The Past as a Benchmark in Defining Turkey’s Status Politics

Abstract

This article deals with Turkey’s status politics since the 2000s, by employing an aspirational constructivist approach that links social psychology with social constructivism in international relations. It focuses on the temporal side of status, stemming from historical identity construction in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) rhetoric and practices under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) since 2002. Turkey’s status politics is motivated by its past legacies rather than by a peer-to-peer comparison. Therefore, different variances and practices of identity politics in TFP offer valuable insights into its status-seeking practices. The article offers five images of the past that define various role sets and status claims for Turkey.

Keywords

Status Status politics Turkey Turkish foreign policy

Introduction

Scholars of international relations (IR) often argue that status matters in different ways in world politics. This interpretation echoes that international relations are ordered by hierarchy, not by equality (Lake, 2011, pp. 45–46), and stems from social-political and economic stratifications in international affairs. During the Cold War, status/prestige politics had been replaced by political struggle and class-linked ideologies in world politics. Much of the discussion on status was generally about the competition for “superpower” status between the US and the USSR. In the post-Cold War era, the so-called power transition has brought status politics back into international affairs and “it is ultimately on status, not bullets, that the success or failure of all international policies rests” (Renshon, 2017, p. 1).

Indeed, the international system's structural changes emphasize status politics as an explanatory variable in defining international relations. However, studying status is still an elusive academic activity (Dafoe et al., 2014). IR scholars borrow several key concepts from sociology to study status-related issues. There are numerous contemporary studies including various approaches, models, and designs dealing with topics such as the importance of status, intrinsic relationship between status and conflict/war, problem of measurement, conceptual foundation, and material/social sources of status (Paul et al., 2014; Volgy et al., 2011). Relatively, less attention has been paid to the construction of the past as a status benchmark. When it comes to Turkey as a case study, there is almost none in the existing literature. Departing from this, the article analyses the distant past as a benchmark in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) rhetoric, practice, and corresponding status claims.

A Conceptual Map: Status, Status-Seeking, and Aspirational Constructivism

Contextual confusion has complicated the study of status (Dafoe et al., 2014) not just because finding a range of objective criteria to measure status is not an easy task (Renshon, 2017, p. 4), but also because status means different things for different people in different contexts. Primarily, status entails rank/position/standing in the social order as a positional phenomenon. However, value rational behaviors such as prestige, reputation, glory, and honor are also used interchangeably with status. Therefore, status motives and policies do not have to be (instrumental) rational per se. It can often be more about nonmaterial stakes and preferences with no discernible material benefits involving value rationality or context-specific rationality. As such, status has been marked both by material and nonmaterial factors. Thus, there is a long list of material and nonmaterial status markers found in the existing literature.

Status is generally divided into two categories: (a) attributed status, which is often measured empirically by diplomatic exchanges (Bayer, 2011); and (b) assumed status, which is seen as direct results of material achievements such as military and economic might that a country possesses. If there is a gap between assumed and attributed status, these circumstances are referred to as status inconsistency. Status inconsistencies are one of the early focal points within scholarly works on status in IR. For example, Johan Galtung considered status inconsistencies as one of the causes of international conflicts (Galtung, 1964). Later, this topic has become prominent among IR scholars who consider status as an explanatory variable for understanding the dynamics of war and conflict (Dafoe et al., 2014; Midlarsky, 1976; Ray, 1974; Stryker & Macke, 1978; Volgy & Mayhall, 1995; Wallace, 1971).

Great powers generally institutionalize their higher status with prestigious role sets through building international institutions that reify and solidify their privileged positions, whereas rising powers either try to increase their power within existing institutional architecture by preserving the status quo or create their institutions by challenging the status quo or revisionism (Lipscy, 2017). Rising powers are also tempted to acquire material status markers such as nuclear technologies or aircraft carriers (O’Neill, 2001). They can increase their status by emulating the practices of the nations/groups of higher status (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010a, 2010b).

The status also refers to the state's identity, and therefore, identity politics sometimes incorporates status politics. Being a major power, claiming regional leadership, and fighting for standing as a great power are common examples of identity-driven status politics in international relations. As such, acknowledged, recognized, or ascribed status matters in domestic and international politics (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 74) since it brings flexibility, autonomy, and self-esteem in decision-making (Wohlforth, 1998, p. 26).

States seek the corresponding status with their capabilities because it is a valuable resource in strategic interactions for coordinating perceptions of control and deference (Renshon, 2016). Therefore, the behavioral patterns of states intrinsically involve certain status motives and politics such as being a dominant leader or defender of a group. Status politics are also generally associated with higher-status individuals. There is extensive literature on how leadership affects international politics. Status concerns are one of the important factors affecting the decision-making of higher-status individuals and groups. A leader’s perception about nation’s position in world politics affects their conception of national role, shapes their foreign policy rhetoric and practices, and influences the calculation of their national interests (Wish, 1980). Charismatic leadership is often accompanied by high-profile diplomacy and seeking a more prominent role on the world stage (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010b). Overall, the presence of higher-status individuals or demand for higher-status identity politics increases status inconsistencies, resulting in conflicts.

Overall, status refers to a state’s position, standing or rank in a global social hierarchy. In this sense, status is perceptual, social, and positional. As such, it derives from both material capacities and collective beliefs about one’s designated rights and obligations in a given social order. Thus, status (seeking) politics appear to have a lot to do with shaping the collective understanding of other nations (Dafoe et al., 2014). However, status also derives from how one sees himself, and looking at how and on which identity one’s self-esteem is constructed is important to understand status politics. Aspirational constructivism comes in at this point.

Aspirational Constructivism

Aspirational constructivism is a term used by Anne L. Clunan to refer to a situation where a state's identity is shaped by the legitimacy of its past. The past greatness shaped the elite’s world view in foreign policy and hence shaped foreign policy decision-making (Clunan, 2009). Clunan starts with differences between aspirational constructivist identity formation as opposed to the constructivist identity formation. In constructivism, a state's identity is identified by others, whereas aspirational constructivism sees a state’s identity as a product of its own history, in the form of historical memory and legacy, which consequentially shapes the aspirations of the political elites at present (Clunan, 2009, pp. 6–7). As such, aspirational constructivism incorporates important insights from social psychology and TCT (Temporal Comparison Theory). It is important to note that when political elites aspire to regain a country's past greatness, it is a different status-seeking political situation. This logic is not often analyzed in the current literature. However, it offers insightful explanation for many countries such as China, Russia, and Turkey.

In an aspirational constructivist account, history becomes so embedded into the national self-image that historical memories do not only generate aspirations for the future but also create national interest and legitimacy for certain foreign policy behaviors. In other words, “past-self becomes a benchmark to judge present-self” (Clunan, 2009, p. 13). Perception of external factors, such as the Chinese perception of Century of Humiliation, Russian perception of the fall of the USSR, and the Turkish perception of the fall of the Ottoman Empire is associated with the national self-image providing a practical guide for current aspirations. Historical aspirations derived from the country’s past status and political purpose set standards that shape the present (Clunan, 2009, p. 94). As such, they are products of political and ideological entrepreneurship (Lustick, 2002, p. 9) driven by elites that seek to find positive meaning for the collective self through a number of socially/historically constructed political discourses (Clunan, 2009, pp. 33–34).

It is incorrect to equate status only with the prestige derived from military strength and material capabilities. Social psychological variables such as self-identification and past glories play an important role in attributing current status to a nation. In their social situation, political elites are psychologically driven to find meaningful purpose; a key way of defining purpose is to establish and protect a collective identity based on one's values, convictions, norms, and practices and make it the foundation of social order (Clunan, 2013). When it comes to Turkey, a selective distant past has become an important part of the Turkish national identity and affects its foreign policy behaviors. The argument here is that the past plays a crucial role in defining Turkey’s status inconsistencies in the current international system, and past glories and selected victories make up contemporary status aspirations for Turkey. However, to play that role, the past has been used by the political and ideological entrepreneurs around the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Thus, we must analyze different meanings and functions of the past in TFP and how it is materialized by the JDP elites to assume higher status (higher than recognized/ascribed) in international politics. Aspirations to restore the position that Turks claim their country held in the past is crucial to Turkey's current national identity and national security interests. By introducing national self-image, collections of ideas about the nation's proper international status, and political purpose, the JDP elites attempt to craft and re-craft national identity. They introduce national self-image into the political discourse for these purposes.

Retrospectively, the Turkish identity has always been a critical ingredient in the TFP decision-making and implementation. Western-oriented foreign policy in the years following the World War I was a result of the Turkish identity constructed by the new republican elites. At the time, modernization through Westernism was an important identity for Kemalist elites, and the complete exclusion of the Ottoman past and Islam from the definition of the state identity became an important benchmark for its foreign policy (Bozdaglioglu, 2004, pp. 4–5). Over the years, that identity has been recalibrated by introducing several other ingredients such as Islamic rhetoric, conservatism, and liberalism. The national identity is also defined by Turkish nationalism. A closer inspection shows that secularism and Islamic conservatism are two sides of the same right-wing politics melted into nationalism and its variants (Karaveli, 2018). Nationalism consolidated the influence of Turkish elites and paved the way for a fabricated official identity (Kadioğlu, 1996).

Turkish nationalism has been loaded with special yet often contradictory premises such as Westernism-anti-Westernism, Americanism-Eurasianism, Islamism-secularism, liberalism-statism, and conservatism-modernism. This allowed the elites to fortify different intellectual premises at different periods and materialize identity-based politics for their individual agendas. In an earlier attempt, JDP had relied on a more pro-European, modernist, and liberal outlook. However, in the latest variants devised by the JDP elites since 2013, Turkish nationalism is loaded with religious, conservative, statist, and Eurasianist outlook admiring the past as a way forward under a strong leader that adopts an assertive approach to claim the rightful place the country deserves (Mehmetcik & Dal, 2019). Turkey as a messenger of a transcendent civilization with a universal mission is not an idea that belongs to JDP, but Turkish aspirations under JDP, as conveyed in the images below, have become a factual discourse strongly attached to its foreign policy. With high-status individuals like President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, TFP under JDP turns to be an image-building experiment to ascribe an identity to the nation, and reciprocal ascribed images have affected decision-making and implementation.

The Role of the Distant Past as a Benchmark in Turkish Foreign Policy

Over the last decade, Turkey has become an important regional power thanks to the transformation under JDP rule for more than fifteen years. JDP won the election in 2002 after a stiff financial crisis a year ago, which brought down the political establishment in ruins. Turkey’s economy has tripled since then and its reach has been extended far beyond its traditional foreign policy in terms of geography, scope, and context. JDP has particularly and deliberately cultivated this new-found economic and political power into its former Ottoman domains (Danforth, 2016). In the meantime, neo-Ottomanism has become an often-cited-concept among scholars to assess TFP even though much of these studies lack conceptual and theoretical coherence (Ongur, 2015).

However, the use and abuse of the past are not just limited to the Ottoman past in case of Turkey. It goes beyond the Ottoman past, stretching from Seljuk Empires to the Turkish Republic depending on the context. Indeed, neo-Ottomanism is used more often since 2002 to discredit or praise JDP’s foreign policy orientation and implementation. In the discrediting narrative, neo-Ottomanism in TFP refers to an ideologically motivated, romantic, detached from reality, and prone-to-fail-foreign policy agenda (Özkan, 2014, 2017, 2018). In the praising narrative, it refers to an active, dynamic, multi-sectoral, and multi-purpose diplomacy in the lands which were historically part of the Ottoman Empire (Aras, 2009; Küçükcan & Küçükkeleş, 2012, p. 87). In brief, almost everyone who talks about neo-Ottomanism agrees that under the JDP, TFP is motivated by the Ottoman Empire's legacy. Nonetheless, there is little agreement on what kinds of ideology neo-Ottomanism entails and to what degree it affects the actual foreign policy decision-making and implementation.

Analytically, we should use the term “the past” instead of “Ottoman past” because other motives, including architecture, historical references, legacies, and selected memories, go beyond the Ottoman past. We witness that selected sets of past, particularly past victories and glories, are being used to solidify and promote current TFP preferences. The present-day emphasis on Turkey's past legacies has not happened in a vacuum. Rather, it has been a gradual process over decades, helping to justify Turkey's foreign policy (Yanık, 2016). The motivation of JDP leaders in adopting past images derives from its anti-establishment “National Outlook” (Milli Görüş) history. For them, referring to past images was not purely a political choice like other actors, rather it was a means to survive in a political context that was shaped by the secular nationalist narrative, which excluded political Islamist parties from the governing circle and even delegitimized their political discourses.

The National Outlook was the name of an Islamist political movement led by Necmettin Erbakan for decades. Four of its five parties were closed in the past, and JDP was formed by the reformist wing of the fourth of these parties, namely “Felicity Party.” JDP also faced a closure trial in 2008 and the closure request failed by only one vote in the Constitutional Court. In this political environment, shaping foreign policy in an alternative way and foreign policy-making itself emerged as a tool to challenge and redesign such a domestic political context. The application of past images helped the JDP leaders reinvent the past (both glories and defeats) in line with its contemporary needs, which could not be met within the existing political context.

It should also be noted that politicians from different spectrums similarly used the past as a source of identity for Turkey at domestic and foreign policy levels (Yanık, 2016), even if it was not consistently manifested. The emerging power vacuum in the Turkic world in Central Asia or the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the Balkans have played a role in the re-imagination of identity in the 1990s (Yavuz, 1998, p. 22). Its usage has not only been linked to foreign policy but also to domestic political purposes. However, the JDP interpreted the past as a benchmark in defining the Turkish identity in an organized and sophisticated way. Various images and roles were discovered by JDP leaders in history, even though they literally contradict each other. Recalling those images did not necessarily recall the contradictions but rather provided a pragmatic mindset where reformist/conservative, religious/secular, aggressive/peaceful images, and past roles may exist together. The traditional Ottoman-skepticism of mainstream parties from right to left, despite their infrequent past references, unintentionally spared this enormous cognitive world to the benefit of JDP. This privilege enables the JDP elites to abuse the contradicting images when necessary without receiving a harsh challenge.

Therefore, we focus on the JDP’s foreign policy rhetoric and practices. With high-status individuals like President Erdogan, TFP under JDP turns to be an experiment to ascribe an identity to the nation and a corresponding status in international affairs. In this context, we can re-group the use of past and corresponding status claims under five abstract images, as seen in the table below:

Images	Orientation	Tools	Outcomes	Corresponding Status Claims
First image (a cultural aspect of the past)	A tool for asserting Turkey’s rightful place as a cultural, political, and economic hegemony in the region	Using TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs), humanitarian NGOs, and THY (Turkish Airlines),along with cultural tools in architecture, arts, and pop-cultureSoft-power projections	Political, economic, and cultural capitalization of Turkey’s historical ties with the imperial domains	Benevolent regional power, helping hand, and elder brother
Second image (Modernizing aspect of the past)	As the secret ingredients transforming Turkey into a model for Middle Eastern countries	Domestic institutional reforms and incentivesOpening spaces for new actors	Economic growth, political stability, modernization, and democratization of Turkish society while maintaining its Muslim character	Democratic Muslim superpower, a bridge between East and West, Turkish model, mediator, and peace maker
Third image (Islamic aspects of the past)	The “Islamization” of TFP and viewing it as a historical shift from traditional Western bounds	Using Islamic references in foreign policy rhetoric and practiceRaising the voice of the Muslims and other underrepresented nations in international fora	Moral authority to pursue such interests on behalf of the Muslim worldIncrease in ideologically oriented foreign policy preferences	Voice of Muslims, sound of the soundless, protector of Ummah, and leaders of Muslims
Fourth image (Re-orienting or re-positing aspects of the past)	Turkey’s Asian, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern ties over its European one	New alignments and relations	Eurasianism, axis shift	Central state, regional power, and global actor
Fifth image (irredentist aspects of the past)	Open political and military interventions	Military power and coercive discourses	Over-expansionist, adventurist, and masculine foreign policy	Nation builder, Security provider, global actor, and regional power

Based on an analysis of political rhetoric and policy choices, we can argue that a mixture of objective and subjective features combines these images, and many times, TFP summons multiple images together. However, these images correspond to different sets of status claims.

First Image and the Cultural Aspect of the Past

The first image of the past is set as a tool for asserting Turkey as a regional hegemon representing Turkish civilization and culture. This image is related more to the cultural aspect of the past rather than to political irredentism or any post-colonial agenda. By using this image, foreign policy elites generally promote the activities of several state bodies like TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), and Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) in resurrecting Turkish and Ottoman cultural heritage in many former Ottoman cities across different regions, and in building cultural and political bridges between Turkey and people living in the former imperial lands. Cultural and historical ties go beyond numerous restorations of former Ottoman and Seljuk Mosques, buildings, bridges, and monuments. The surge of the Ottoman nostalgia in movies, TV series, dramas (Çevik, 2019) historicist architecture, renovations, new project implementations representing Seljuk and Ottoman times (Çeler, 2019), rising interests in historical rituals, ceremonies, clothing, and other cultural products are a part and product of the cultural aspects of the past.

The role of the past in status politics is not limited to foreign policy. Attempts to create such lineage goes beyond discursive attitudes with material practices in mass cultural climate including pop culture, daily life of the ordinary Turks, arts, and architectures (Ergin & Karakaya, 2017; Fisher-Onar, 2018). These cultural actions function as a tool that reminded the people who live in the former imperial lands of the past (Ongur, 2015) and being reminded of the history through these cultural acts give Turkey a “superfluous sense of mission” (Yanık, 2016). It is important to note that Turkey uses different cultural, religious, and ethnic bonds in different regions. In the Middle East, religion and Islamic references are used; in the Caucasus, ethnic ties are more visible and obvious; and in the Balkans, Ottoman heritage becomes important and apparent. By playing different cards in accordance with differing regional conditions (Küçükcan & Küçükkeleş, 2012), Turkey strategically realized a soft power derived from the past. In this context, cultural aspects of the past, as Taşpınar (2008, p. 15) stated, are not about territorial irredentism/expansionism, but about political, economic, and cultural capitalization of Turkey’s historical and cultural ties.

This is the determinant difference between cultural and Islamist foreign policy images. While cultural image concentrates on non-military aspects of Turkey’s rise, Islamist image contains paternalistic characteristics like being the “protector,” “voice of Muslims,” or “sound of the soundless.” Although both images could be implemented by the same soft power tools to a large extent, the Islamist image is laying down civilizational differences by putting Turkey at the top of the Islamic world. On the contrary, the associated status claims with the cultural aspects of the past can be read in labels such as “benevolent regional power,” “helping hand,” or “elder brother,” along with a higher profile as a mediator driven by the use of soft tools and active diplomacy (The Economist, 2010). Created by using the legitimacy and greatness of the past, these types of labels and role sets are used by the foreign policy elites to shape the foreign policy discourse and practices.

This cultural aspect of the past has been severely challenged, especially in the Middle East. The reversal of the Arab Spring through the militarization of politics either through military coups or civil wars and the policies of the Saudi and Emirati regimes have undermined Turkish-backed emerging regional order. The terrorization of uprisings did not only delegitimize Turkish efforts but also created a loose coalition resisting Turkey’s regional ambitions. The exported Turkish cultural products in the region were one of the first targets. In recent years, Turkish dramas have been restricted in many Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. In 2020, Dar al-Ifta, the Egyptian official fatwa organ, warned Egyptians not to watch Turkish series, which are allegedly distorting historical facts and spreading misinformation. The statement accused Erdogan of trying to revive the Ottoman Empire, imposing hegemony over Arab countries, and using religious discourse as a cover for military operations (Amin, 2020).

The past has turned into an arena of cultural conflict between Turkey and certain Arab states, and each actor has different and contesting narratives, especially about the Ottoman era. The Saudi owned, UAE-based MBC channel’s 15-episode-long anti-Ottoman Kingdoms of Fire series, assailing Ottomans as tyrannical occupiers, was released in late 2019, and it was an answer to major Turkish historical dramas such as Resurrection Ertugrul or The Magnificent Century that glorify the Ottoman Empire and are popular in the Middle East (Idiz, 2019). Turkey’s state-run international broadcaster TRT WORLD has explicitly defined these counter activities as examples of cultural warfare alongside Abu Dhabi’s Foreign Minister Abdullah al Nahyan’s humiliating words for Fahreddin Pasha, the Ottoman officer who is known for the defense of Medina during the World War I and the Saudi revision of textbooks to cast the Ottomans as occupiers (TRT World, 2019).

Certain Arab states are uneasy over Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist cultural activities in the region and in Israel. The major reasons for the uneasiness are gradually worsening relations since the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid that resulted in the killing of 10 Turkish citizens by Israeli commandos and Erdogan’s repeated condemnations against the Israeli governments. Israeli officials have discredited the activities of Turkey’s governmental institutions in the Palestinian territories, especially in East Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Israel Katz called Turkey’s activities in East Jerusalem “subversion and incitement” (The Jerusalem Post, 2019).

However, Turkey’s status-seeking process through cultural capitalization has been stable largely in other regions such as the Balkans. Turkey’s soft power instruments like TIKA are still working in the region without interference. The state broadcaster (TRT) and the official news agency (Anadolu Agency, 2018) are also operating in the Balkans, and the content of the latter is covered in Balkan languages. Local newspapers use it as a source for their news (Palickova, 2019). Moreover, Yunus Emre Institutes that prioritize enhancing Turkey’s recognition, credibility, and prestige in the international arena and spreading education in Turkish language are quite active in the region. Overall, unlike serious challenges to its growing cultural influence in the Middle East because of political, military, and ideological confrontations, Turkey appears to have stabilized its cultural self-image in the ex-Ottoman territories of the Balkans. Furthermore, Turkish cultural products referencing the past are also successful in many Muslim-majority countries from Morocco to Malaysia (Rafiq, 2020).

Second Image and the Modernizing Aspect of the Past

The second image of the past is the secret ingredient transforming Turkey into a model for Middle Eastern countries, that is, a transformational project rooted in Turkey’s identity and political purpose (Hartmann, 2013, p. 8). Along with economic miracles, modernization, and democratization of society, bonds to Western and Eastern nations and institutions are being promoted while maintaining Turkey’s Muslim character. This interpretation also encompasses Turkey as a civilizational project by locating it as a bridge between the East and West, and between Christianity and Islam (Cagaptay, 2014). However, this “in-between-ness” departs from Turkish society's multi-ethnic composition (Onar, 2009). Just like the Ottoman Empire provided a working social order for diverse ethnic and religious groups, this image of the past offers a vision for cooperation by referencing Turkey’s past and its special roles (Gocek, 2011, p. 2).

The JDP has often represented itself as the party that has revitalized the liberal and multicultural legacy of Turkey’s past (Czajka & Wastnidge, 2015). This image, thus, refers to Turkey as a model and example to the Muslim world in general. Indeed, Turkey has long been portrayed as a model of a secular and democratic state with a majority of Muslim population. It is generally depicted as “a shining and rare example in the Islamic world” (The Economist, 2011) or a twenty-first century “Muslim superpower” (Cagaptay, 2014). Even though the reading of the profile has shifted sharply since 2011 (al-Zein, 2013; Cagaptay, 2017; Genc, 2019; Parkinson, 2015; Tugal, 2016), the rhetoric is still used by the foreign policy elites of JDP for domestic and foreign policy purposes.

Yet, recent democratic backsliding has undermined its self-identity claim of being modern, democratic, and a Muslim state. Simultaneously, the nationalistic and centralized foreign policy-making (Kirişçi & Sloat, 2019) has transformed Turkey’s image into an aggressive regional player in the Middle East. However, these two are interlinked by the government elites to depict Turkey as a country trying to keep its self-asserted identity against existential threats. According to this new rhetoric, political deficits (de-democratization in domestic politics), economic drawbacks (ongoing Turkish currency crisis since 2018), and military interventionism (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Eastern Mediterranean and Nagorno-Karabakh) are consequences of organized plots against Turkey’s rise and even direct threats to the existence of the country in political (coups, domestic incitements), economic (interest rate lobby), and security (People’s Protection Units (YPG)-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) connections) areas. Additionally, the new security-oriented language reasserts the “Muslim superpower” status by adding new heroic elements and removing previously praised liberal values. Erdogan often emphasizes that “Turkey is braving another war similar to the War of Independence” (Anadolu Agency, 2019). This is also an example of how JDP elites succeeded in covering a failure of a particular image and relevant foreign policy roles in certain areas by promoting a new image which is not compatible with the previous one.

Third Image and the Islamic Aspect of the Past

The third image of the past underlines the re-Islamization of Turkish identity and viewing it as a historical shift from traditional Western bonds in foreign policy orientation. This image entails the policies to come to terms with Turkey’s Islamic identity (Özkan, 2014b) while standing against Westernization and Western values. Hakan Yavuz points out that there are two competing visions in this context: “one of Turgut Ozal’s vision, which is more cosmopolitan, pro-European, and religiously pluralist, even while it recognizes a special role for Islam in society; and the one of Erdogan’s, more exclusivist, anti-Western, and pro-Islamist in both a political and social sense” (Yavuz, 2018). However, JDP’s use of the past represents a more complex and socially effective process than any of its historical peers (Ongur, 2015). Yavuz also shares this interpretation and states that “this historical label to symbolize much else—from justice, power, and pluralism to Islamic primacy and Turkey’s campaign to make the country great again” (Yavuz, 2018). Since the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state, it is not surprising to see JDP’s Islamic-oriented TFP discourse.

This image of the past is practiced in two ways under JDP’s foreign policy-making. First, it comes in the form of Islamic references in foreign policy rhetoric and practice, and second, raising the voice of Muslims in international fora. It assumes a moral authority to pursue such interests on behalf of the Muslim World and position Turkey in a leadership role in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, TFP rhetoric appears to be an ideologically oriented foreign policy discourse, “which is often exposed as a blend of political Islam, Ottoman nostalgia, anti-American, anti-European, anti-Israel, pro-Muslim, or generally, the Middle East oriented foreign policy” (Danforth, 2011).

This image has also often been associated with the legacy of Abdulhamid II, who is referred to by the conservative intelligentsia as the Sultan who pursued an Islamist agenda for the sake of preventing Ottoman retreat and eventual demise of the empire (Mert, 2016). He was seen as the “Supreme Sultan,” the last proudly Islamic Ottoman leader standing up to the West and uniting the Muslim world. This image of Neo-Ottomanism sees Islam and Ottoman experience under Abdulhamid as a prime example of successful foreign policy. JDP pedigree is particularly smitten with such a discursive link between Erdogan and Abdulhamid. Erdogan himself sees Abdulhamid as the “most important, most visionary and most strategic-minded individual that made his mark in the recent 150 years” (Turkish Republic Continuation of Ottoman Empire, 2018). Overall, the labels used by Turkish elites, such as “Turkey is the voice of the Muslim world,” “Turkey is the voice of voiceless,” and “protector of Ummah,” are associated with national self-image which casts itself as a practical guide for Turkey’s interests at present as conforming to current Turkish identity. This identity politics provides nonmaterial stakes as classic status politics benchmarked in historical legacies.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is one of the key platforms where Turkey performs its self-proclaimed role as the protector of Ummah by addressing severe criticisms against Western leaders over the major problems of the Muslim world and the rise of Islamophobia in the West. Erdogan uses the platform to show his eagerness to be a spokesperson for the world's Muslims. In the opening speech of the OIC Ministers of Social Affair Summit in 2019, Erdogan slammed French President Emmanuel Macron over his “Islamic terrorism” expression by informing the audience that he urged him many times not to do so (Hurriyet Daily News, 2019).

Turkey constantly uses the OIC platforms to declare its pro-Palestinian stance by condemning the Israeli occupation. The last two extraordinary OIC summits were held in Istanbul in 2017 and 2018 with the agenda of discussing the status of Jerusalem after Donald Trump decided to transfer the US Embassy to Jerusalem. This decision was condemned in the summits, and the centrality of the Palestinian cause and the sanctity of Al Quds Al-Sharif (Jerusalem) to the Muslim Ummah was reaffirmed (OIC Extra-Ordinary Summit Conference, 2017). Since the motto of the organization is “the collective voice of the Muslim world,” it becomes a place for Turkey to present its Islamic aspect of the past and promote its new status with corresponding role sets such as “protector of the Muslims” or “sounds of the Ummah.”

Apart from the OIC meetings, Turkish elites use every opportunity to promote their leadership status across the Muslim world. Erdogan points out the Turkish mission as follows: “we rush to the aid of the disadvantaged and oppressed across our region, from Somalia to Arakan, from Gaza to Yemen” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2019). However, this claim is not free from questioning. For example, Turkey’s approach toward Uyghurs of East Turkistan is different from the harsh rhetoric adopted on other topics. Despite Turkey being one of the few Muslim-majority countries criticizing China’s “re-education camps,” it asserts that a solution is possible under the single roof of China and that the Uyghur issue will not spoil the relations between the two countries (Westcott & Sarıyuce, 2019). Turkey’s reluctant and cautious approach to this issue is being criticized, and it becomes one of the constraints of Turkey’s Islamic-oriented discourse.

Islam and historical legacies are also needed for domestic consumption. The conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, which had been used as a museum since the 1930s, was for both domestic and foreign policy purposes. For many, it indicates a more independent and confident Turkey, while some others read it as the emblem of the re-Islamization of Turkey or the counter-revolution against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's legacy. As Muhammed Ayoob cited in an op-ed, “Ataturk was a great man, but he left us a people without history.…Turning Hagia Sophia once again into a mosque is seen by a substantial segment of the Turkish population as part of the effort to reclaim their country’s history” (Ayoob, 2020). Erdogan also stated that “the resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the footsteps of the will of Muslims across the world to come… the resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the reignition of the fire of hope of Muslims and all oppressed, wrong, downtrodden and exploited” (Masoud & Sasmaz, 2020). This rhetoric is aligned with the role of assuming the voice of Muslims, protector of the Ummah, and leader of Muslims.

Fourth Image and the Re-orienting Aspect of the past

The fourth image of the past involves policies to build new alliances and friendships based on common geography, culture, and identity across its former imperial domains in the Post-Cold War era. Turkey’s recent ambitious foreign policy goes beyond “openings” to distant regions and advocates some global issues. It also includes Turkey’s questioning of several US-led international orders (Kardaş, 2013; Mehmetcik, 2019). As a rising middle power (Dal, 2018), Turkey has its unique views on the liberal international order, many of which are constructed by the JDP's lauded rhetoric. Among these, the rhetoric and practice of the rise of Eurasianism in Turkish foreign and security policy since 2011 is important (Erşen & Köstem, 2019). Eurasianism as a geopolitical discourse caught on with some Turkish intellectuals, and it was always part of TFP. Turkish politicians began to envisage the role of Turkey as an important player not only in the region but also as a central state. Being located in the center of Eurasia, the country was not allowed to be degraded to the role of a peripheral state and taken advantage of in games between the powers (Adamczyk & Ilik, 2019). The foreign policy elite position Turkey as a regional and rising global power (Hoffmann, 2019).

Turkey’s foreign policy is still a part of the transatlantic alliance of NATO, but it does not hesitate in diversifying alternatives, as seen recently in the purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia despite harsh criticism by the US. Despite it being seen as a sign of Turkey’s shift of axis, Erdogan’s remarks showing his intent to reach a comprehensive military deal with the US and Turkey’s military relations with the European powers reveal that Ankara seeks strong engagement with NATO allies and demonstrates its commitment to the West (Ozer, 2019). Yet, Turkey’s alternating foreign policy strategies including pragmatic alignments are significant aspects of its desire for being an independent regional power rather than being the recipient of US agenda. However, Turkey’s dependence on the US in economic and security matters continues to draw the boundaries of such an independent and active foreign policy (Kesgin, 2020, p. 8).

Turkey’s “global actor” status-seeking efforts are highly visible at the ideational level, too. Its emphasis on the need for a new regional and international order and revisionist stance towards the UN system is manifested in the slogan of Erdogan: “The world is greater than five,” which is directed at the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC; Uzer, 2018, p. 32). By targeting the drawbacks of the Security Council system and its failure to resolve existing global crises and end injustices, Turkey aims to ideationally relocate itself as a global actor who is the voice of many in the new emerging order.

However, Turkey’s geopolitical imagination defining its interest is also a product of historical legacies. It has always had clear ethnopolitical aspects. For example, a pronounced ethnic dimension was reflected in the 1990s in Turkey’s foreign policy initiative as Pan-Turanist tendencies. Recently, Turkey's strategic bandwagoning with Russia, Iran, and China complemented the Eurasian tendencies as a product of historical legacies. It is true that the long-standing and bloody rivalry between the Ottoman and Russian empires—both fought 12 wars with each other—has left indelible marks on the cultural and historical memories of both countries. However, there have been significant episodes of cooperation (Reynolds, 2019). In the early 1920s, during the Turkish War of Independence,¹ the Bolshevik Russian Government provided vital financial and military assistance to Turkish revolutionaries. There is even a monument, the Taksim Republic Monument, in which two Russian generals, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and Mikhail Frunze, are standing behind Ataturk. They are there Ataturk’s special order to commemorate Russian help to the Turkish War of Independence.

In the 1980s, while the Western allies were reluctant, the USSR provided crucial material and finance to build some of the most important Turkish heavy industries, including Iskenderun, Karabuk iron and steel factories; the first oil treatment plant—TUPRAS; Mersin and Iskenderun Ports; and the first aluminum factory. The first nuclear power plant in Turkey has been established by Russia as well. Turkey’s nuclear ambitions go back to the 1960s, and since then, Western reluctance was one of the important restricting factors that refrained Turkey from reaching that threshold (Kibaroglu, 1997). When traditional allies are ignorant of Turkish interests, these historical legacies resonate with many Turkish policymakers when they take decisions concerning cooperation with Russia. The JDP also uses these instances of a relatively closer past to advertise the preferences of recent TFPs.

Fifth Image and the Irredentist Aspect of the Past

The fifth image of the past is more masculine and irredentist in using military power and coercive discourses. As Hoffman (2019) pointed out wisely, Turkey’s foreign policy has become more interventionist, having large parts of its army stationed abroad. Turkey’s recent interventions are generally legitimized as “circumstances have forced Turkey to become assertive as a regional power” (Duran, 2018). However, the establishment of new bases further afield, notably in Qatar, Somalia and, most recently, Sudan, in addition to Turkey's involvement in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, has given rise to claims that it continues to pursue a “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy (Hoffmann, 2019). These types of risky, masculine, and adventurist foreign policy practices by direct political and military coercive tools give rise to unease about Turkey’s motivations at the domestic and international levels (Demir, 2017; Hoffmann, 2019). Furthermore, there is little desire for a Turkish neo-imperial adventure in former imperial domains (Wastnidge, 2019). Yet, this image goes along with the acceptance that “Turkey is a real regional power and a global actor—which requires the successful juggling of both hard and soft power” (Ataman, 2019). The other four images of the past come in the form of public and cultural diplomacy push. The fifth image is different and functions as a nation builder and security provider.

The early signs of such status-seeking activism began in Somalia at the beginning of the last decade. For the first time, Turkey adopted a strategy of state-building in Africa, which is traditionally outside the concern of the modern Republic (Özkan, 2014, pp. 11–12). As an opening to Africa, Turkey’s business and infrastructure investments, development aids, and military training programs in Somalia have turned it into Turkey’s zone of influence and credited Turkey’s nation builder status. This attempt has been replicated in Western Syria, where Turkey has also established a zone of influence. These experiences have even been partly duplicated in Libya and Azerbaijan.

However, Turkey’s foreign policy preferences that were shaped by the light of the aforementioned self-images eventually faced serious challenges in the Middle East, and to deal with those challenges, Turkey resorted to military means to varying degrees. Energy has become a significant variable in shaping the regional re-groupings in the Middle East, and Turkey is excluded from the energy partnership emerging in the East Mediterranean region. The energy cooperation between Israel (former close ally), Egypt (post-Arab spring rival), Greece (traditional regional rival), and Cyprus (traditional regional rival) has pushed Turkey to find peripheral partners to bloc this chain that excludes Turkey from the energy sources and its transfer to Europe. In this manner, Turkey signed a maritime delineation deal with Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord, which would undermine such efforts eliminating Turkey. This ambitious move not only shows Turkey’s eagerness to be accepted as a regional player but also triggers Turkey’s military involvement in Libya's ongoing civil war because of the dependence of the security of the maritime deal on the security of the existing government (Johnson, 2019). Bilateral agreements allow Turkey to provide military support (arms and troops) to the regime against the Russian-backed rebels commanded by Khalifa Haftar.

Another important development regarding Turkey’s military activism is its Syrian campaign. Unlike Libya, Turkey’s Syrian war is more complex as it also has domestic reflections like the Kurdish question, an increasing number of refugees, and transnational activities of the terror groups (YPG-PKK connections and radical Islamist groups like ISIS). The Syrian campaign has also become a situation where Turkey tests its strength by flexing its military and diplomatic muscles.

In domestic politics, the combination of nationalist and Islamic discourse is functionalized to legitimize Turkey’s Syrian operation, whereas its regional power status is promoted by the use of national military technologies (for e.g., drones) during the operations, which are often used to emphasize the modern face of the powerful “new Turkey” image. Internationally, Turkey’s presence and actorness in Syria, which is supported by diplomatic and military means, serves Turkey’s regional actor rhetoric in the international realm.

Conclusion

This article deals with different variants of using the past for self-identity formation in TFP from an aspirational constructivist perspective to analyze Turkey's status politics. The overall argument is that Turkey’s status politics is motivated by distant legacies or chosen glories rather than peer-to-peer comparison. Bridging the status inconsistencies derived from the past in the equation as an analytical explanatory variable, the article tries to understand several Turkish status claims rhetorically presented since the 2000s.

The rebirth of Turkey stems from prevalent security concerns, nationalist aspirations, and social interactions, with a new political philosophy and a reconfiguration of national interests. However, the role of the past in reformulating Turkish identity is an intellectual movement departing from the historical legacies locating Turkey as a regional and global player. Turkey, when rejecting its identity and past in favor of the West, was characterized as a torn country (Huntington, 2011, pp. 144–149) or a maverick for most of its modern history. Modern-day Turkey was created in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In its early times, its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sought to actively remove and replace everything once considered the past to foment a new national identity based on Turkish nationality. As Turkey moved into the pluralist system of democracy in the 1950s, the religious motivation among the majority of Turkish citizens came to be used by political leaders, and historical sentiments and rhetoric resurfaced. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, prime minister and later president Turgut Özal, and prime minister and founder of National Outlook Movement Necmettin Erbakan, used idealization of the past in one way or another for domestic and foreign policy purposes (Murinson, 2012; Yanık, 2016).

However, under President Erdogan’s rules, the past has become an often-mentioned phenomena in understanding TFP discourse and practice. We can also argue that the past functions as a myth to explain TFP much akin to many IR myth functions, which are “apparent truths, usually expressed as slogans, that IR traditions rely on in order to appear to be true” (Weber, 2013, p. xviii). Yet, the emergence of JDP has not only rekindled the debate over Turkey‘s historical roots and legacy as a successor state to the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, but also taken deliberate political and cultural steps in flagging the past as a source of grandeur, admiration, and as an example to Turkey.

JDP governments have not equally and simultaneously adopted all the images we discussed above in practice. It is possible to identify three foreign policy periods in an almost two-decade-long JDP rule rather than taking it as unitary. These periods can be defined as EU-oriented early years (2002–2009), Ahmet Davutoğlu-led foreign policy (2009–2016), and post-Davutoğlu period (since 2016). In each period, the selection of image adoption, the orientation of a particular image, or expected outcomes of adopting any of those images varied to a certain degree.

Modernizing and cultural images were extensively used in the earlier years of JDP. In domestic politics, JDP was under pressure by the “Republic Protests” of secular nationalists (2007), “e-memorandum” released by the General Staff (2007) about the centrality of secularism in the country, and closure trial at the Constitutional Court (2008). In this regard, the EU reforms contributed to democratization and pluralization of the Turkish political system, which in return fueled its modernizing image abroad. It also helped JDP elites erase their anti-establishment image in domestic politics and receive support from different segments of the society. There was a continuity in terms of such foreign policy roles with previous Turkish governments that had been increasing political and cultural influences in the Balkans and prioritizing EU reforms since the 1990s.

However, JDP reinterpreted the EU membership process in an alternative way, which was in line with its self-defined modern conservative position in domestic politics and possessed the pro-EU camp leadership in Turkey. In 2003, while Erdogan was praising Turkey’s Westernization history dating back to the writing of the first constitution in the Ottoman Empire (Hürriyet, 2003), he was also pointing out the alternative way of modernization, that is, catching up with the world without concessions on the identity of the country. This became the center of its modernizing image in later years. Even if the pace of the EU negotiation process slowed down, it was easily transferred to the military's technological developments.

Moreover, a particular failure or a disappointment in any self-ascribed foreign policy role that was articulated around one of these images often expedited the construction of a new role through overemphasizing another image. For Erdogan, Turkey was about to join the EU as a representative of different civilizations, and the EU had to prove that it was, in fact, not a Christian club (Türkiye, 2004). However, this modernizing aspect was challenged when negotiations came to deadlock in particular areas. This failure was defined as hypocrisy towards a Muslim-majority country and even a form of Islamophobia (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2015). Such an articulation effectively fueled Turkey’s Islamic image in the form of being a fighter against “Islamophobia.” It would be very simplistic if we claimed a direct causality between the failure of the EU membership process and Turkey’s adoption of Islamic references. This discursive change coincided with other changes that took place in Turkish domestic and foreign politics.

Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign ministry (2009–2014) represents a certain shift in image adoption in this regard. In domestic politics, JDP consolidated its power and Erdogan was re-elected as a prime minister for the third term in 2011. A democratic initiative was launched to resolve the Kurdish question by non-military means, which in return underpinned its democratic claims in Turkey and abroad. Turkey enjoyed promoting itself as a key player in its region by becoming a member of global institutions such as the UNSC, initiating mediation in regional conflicts, increasing trade volumes with neighboring countries, and developing assistance networks across the continents. In this period, Islamic and reorienting/repositing aspects of the past were often used alongside its modernizing and cultural aspects. However, the modernizing aspect differed to some extent. Rather than further integration with the West, the new rhetoric created a repositioning that places Turkey in a wider geographical landscape (Aras, 2009, p. 130). According to Davutoğlu, this new mission was going to make Turkey a global player, so it required Turkey’s engagements in regional and global politics from Africa to Central Asia or from EU to OIC (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 96).

In this period, the designing of domestic political context function of image adoption was also seen with regard to the Islamic images. Turkey’s engagement in the Palestinian issue was justified in the domestic realm by referencing Pan-Islamist Abdulhamid II, whose role in Turkey’s modernization is quite controversial among historians. However, for a self-defined role of “the voice of the oppressed Muslim,” Abdülhamid II, who once rejected the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Ottoman Palestine, was certainly a perfect match. In this regard, a pro-Palestinian foreign policy by making a connection to him is also a challenge against Turkey's secular national narrative. It does not matter whether he was the one who suspended the first constitution, which Erdogan praised in his comments on Turkey’s modernization history.

In this proactive foreign policy realm, the uprisings in the Arab world had significant positive and negative influence on Turkey’s self-defined roles. Although Turkey found an opportunity to promote itself as the model for the Middle Eastern countries in the beginning and intensified its political and economic engagement that had already started before the uprisings, the counter-revolutionary turn in Egypt, Syria, and other countries challenged Turkey’s self-promotion. Furthermore, the political landscape of the post-Arab Uprising Middle East upended many of Turkey’s regional ambitions (Çagaptay, 2013, p. 7). The Post-Arab Spring period led to further militarization of TFP, largely under the region's emerging instability. Repositing/reorienting images, which had often been articulated by non-military means, started to be militarized alongside the adoption of irredentist images of the past and Islamist images as supportive elements. In this period, significant internal developments also took place in terms of transition in image adoption such as JDP’s authoritarian turn after Gezi Protests, re-militarization of the Kurdish problem, the coup attempt on 15 July 2016 and the subsequent democratic backsliding, repeated currency crises, and terror campaigns in the country.

Until the uprisings, Turkey adopted cultural and military means simultaneously in its region. While searching for free trade and travel agreements with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in 2010, Turkey was also conducting cross-border military operations in Northern Iraq. Further, while opening education centers to increase its cultural influence in the Balkans, it was also engaging in state-building efforts in Somalia. However, Turkey’s military intervention in Syria in 2016 marked a beginning of a new term, which could also be referred to as the post-Davutoğlu period. He was forced to resign as prime minister and JDP leader in the same year. Turkey’s increasing direct military engagement in regional conflicts in Syria and Libya or rising regional confrontations in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region fueled the “regional power” discourse of the JDP in domestic politics, while denouncing the opposition parties. The row over the Lausanne Treaty is an example in this regard. Although Lausanne Treaty has mainly been known as a clear sign of the victory of the War of Independence and the title deed of the Republic, Erdogan drew a different picture. “Some tried to deceive us by presenting Lausanne as a victory. In Lausanne, we gave away the [now-Greek] islands that you could shout across to” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). This revisionist discourse shows the JDP’s “irredentist image” and assertive foreign policy role on one hand, and on the other hand, directly targeting the opposition’s status quoist foreign policy that is identified with Turkey's modern history.

Erdogan has rejected Ottoman nostalgia as a driving factor in TFP on many occasions. In a Newsweek article, he wrote that “This is not a romantic neo-Ottomanism: It is realpolitik based on a new vision of the global order” (Erdogan, 2011). JDP’s close circles labeled these attempts as “urban legend” (Duran, 2020). However, a romanticized and glorified version of the past has been rhetorized by JDP foreign policy elites and pedigrees to cast Turkey as a regional power, a leader in the Muslim world, a helping hand, and a bridge between the East and West. In this context, the past is an indicator of identity politics as a product of history in historical memory and legacy, which consequentially shapes the aspirations of the political elites and national interests. In case of Turkey, this has certain ramifications in rhetorical and practical role sets, and the status that Turkey ascribed for itself, deriving it from historical legacies. In short, as then Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated “the Ottoman history plays a vital role for today’s Turkey for its identity and political status” (SETA, 2009). Within such a discourse, Turkey does not compare itself with other similar middle powers or regional powers. Rather, it continuously compares its current status with the past as its benchmark.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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