Transnational Operations,International Reactions,and Legitimacy: The Case of Turkey and Saudi Arabia

Abstract

Maintaining global peace and security remains an essential concern for many actors in the international system. To achieve this goal, both states and international organizations commend that action needs to be taken against perceived threats to national and international security. However, how to respond to these threats continues to divide the world. The declining role of the UN in peace enforcement, emergence of non-state actors, new forms of threats, and increasing unilateral actions by states have raised questions over the legitimacy of who, when, and how these actions can be taken. This article seeks to examine how international actors respond to transnational counterterrorism events. It adopts a comparative case study to discuss how regional and international actors reacted to Saudi Arabia’s Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen (2015) and Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in Northern Syria (2019). It draws important similarities in the justification of both countries’ actions and the varying responses and attitudes these countries have received for their actions. The study identifies the lack of international consensus on transnational counterterrorism as a catalyst in the crisis being witnessed in crisis resolution. Factors such as timing, universality of the threat, prevailing circumstances, actors involved, and mode of operation shape international response on transnational actions.

Keywords

International counterterrorism legitimacy transnational operations conflict Turkey Saudi Arabia

Introduction

Classical threats to national and international security have changed rapidly over the years, but the existing structures and institutions put in place to curb such threats are not transforming fast enough. Traditionally, interstate conflicts and later civil wars aimed at liberation from colonialism and authoritarian regimes dominated global attention since the end of Second World War. The UN has historically been an important agent of promoting international peace. This mandate is embedded in Article 24 paragraph 1 of the UN charter. The Security Council, in particular, has passed several resolutions aimed at providing comprehensive approaches to counterterrorism (Heupel, 2007; Rosand, 2003; Ward, 2003). However, scholars (Chopra, 1996; David, 1999; Paris, 1997) have observed that although the UN has attempted to adjust its responses to cope with the changing nature of violence and conflicts in the world, the level of success has been minimal, especially in the last two decades. From its peacekeeping to peace maintenance and peace enforcement strategies, the UN has performed relatively well in two areas. First is its response and discouragement of interstate conflicts, which have significantly reduced since 1945. Second, its contribution to peaceful settlement during pro-independence and democratic transitions in many parts of the world have, in the past, yielded good results. But, as the world continues to face new security challenges, the international body is becoming less effective. For example, the threat of terrorism is one challenge that continues to expose the crisis within the UN in promoting peace and security. Table 1 below shows the trend in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks across the world between 1994 and 2017.

Table 1.

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)

Terrorism has become a problematic phenomenon for states and non-state actors, and while it poses serious threats to human security and state sovereignty, there appears to be little consensus as to what or who terrorist and terrorism constitute. Policymakers and academicians are divided on who or what terrorism is or how to deal with it. International organizations such as the UN provides a vague definition of terrorism often open to abuse by member states under whose discretion radical domestic and foreign policies are adopted in the name of counterterrorism (Ganor, 2002; Hodgson & Tadros, 2013; Nyadera & Bincof, 2019; Richards, 2014; Wolfendale, 2007). The general lack of international consensus on terrorism as a concept and how to respond to the challenge is driving states away from seeking support and approval of their actions in dealing with the threats posed by terrorism. Until 9/11 terrorism was largely seen as a domestic affair that states could deal with within existing judicial and security measures. Shortly after 9/11, the United States was able to establish an international coalition against terrorism (Rudner, 2004; Wanandi, 2002, p. 184) but such an approach is increasingly becoming unpopular. This is partly due to international concerns over the outcome of some of the operations conducted as part of international counterterrorism measures.

Wilkinson (2006) observes that despite forming various coalitions to combat terrorism, limited success has been registered in tackling the menace. Fatigue and prolonged engagement in war are making states facing the direct threat of terrorism to be more isolated in dealing with the threat. States are, on the other hand, responding with increasingly offensive and preemptive strategies against “terrorists” leading to operations beyond their territorial jurisdiction (See operations of Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia, India’s operations in Pakistan, and the United States and EU’s global war on terrorism). Further, reasons for adopting offensive measures against terrorism may include the growing influence and networks of terrorist groups across the world, the strategy of occupying territories with unstable and ineffective governments, changing and unpredictable tactics by terrorists, lack of a universal approach to terrorism, and domestic pressure or rising populism. State actions against terrorist groups have not gone unchecked even though terrorism is widely condemned. Questions have been raised with regards to how counterterrorism measures threaten human security, how they result in abuse of fundament human rights, the politicization of the war on terrorism, excessive use of force, and violations of other states’ sovereignty (Cronin, 2015; Jackson, 2018; Nyadera, 2018; Richards, 2015). This has, thus, triggered a debate over the legitimacy of states’ behavior in the international arena.

This article discusses two cases of states’ involvement in international counterterrorism actions which have received mixed reactions. The cases of Saudi Arabia’s operation in Yemen (2015) and Turkey’s operation in Northern Syria (2019) offer striking similarities in terms of motivation and justification to launch the operations. The study aims to examine the narratives given by states to justify transnational actions against non-state actors, how regional and international actors respond to such actions, and identify factors that influence other countries to support or condemn transnational operations. The study looks at the justifications behind the Turkish and Saudi operations in Syria and Yemen, respectively. It relies on the analysis of the reactions the two countries have received for their actions and contextualize these responses based on several international, regional, and domestic factors to identify the reasons for the mixed reactions in approving or disapproving the operations.

Literature Review

Transnational counterterrorism strategies are increasingly becoming visible in the international system since 9/11 (Belasco, 2009; Cassidy, 2006; Monar, 2007; Steger, 2008). Their prominence has been strengthened by narratives such as “intervention by invitation” which have been used by countries such as France in Mali (2013), United States-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and Russian’s entry into Ukraine (2014) as well as “threat to national security” to justify their operations (Bannelier & Christakis, 2013; Byrne, 2016; Fox, 2014; Nolte, 2010). However, cross-border operations have often raised mixed reactions from other states and non-state actors. Yet, despite the importance of legitimacy in state action, few scholars have sought to examine why similar actions have caused a mixed reaction. In this section, the article discusses two operations undertaken by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This gives an important background to understand their motivation and justification from which similarities will be drawn and put into context.

Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in Northern Syria (2019)

In 2019, President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey while giving a speech at the 74th UN General Assembly, declared an ambitious plan to resettle over 2 million of its 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. The resettlement plan outlined by Turkey at the Assembly hinted towards the establishment of a safe zone in Northern Syria. Turkey outlined a proposal for the buffer zone to cover an area stretching 80 kilometers from the town of Jarablus to Al-Malikiyah that is close with the Iraq border. Additionally, the safe would expand 30 kilometers wide into Syria (cutting through Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor towns) from the Turkish border. Turkey highlighted three key benefits for establishing this safe zone. First, the safe zone would be a haven for Syrian refugees to resettle. Secondly, the safe zone would push back the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) away from the Turkey–Syrian border. Turkey considers SDF a threat to its national security because of existing links with Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê‎ (Kurdistan workers’ party [PKK])/Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s protection units [YPG]) that is a designated terrorist group by the European Union (EU), United States and Turkey. Third, the Syrian government would be able to consolidate its territory for the first time since the civil war broke out in 2011. These proposals seemed to offer benefits not only to Turkey but also neighboring states that have had to deal with the socio-economic challenges of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Nonetheless, skeptics of this grand refugee resettlement plan questioned the practicality of its implementation. For instance, concerns were raised as to whether US soldiers stationed in more than 10 military bases in Northern Syria (Kurdish-held territories) would withdraw from the area. This was a critical aspect given that both the United States and Kurdish SDF fighters were cooperating in combat and security intelligence in the war against ISIS terrorist organization. On the other hand, both the United States and Turkey are allies and key members of NATO. As such, a consequential dilemma emerged from this complex and interconnected relations involving Turkey, United States and the Kurdish SDF fighters located in Northern Syria including in the areas proposed to be part of the safe zone. In the Norther Syrian regions of Al-Hasakah and Kobani’s Harab Isk regions, the United States had established two large air force military bases.

Nonetheless, on October 7 2019, an unprecedented move by the US government to make an impromptu withdrawal of the US troops from for Northern Syria eased the dilemma. President Trump while announcing this decision that surprised many political analysts and US politicians including some of his close allies in Washington also defended his position on withdrawing US soldiers from Northern Syria. Through social media, Trump tweeted that:

Almost three years, but it is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home. WE WILL FIGHT WHERE IT IS TO OUR BENEFIT, AND ONLY FIGHT TO WIN. Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and the Kurds will now have to…

(Trump official Twitter handle, October 7 2019).

On October 9 2019, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring in Northern Syria to clear the area of SDF fighters. A combined force of Turkish soldiers and its Syrian allies captured the provinces of Al-Hasakeh and Raqqa alongside other towns such as Ras Al Ain, Abbiad, Halafin and Abiad. Cognizant of victory for the combined Turkish forces, SDF negotiated with the Assad regime to deploy Syrian government forces in the remaining towns of Al Tabqa, Menbij, Kobani, Ein Issa, Al-Hasakeh and the provinces of Raqqa and Allepo (Liz et al., 2019). Operation Peace Spring attracted both international and domestic reactions directed to the respective governments of Turkey and United States. Increasing pressure from the international community led to a temporary agreement for the cessation of fighting that was announced on the October 13 2019 after negotiations led by US Vice-President Mike Pence and President Erdogan in Ankara. The negotiations yielded a 120-hour grace period without fighting in Northern Syrian towns and provinces to facilitate a “complete” withdrawal of the SDF fighters away from the Turkish border (BBC, 2019). Another meeting between Russia and Turkey signed on the October 24 2019 in Sochi further extended the ceasefire by an additional 150 hours.

A report released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2019) documents that Operation Peace Spring displaced more than 220,000 people, and that a majority of this new refugee wave fled to Kurdish-controlled territories in Iraq. The Iraqi government responded with a reinforced deployment of government soldiers at the Iraqi border to prevent entry of ISIS fighters and members (Mohammed, 2019).While the ceasefire has provided a much needed break from fighting in the region, implementation of the resettlement plan continues to be clouded in uncertainty. This is because of the massive resources needed from the international community through a well-coordinated program. As of October 24 2019, control of the Syrian territory is illustrated in Figure 1.

Saudi Arabia Decisive Storm Operation in Yemen (2015)

One of the most protracted and high intensity conflicts experienced in the last five decades has been the Yemen conflict. Statistical data drawn from the ACLED database indicate that the conflict has led to the loss of over 93,000 lives of combatants and innocent civilians between 2015 and 2019. Figure 2 shows the different forms and trend of violence that have been taking place in Yemen between 2015 and 2019. The conflict became severe particularly during the last one year claiming the lives of 42,000 people in Yemen. As it is often common with protracted conflicts, millions of other people have been displaced, millions suffer from acute starvation, and others from physical disabilities and psychological torture. Slow response to the Yemen crisis has sparked questions regarding the role of the international community and international institutions such as the UN in enforcing peace and conflict resolution. The conflict experienced in Yemen can offer a unique case study on the declining role of international organizations in peace and security. The absence of firm actions by international organizations such as the UN perhaps underlie the reason why states such as Saudi Arabia became involved in a conflict that has now transformed into a multidimensional conflict attracting many actors with different interests. Whereas exploring the factors motivating different actors in the Yemen conflict can be subjected to further studies, this section is confined to examining the response of international and regional actors on the involvement of Saudi Arabia in the conflict.

Figure 1.

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (2019).

Figure 2.

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (2019).

The nature of Yemen conflict has always influenced a trend whereby the underlying reasons of the conflict are overlooked because of how frequent the conflict is transforming. Nonetheless, in 2011, nationwide protests emerged demanding an end of more than three decades of President Abdullah Saleh’s regime (Antelava, 2011; Hill & Nonneman, 2011;). A declaration of support by General Mohsinal-Ahmar to protestors after some were killed during demonstrations exposed divisions within the military ranks. Negotiations orchestrated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after sustained coercions from the international community led to the resignation of President Saleh (Whitaker, 2011). The UN also became involved to oversee a peaceful transition of power. However, the GCC-brokered agreement did not hold as rebellions dominated by the Houthis, Hirak, and other marginalized tribes emerged from claims that the agreement did little to transform the status quo. One conspicuous failure of the agreement was its failure to account for the role and a possible exit of Saleh from active political activities. Instead, Saleh was able to maintain his position as the head of the General People’s Party (GPP) which he used to galvanize other minority groups in Yemen and establish an alliance and started calling for changes in the country’s power structure and governance (Al-Akwaa, 2017; Juneau, 2016; Palik, 2018).

Meanwhile, Masur Hadi who had become the new head of state earnestly began undertaking changes in his new administration by restructuring the command of top security and military departments, and removing officers that were deemed loyal to former president Saleh. The reshuffling agenda sparked a new wave in discord between top military officers and political elites. Moreover, whereas there were attempts to conciliate minority groups, the absence of constitutional reforms, economic decline, collapse of social services, opposition over proposed federal system of government by resource-rich regions, and rationing of basic goods, ultimately plunged the country into anarchy. Starting September 2014, the Houthis begun to gradually capture different positions of Yemen’s capital Sanaa. Several key government installations in the city having been occupied by Houthis forced the entire government to resign. The Houthis also captured and held the president hostage in January 2015. Hadi escaped from his captors and fled to Aden where reaffirmed his status as the legitimate president of Yemen. In April 2015 resolution 2216 was passed by the UN Security Council recognizing Hadi as the legitimate president of Yemen.

This resolution had an important impact regarding how the international community perceived both Hadi and the conflict. Hadi henceforth acquired and enjoyed international legitimacy and the conflict was transformed into one involving the state and non-state actors. The resolution sparked violent fighting between the Houthis (aligned to Hadi) and Salafi militia groups allied with Saleh as well the entrance of other groups such as ISIS pursuing different goals (Bellal, 2018, p. 5). The violent conflicts in the country ultimately forced president Hadi into exile and he sought the assistance of regional states led by Saudi Arabia.

On March 26 2015, Saudi Arabia responded to appeals by Mansur Hadi to the GCC and the UN Security Council for an urgent military support by launching Operation Decisive Storm to prevent the Houthis from advancing and potentially capturing the city of Aden (Al-Karimi, 2015; Buys & Garwood-Growers, 2018; Russia Today, 2015; Ruys & Ferro, 2016). Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with support of other regional states and international actors led a coalition of troops to counter the Houthi militias who were focused on capturing Aden and with it the entire government of Mansour Hadi. Whereas there were criticisms of the operation from certain quotas such as Iran that favored dialogue, Saudi Arabia launched the operation with a large international support base. Table 2 shows the number of of aerial bombing carried out by the Saudi -led coalition in Yemen between 2015 and 2019.

Table 2.

Source: Yemen Data Project (2019).

The sustained strategy of bombardment by the Saudi–UAE-led coalition attracted international criticism following massive deaths of innocent civilian caught in between the coalition and the rebel fighting. A report released by the Yemen Data Project (2019) highlights that between 2015 and 2019 over 20,000 air strikes were conducted by the coalition air forces. Moreover, 6,331 air raids were conducted on non-military targets including residential areas, political headquarters, communication installations, and social gatherings. The raids also targeted 6,961 military objectives and 6, 901 are yet to be classified.

Justification for Transnational Counterterrorism

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have sought to justify the need for their involvement in fighting groups they considered to be terrorists beyond their borders. While the UN seems to have limited ability to stop states from engaging in transnational operations, countries continue to use legal, institutional, political, rhetoric, and technical maneuvers to justify their actions (De Londras, 2018, 2019; Murphy, 2015). Following are some reasons given by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to justify their recent operations.

National security: Realists emphasize that states are constantly faced with national security threats given the anarchic nature of the international system (Mearsheimer, 2007). Governments are therefore reduced to positions whereby they must pursue or implement policies that can guarantee their survival in the face of domestic or foreign threats. The UN Security Council resolutions 1624 (2005), 2170 (2014), and 2178 (2014); and Article 51 of the UN Charter, cognizant of these threats, have provided states with international legal framework for the right to self-defense. Since 1978, various administrations of Turkey have been dealing with the national security threat posed by the PKK terrorist organization that has been engaging in violent terror activities to demand for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997; Özcan, 2012). The existing relations between SDF and the PKK influenced Turkey to declare both as terror groups collaborating in instigating terror attacks inside Turkey (Parlar, 2016). For years, the biggest challenge for Turkey in curbing the national security threat posed by SDF is the close working relations with US military in Northern Syria in their fight against ISIS. The impromptu decision by the United States to withdraw troops from the area provided Turkey with an opportune moment to conduct military operations against SDF. Ankara became more concerned that PKK could influence SDF to share sophisticated military equipment acquired during the war against ISIS from US military.

Saudi Arabia justified its military operation in Yemen as a response to a “direct appeal” from a “legitimate” government of Yemen. The internationally recognized administration of Hadi based in Aden designated the rebellion mounted by Houthis as a direct threat to Yemeni national security and sovereignty (Nußberger, 2017; Ruys & Ferro, 2016, p. 62; Sharp, 2015). Additionally, Saudi Arabia besides emphasizing that the coalition was responding to safeguard civilian lives, the Saudi Kingdom was also anxious about prospective future or long-term consequences of a successful coup against an internationally recognized government in its domestic politics and also having to potentially deal with an Iranian-backed Houthi regime regarding its foreign policy interests.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia share significant concerns about the actions of armed non-state actors near or along the sovereign territorial boundaries. Out of the 822 kilometers (511 miles) of border shared between Turkey and Syria, the SDF territories in Northern Syria occupy an estimated 130 kilometers (80 miles) of the boarder stretch. Saudi Arabia also shares about 1,800 kilometers (1,100 miles) sovereign boundary with Yemen. The transformation of terrorism into a transnational threat has spooked states to become more vigilant particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa.

Threat of ungoverned spaces: Conflict trends in the last two decades in countries such as Somalia, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iraq offer a unique experiences on how internal conflicts can lead to emergence of ungoverned spaces that become occupied by armed non-state actors seeking to expand and become transnational. The 2011 demonstrations that emerged in Syria offered an opportunity to groups such as the SDF to exploit the demonstrations and expand its territory, establish working relations and support from US in the fight against ISIS, and exponent its ideology for an independent Kurdish state in the region. Turkey’s strategy against the threat of ungoverned space in Northern Syria has been to resettle over two million Syrians along its border stretch with Syria and change the demographics of the area. Saudi Arabia on the other hand considers that the presence of ungoverned spaces in Yemen would attract other non-state actors such as militia groups or terrorist organizations in the region. A 2015 attack on two Shiite mosques in Sanaa by ISIS member and an increasing support of the Houthi rebels by Iran reinforced Saudi Arabia’s stance in Yemen (Kalfood & Smith, 2015; Sohlman, 2012). Iran has been increasing its influence in the Gulf and the larger Middle East region having established allies in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad and thus, losing Yemen to the influence of Iran meant enabling its adversary to get closer to its borders (Laub & Robinson, 2016, p. 4). The bombing of Aramco oil fields on September 19 2019 by Houthi militia reflects the threat that ungoverned spaces can have on states. As such if such threats were taken into consideration by Saudi Arabia in its operations against the Houthis in Yemen, then their response can be perceived as legitimate.

Last recourse: Whereas international law does not openly promote violence as a peace and conflict resolution mechanism, it strives to manage the conduct of combatants during armed conflicts. The concept of Jus ad Bellum permits states, regional organizations, and international institutions to appropriate violence as a last recourse to peace after all other avenues have failed to yield such. The conflict in Yemen was exposed to several peace initiatives that nonetheless failed to resolve the conflict. The first peace process initiated by the GCC, UN and the EU in April 2011 yielded the Initiative on Yemen whose implementation process was to be spearheaded by the GCC through various implementation frameworks (ICG, 2012). The failure of this first peace process led to another agreement, Peace and National Partnership Agreement signed in September 2014. This agreement was signed between the Yemeni government headed by Hadi and the Houthi rebels who agreed to surrender the territories they had captured from government control (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2018).This agreement also collapsed and the crisis worsened after Houthi rebels captured senior government officials and placed them under house arrest on January 25 2015 (United States Institute of Peace, 2015). Because of the failure of these peace efforts and an attempt by the rebels to capture Aden after overrunning Sanaa, proponents of the Saudi Arabia coalition argued that the use of violence became a last resort.

Turkey argues that for several decades, it has been committed towards achieving a peace process regarding the Kurdish question within Turkey (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997; Ensaroglu, 2013). The Justice and Development Party partly inculpated the Republican Party for Turkish nationalism as one of the underlying causes of the Kurdish question and promised to resolve the issue through a peaceful process (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). Indeed, the Turkish government became involved in several negotiations with the Kurdish leaders in Turkey such as the jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan in a period that came to be popularly known as the Çözüm Süreci (solution process) from 2012 (Ozkahraman, 2017). However, the absence of trust and sabotage of the peace processes led to failure and resumption of hostilities (Göksel & Mandıracı, 2016). Turkey has often reiterated its commitment to finding a peaceful resolution to Kurdish concerns including reopening the Kurdish TRT channel and permitting Kurdish political parties to participate in elections. However, continued violence by section of the Kurdish groups in Turkey is what has been considered as justification by the government to respond through military operations both within Turkey and across its sovereign borders.

Refugee crisis: The military operations by both Turkey and Saudi Arabia can be argued to have been influenced by humanitarian needs. Turkey for instance, has the world’s largest refugee population since 2011 (Baban et al., 2017; İçduygu, 2015) and data released by the UNHCR (2019) estimates that there are approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Initially, the government received domestic political support for hosting the refugees but increasing economic problems in the country espoused by a weak Lira (local currency) and absence of adequate support from the international community, particularly the EU, led to the emergence of anti-Syrian refugee sentiments in Turkey. These sentiments were projected clearly during the municipal elections held in 2019 whereby the ruling Justice and Development Party lost in both Istanbul (Turkey’s economic hub) and the capital Ankara. This highlights the urgency of the government to establish a safe zone and resettle over 2 million refugees in Northern Syria.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is however not a signatory of the UN Convention on Refugees and Riyadh voted against granting anybody a refugee status and instead opted for other options. For instance, it supports the resettlement of refugees in other third countries and giving residency permits to some people. This stance by Saudi Arabia can be accredited to the massive numbers of pilgrims that visit the Kingdom for the Hajj. However, it remains in the interest of Kingdom to not deal with a massive influx of refugees in its borders because of the conflict in Yemen that has already displaced millions of Yemenis between 2011 and 2015. The military operation conducted by Saudi Arabia was therefore aimed at ending the war in Yemen and minimize refugee displacement especially now that the Kingdom was facing international criticism against its inaction to the refugee crisis.

Domestic politics: The military operations conducted by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and Turkey in Syria can hardly be analyzed without examining the impact of domestic politics, especially regarding the decision-making process for such operations. Often, war is perceived as a “continuation of politics by other means” (Callum, 2001; Esposito, 1954; Yoo, 1996). While this is an important aspect of military operations, it does not whatsoever cloud the fact states may be driven by genuine concerns for national or perhaps even regional security. Turkey has experienced sustained changes in its Syria policy since the onset of the conflict and this can largely be attributed to the influence of domestic politics. When the Justice and Development Party assumed power in 2002, reforms yielded rapid economic growth in Turkey and a rebirth of religious consciousness. The government was therefore able to easily convey a religious message that accepting refugees was a noble responsibility nurtured out of humanistic values such as compassion, kindness, and above all, religious solidarity. While a vast majority of the Turkish citizens supported the country’s decision to host refugees, declining economic performance was blamed on the huge number of refugees in the country by many citizens. After a comparatively weaker performance in national and municipal elections between 2014 and 2019, and the establishment of a coalition with the nationalist MHP party, government policy towards Syria shifted. The bipartisan support for Operation Peace Spring has often been loosely interpreted as a unilateral understanding from Turkish political parties. However, a more intricate understanding of the Turkish voter behavior or public opinion reflects that even if the operation had certain questionable aspects, no leading political party would go against it because of concerns about public backlash.

For Saudi Arabia, military intervention and an anticipated victory against the Houthi rebels offered an opportune moment for King Salman to foster the credentials of his son Muhammad bin Salman who a few months before the operations had been bestowed with more responsibilities on behalf of the Kingdom. Restructuring of the Kingdom’s executive elevated Mohammed bin Salman to the deputy crown prince—which is a prime position to further advance to kingship in future—minister of defense, and the head of the economic and development affairs (Cochran, 2019; Hokayem & Roberts, 2016). These changes raised concerns with some top officials mutedly questioning the logic behind bestowing far-reaching powers to the less experienced and young 29-year old Mohammed bin Salman (Stenslie, 2015, pp. 2–3). The Yemen peace operation would therefore have offered the opportunity to the king to justify his choice of the crown prince and to Mohammed bin Salman to also prove his leadership capacity and silence those who may have silently doubted his capacity. Mohammed did not hesitate to use this opportunity and embarked on media propaganda through media videos showing him visiting troops in Yemen and directing operations from his office. These were attempts to portray him as a competent “commander-in chief.” King Salman also exploited the opportunity to galvanize domestic support in what was widely viewed as a direct assault on Iran that is known to provide support to Houthis.

Lack of international action: The international actors such as the UN failed to take a firm actionable response in Yemen and most of its contribution was limited to issuing statements regarding the need for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and upholding human rights during the conflict. It is because of the unpredictability of the UN that states often consider responding to both internal and external threats as a sovereign responsibility and right. The Kurdish question in Turkey has claimed over 50,000 lives in over four decades (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011; Ünal, 2016, pp. 92–96). Nonetheless, international action to facilitate the resolution of this conflict is yet to be scene. On the contrary, some countries have been involved in providing support to some of the groups Turkey considers as threats to its national security. As such, Operation Peace Spring was also a clear message to the international community by Turkey that in the absence of international action, Turkey can take unilateral actions to protect its national security and sovereignty by invoking its right to self-defense.

The impact of the Yemen conflict even before the launch of Operation Decisive Storm was already clear. Data from ACLED between 2011 and 2015 highlight more than 1,000 violent events. These violent events account for the death of thousands of people in Yemen, displacement of millions of people, and a near collapse of economic activities in the country after the Houthis captured the port of Hodeida. Despite deteriorating conditions in Yemen, the UN failed to mobilize and deploy an international force and instead resorted to diplomacy by appointing a special representative to Yemen which did not yield much progress so far as the conflict was brought to a halt. By the time president Hadi was seeking support from the UN, EU, and GCC, the Houthis had grown in numbers and acquired sophisticated military equipment and become more committed to the rebellion. Saudi Arabia therefore considered a direct invitation from Yemen government as a justification for launching the operation.

Territorial integrity and stability: Turkey and Saudi Arabia also justified their military operations on the premise that they would assist respective governments regain control over territories captured by outlawed groups and who have shown intent and capacity to establish new autonomous states or regions. Turkey’s intervention against the SDF in Syria was critical as it could disrupt an emerging trend for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region. In Iraq for example, the Kurds had been successful in establishing the Iraq Kurdistan autonomous region. The success of such a movement in Syria would also influence such a movement in southeast Turkey that is predominantly occupied by Kurds. Although Turkey is largely opposed to the Assad regime in Syria (Tür, 2016), it considers its existence a lesser bargain than the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state that may potentially lead to loss of parts of Turkey’s sovereign boundaries. This is reflected in the 10-point Sochi agenda signed between Turkey and Russia on October 22 2019 that permitted Syrian government forces to oversee patrols in the northeastern regions formerly under the control of SDF. In Yemen, existing tensions between the northerners and southerners even before the outbreak of the conflict was already threatening the long-term unity of the state. Al-Hirak which is a south Yemeni political outfit, had been calling for the secession of south Yemen since 2007. Other groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also moved to Yemen to establish part of its caliphate therefore threatening the territorial integrity of Yemen. As such the Saudi operation was also meant to clear these non-state militia groups and restore the internationally recognized government.

Reactions to Saudi Arabia (Yemen 2015) and Turkey’s (Syria 2019) Operations

Despite the reasons and different views given by both Turkey and Saudi Arabia regarding their military operations in Syria and Yemen respectively, other international actors espoused different reactions. Operations by Saudi Arabia got the support of most Arab states, the United Kingdom and United States. Turkey on the other hand received heavy criticism for its Operation Peace Spring in Syria. Some response by different regional organizations, international institutions and leading global powers include the following:

The UN: It continues to maintain diplomatic approach to majority of the interstate conflicts, especially those related with terrorism. However, this approach is yet to prove its effectiveness during the past two decades. Many conflicts have transformed into serious civil wars affecting the lives of millions of people, yet the UN has maintained its approach of appealing for restraint of combatants without any firm action. In the Saudi Arabia operation, the UN deputy spokesperson, Farhan Haq stated, “UN does not believe in military actions to resolve the Yemeni conflict” (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). The Security Council also failed to pass any resolution or directly condemn the military operation of Saudi Arabia in Yemen because of existing divisions among members of the Security Council regarding the importance of such an operation.

The UN remained non-comital. The UN Secretary-General only issued a statement calling for respect for the sovereignty of Syria (AFP, 2019). Another statement by the UN Syrian Humanitarian Coordinator only emphasized the importance of any military operation to not cause further displacement of civilians (Nebehay, 2019). The different interests pursued by both Russia and the United States also led to a divided UN Security Council on issue regarding Syria. Both Russia and United States, for example, vetoed the Council’s resolution supported by Germany, France, United Kingdom, Belgium, and Poland that called on Turkey to stop unilateral military actions in Syria (Daily Sabah, 2019).

Arab League: The organization was among the first international actor to take a firm stance towards Turkey’s military operations in Syria. During an emergency convention held on October 29 2019 in Cairo which was just a day after Turkey launched its Operation Peace Spring in Syria, members adopted a resolution describing Turkey’s actions as an “aggressive invasion” against Syria. The resolution also highlighted that Turkey was acting contrary to international law. The Secretary-General of the Arab League Aboul Gheit, described Turkey’s actions as “blatant violation of Syria’s sovereignty” (Al Jazeera, 2019, October 10).

The Arab League adopted a different stance from the one directed towards Turkey. The Arab League convened a few days after Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes in Yemen to review the operation. On March 29 2015 the organization adopted a resolution to establish a joint military force that would be tasked with intervening in Yemen until the Houthis withdraw and surrender their military equipment (Los Angeles Times, 2015). A majority of the organization’s member states not only supported the Saudi Arabia-led operation but also provided additional physical and logistical support.

The EU: It has often maintained a diplomatic stance towards conflict resolution which calls for the dialogue between combatants and the essence of respecting human rights during conflicts. Notably, the position adopted by the EU is not tantamount to a reflection of the stances of individual member states. In the case of Turkey, a statement released by the EU Migration Commissioner stated that “the European Union remains committed to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian state.” Additionally, the EU High Representative stated, “In light of the Turkish military operation in north-east Syria, the EU reaffirms that a sustainable solution to the Syrian conflict cannot be achieved militarily. The EU calls upon Turkey to cease the unilateral military action” (France 24, 2019). But sustained pressure from a section of the member states yielded a unanimous decision for the Union to sanction Turkey including establishing an arms embargo. The resolution establishing the sanction on Turkey further clarified that the EU disapproved in the strongest terms the unilateral military operations conducted in Syria by Turkey (Brzozowski, 2019). The stance of the EU towards the Saudi-led operation in Yemen was mixed as the Union only highlighted its concern regarding human rights violations while other member states such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany offered support for the operation (Musa, 2017, pp. 438–441).

The United States, China, and Russia: The various stances adopted by these three powers are significant because of their ability to influence and shape the structure and balance of international affairs. The United States’ stance on Turkey’s operation in Syria is marked by inconsistency partly due to the different positions between the executive and other arms of the government. The executive maintained an unpredictable policy towards its Syria policy (Singh, 2019). The US Congress unlike the executive issued two congressional resolutions for sanctions against Turkey and recognized the Armenian question as a genocide (Pamuk, 2019). The United States however provided immense support towards the Syrian operations during the Obama administration although it did not involve its troops (Dilanian, 2015).

Russia registered its disapproval of both operations and wrote a formal letter addressed to both the UN Security Council and Arab League advocating for cessation of fighting in the Saudi-led operation in Yemen (Sharkov, 2015). In Syria, Russia condemned Turkish military operations and offered to mediate between the two countries (Al Jazeera, 2019). China also enunciated its “concern” for the operation in Yemen and appealed to the actors involved to find peaceful means of resolving the conflict. Responding to the military operations in Syria, through its Foreign Ministry, China expressed that “Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity must be respected and upheld” (Al Jazeera, 2019, October 13).

Members of the international community such as Palestinian Authority, Israel, Canada, United Kingdom, Turkey, Bangladesh, Somalia, France, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Germany, Malaysia, and members of the GCC, OIC openly reiterated their support for the Saudi-led coalition in conducting a military operation in Yemen (Fraihat, 2015). Comparatively, Turkey’s operation in Syria attracted relatively fewer support. Turkey’s operation in Northern Syria was supported by Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Rehimov, 2019). Other states opposed the operation or did not espouse any concerns regarding the impact of the operation (Al Jazeera, 2019)

Factors Influencing State’s Reaction

Although the position of third-party states may have little impact on a country’s decision to carry out transitional operations, states value and are keen to gain international support in most cases. The cost of ignoring international concerns may have long-term consequences such as isolation, sanctions, and being considered a rogue state. It, therefore, matters that countries consider several factors that can shape international reactions for their actions. Some of these factors include:

Timing: The question as to when a country should consider extending its operations into other countries is critical in determining whether the action will be supported or not. The global trend has been that there is more international support for operations when the situation has deteriorated, as evident from pictures and videos showing people suffering or after a major attack. The Saudi-led coalition got general support as the situation on the ground in Yemen was already desperate after three years of war. This also explains why the operation received huge criticisms when it was believed to be furthering the suffering. In the case of Turkey, most countries were not moved by the situation between Turkey and the SDF, even though Ankara attempted to show that the group posed a threat to its security. Ankara’s timing was based on the withdrawal of American troops and not a desperate state of war. This made the operation a preemptive attack, thus attracting condemnation as the United States did with its preemptive attack on Iraq in 2003.

A coalition of states: This comes down to the number of countries involved in the operation and the clarity of its objectives. No doubt that transnational operations in recent years have involved a coalition of countries in different operations (example, the global coalition in Libya, ISIS, counter-piracy in the horn of Africa, G5 in Sahel). While this can help with the pooling of resources needed to conduct massive operations, it is also an important legitimating factor for the countries involved. The Saudi-led coalition directly involved over 10 countries and several others providing indirect support. The support here is in the form of general approval for the operation to begin and such support can change if the coalition does not deliver. Turkey is seen as taking a unilateral decision from its proposed plan, it was going to seek the support of other countries to finance the establishment of the safe zone, and this made the operation less popular from the beginning among countries which would be required to contribute in the safe zone. Furthermore, previous unilateral decisions such as the Russian operation in Crimea, the US invasion of Iraq, and Indian handling of Kashmir have been met with condemnation.

Regional and international organizations: Regional and international organizations are important actors of global governance and wield important influence in approving state actions. Seeking the support of international actors will most likely increase the level of support a country receives. The Saudi operation was supported by both the GCC and the OIC while using other international norms and laws to support the military action against the Houthis. President Erdogan did mention his intended plan for the region at the UN General Assembly, but the avenue where he made the pronouncement did not involve any deliberation nor were votes cast, resolutions or decisions made in such a session.

The position of the ruling government: Sovereignty is perhaps the most critical aspect in the contemporary state structure. This gives the government of the day the authority to make declarations that are taken seriously by international actors. Therefore, it is more likely that the actions of one state in another may get support or condemnation depending on the position of the regime in power in the affected country. In Yemen, the government of Hadi gave a green light for the operation to be conducted while in Syria, the deep-rooted difference between Ankara and Damascus led to the opposition of Turkey’s operation. When there is confrontation between the government and the country conducting the operation, the latter is portrayed as an invader leading to widespread condemnation.

The actors in question and their perceived contribution to international efforts: One of the important lessons one can draw from the Saudi and Yemen case is non-state actors are increasingly shaping the attitude of countries toward other countries. The Houthis and other armed groups in Yemen, such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, are seen as much bigger threats to international security, and thus some countries would be grateful for the Saudi-led coalition. On the other hand, the SDF fighters in Syria who were being targeted by Turkey are seen as dependable partners in combating ISIS which poses a greater threat to international security. This means that while the SDF posed a threat to Turkey’s national security, ISIS, which the SDF had fought and are currently holding thousands of its fighters is considered a bigger priority. International actors appear to be more concerned with the reemergence of international terrorist groups than domestic terrorists.

Conclusion

The article examined some of the factors that drive countries to engage in transnational operations and challenges that arise with justifying their concerns to international actors. The study finds that the attitude and positions of countries on events and actions by other countries are not consistent and vary depending on some factors. It concludes that an operation is likely to get more international support when the initial violence has reached an unprecedented level, and therefore immediate and swift action is needed to curb the suffering. In addition, the case studies reveal that a transnational operation may get more support if actors are acting under a coalition of many countries. This legitimacy is only important in the initial stages of whether the operation is acceptable or not. The continued support for the operation is subject to further conditions including its impact on the civilian population and respect of international laws, which are areas that can be investigated further.

An important observation is that international organizations, particularly the UN, will need to reflect on its approaches and reactions to violence and contemporary conflicts. Diplomacy, which the UN highly depends on, is no longer effective, especially when dealing with non-state actors such as terrorists who are not obliged to adhere to international norms and achieve their goals by inflicting pain and suffering on civilians. In other words, statements expressing deep concern, calling for the protection of civilians, and asking parties to adopt negotiation only promote impunity among actors.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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