Target Saudi Arabia: To Demonize and Belittle

Secondary Arab Power

First, the author perceives Saudi Arabia as a secondary Arab power, which is incorrect, and how his “insatiable career-long fascination with the ‘secret kingdom’ of Saudi Arabia” (p. 1) motivated him to investigate this hypothesis. There is nothing secretive about the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula that hosts nearly two million pilgrims each year, which meant that hundreds of millions interacted with Saudi society over the decades to discover it in full. Ottaway provides readers with a glimpse of his discoveries on various trips and opines that Riyadh’s quest for Arab leadership—chiefly through the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) “to counter the Iranian threat” (p. 6), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—came to naught because Saudi “heavy-handed tactics” (p. 144) were rejected by most members. The author devotes chapter nine to “[t]he Quest for Great Power Status” (pp. 139–164) to illustrate how the GCC rejected the Saudi bid for unity, a goal that the late King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is credited with, even if this was explicitly stated as an original objective inked in the 1981 preamble of the GCC Charter.

Presumably, Heir Apparent Muhammad bin Salman (pejoratively labeled MBS throughout the book although Ottaway is not the only culprit who has opted for convenience instead of accuracy) picked the GCC to display Saudi muscle as he attempted power projection in Yemen that, in this fictitious narrative, proved to be a failure. The 2015 war apparently turned into a disaster (pp. 149–150) though the author conveniently overlooks the UN Security Council Resolution that authorized the use of force in Yemen. It is worth noting that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, passed Resolution 2216 in 2015, which expanded the sanctions regime against Houthi rebels that took arms against the government through the creation of a targeted arms embargo and authorized states to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim, Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Houthi, and the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of Resolution 2140 (2014).

Instead, one is offered a full anti-Saudi plate: “MBS Goes to War” (pp. 147–149); “Saudi Disaster in Yemen” (pp. 149–150); “Saudi Arabia and the UAE Part Ways” (pp. 151–152); “Saudi Military Failure” (pp. 154–156), and similar fare that certainly are colorful, including the canard that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) “has seen its reputation destroyed in the Yemen war because its pilots repeatedly bombed scores of civilian rather than military targets” (p. 155). Conveniently, none of these discussions touch on the core concern of Iranian involvement on the Arabian Peninsula, as Tehran backed—financially and militarily—Houthi rebels against the country’s elected government. Moreover, observers who follow military affairs know that the RSAF coordinated most of its bombing raids in Yemen with the United States, which supplied target coordinates that were, doubtless, legitimate military ones. There were, to be sure, genuine errors that resulted in civilian casualties, but this did not destroy the RSAF’s reputation, whose pilots were and are thorough professionals.

To further illustrate his point that Riyadh failed to lead the GCC, Ottaway focuses on putative differences between Saudi and Emirati leaders, raises the Qatar challenge that preoccupied regional powers between 2017 and 2021, and falls back on “MBS’s Misstep[s] (in both Lebanon and sudan)” 뺭, all to underline that “[a]s of early 2021, MBS cut a lonely and highly compromised figure in the Arab World” (p. 162). Given this compilation, Ottaway perceives the Saudi leader as a collector of policy disasters (p. 162), even if GCC unity was restored a few months after the publication of this book when the Qatari ruler, Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, visited the Kingdom on at least four occasions, including on 5 January 2021, 11 May 2021, 17 September 2021 (the latter conclave grouped Muhammad bin Salman, Shaykh Tamim and UAE National Security Adviser Shaykh Tahnun bin Zayid Al Nahyan—all wearing casual shorts and t-shirts), and 14 December 2021 for the 42nd GCC Summit. Moreover, Muhammad bin Salman went to Doha on 9 December 2021 during his Gulf tour a few days before the GCC Riyadh 2021 Summit held under the Saudi heir apparent’s leadership. According to published documents, GCC summiteers agreed on various policies that highlighted the institution’s value to all of its member-states. So much for erroneous analytical prognostications.

Naturally, Ottaway was not the only writer who got it wrong on Saudi leadership capabilities as the safe bet was to dismiss Muhammad bin Salman and denigrate the Kingdom since that was bound to receive wide coverage in and on compromised media outlets. Arab leadership has always been a gargantuan task, and most who ventured on this path proved to be far less successful than they contemplated. In the twentieth century, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq were ambitious enough to embark on empire-building ventures, and all three left mixed legacies. Mercifully, Arab Gulf leaders proved to be better readers of history, as most distanced themselves from such schemes. Qaboos bin Sa‘id of Oman, Zayid bin Sultan of the UAE, and Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz of Saudi Arabia concentrated on their nations, anxious to advance nascent development projects to enhance their respective peoples’ socio-economic aspirations. To be sure, the late King Faysal backed the OIC to gain global influence, but only to strengthen the position of Muslim states vis-à-vis major powers. The latter successfully institutionalized intrinsic interests by riding roughshod over the rest of humanity, and while Faysal never aimed to replace major powers, his reward was to secure mutual respect, which he earned from friends and foes alike.

Ottaway believes that Muhammad bin Salman is unlike other Saudi leaders and lacks qualities that distinguished men such as King Faysal and the founder, King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz. In fact, the author frequently repeats that Muhammad bin Salman is no more than an impulsive and reckless person (p. 8) and that his alleged actions—ranging the gamut from poor military decisions in Yemen to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi—“raised serious doubts about his fitness to rule” (p. 8). The Khashoggi case is discussed in chapter eight (pp. 113–138) without presenting anything new. Still, Ottaway believes that the Saudi heir apparent “might very well rule Saudi Arabia for the next half century” (p. 8), a dreadful prospect that leads him to the Greek mythological figure of Icarus (pp. 8–9).

The Icarus Analogy

This is the second major theme of the Ottaway study that deserves careful consideration. Icarus, “who suffered from an excess of youthful recklessness and hubris and [who] wanted to escape the island of Crete” (p. 8), led his father Daedalus to design wings of feathers held together by wax that, naturally, melted when Icarus flew too close to the sun. Ostensibly, and according to Ottaway, King Salman was Daedalus who empowered his son to overlook Al Sa‘ud norms to earn leadership credentials which, and this must be stated as clearly as possible, is the product of the author’s vivid imagination. Ottaway cannot possibly know what motivated King Salman to reach the decision to select Muhammad bin Salman over his other sons, cousins and other members of the family, and he would know even less as to the intricate conversations and debates that may have occurred or are presumably occurring among senior officials. Observers like Ottaway ought to discern better than most that such deliberations and decisions are impossible for any stranger to grasp, even the most seasoned, simply because no outsiders are admitted to such majlises, and because Saudi Arabia is a monarchy where the final pronouncement is the ruler’s distinctive privilege. There are, of course, certain clues that may illustrate the kind of debates that may have occurred within collegial conclaves, but these are nearly impossible to confirm or even decipher without inside knowledge that is difficult to come by.

Moreover, and as far as it is publicly and widely recognized within the country, King Salman is a true Al Sa‘ud, not a suicidal father who would jeopardize his family’s rule for the sake of any one member. Could it simply be that he, King Salman, determined that his son Muhammad was the best equipped to deal with current and future challenges that confronted the Kingdom? Even if young and relatively inexperienced, was King Salman foresightful in his selection rather than the caricature that Ottaway depicts of a Daedalus who would sabotage his son’s prospects to guide and rule Saudi Arabia?

Since the Icarus analogy is mythological, it is important to state that Ottaway is not shy in his criticisms of the monarch, as he accuses King Salman of being the family “divider.” According to the author, “[s]ecuring the throne for his son became [Salman’s] end-of-life mission rather than ensuring the unity of the House of Saud” (p. 65). This opinion may be true, or it may be wrong, and while the monarch may well have decided to “discard the bedrock family principle of Shoura (sic), the practice of consultation among senior princes to obtain consensus, or close to it, on the line of succession” (p. 65), few outsiders were privy to the kind of discussions that occurred among senior princes on this most important concern. The point that 3 out of 35 members of the Allegiance Council failed to approve the appointment of Muhammad bin Salman as heir apparent in June 2017 did not indicate anything more than three negative votes.

Notwithstanding the “divider” epithet, the King is portrayed as a naïve individual who was not even aware that his wife, Prince Muhammad’s own mother Shaykhah Fahdah bint Falah al-Hathlin, was “placed … under virtual house arrest,” again without any evidence to back yet another gratuitous assertion, which confirmed the erroneous Daedalus characterization (p. 65). Few readers may know that the mythological figure of Daedalus was a charming plotter in his own right that, in the Ottaway tale, was eclipsed by dementia or other debilitating diseases [all false too]. In other words, the mythological Daedalus wanted Icarus to fail, whereas King Salman’s health conditions—not necessarily his will—led to a similar outcome. Strangely, Ottaway enquires, “how would King Salman react to what the US Central Intelligence Agency concluded was the result of an order from MBS” [to murder Jamal Khashoggi]? “Would the king reconsider his decision to make his son heir apparent,” (p. 69) he wonders?

It does not occur to Ottaway to query whether King Salman actually believed the CIA conclusion, which was made public on 26 February 2021 after President Joe Biden authorized the agency to publish the thin, three-page long report that, and this must be underlined, did not disclose any proof. The “assessment” included several caveats but reached its conclusions because CIA analysts believed that a kill order could not possibly have been rendered by anyone other than the heir apparent. Whether the Icarus analogy holds under these circumstances is problematic though, again, the reasons may be both because such correlations lack genuine analytical values or because they stressed journalistic preferences that skirted concrete and independently verifiable facts.

A Meteoric but Undeserved Rise

At the heart of Ottaway’s study—the third major theme—is a resentment at Muhammad bin Salman’s meteoric rise to power (pp. 13–26), which the author attributes to the mere privilege of being his father’s favorite. The author quotes former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan, who apparently “stated ruefully that MBN [Muhammad bin Nayif, whom King Salman removed from the heirship in 2017] was the perfect prince, but he had the wrong father” (p. 24). Given that a ruler is the final arbiter in a monarchy, what Jordan’s (and, consequently, Ottaway’s) doleful comment illustrates is naiveté.

Be that as it may. What has Muhammad bin Salman done to merit such a systematic denigration? A very long list is duly provided, including repression at home (pp. 79–92) and missteps elsewhere (pp. 160–162). Ottaway repeats what so many polemical writings have already covered, emphasizing the journalistic preference for sensationalism. For example, we learn that Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a former Saudi ambassador to Washington (and the subject of a previous Ottaway book), was not arrested in November 2017 when Riyadh incarcerated prominent figures at the Ritz Carlton Hotel on corruption charges. The author ponders—but without providing any evidence to back his claims—whether Prince Bandar “had reached some secret deal to avoid arrest,” though he adds in a cameo-nod to former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “Among the known knowns, however, was that MBS appointed two of Bandar’s children, his daughter Reema and son Khalid, ambassadors to Washington and London respectively—the two most important diplomatic postings for the House of Saud” (p. 38). How the non-arrest of Prince Bandar and the appointments of his two offspring to key posts are related is never explained even if the implication is that the Prince, Bandar, may have “purchased” two posts that are, to use neutral terms, incomprehensible and bizarre. Again, no evidence is advanced to back this balderdash paragraph that only a professional soothsayer can decipher.

More seriously, and while readers may accept the notion that this is a meaningful effort to look at a society that is going through dramatic transformations under a complex new leader, Ottaway devotes several sections to the “Kingdom of Mohammed bin Salman” (pp. 75–94) and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (pp. 95–112). While he raises valuable points, he also makes irrelevant analogies. For example, Ottaway wonders “what it means to be called a citizen in Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy rather than a subject” (p. 77), aware that the Kingdom was not a Jeffersonian democracy and has not laid claim to such a vision. Even the heir apparent’s “tactics to curb Wahhabi influence and end the reign of moral terror exercised by the mutaween (sic) over Saudi society” (p. 79) is analyzed as an assault on freedoms. The decision to curb the royal welfare state (pp. 82–83), putative suppression of activism (pp. 83–85), the jailing of feminists (pp. 85–86), and the appearance of a Saudi diaspora of “2,170” Saudi “asylum seekers abroad” in 2015 (according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) are all presented as illustrations of the heir apparent’s alleged misdeeds.

The author certainly acknowledges that fundamental changes are under way in Saudi Arabia, but how Saudis responded and are continuing to welcome the ruler’s (and his heir’s) visions—subjects that are certainly worthy of discussion and analysis—are barely skimmed through. Moreover, it is certainly a stretch of the imagination to conclude that these changes have led to the rise of a “relatively secular counterculture to the oppressively conservative Wahhabi-dictated one” (p. 92), which begs the question: why was it not possible to have a mix of modernization that also respected local traditions and norms?

Not surprisingly, Ottaway derides Muhammad bin Salman “as the architect of an imagined Fourth Saudi kingdom” (p. 95), dismissing most of the vast new projects—from NEOM to other features planned within the vast Vision 2030 blueprint—as being “somewhat Orwellian” (p. 96). Were non-Western leaders not entitled to dream of how best to transform their societies, and when one stepped forward with the kind of epochal vision that upset the traditional apple cart, was it normal for critics to dismiss them out of hand? Where is the fair play to allow one to imagine grandiose plans? Of course, while it is equally just to subject such visions to constructive criticisms, should critics not display some patience to see what can or will be accomplished before scorning them as “elephant” schemes? Giga-projects take time to rise and while astronomical costs may well limit or even delay some of the many contemplated construction ventures, judicious planning and equally sagacious investments may yet translate into concrete achievements.

Ottaway affirms that “MBS seemed to have abandoned altogether his goal of switching the kingdom’s economic motor from the state to the private sector” (p. 108) and that he failed to end or curtail the country’s addiction to oil revenues (pp. 109–110) that, following this line of thinking, prevented any alternatives to encourage necessary foreign direct investments into the Kingdom. This, apparently, led critics to urge the heir apparent “to reconsider his whole approach to economic reform” (p. 111), as his “glitzy megaproject” were bound to ruin the Kingdom. In other words, Muhammad bin Salman was better off to lower his sights since he is no economic Czar, much less a successful one, even when foreign investments were widely available. Again, one is entitled to one’s opinions but not to facts, and while certain investors backed away from specific projects, others jumped in to be in a good position to reap inevitable economic windfalls.

Finally, and before concluding, it may be useful to touch on the chapter dealing with US–Saudi ties as this reveals a genuine dilemma. Indeed, the paucity of facts is further highlighted in this discussion (pp. 175–195) and, notwithstanding periodic hiccups that define diplomacy, US–Saudi relations were not “strange” (pp. 173–175), as avowed here, but based on mutually beneficial policies. For eight decades, successive American administrations invested in this relationship just as much as every Saudi monarch did, in what was skillfully perceived by Prince Saud al-Faysal, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a catholic marriage. For better or worse, the two partners preserved access to petroleum resources at reasonable prices, denied Soviet (and later Russian) expansion towards a warm-water port, stood by pro-Western allies as Western colonialism came to an end in the Arab World, firmly backed the capitalist economic model to which both sides were intrinsically committed, and otherwise checked the rise of extremism across the realm.

Where Riyadh differed from Washington was its backing of friendly dictators and on its more recent preferences that favored Iranian expansion throughout the area. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudis perceived Tehran’s expansionist vision—to conquer and rule over Mecca and Medina—as an existential danger to the country. For their part, King Salman and his son held on to Saudi–American associations even if Ottaway avowed that the US commitment to defend the Kingdom “seemed increasingly questionable” (p. 188). Discounting eight decades of mutually advantageous contacts, the author’s treatise takes on truly peculiar forms when he compares former President Donald Trump with Muhammad bin Salman, who apparently shared a bond with each other, one that deceptively stemmed “from their similar histories and character traits” (pp. 190–191).

One does not have to be either a “Trumpist” or an “anti-Trumpist” to find the pretentious allegations advanced here to be largely irrelevant. For example, in his zeal to add polemical content, Ottaway states that President Trump and Muhammad bin Salman placed “their hands on a globe during Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2017” (p. 191), which was not the case. In reality, Donald Trump’s hands on the globe that so infuriates Ottaway were accompanied by those of King Salman and Egyptian President ‘Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, not those of the heir apparent. But since the point is to denigrate and belittle, Muhammad bin Salman is dismissed as little more than the King’s spoiled child or, as the French would say, l’enfant gâté du roi.

What is one to make of dramatic and largely negative soliloquies that pretend to be analytical but are largely polemical? Long before he became the heir apparent, Muhammad bin Salman spent six years with his father when the King served as Governor of Riyadh, honing his skills and tutoring the individual he hand-picked for leadership. Ottaway may not appreciate the value of such training, but he cannot dismiss them as being useless. Equally phantasmagoric are the author’s calls to rethink the US–Saudi alliance, which he recommends (pp. 191–193), though his diatribes stand in direct contradiction to reality. Notwithstanding campaign rhetoric that, regrettably, is an American specialty, the Biden Administration has not discarded eight decades of mutually beneficial ties to satisfy short-term gains. In fact, and at the height of the Corona pandemic that mobilized the globe between 2020 and 2022 (which led to sharp reductions in oil production), Washington beseeched the Kingdom to increase output. In April 2021, President Biden’s Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm thanked ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Salman, her Saudi counterpart, when production was raised—not under US pressure, but as decided by OPEC+ that grouped several non-OPEC producers.

It must be added that Saudi Arabia handled the consequences of the pandemic rather well and may be said to have escaped the worst of it after it curtailed annual Hajj gatherings and limited social interactions. Muhammad bin Salman’s leadership saw the Kingdom pass through a most difficult period as the country’s economy gradually recovered too. This was the mettle of statesmanship as one looked after the interests of one’s nation. Still, Ottaway’s conclusion that “Saudi Arabia under MBS will constitute a daunting challenge for US policy-makers for years to come” (p. 193) may indeed be true, not because Riyadh will not be led by a statesman but because of it. Indeed, King Salman, his heir apparent, and the overwhelming majority of the Al-Sa‘ud ruling family members have been and will continue to be loyal to themselves, their faith, and to Washington, provided the United States reciprocates. Towards that end, it may be safe to postulate that Muhammad bin Salman’s fortitude and sagacity—with both the Trump and Biden administrations—illustrated statesmanship.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is involved in an existential struggle for regional stability with two leading hegemonic powers, Iran and Turkey, which it cannot afford to lose. This tussle fell on Muhammad bin Salman’s shoulders though most other Al-Sa‘ud family members would have reacted the same way if they were in a position of authority. How Riyadh maneuvered through these troubled waters stood to determine its future mandate(s) for leadership. Ottaway judges that Muhammad bin Salman is not that individual, imagining him to be “highly impulsive, ruthless, self-centered, greedy, and extremely vindictive.” However, it could very well be that the heir apparent would prove critics wrong as he displays traditional Saudi norms that uphold the tenets of the faith and proven generosity. Time will tell whether the heir apparent channels immense energies to empower Saudis, encourages entrepreneurship, and defends his nation from regional foes.