Constraints and Adjustments in the US–Yemeni Relations

Early Official Contacts (1946–1956)

Yemen’s ruler Imam Yahya became familiar with the Americans after meeting Charles C. Crane, who was a member King-Crane Commission tasked to find out which great power the population in the region preferred as a mandate holder to rule over them. Crane made contacts with the Imam, but he also explored the commercial potential of that country. He opened Saudi Arabia to oil exploration, sent the engineer Karl Twitcher to explore mining possibilities in Yemen and even constructed the first steel bridge on its border with Saudi Arabia. Impressed by the sincerity of his American guests who came to visit him, the Imam came to believe that the United States could be helpful to him without taking over the country. In the spring of 1944, he sent an agent to the US mission in Cairo asking for mediation in the dispute over his border with British-dominated Aden.

Given that Saudi Arabia began looming large in the eyes of the US government, the response was immediate, and the State Department sent its consul in Aden, Harlan P. Clark, to meet the Imam. According to Clark, his delegation was received cordially by the Imam who asked for American technicians and expressed his desire to sign a treaty of friendship with the United States. After Clark informed his colleagues in Washington that Yemen had considerable quantities of minerals such as iron, lead, copper, mica and oil, the US government began showing greater interest in that country. According to Richard Sanger of the State Department’s Bureau of Near East Affairs, President Harry Truman immediately agreed to recognize the Imam’s government and to establish diplomatic relations with it because, as he put it, “the United States now had direct interest in the Arabian Peninsula” (cited in Lippman, 2008, pp. 184–185).

Truman’s representative William A. Eddy who traveled throughout Yemen at that time, described it as “the most medieval theocracy on earth” (Cited in Lippman, 2008, p.186). He stated in his scattered noted that what he saw was “Friendly, smiling natives. Congregate at sundown. Wild baboons, in troops across road. Schools: Gymnastics. Pupils chained for tardiness. Women mostly unveiled. Much prettier than in SA (Saudi Arabia)” (cited in Lippman, 2008, p. 187). He found Yemen more fertile and greener than Saudi Arabia but far more backward and remarked that “Saudi Arabia is very advanced…compared to these people who punish offenders brutally without trial and put in chains school children who are tardy or do not know their lessons”(cited in Lippman, 2008, p. 188). Commenting on the judicial system, Eddy said that punishments were harsh and that “People disappear without anyone knowing why or daring to ask any questions…Distrust of foreigners was no greater than distrust of brother and son” (cited in Lippman, p. 188). As for the nature of the Yemeni government, he noted that the Imam had no agencies or advisors and that he alone was the authority in the country. Referring to his assignment in Yemen, he stated that his work was going slow because “this government is still in the dark ages and knows nothing of western ways” (cited in Lippman, p. 109).

Eddy who was the head of the American mission in Sana’a at that time was the one who brought the Yemeni government to agree to sign a treaty with the United States (Prettiman, 1992, p. 210). In his meeting with the Imam on April 14, 1945, he presented to him Truman’s letter recognizing Yemen’s independence, but he did not reciprocate. Eddy speculated that apparently, it was out of reluctance to be involved in world affairs or maybe as a sign of refusal to recognize US independence. He also noted that the Imam expressed his opposition to signing a friendship treaty with Germany. According to Eddy, there were problems with signing the treaty of friendship since the Imam and his sons had different views regarding the legal and diplomatic terms mentioned in the treaty, and some of them objected to the idea of signing agreements with foreign powers. Of those who objected, Prince Hussein was the most vocal. According to Sanger, he felt “that any negotiations of foreign law in Yemen would be the first in breaking down the religious and social patterns of this country” (Lippman, 2008, p. 190). On November 19, 1945, Truman wrote to the Imam calling him a “friend” and seeking to comply with his condition that no foreign diplomats take residence in Yemen, he informed him of his intention to send no more than a one-time special diplomatic mission to discuss the possibility of establishing commercial and friendship agreements. Led by Eddy, the team, which included Clark and Sanger, made its way to Sana’a, bringing with them a mobile radio station as a gift. Finally, the Imam agreed to sign the treaty, and when Eddy’s successor J. Rives Childs who became a minister in Jeddah arrived in Sana’a and asked that the United Statesbuild a port in Hodeida and gave him a long list of industrial equipment, airplanes, and advisors that he hoped to receive.

Although the US government recognized the Kingdom of Yemen on March 4, 1946, the recognition was not confirmed until more than three years later when the Imam agreed to Washington’s proviso that he promise to respect all international agreements. Even then, Yemen was still unknown to the United States. In one of the images of the Yemenis portrayed in an essay that appeared in National Geographic in October 1947, Clark described Imam Yahya watching his troops who were performing a traditional dagger dance, which gave the reader the impression that he was watching a scene from Arabian Nights. He described Yahya’s son Prince Saif who arrived at the White House clad with a prayer shawl, fez and worry beans [a string of beans used to pass the time of the day] and noted that the Imam’s visit, which took place in July 1947, must have convinced Truman that he was looking at a scene from Arabian Nights (Little, 2002, pp. 25–26, 30).

Imam Ahmed,who came to power following the assassination of Imam Yahya on February 17, 1948, was irritated by the American stipulations but eventually yielded, and the recognition was confirmed on January 19, 1950 (Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, pp.1358–1359). What particularly pleased officials in Washington was that the Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of the Yemeni Delegation to the UN, Qadi Muhammad ibn Abdallah al-Amri announced that his government declared open-door policy toward oil exploration, preferably by US companies and even agreed to allow a scientific expedition to come to his countrywith the sole proviso that the Yemeni government be consulted in the matter (FRUS, 1949, p. 1357).

Interest in securing a foothold in Yemen increased somewhat in Washington as the Cold War reached one of its crescendos in 1956 when the Suez Affair, which jeopardized Western ships’ passage through the canal, erupted. What brought the United Statesto pay more attention to Yemen at that time was the British appeal to curb the Egyptian and Soviet influence in that country and relieve the pressure on Aden and the Federation of Southern Arabia that Britain formed in 1962 to provide protection to that area. Fearing that Nasser was spreading his pan-Arab ideology in Yemen, the British were compelled to consult Washington. Britain planned to protect Aden from foreign domination, and the fear prevailed in Whitehall that Nasser’s penetration might lead to instability in the Federation of Southern Arabia, which the government was trying to bolster prior to its withdrawal from the Aden base. Once it became obvious that Nasser was determined to spread his influence in that region, the British government approached Washington. A British Foreign Office memorandum warned the US government that “Another success for Nasser in this area would have serious consequences for Western prestige throughout the Middle East” and called for cooperation between the two countries, saying, “All of this increases the need for coordinated action by Britain and America.” ¹

The British response came at a time when policymakers in Washington were occupied with other issues related to the Cold War. In addition to the Suez Affair and the Soviet invasion of Hungary, President Dwight Eisenhower was concerned about the danger to Lebanon’s security and decided to send the US Marines in 1958. Likewise, he was concerned about the security of the beleaguered state of Israel and the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, where King Hussein was facing the danger of a Nasser-sponsored coup and was tempted by Soviet offers of financial aid and sophisticated arms. In addition, Eisenhower sought maintain a foothold in Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich state of the Persian Gulf. It was at that point that US diplomats began expressing concern about the Soviet penetration of Yemen.

Given Yemen’s strategic location at the southern region of the Arabian Peninsula, close to the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, US officials feared that the Soviet Union would be in a position to block the entrance to the Red Sea and jeopardize the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Indeed, there was ample evidence of Soviet penetration in that region to cause concern in Washington. Soviet intervention in Yemen began as early as 1956 when a military aid agreement was signed between the two parties, providing US$30 million worth of arms and equipment, including IL-10 piston ground attack aircraft, T-34 tanks, and rocket launchers. By then,Soviet technicians already built the port of Hodeida and improved the existing airfields. In addition, Communist China began its penetration and sent workers who began constructing a strategic highway between Hodeida and Sana’a. What increased Washington’s suspicion was the secret manner in which the Soviet Union dealt with Yemen and the fact that accurate statistics regarding the supply of arms were not readily available. Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev never revealed details regarding his involvement in Yemen or the arms that he supplied to it (Khrushchev, 1970, p. 404). ²

Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, both US encouragement and the Cold War climate brought the British to expand their base in Aden (Mackintosh-Smith, 1995, p. 151).In May 1958, British and American diplomats traveled to Aden to explore the possibility of overthrowing imams Ahmed and Muhammad al-Badr. Two options were suggested after a lengthy debate: to replace Ahmed with Hasan, who, unlike Badr, was less likely to press Yemen’s claim to the Aden Protectorate or to prepare a contingency plan to prevent Badr from coming to power after Ahmed’s demise. While most British officials favored the first option, US diplomats remained skeptical about the plan’s practicality (Mawby, 2005, p. 63). ³ On August 29, 1958, the American diplomat Loy W. Henderson informed US State Secretary John Foster Dulles that Yemen's situation had become alarming. He mentioned that King Saud’s special envoy told the Imam that he saw a hundred Soviet aircraft, arms that were still in cases, and numerous technicians. Henderson told Dulles that even if the news were blown out of proportion, they ought to cause Washington's concern (Heikal, 1988, pp. 254–255). Nevertheless, the United States was not directly involved in the events and little happened that could cause alarm. ⁴ Nasser’s attempt to extend Egyptian influence in that region brought him to a conflict with Saud Arabia, and the two countries became entangled in a civil war that poisoned their relations for the years to come. After a coup by radical Republicans in September 1962, Imam Badr was overthrown, and General Abdallah Sallal came to power. A conflict between the Republicans and the Royalists loyal to the Imam ensued. This conflict led to hostility between Nasser, who supported the Republicans and the Saudi king, who supported the Royalists. US President John F. Kennedy offered to mediate between the belligerents and dispatched a team to be in charge of his aid program to Yemen. The conviction among many officials in Washington was that the president was about to adopt a firm position and strive to evict the Egyptians from Yemen, given Nasser’s tendency to maintain close relations with his Soviet ally. However, from Imam Badr’s testimony, it seems that not only was the Kennedy administration not alarmed by the coup but that it actually viewed it with favor. He told Saeed Badeeb long after the event that “The United States was in full agreement with the coup d’état against me and did not take action in the beginning. In fact, I wrote a personal letter to President Kennedy, but he did not answer me at all” (Badeeb, 1986, p. 121).

Indeed, the Kennedy administration had no intention of restoring the Imam’s regime. On September 27, 1962, Prince Hasan, son of Imam Yahya who led the Yemen delegation to the UN General Assembly, met the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot and asked if the United States was willing to help rally the Royalists and help them restore the Imamate. Talbot responded that this was out of the question since his government did not interfere in foreign countries' domestic affairs. In January 1963, the US Air Force stationed a squadron of fighter-bombers in Bahrain, near South Yemen, to deter Egypt from overthrowing the Imam, but no major attempt was made to resist Nasser. In contrast to what many US officials believed, Kennedy’s reaction to Nasser’s involvement in Yemen was mild and restrained. In one of his messages to Nasser, he said, “As you know, the conflict has affected our vital interests in Aden, the Persian Gulf area, and throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and I welcome the earlier affirmations of your government that it recognizes these interests”(FRUS, 1962b, p. 275). Moreover, he asked George Bundy’s assistant Carl Kaysen to maintain contact with the Air Force, saying, “If we are going in there shooting down Egyptian bombers, I want to hear about it before we shoot” (Reeves, 1993, p. 448).

Washington’s sensitivity to Soviet reaction played a significant role in how it handled the Yemeni crisis. When Nasser inquired into the possibility of nominating an American representative to act as a mediator, the US Ambassador to Egypt John Badeau responded by saying that “this would open United States to accusation of colonialism and imperialism of which the Soviets would take full advantage. Moreover, parties to YAR [Yemen Arab Republic] dispute might be attacked on same grounds” (FRUS, 1963e, p. 323). The State Department's decision was not only to avoid undermining the YAR but also to grant it recognition. The rationale was that the recognition would limit the influence of the UAR (the United Arab Republic as the union between Egypt and Syria was called) to undermine Soviet influence and protect Saudi Arabia and Jordan from internal revolts. Moreover, Washington sought to pacify King Faisal and tried to convince the YAR to accept the Sana’a Treaty of 1934 (FRUS, 1962c, p. 143, Note 3). From Washington’s standpoint, the terms of the Sana’a Treaty were regarded as a reasonable solution to the Yemeni conflict and to the Gulf region’s stability since (a) it terminated the Saudi-Yemeni conflict; (b) it recognized British rights in Aden; and (c) it protected the assets of the US Agency for International Development mission in Ta’iz. Consequently, the US government recognized the new regime despite opposition from the Imam (Barret, 2016, pp. 80–81). Nasser’s intervention in Yemen resulted not only in a rapprochement between the United States and the conservative Arab states but also in closer cooperation with Israel (Herring, 2008, p. 714). This is one of the reasons that encouraged the Israeli government to take part in the conflict. Besides, Israel’s foremost enemy was Egypt at that time, and therefore, it airlifted equipment and supplies to the royalist forces (Kessler, 2015). In September 1962, Nasser reequipped the new YAR army, and in June 1963, a thousand Soviet technicians became involved in numerous construction projects and instruction of Yemeni personnel (FRUS, 1963c, pp. 599–600).

At the same time, there was growing concern in Washington that the new YAR regime might gain excessive confidence, threaten Saudi Arabia, and upset the delicate balance that Kennedy hoped to establish in the region. Indeed, there were grounds for concern. According to Nasser’s confidante and celebrated editor of the semi-official daily Al-Ahram, Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Kennedy heard Sallal boasting that he had missiles capable of destroying the Saudi royal residence and kill all its occupants. This was on the same day that he recognized the new regime in Sana’a. Alarmed by what he heard, Kennedy complained to Nasser (Heikal, 1988, p. 647). The response from Cairo was immediate and furious. Nasser told former Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that the rumors regarding Egypt’s intention to enter Saudi Arabia and dominate the oil fields were entirely false. He said, “Tell the President…that I am not Hitler, and I don’t have a Rommel in the Yemen….If the Saudi Arabians will stop their aid to the Royalists we will withdraw immediately” (Heikal, 1973, pp. 218–219).

Talks about a possible armed intervention began in Washington,but no decision was made. The US government faced a major constraint when the issue was brought to the fore as the US Consul General in Dhahran explained, “If US actually sent forces to Saudi Arabia, SAG (Saudi Arabia Government) policy of aid to Royalists posed problem, making US Government accomplice in action against (YAR) which it had recognized”(FRUS, 1963d, p. 402). At a meeting with representatives of the oil companies, State Department officials expressed their concern that the situation in Yemen was likely to worsen before it improves. Nevertheless, they refrained from taking any step that might prove to be too drastic. They stated categorically that no US troops were going to be used to “liberate” Yemen, arguing that pressure on Nasser to withdraw was increasing, that Soviet influence was decreasing, and they concluded by saying that cutting aid to Egypt would not accelerate its withdrawal from the country “but would greatly injure our position in the NE area”(FRUS,1963b, pp. 827–828).

During the entire period, there was considerable tension not only in US-Soviet relations but also with its British ally. US officials were suspicious of British intentions in Yemen, believing that they were bent on fighting Nasser and helping the Royalists. However, in his meeting with Kennedy on October 4, 1963, Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home denied the accusation. Robert Komer was among those US officials who remained convinced that the British were covertly stirring trouble. He warned that the British intervention could only provoke Nasser and lead to greater Soviet intervention in both the YAR and the UAR (Mawby, 2005, p. 113). Indeed, there were grounds for such suspicions since the British were conducting covert operations in opposition to the Republicans and the Egyptians in the YAR, and these were known to the United States. One of these operations was known by the codename RANCOUR, and its details became known to the Americans through their consul in Aden, Curtis Jones. He was approached by a shaikh from the Sabir tribe in Yemen who asked him for arms and money to fight the Sallal-Amri regime and turned down the proposal (Mawby, 2005, pp. 140–141).

The US and First Yemeni Civil War

Unlike his predecessor Eisenhower and his successor Lynden Johnson, Kennedy regraded the Arab leaders as pragmatic and practical rather than ideological bent on spreading treacherous doctrines (Bishku, 1992, p. 128). He regarded the coup in Yemen as an internal issue that does not justify foreign intervention (Gerges, 1995, p. 294). Moreover, he believed in reaching an agreement that would satisfy Nasser and provide security to his Saudi ally. In a telegram he sent to Nasser on November 17, 1962, Kennedy called upon all belligerents to gradually withdraw from the Yemeni border. However, Nasser insisted that the Yemeni crisis was a local matter that ought to be resolved among the Arab states and blamed the close ties between Washington and Riyadh for aggravating the situation. He argued that his interference in Yemen came at the request of that country; that he had documents demonstrating that US pilots took part in a campaign designed to bring supplies from Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the Yemeni border; that he was seeking peace and aspiring to bring an end to foreign intervention in Yemen; and that he had no desire to fight against Saudi Arabia in Yemen (Fatḥi, 2003, pp. 205–206).

Seeking to diffuse the tension in Yemen,US officials began discussing the possibility of withdrawal of the foreign forces. However, the Kennedy administration sought to avoid a clash with Nasser to prevent him from greater dependence on the Soviet Union. As it turned out, the United States handling of the crisis in Yemen did not meet the expectations. Many criticized Kennedy’s lenient approach. Some were convinced that the US government sought to pacify Nasser and thereby encouraged him to maintain his troops in Yemen long after Saudi Arabia ceased its intervention on behalf of the Royalists. For example, on June 21, 1963, the adviser to the Yemeni government, Bushrod Howard Jr., said in his speech to the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations,

I am ashamed and angry to have witnessed the criminally vicious war the American money has financed.…To vote Nasser sums of money, without any guarantee that he will cease his aggression, means that many innocent people will die as a direct result of that vote. Today in Yemen, tomorrow elsewhere (Howard, 1963).

The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia opined that the best way to reduce the tension was to convince Nasser to start by withdrawing one battalion (FRUS, 1962a, p. 285).What prompted the US government to come up with the suggested withdrawal of all forces was that all sides realized that the continuation of the conflict in Yemen would be detrimental to their cause. They realized that the Saudis were unwilling to see Egyptian presence in Yemen, that the Egyptians were concerned about a Saudi-backed Royalist counter-revolution and that the British feared that a republican Yemen would provide the Egyptians with a base to invade Aden. From Washington’s point of view, a proposal to disengage was seen as a way to allay all those fears (Trevaskis, 1968, p. 185). However, Nasser attempted to temporize, and Saudi Arabia remained suspicious of his intentions. A CIA report of October 3, 1963, warned against the possibility that Saudi Arabia resumes its support of the royalists saying that “Nasser would be strongly tempted to strike against Saudi Arabia either by renewed air attack on supply bases or perhaps by intensifying subversive activities against Crown Prince Faysal” (CIA, 1963, p. 9). Discouraged by the lack of substantial progress, Kennedy said in a news conference held in Washington on November 14, 1963, “I am concerned about the Yemen because the rate of the withdrawal, of course, has been quite limited”(Chase & Lerman, 1965, p. 519).

Nasser’s suspicion that US policy was biased toward his Saudi nemesis increased, and the stalemate continued. Indeed, the Kennedy administration regarded Saudi Arabia as the axis on which the US defense of the Middle East leaned. A State Department telegram of December 23, 1963 made it clear that protecting Saudi Arabia was one of the most important objectives of US foreign policy. It stated clearly that “USG would not stand idly by if UAR should attack Saudi Arabia” and that “US undertook Yemen policy primarily as means to protect Saudi Arabian integrity” (FRUS,1963a, p. 853).

Indeed, a close examination of the US approach reveals that Yemen was never the main target of US foreign policy and that its involvement in that country was meant to achieve a greater purpose, to safeguard Saudi Arabia and bolster the ties with it. In an interview with Elizabeth Farmer on July 19, 1964, U.S. National Security Advisor Robert Komer admitted,

[F]rom the standpoint of our interest, Yemen itself didn’t count for very much. If this place were on the moon or in the center of Africa and the Russians and the Egyptians or other people were not involved, we couldn’t care less what went on in Yemen. ⁵

Unlike Syria, where the US government tended to encourage the independence movement in the aftermath of World War II, Aden was regarded as an essential base to protect Saudi Arabia and serve wider global interests that it had at that time. In addition, American companies such as Caltex, Exxon, and Mobil established terminals in Aden to supply their ships with oil. Consequently, the United States did not pressure the British government to accelerate the withdrawal process, nor did it encourage the inhabitants of that region to fight for independence, at least not until the 1960s, when its forces became heavily involved in Vietnam. Given the likelihood that the Vietnam conflict would spill over to other countries in the region, the Johnson administration paid attention to the military strategists who attached considerable importance to the domination of Aden by the West (Anthony, 2000, No. 3).

Washington’s failure to bring Nasser to withdraw his forces from Yemen caused consternation in Saudi Arabia and brought King Faisal to take drastic measures. Whereas Kennedy was keen on improving the ties with Nasser, Johnson was resentful and impatient about his intervention in Yemen (Jacobs, 2011, pp. 177–178). Witnessing Johnson’s opposition to Nasser’s aggression, the Saudi King sought to benefit from his resentment. An article published several decades after the event by Middle East Monitor reveals that the YAR’s President Abdallah Saleh was aware of the content of a letter sent by the Saudi king in 1966 to Johnson, in which he advocated an Israeli operation against Egypt and the occupation of large areas in the Sinai and Gaza, to force Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen. The king implored Johnson to explore that possibility, saying explicitly that Nasser was an enemy not only of Saudi Arabia but also of the United States (Middle East Monitor, 2017).

Washington’s sensitivity to Saudi reaction had an adverse effect on its relations with the YAR. When Yemen’s Foreign Minister Hassan Muhammad Makki approached US officials asking to restore the diplomatic relations that were severed in the aftermath of the Six-Day War of 1967, they ignored the request out of fear that King Faisal might object. Consequently, William Rogers, who later became the US Secretary of State, recommended that the United States open an interest section at the Italian embassy in Sana’a,whichwould deal with Yemeni affairs. Richard Nixon approved the recommendation saying, “But only if Faisal has no objection” (FRUS, 1969c, pp. 554–555). King Faisal agreed. An interest section was opened in the Italian embassy, and it was not until three years later that it was transferred to Sana’a. One of the issues that gave Washington a higher moral ground when intervening in other countries was its role as guardian of human rights. However, in Yemen’s case, US officials were hardly in a position to criticize the regime for violating human rights. Like Yemen, the US government had failed until then to ratify conventions relating to human rights, forced labor, freedom of association, genocide, political rights for women, and slavery. This point was made abundantly clear by Wisconsin’s Democratic Senator William Proxmire in his speech to the Senate on August 9, 1967, when he said, “The United States has failed to ratify a single one of these five Human Rights Conventions” (Congressional Record (CR), 1967, p. 22061).

By the summer of 1967, there was growing concern in Washington that the Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, which came on the eve of the Six-Day War, did not improve the US position in that region. Moreover, officials continued to argue that the Soviets might exploit the void to increase their influence in that country. For example, on December 14, Illinois representative Edward J. Derwinski told the Congress members that the Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen increased the danger of greater Soviet penetration into this country (CR, 1968, p. A6197). However, as it turned out, the years that followed the British withdrawal from the region did not witness stiff competition among the great powers in that region. Neither the Soviet Union nor China demonstrated a strong tendency to compete in Yemen. As for the US government, its preoccupation with the consequences of the Six-Day War and the Vietnam conflict prevented it from serious involvement in Yemen. US policymakers tended to rely on local actors such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, whose objectives were limited and designed to achieve their own goals without contributing to a comprehensive plan to establish a reasonable status quo that could lead to stability in that region. One major issue dominated Washington’s thinking at that time: to protect the oil flow from the Persian Gulf. For that purpose, it conducted naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, leased the Masira Island from the British, and later expanded its facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia (Kostiner, 1990, pp. 29–30; 32).

The United Statesand Two“Yemens”

US diplomacy began facing greater challenges with Yemen’s division. Following the British withdrawal in 1967, the YAR continued to cultivate ties with Western countries while the PDRY (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), which was established two years later, welcomed cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet leaders spoke highly of the value of the newly established alliance with PDRY, they did not act aggressively enough to warrant a serious reaction by the United States. A report prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department entitled the People’s Republic of Yemen was sent by the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco to Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador Nicholas Thacher argued that the Marxist government of the DPRY followed a pro-Moscow line and that Soviet military and civilian advisers played a major role in the country. However, he said that although the Soviet Union was using the Aden port and the island of Socotra, it was not building a major port on it. He concluded by stating that the Soviets were unwilling to “increase their aid or military presence in South Yemen under present circumstances”.

The relations between the DPRY and the United Stateswere tense already a year before that country turned pro-Soviet. The tension started when a defense attaché at the headquarters of the Army’s Sixth Brigade was blamed for ordering the arrest of individuals who demonstrated in support of the NLF’s (National Liberation Front) plan to introduce measures designed to turn the country into a leftist popular democracy.Consequently, he was expelled from the country on March 26, 1969 (Stookey, 1982, p. 72, Note 7). Nixon, who became president that year,sought to reduce the tension in the region without alienating the PDRY. In addition, he became convinced of the necessity to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Egypt as a way to reduce Soviet influence in the region. The decision to reduce the tension between these two countries came after the president consulted with his Assistant Secretary Henry Kissinger. In a letter to Nixon, Kissinger opined that the US government ought to mediate between the two countries. He also emphasized the need to allow King Faisal to stand on his feet and continue with the aid program to the YAR by allowing the members of the American assistance team to fulfill their tasks (FRUS, 1969d, pp. 553–554).

The fear that the conflict between the two Yemeni states would lead to instability and greater Soviet intervention increased in Washington in that year. In a speech on April 14, 1969, Pennsylvania’s Republican Senator Hugh Scott said,

In fact, [the] balance in the Middle East is already imperiled by Soviet extensions of interest in Iran and in Southern Arabia, where the British are withdrawing. The establishment of the latest Arab state, the People’s republic of Yemen, is just one additional indication of this penetration. (CR, 1969, p. 8834)

Moreover, observers were concerned that the port in Hodeida and the island of Socotra were providing access to an increasing number of Soviet ships (Baldwin, March 21, 1972). By comparison, US naval presence in the region was meager, consisting of no more than three vessels, an old converted ship and two obsolete destroyers anchored in Bahrain (Baldwin, March 22, 1972).

The Nixon administration’s attempt to appear as an honest broker in the conflict between the YAR and the PDRY, which increasingly became dependent on Soviet aid, faltered, and there was little hope that a favorable equilibrium could be established in the region. While the YAR government resented the fact that the US government was not wholeheartedly committed to its national security, the leaders of the PDRY blamed it for an almost total lack of concern for their country’s welfare. According to the PDRY Ambassador Isma’il Sa’id Nu’man, the bilateral relationswere marred from the very beginning because the US government failed to provide his country sufficient aid at the time of independence. Moreover, he argued that the seizure of American arms with clasped hands insignia in possession of anti-government forces led the PDRY government to conclude that the United Stateshad no faith in its leaders. What reinforced the ambassador’s conviction that the United Statesopposed his government was that it supported the Saudi government, whose declared objective was to overthrow the NLF regime in his country (FRUS, 1969h, p. 543).

Nevertheless, Nu’man expressed his government’s desire for better relations with the United States.The response of William Brewer, who served as Director of the State Department’s Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, was that the PDRY government was the one that did not reciprocate to Washington’s attempts to normalize the relations. Brewer stated that the US government intended to maintain cordial relations with the PDRY and Saudi Arabia without interfering in their domestic affairs (FRUS, 1969h, p. 543). ⁶ However, the tension between the two countries did not cease. A telegram from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Tom Hughes to Rogers on June 25, 1969, stated that leftist extremists used the NLF’s General Command to oust the PDRY’s President Qaḥtan Muhammad al-Shaabi. Headed by five men, the new regime in the PDRY was said to have been dominated by the extreme left segment of the radical NLF. The telegram noted that the moderate army leaders failed to topple the new regime in the PDRY. He estimated that the new regime would probably seek closer relations with the Soviet Union and that its relations with its neighbors would likely worsen (FRUS, 1969b, pp. 544–546).

As it turned out,however, the fear that the PDRY had turned irrevocably into a Soviet satellite in southern Arabia was highly exaggerated. The PDRY government proved far more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than officials in Washington expected, and it managed to maintain a safe distance from the Soviet Union. In fact, officials in Aden estimated that the number of Marxists in the YAR far exceeded those in the PDRY. There were no more than 35,000 pro-Soviet members in the PDRY’s Yemen Socialist Party,while their number in the YAR exceeded 350,000 (Anthony, 2000, No. 3).

When it became known that the Saudis were about to invade the PDRY, US officials were inclined not to recommend intervention on its behalf. For example, in a memorandum on February 5, 1971, to Kissinger, the CIA liaison officer Harold Saunders argued that an American operation was unlikely to bring a real change in the PDRY and that it ran the risk of Soviet reaction (Saudi efforts to overthrow South Yemeni regime, February 5, 1971). At the same time, US relations with the YAR significantly improved. At his meeting with Rogers, the YAR’s Foreign MinisterAhmad Barakat stated that his country was more stable than it had been and that his government was willing to improve the ties with Washington. He asked Rogers to consider the possibility of recognizing his country as a special case, not connected with the situation in the Middle East. Rogers responded that the US government was not in a position to reassess its recognition policy,but he assured Barakat that it would continue watching the developments in the region closely (FRUS, 1969g, pp. 546–547).

While the contacts with the YAR continued, the PDRY ties with Washington remained severed. Its foreign minister stated that his government severed the ties because the United States provided material help to all enemies of the Arabs.Moreover, Barakat blamed the United Statesfor sending soldiers and pilots to serve in the Israeli armed forces. However, the PDRY’s decision was by no means unanimous. According to a telegram from Aden dated September 8, 1969, thegovernment was divided over whether or not to sever the ties with Washington after its decision to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel. Finally, on October 24, 1969, the PDRY decided to sever the ties and asked that all US personnel leave his country within 24 hours. Aden’s decision came largely due to its conviction that Washington conspired with Saudi Arabia to undermine its regime.

According to Rogers, the decision was due to the PDRY’s resentment over US supportof Saudi Arabia‘s efforts to help South Yemeni exiles rise against the regime in Aden. He was also convinced that the allegations that US personnel were operating in the Israeli armed forces were taken seriously by the public and forced the PDRY government to take such drastic measures. Rogers expressed his concern over this matter and argued that although US interests in the PDRY were marginal, the action taken by its government made it more difficult to track the growing Soviet presence in the strategically located port of Aden. Moreover, he noted that this was the eighth Arab country to break off relations with Washington and that only a change in the orientation and composition of the PDRY government could lead to the renewal of the diplomatic relations (FRUS, 1969f, pp. 547–548). Indeed, there were clear indications that the PDRY leaders began taking steps toward improving their ties with the Soviet Union.

When al-Shaabi visited Moscow on January 28, 1969, the PDRY government officials made pro-Soviet statements, and Moscow agreed to train their air force cadets (FRUS, 1969g, pp. 546–547, Note 4). However, the tension in Washington’s relations with the PDRY did not reach its peak until November 26, 1969, when the PDRY forces attacked al-Wudai’a, a Saudi post east of Yemen. At that point, officials in Washington expressed concern that Saudi Arabia’s security was about to be compromised. Naturally, spokesmen for the PDRY laid the blame on Riyadh. They stated that the Saudis were the ones who attacked; that American imperialism and intelligence were behind them; that the attack was instigated by “oil companies operating inside Saudi Arabia”; and that Saudi aircraft were flown by “mercenaries.” Moreover, the PDRY government brought the matter to the Arab League as well as to the UN (FRUS, 1969e, pp. 549).

The Saudis retaliated by claiming that the Soviet Union played a major role in prompting the PDRY to act, but there were no indications that the Soviet Union was engaged in the conflict (FRUS, 1969a, pp. 552–553). Furthermore, a CIA intelligence report of February 11, 1971, concluded that the PDRY regime appeared capable of surviving the attempts of the insurgents to overthrow it; that the Saudi involvement in that country was likely to remain limited and that despite its interest in providing logistic support to the PDRY the Soviet Union was unlikely to send large military forces (FRUS, 1971a, pp. 567).Yet, the US government remained concerned about the possibility that PDRY forces might exhibit large amounts of weapons and ammunitions that it supplied to the insurgents since that was likely to increase Soviet suspicion. In a telegram from the State Department to the US embassy in Saudi Arabia, Under Secretary of State John Irwin writes:

It is clearly undesirable that Soviets be encouraged assume that anti-PDRY campaign may not just be quarrel between different factions of South Yemenis but efforts by US, with Saudi and dissident southern Yemeni help, to oust radical regime that has allowed USSR to develop foothold in strategic Aden outpost. Soviet reaction to what is likely regard as open US support for NUF [National Unity Front] cannot be accurately predicted but could well be increase in its own military aid to PDRY. This development if it occurs, would be in neither USG nor SAG interest. (FRUS, 1971b, pp. 568–569)

By the early 1970s, the YAR intensified its efforts to establish closer relations with Washington. When the North Yemeni Chief of Staff Brigadier Husayn al-Maswari inquired into the nature of the support that the United States could provide his country, the Principal Officer in the Interest Section in Sana’a, Robert Stein, opined that a positive response to his query would facilitate the resumption of the bilateral relations. He suggested that Washington grant US$3million aid package promised after the resumption of ties and encouraged greater Saudi involvement in that country (FRUS, 1972f, p. 579, Note 6). On March 30, 1972, the YAR announced its intention to shift its procurement of arms from Soviet to Western sources with help from Saudi and Iranian officials. Convinced that increasing the arsenal of the YAR was in their interest, the Saudis recommended that Sana’a purchase surplus Iranian F-5s to replace the obsolescent MIG-17s (FRUS, 1972a, pp. 581, Note 4).The Interest Section in Sana’a recommended that the US government not only consider the requests by Saudi Arabia and Iran to permit the sale of military equipment to the YAR but also to provide it economic assistance. Such an approach would help give the YAR public the impression that the United States was interested in their welfare and not only to topple the pro-Soviet regime in Aden. As one member of the Interest Section put it:

It is highly important we build approach to Yemenis which emphasize our genuine interest in their economic rather than their military development….Such cooperation would help offset widely held impression here that only aim of some of YARG’s neighbors is to fight to the last Yemeni to defeat PDRY regime in Aden. Even in background US could eventually become similarly regarded if we are associated only with military side of things (FRUS, 1972e, p. 582)

There were several obstacles, however, that remained on the road to better understanding between the YAR and Washington. As a precondition for the resumption of the diplomatic relations, the United States demanded that the charges against two of its nationals and AID officials Stephen Liapis and Harold Hartman, who were accused of espionage and an attempt to blow up installations in Taiz,be dropped (Pace Eric, May 4, 1967). Also, Washington demanded that the accusation that US forces were involved in the Israeli attack on the Arab states during the Six-Day War be withdrawn (FRUS, 1972d, p. 587, Note 2). These demands seemed so uncompromising, and US officials were concerned that the negotiations were about to falter. However, the fear that the Soviet Union might gain greater influence in Sana’a forced Washington to adopt a flexible position. When the YAR government seemed reluctant to issue a formal statement clearing the accused AID officials, the State Department did not insist and merely asked for rent-free land in Sana’a to construct the US embassy. The atmosphere seemed to have been cleared; however, when the YAR explored the possibility of purchasing F-86 aircraft, Washington turned down the request out of fear of provoking the PDRY regime. US officials argued that this kind of aircraft was not considered among the excess items available for transfer and that it was not suitable for the YAR (FRUS, 1972b, pp. 590).

While trying to maintain close relations with both Yemeni states, Washington continued to be concerned about the Saudi King’s reaction. When the State Department explored the possibility of resuming the diplomatic relations with the PDRY, US diplomats in the region expressed their concern that he would oppose the move. In a letter to the State Department on July 12, 1972, Thacher writes: “believe we must anticipate extremely adverse reaction from King Faisal and senior levels SAG when they become aware we even discussing subject with PDRYG, a government they feel is dedicated to spread Marxism/Maoism throughout Peninsula” (FRUS, 1972b, pp. 546–549). Throughout the entire period, Washington had been under Saudi pressure to supply the YAR weapons. However, the fear that supplying sophisticated weapons to the YAR was likely to increase the tension between the superpowers led Washington to concentrate on supplying economic assistance and rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran to become involved in supplying weapons to Sana’a.

The contacts between the United States and the DPRY were very few in the 1970s. In 1974, Republican Congressman Paul Findlay came to Aden to secure the release of an American teacher who was arrested for photographing Aden’s harbor and met one of the members of the DPRY’s politburo Muhammad Salih Muti’a (Halliday, 1990, p. 83). The concern that the Soviet Union was gaining greater influence in the region did not cease. In a statement before the Senate on August 1, 1974, CIA Director W.E. Colby warned that the Soviet naval presence increased considerably in the Indian Ocean and argued that the reopening of the Suez Canal would provide the Soviets, especially in times of crises, access to the Persian Gulf and South Arabia. He added that the British base in Aden could be used effectively by the Soviets (CR, 1974, pp. 26292–26294). In April 1976, President Gerald Ford agreed to the Saudi request to supply the YAR with US$140 million worth of arms to prevent it from turning to the Soviet Union. Talks between the US and an official from the PDRY resumedin the fall of 1977 when President Jimmy Carter came to power, and it was Saudi Arabia that had taken the initiative to encourage them (Mylroie, 1983, p. 46). Findlay was the one who arranged a meeting between politburo member Salim Rubayya Ali (Salamin) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the UN in September that year, and a congressional delegation arrived in Aden in January 1978. Findlay came to Aden once more in June of that year. However, after Salamin’s disappearance and the rise of Abd al-Fatah Isma’il, there wereless prospects for improved US-DPRY relations. Concerned by Saudi Arabia’s hostility toward the DPRY and the latter’s close defense ties with the Soviet Union, the US government showed increasing interest in that country.

The Carter administration encouraged the Saudis to improve their relations with the PDRY, and in 1978 they were authorized by Washington to supply the YAR with US$400 million worth of arms. However, the deal was delayed until the war between the two Yemens broke out in February 1979, andit was not until March 9 that Carter approved the sale. Defending the decision, the Carter administration argued that the step was taken due to the close ties between the DRPY government and the Soviet Union and the fact that more than 40 percent of its armed forces were involved in the attempt to increase its size at the expense of the YAR (Congressional Quarterly [CQ], 1979, p. 470). By then, the DPRY was already on Washington’s list of countries sponsoring terrorism, and it was not until the establishment of a united Yemen more than a decade later that the ties with the United Statesbegan to improve (Brehony, 2011, pp. 85, 117).

The developments in the YAR in the late 1970s caused considerable concern in Washington. It seemed that the regime’s stability was being compromised by opposition groups in the southern part of the country who relied support from the PDRY. In a telegram to the State Department, the US ambassador to the YAR stated that the gains made under President Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who was assassinated on October 11, 1977, were in jeopardy and that his successor Bin Hussein al-Ghashmi was facing insurmountable difficulties. At the same time, he argued that Soviet support for the PDRY encouraged its president Abd al-Fattah Ismail to send troops and equipment to Ethiopia, thereby leaving Somalia in a weak position. This, he said, would be “against our interests” given the support that Ethiopia obtained from the Soviet Union and the weakness of the YAR. He ended the telegram by recommending that the United States expressed its moral support for the YAR’s regime and used the Saudis to deradicalize South Yemen (FRUS, 1977, p. 750).

In 1979, the ties between the YAR and Saudi Arabia became strained when Saleh, who sought to unite the two Yemens, attempted to reach an accommodation with the anti-Saudi Democratic Front opposition group. The upshot was that he alienated the Saudis who did not look favorably on his attempt to control the northern tribes in Yemen. Consequently, in June 1979, they restricted the supply of arms and thereby forced him to deal with Washington directly. Like many Third-World leaders, Saleh sought to take advantage of the tension in the Cold War, and after failing to obtain arms from Washington, he turned to Moscow and concluded a major arms deal with it (Safran, 1988, pp. 298–299, 387).This brought considerable tension to the US-YAR relations. However, by December, the United States became preoccupied with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and little attention was paid to the events in southern Arabia.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the ties between the PDRY government and the Soviet Union became closer. Ali Nasir Muhammad, who came to power in the PDRY on April 21, 1980, declared that the Soviet Union was a friend of his countrymen and on a higher level than the United States,which he considered an enemy (Cigar, 1985, p. 777). In a CIA intelligence report in July 1981, the author warned that the Soviet Union was bent on increasing its influence in the PDRY with a view to supporting dissident movements operating against the moderate regimes in the, particularly Oman and Saudi Arabia and that this was likely to put the oil reserves in the region in jeopardy (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1981).

Coming shortly after Ronald Reagan became president, this report has a considerable impact in Washington. Once again, suspicion of Soviet intentions increased, and Reagan expressed his concern that the Gulf region and South Arabia were under threat from Moscow. Reagan was long known for his suspicions of Soviet aims in every region of the globe ashis biographer Lou Cannon noted, “Reagan blamed the ills of the world on the Soviet Union and its surrogates” (Cannon, 1991, p. 449). Officials who dealt with the events in the region expected the Reagan administration to increase aid and arms sales to the YAR. As it turned out,however, the aid to the YAR decreased during the fiscal year 1983. This was due to a change in the Reagan administration’s preferences to provide more aid to countries where the United States had direct military involvement, such as Israel, Lebanon, and Morocco. Consequently, United States aid to these countries increased during the fiscal year 1983, while other pro-Western regimes in the area such as Egypt, Jordan. Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the YAR received less (Lawson, 1984, No. 128).

A CIA study of April 13, 1984 concluded that the prospects of discovery of oil in the YAR were likely to bring rapprochement with the United States and reduce Saudi influence in that country. It concluded that the US agreement of 1979 to supply arms to the YAR caused substantial problems to its relations with Saudi Arabia. This was largely because Saudi Arabia became the main supplier of maintenance and spare parts to the YAR and took advantage of its needs to increase its influence in that country. When officials in Washington examined the possibility of elevating the status of US relations with the YAR, they concluded that Saudi Arabia might be resent the move. Indeed, improving the relations with the YAR required the United States to conduct high-level discussions with the Saudis, who looked askance at such rapprochement. Nevertheless, a CIA report concluded that the Soviet Union, which had 500 advisers in the YAR, was not likely to increase its presence even if Washington decided to upgrade its ties with that country. Furthermore, it argued that reluctance to enhance the bilateral relations was likely to bring the YAR to approach the Soviet Union for increased support (Directorate of Intelligence, 1984). Fearing that the unrest in the PDRY would cause instability in the surrounding countries, officials in the Reagan administration stated that the lesser evil would be if Ali Nasser gained the upper hand despite the fact that he was pro-Marxist. What made him preferable in their eyes was the fact that he tended to seek reconciliation with his neighbors and was less inclined to support rebel groups in them (Gwertzman, January 22, 1986).

In a CIA report of 1987, the author recommended providing the YAR with substantial military aid. Like previous authors who worked in that agency, he emphasized that failure to do so would result in the decline of US influence in that country and bring its leaders to appeal to the Soviet Union for aid (CIA, 1987, p. 16). Concerned that concentration onthe needs of the YAR might lead the PRDY to greater dependence on the Soviet Union officials in Washington hesitated, and some of them called for exploring the possibility of improving the ties with Aden. Policymakers and CIA personnel discussed the issue and its implications at length. In another report published by the CIA on September 1, 1988, the writer argued that despite its distrust of the United States,the DPRY government was interested in negotiations due to its connections with good will organizations and as a counterweight against excessive Soviet influence South Yemen’s Oil Resources (CIA, 1988). As it turned out, the PDRY government was more opened to the idea of negotiations precisely due to its reluctance to be vulnerable to Soviet machinations.

On May 22, 1990, the YAR and the DPRY reunited and thereby simplified the task of US policymakers. By then, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold War was over. However, the US government continued to encounter problems with the newly unified country. This became abundantly clear when President George H.W. Bush sought to form a coalition, including the Arab states, against Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait. Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, which supported the American initiative, Yemen supported Saddam Hussein (Rubin, 1992, p. 204). This, however, was largely due to its hostility toward Saudi Arabia rather than to the United States. Never the less, its support of the Iraqi regime was not well received in Washington. When US Secretary of State James Baker failed to obtain Yemen’s support in the Security Council for the attack against Iraq, he reminded Saleh that his government refrained from putting his country on the list of countries supporting terrorism. Saleh refused to change his mind even after Baker warned that Yemen risked US$70 million of annual aid by refusing to support the US resolution. Another issue that caused tension in the bilateral relations was Yemen’s insistence on extending UN protection for Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel (Baker, 1995, pp. 317–318). No one predicted the great danger that was looming ahead when Iran and Saudi Arabia began clashing in Yemen, tearing the country apart in the process and further complicating the task of US policymakers.