the divisive and separative you will bring no boon to the state and the country, and harm American Zionism itself … The further Zionism will stray from the essence, the unified and unifying, and identify with the separative and divisive–so it shall alienate the masses and doom itself to ruin.

This is a clear criticism, which stems from the most basic principle of Mamlakhtiyut—the strengthening of the governmental center. Ben-Gurion reprimanded American Zionists for their continuing insistence on strengthening the political subcenters in Israel, instead of placing the common good above all else. Furthermore, during his speech, Ben-Gurion portrayed separation and preoccupation with narrow partisan interests as “a lamentable inheritance,” which constitutes an “Exilic ailment,” and juxtaposed it with “the Mamlakhti qualities of an independent and responsible people,” which he had hoped the citizens of Israel would embrace. However, while Israeli citizens’ focus on the narrower “partisan quarrel” angle is a legitimate (albeit undesirable) one, for the Jewish Diaspora to take such a stand is, to him, an unconscionable deed.

Thus, the speeches’ prominent third motif comes into play: the principle of “limited partnership.” Ben-Gurion greatly utilized “partnership” terminology, which he injected into his speeches at the Bonds rallies. For example, as he generally wrote in his notes for his Madison Square Garden address, which later appeared in his diary: “We shall do our duty–I believe you will do likewise.”²¹

BGA, item 87104, At Madison Square Garden, 10 May 1951.

In his notes for his Los Angeles address, he specified the essence of this partnership: “We believe in the historic partnership of the Jewish people as a whole–we share a great past, we share a great future. We share the responsibility that we accepted to save any Jew who wants to lead a life of freedom and security in their own land.”²²

The speech in Los-Angeles. The original version said, “we share a great past, we share a great past.” But this is, apparently, a copying error.

This terminology is derived from the previous motifs of the speeches and is certainly not a lip service—it reflects Ben-Gurion’s genuine offer to Diaspora Jews to take an active part and contribute the Israeli Mamlakhtiyut. As I argued earlier, this was the central message of the Bonds and the journey.

However, the kind of partnership he offered to the American Jews is quite different than the American Zionist long-standing involvement in Israel. On the one hand, it allows Diaspora Jews to become partners of Israel’s Mamlakhti meta-narrative; but on the other hand, the Mamlakhti emphasis on Israel, as the place where history is made and as an exclusive hub of creativity and enterprise, creates a partnership between unequal partners. By accepting Mamlakhtiyut as an organizing principle, the Diaspora Jews accept its hierarchy and condemn themselves to marginality; yet, they transform themselves from external supporters to shareholders.

Ben-Gurion’s problem with American Zionists (and to some extent with the UJA as well) is that they reject this organizing idea. They failed to understand that the Israelis are the ones who steer the ship and design the Mamlakhtiyut, while noncitizens can support the republican ethos directly, but not fully affect it. The ZOA address is the most explicit in this context. In its beginning, Ben-Gurion presented immigration to Israel as the Zionist’s primary duty from which other duties are derived and constitute “commandments which apply only to the land of Israel” (Mitzvot Ha’teluyot Be’aretz). This point, which makes up the core of the Mamlakhti ethos, creates a fundamental separation between citizens and noncitizens (Ben-Gurion, 1953,p. 152):

The states’ authority does not apply in any way to Jews abroad, nor can these Jews participate in its governing … Every Jew in the world–and not just them–may express their opinion on the happenings in Israel. But a state has no power nor right to oblige those who do not reside within it, and those who do not reside within it have neither the authority nor the power to take part in its political and legal decisions.

In the meeting he held with the press to summarize his journey, Ben-Gurion reiterated this principle, while turning the hierarchal differentiation between those who take part in establishing the state and those who support it from the outside to a guarantee of the continuity of the Zionist movement in the Diaspora²³

BGA, item 235185, A Meeting of the Prime Minister with Jerusalem Journalists, 12 June 1951.

The fate of the Zionist movement in America … depends on their chosen path, and they have yet to set their course. Will they see their center in the same elements which are principle to the establishment of the state and shared by all sections of the Zionist movement … or engage in Yishuv infighting. While these feuds may be justified within the Yishuv … they are artificial to the Jews of America.

This paragraph, exactly like the paragraphs from the ZOA speech I had analyzed above, marks clear borders and clarifies the meaning of the republican hierarchy, which determines that what is permitted to a citizen is not permitted to noncitizens. A clarification which, at the time, was more appropriate than ever—not only because of the aforementioned American Zionist involvement in Israeli politics, but also due to the Diasporic demand to take part in running the state, as seen in the first discussions on the WZO Status Law (1953) held at the time.

Later in the meeting, Ben-Gurion stressed that “the State of Israel is run by its voters”; for the Jews of the Diaspora, the only way to truly affect the state of Israel is by immigrating and the partnership options facing those who choose not to immigrate are limited and come down to supporting Mamlakhtiyut. In Ben-Gurion’s own words: “If the Zionist movement in America wishes to deal with the founding of the State, rather than with Israeli infighting, I believe it does and will have a great effect.”

And thus, the fourth motif of his speeches begins to take form: Ben-Gurion’s demand that Diaspora Jews act in favor of Israeli Mamlakhtiyut. This call to action is parallel to the republican demand from Israeli citizens. It is designed as an alternative (albeit a partial and unsatisfactory one) to the main civil demand of carrying the burden of citizenship and aims to support it. In his addresses at the Bonds committees, this alternative demand was mostly of a financial nature: the audience was requested to fulfill their partial role in the partnership and fund the Israeli immigration absorption enterprise. In other speeches, such as his address at Brandeis University and at the ZOA, Ben-Gurion included another list of calls to action.

This list first appeared in Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Zionist Executive the previous year²⁴

BGA, item 87232, The State of Israel and the Zionist Movement (At the Zionist Executive), 23 May 1950.

and includes the following articles: founding of a pioneering movement; voluntary immigration of experts, who will undertake a similar civil role to that of Machal (overseas volunteers who fought alongside Israeli forces during the 1948 War); Gap Year Programs in Israel for university and high-school students; Jewish tourism as a modern version of pilgrimage; capital investment in the Israeli industry; and Hebrew-pioneering education in the Diaspora, centered around Israeli culture.

Notably, this call to action was considered mandatory and was not an offer or a request. In his speeches, Ben-Gurion emphasized once again that the existence of the State of Israel is necessary to every Jew, “if not to their physical deliverance then to their dignity,” and phrased the existence and success of the State of Israel in fulfilling its goals as a “test for every Jew.” Therefore, not only was this partnership needed, it was also lacking in choice.

Either way, this framing is also an expression of the fifth motif, evident in nearly all speeches, the establishment of the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora on the basis of mutual respect. The Bonds launch and Israel’s request for a loan were presented as a requirement, which stemmed from the irregular nature of the ingathering of the exiles enterprise. A vital effort was made to differentiate between aid to the State of Israel in its Mamlakhti tasks and other aspects of solidarity between Jews. This point is expressed, for example, in Ben-Gurion’s declaration upon his departure from the USA²⁵

The speech upon departure from the USA.

In most of the other tasks confronting us, we feel we can carry on ourselves, but in this job of absorbing hundreds of thousands of immigrants over a short period of time we must of necessity seek outside assistance ... I know that America’s recognition of what we are trying to do in Israel will find its answer in a full subscription to the loan. Our need today is agricultural and industrial machinery, irrigation equipment, building and raw materials … We aim at absorbing many more hundreds of thousands of immigrants and making them economically self-supporting and independence.

Ben-Gurion emphasized that he does not ask for charity, but for investment that combines ideological support and financial profitability. He provided them with a detailed plan founded on the creation of financial development leverages and time and again presented the purchase of loan Bonds as buying stock from the Israeli Mamlakhtiyut corporation. This matter was refined and expressed in his address in Tulsa, Oklahoma²⁶

The speech in Tulsa, OK.

We are launching a loan of 300 million dollars, which we are sure will be repaid, because all these people that are coming, are going to work and not to live on charity. They are coming to be productive and creative element … The State of Israel can be relied upon; when we say we will repay, we will repay … Every Jew in the world who can afford it, will feel privileged to be partner to that great work of reconstruction of his ancient country and his people.

From this paragraph, we can learn not only of the dignified character Ben-Gurion wanted to attribute to Israel, but also of how he managed to depict buying the Bonds as a privilege that the Jewish Diaspora was lucky to receive by fulfilling their duty and taking part in the enterprise for Israel. And while these words were spoken to the Jews in the Diaspora, their meaning is also profoundly significant to the self-perception of Israelis: not as beggars, but as the pioneering avant-garde who executes an innovative and extraordinary vision—that of Mamlakhtiyut. This point which is, in fact, the result of all five motifs, was especially significant to Israelis in this historic period. In the ordinary days of the early 1950s, when every Israeli was obligated to go above and beyond in the name of common good, Ben-Gurion used the Jewish-American crowd to reframe Mamlakhtiyut: the knowledge that the republican deed has thousands of supporters and viewers across the great America charged it with meaning and therefore, with a new power.

Epilogue: The Ben-Gurion Model for Israel–Diaspora Relations

In this article, I have analyzed one of the under-researched key events in the shaping of the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. The discussion focused on Ben-Gurion and the way in which the concept of Mamlakhtiyut was implemented not only in the inter-Israeli arena, but in the inter-Jewish arena as well. In this context, Ben-Gurion’s 1951 journey can be considered a watershed that has profoundly influenced the relationship in the years to come. By establishing the Bonds and changing the narrative, Ben-Gurion proposed to Diaspora Jewry a genuine, though limited, partnership in the state vision and this way hoped to convert them from external passive supporters into active shareholders.

Ben-Gurion was unable to turn the relationship completely and to manage it according to his Mamlakhti worldview. Even before the journey ended, it became clear that the Bonds had not managed to raise the sums of money that its founders hoped to achieve and shortly after his return to Israel, the involvement of American Jews in Israeli politics reached a new high when the ZOA publicly declared its support of the General Zionists in the upcoming Knesset elections.

However, during the journey, Ben-Gurion succeeded in creating a new model, which will design the relationship in the coming years. Israel has made great efforts to present itself as a source of inspiration for the Jews of the Diaspora and not only to seek their help. The terminology of “partnership” became very central in the relationship and even those who did not accept Ben-Gurion’s principles internalized it. Israel relied more and more on alliance with the American Jews and not with American Zionists and finally, the ZOA withdrew from its involvement in the Israeli political system. More importantly, Ben-Gurion’s six calls to action during the journey matured in the coming years and bore fruit: the pioneering movements in the USA created a new generation of young people, some of whom even chose to immigrate to Israel; the experts immigration helped develop Israeli industry and academia; many educational programs were developed for students; tourism to Israel had increased and became a formative experience for many youngsters; capital investment in the textile industry and other areas expanded in the coming years; and Jewish-American education system emphasized the pioneering ethos and expanded the circle of Hebrew speakers.

All these were not necessarily done out of a full internalization of the Mamlakhti vision, but they certainly matched it and profoundly influenced not only the American Jews, but also the Israeli society. Mamlakhti-republican discourse was needed by both sides to deepen the relationship and make it meaningful and sustainable. It is possible that today too, in an era in which it seems that Israel has ceased to be a source of inspiration for many Diaspora Jews and their involvement in Israeli politics is often a source of anger among the Israeli public, a return to some of Ben-Gurion’s simple principles may foster the discourse and reframe some of the fundamental subjects that divide the two communities.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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