Dynamics of Saudi Arabia–KRG Relations: From 2003 Iraq War to 2017 Referendum and Beyond

Introduction

The 2003 US-led invasion and its aftermath were milestones in Iraq and Middle East politics and also a turning point in the history of the state structure (Charountaki, 2016, p. 201). The end of Saddam Hussein’s 30-year rule, and the subsequent rise of Shiite-dominated governments in Baghdad, raised concerns in Arab Gulf capitals about regional stability and their own security. In addition, Iran’s expanding influence in Iraq and the region alarmed the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia. The need to contain this influence pushed them to search for local partners to counter these threats and increase their sphere of influence in the region. Kurds in northern Iraq have emerged as an important actor.

The collapse of the security and military apparatus due to the US invasion set the scene for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to form a more detailed foreign policy and widen its relationships with the international community (Abbas Zadeh & Kirmanj, 2017, p. 588). Although Saudi Arabia’s relations with the KRG began in the post-Saddam period, the relationship intensified in recent years. In 2015, then KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Arab Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, where he met with senior officials. He was received with an enthusiastic head-of-state reception held by King Salman to demonstrate the KRG’s importance to Riyadh. Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known colloquially as MbS, also attended the reception, as did other princes and military officials. This paved the way for Saudi Arabia to open a consulate in Erbil in February 2016. Iran urged the KRG to shut the Saudi mission down but the request was rejected.

Moreover, Barzani even received the new Saudi consul general to highlight strengthening bilateral ties. In 2018, a visiting delegation from Riyadh agreed with the KRG officials to bolster economic ties with the Kurdistan Region as a starting point for Saudi investments in Iraq. The visit was read as an opportunity to bear fruit in advancing economic cooperation and investment in the KRG, helping its financial crisis in the post-ISIS era, but the Saudi’s move raised eyebrows in Tehran (Hawramy, 2018).

The new Middle East order that has been installed since the US-led invasion of Iraq has evolved further after the Arab uprisings that swept the region since the end of 2010. The threats emanating from the uprisings forced the kingdom to develop a new approach to regional politics, combining the hard (military) and the soft (diplomacy and economy) powers. In addition, the new Saudi leadership under the influence of MbS sought a balance between the interlinked goals of domestic regime stability and regional security. Thus, Riyadh’s outreach to both Iraq and the KRG results from this new policy, which is based on counterbalancing Shiite power in the country through a Sunni collaborator (KRG) and developing closer relations with Kurds who seek support from regional countries. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the architects determining the course and the trajectory of the events in the region due to their rivalry, but also significant is to have the local actors by their sides. Thus, the KRG turned into a new battle area in the Saudi-Iranian proxy conflict and both countries recognize that the KRG occupies a significant geostrategic position in their regional agendas.

This article comprises five sections. Following this introductory section, the next provides relevant background about the role of non-state actors to understand the KRG’s place in international relations (IR). The third section provides a historical background and chronology of the domestic developments, like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Saudi approach toward the invasion, for a better understanding of Saudi foreign policy towards the KRG. The fourth section assesses Saudi Arabia’s relations with the KRG and Iran’s role; and the last section scrutinizes the Saudi interpretation of the KRG’s independence referendum held in 2017.

A Non-state Actor in the Middle East: The Kurdistan Regional Government

Traditional IR theories assume that states are the main actors in international politics (Abbas Zadeh & Kirmanj, 2017, p. 589). However, they are not the sole actors. International politics has witnessed the increasing role of non-state actors ever since the end of the World War I, if not earlier. However, the international arena has evolved further as non-state actors, both within states and transnational, arose since the end of the Cold War (Anderson, 1996, p. 307). The significance of non-state actors in the Middle East has also evolved since the end of the Cold War and became more pronounced with the Arab uprisings. Today, it is difficult to examine world politics and the behaviors of states without taking them (as non-state actors within states) into account. For both the hardline realist approach, which explains non-state actors as tools for state interests and the liberal approach, which considers globalization as a catalyst of these emerging sub-state entities, the non-state actors are important for any analysis of international politics in the twenty-first century, regardless of whether it is a regional government, translational trade body, or parallel actors within the state (Abbas Zadeh & Kirmanj, 2017, p. 589).

The relative rise in power of a variety of these actors in IR only challenges and even weakens the “state-centric” concept of international politics (Ataman, 2003, p. 42) but also affects world politics, in particular the Middle Eastern politics (van den Berge, 2016, p. 13). The transfer of power from states to non-states (in some cases only) has led scholars to conclude that the state started to lose its prominence within world politics as the non-state player gained status and influence (Aydınlı, 2015, pp. 424–444). Baumann and Stengel (2013, p. 489) define non-state actors as “autonomous actors in world politics” which play a significant role in the foreign policymaking of states they are part of; like the KRG. Pearlman and Cunningham (2011, p. 3) define non-state actors as “an organized political actor not directly connected to the state but pursuing aims that affect vital state interests.” According to Naim (2014, p. 97), who observes a decline of power among principal actors of the system, non-state entities, like the KRG, tend to enjoy a “de facto foreign policy.” Since its establishment, the KRG has formulated its own foreign policy, fostered diplomatic relations independent of the government in Baghdad, and even signed international deals, acting beyond the scope of a usual federal region as a de facto state (Abbas Zadeh & Kirmanj, 2017, p. 588). Charountaki (2018, p. 11) emphasizes that the KRG as a non-state actor that has operated officially on a regional and international level since 1992 reveals a unique example of a non-state actor that influences the regional balance of power.

The Kurds, who constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East region, after Arabs, Persians, and Turks, are often referred to as the largest ethnolinguistic group in the contemporary world without their own state (Park, 2016, p. 450). Divided among the territories of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, independence and recognition as a national entity have eluded the Kurds (Riamei, 2015). Until the 1970s, the Kurdish question did not occupy a significant place in Middle Eastern politics. The Kurdish issue in one state had limited influence over other countries where Kurds lived (Yıldız, 2019, p. 151). With the start of the twenty-first century, the Kurdish issue has reached a new height with the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, establishing themselves as significant actors in regional politics and becoming a pressuring force in the domestic politics of these countries (Güneş, 2018, p. 1). The establishment of the KRG has been the most remarkable achievement of the Kurds in the Middle East (Yılmaz, 2018, p. 2).

The Arab uprisings that started at the end of 2010 proved that world politics is no longer an area where only states operate. Non-state actors emerged, and their role was reinforced due to the weakening of state power. This confirmed the Weberian and Khaldonian’s notion of “state end patrimonialism” (Ehteshami et al., 2020). Although it is difficult to accurately calculate the influence of non-state actors in international and regional politics, scholars agree that they have become more significant at the expense of states, and even some armed ones challenge state authority and call for a specific territory (van den Berge, 2016, p. 16). Tilly (1985) argues that “states make wars”; however, in the case of the Middle East, in particular Iraq, wars do not often make states. The state-building process in post-war Iraq led to the rise of non-state actors. The KRG provides a good example in this context (Park, 2016, p. 450).

Thus, the impact and influence of non-state actors depend upon the political, economic, and social context within which they exist. For example, in a conflict situation where state structures are not as effective as they could be, as in the case of post-2003 Iraq, non-state actors can exert a disproportionate amount of influence, as in the case of the KRG. According to Gause (2014, p. 8), state weaknesses can lead to political vacuums that attract other states which would prefer to cooperate with local non-state actors who possess the necessary domestic connections and knowledge but lack the financial, military, and political support to realize their goals. Thus, this makes the non-state actors attractive local allies for other countries that aim to protect their external and internal interests. As the KRG’s role and influence have enhanced dramatically in recent years, its attractiveness as a local ally has also increased.

The geopolitics of the Middle East is being manipulated predominantly within the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional power (Aras & Falk, 2016, p. 4). According to Kausch (2017, p. 10), in many cases, non-state actors contribute to an increase in rivalry on the regional balance of power. Therefore, the intensification of Saudi-Iranian rivalry, escalation of proxy wars, and the increase of collaboration with non-state actors are likely to have unpredictable consequences for the future of the Middle East. In this volatile and complex regional climate, Saudi Arabia’s concerns for security and relative gains lead to it maintaining a relationship with the KRG to balance against a rising Iran.

Despite the significant amount of scholarly works that describe the KRG as a non-state actor, several scholars acknowledge the entity as a sub-state actor. For example, Özdemir and Raszewski (2016, p. 125) describe the KRG as a sub-state actor whose international legal status has not yet been determined. Romano (2020, p. 339) uses the KRG as a case study in his work to offer a possible framework for understanding when sub-state actors behave prudently and more strategically in their foreign relations. Mansour (2017, p. 457) explains the rationale behind the KRG’s reliance on diplomacy and foreign relations, arguing that the KRG used diplomatic relations with de jure states and international organizations as a tool both to distance itself from Baghdad and to build legitimate state institutions and infrastructure to circumvent impediments caused by the sub-state status. Mansour (2017, p. 449) refers to an old Kurdish proverb that “If you do not knock at anyone’s door, no one will knock at your door,” to explain that the KRG’s knocking at doors abroad and searching for international support was for some time perceived to be a necessary lifeline.

Thus, for the KRG leadership, developing foreign relations in the post-2003 context was not only a matter of a strategic choice but also a way to survive as a sub-state in a precarious neighborhood. This article analyzes the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s outreach to the KRG; but there is also a Kurdish rationale behind developing close relations with regional countries. Mansour (2017, p. 450) explains that building close relations with other regional states, including Saudi Arabia, rather than with the neighboring actors, namely, Iran, that had oppressed the Kurds for decades, was the main goal of KRG’s foreign policy strategy. Falah Mustafa, the head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, which was established in 2006 to institutionalize the sub-state’s foreign relations, says, “We are tired of brothers [neighboring states]; what we want are friends” (Mansour, 2017, p. 449). Last, Stansfield and Shareef’s (2017) work The Kurdish Question Revisited combines articles of several scholars who identify the KRG as a sub-state actor, offering insights into how the Kurdish phenomenon is being transformed amid the new political realities of the Middle East.

Historical Background: Saudi Stance during the 2003 Iraq War

Due to its special geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic situation, the Gulf region has always been exceptional for regional and non-regional powers (Darvishi & Jalilvand, 2010, p. 171). However, in the past few decades, the Gulf region witnessed three wars: the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, the Kuwait War of 1990–1991, and the Iraq War of 2003, all of which included Iraq as a major party and impaired substantially the intraregional ties (Aslı, 2016, p. 24).

Geography is the first principle that could not be changed in IR, and it was certain that Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia would be central to each other’s strategic calculations. The Gulf region is based on a triangular power structure where these countries play major roles (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 191). However, the US-led invasion in 2003 resulted in Iraq losing its place as one of the poles in the tri-polar rivalry. The invasion has been considered a systemic change at the regional level with implications at the international level that had led to an alteration in the hierarchy of actors of the Middle East regional system (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 154). The region witnessed a steady relative decline of the Arab power after the war. The fundamental balance shifted to non-Arab states, like Iran, creating a new strategic environment. With the invasion, Iraq has once again emerged as a regional spot where diverse regional interests ally and conflict. The downfall of Saddam’s Baathist regime triggered an internal transformation in the Gulf sub-complex, leading to the collapse of the old security paradigms, and caused the emergence of a weak state and sub-state actors, such as the Kurds, Shiite militias, and pressure groups (Aslı, 2016, p. 26).

On the Saudi side, Iraq’s invasion was a challenging development since the 1990–1991 Gulf War (Al-Rasheed, 2006). Although the regime change in Baghdad favored the Saudi interests, the concern for the aftermath of the invasion led Riyadh to adopt a formal position of neutrality, at least before the invasion (Ibish, 2018, p. 5). As a result, Saudi Arabia was not openly supportive of the US invasion, and its stance was indecisive and confusing. At one level, it did not want to risk ties with the USA by opposing the war; simultaneously, it did not want to create unrest among the people who were highly critical of American moves in the region.

Riyadh’s dilemma was also reflected in the statements of its top officials. For instance, in one interview, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal stated that it would be unwise to launch a war before trying diplomatic efforts and that Riyadh requested a diplomatic solution from the USA. Replying to a question of whether Saudi Arabia would permit US troops to be deployed on its territory, the Saudi Foreign Minister said that Saudi Arabia will not permit bases on its soil to be used in an attack against Iraq, its northern neighbor, and will not grant flyover rights to U.S. military planes. (Schrader, 2002). Also, Abdullah, the Crown Prince at that time, underlined in the same month that Saudi forces would not participate in the war in Iraq and that it was unacceptable for a war that threatens Iraq’s unity and sovereignty or that its resources or internal security (Al-Rasheed, 2006). Saudi officials said they feared that without the UN approval, the invasion would be considered by many Arabs as a war of aggression rather than a war to implement the United Nations resolutions (BBC, 2003).

Although the leadership in Riyadh had several doubts over the post-invasion era, it decided to play a low-profile role. Riyadh’s biggest concern about the US invasion was its adverse outcomes, like an emergence of a power vacuum in Iraq that may pose disquieting risks to the security and the stability of the region, prospect of pro-Iranian forces taking power in the new era, and the escalation of extremism and radical sentiments due to another invasion of the USA after Afghanistan. The rise of extremism was not only a fear of the Western capitals but also the kingdom, which was at the top of the al-Qaeda target due to its alliance with the USA. Thus, Riyadh’s reservation was over the uncertainty in the post-Saddam era.

In the Post-2003 Era: Saudi Arabia’s Outreach to the Kurdistan Regional Government

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy response to the emergence of a new post-Saddam Iraq is noteworthy. Despite early attempts, its outreach to post-2003 Iraq has failed initially (Ibish, 2018, p. 2). The following period of relative disengagement between Riyadh and Baghdad played into Tehran’s hands, giving a unique opportunity to reshape the latter’s national and regional position (Bongers, 2012, p. 124). However, neither its strong ties with the USA nor its stance toward the invasion helped Saudi Arabia to have a decisive role in Iraq’s post-war structure and political dynamics. On the contrary, the decisions taken by the USA in the aftermath of the invasion, which strengthened the hands of the pro-Iranian groups and weakened Sunni ones, caused further concern in Riyadh. The “de-Baathification” policy, which excluded Sunni Iraqis, directly weakened Saudi allies in the country at the expense of Iran (Coalitional Provisional Authority, 2003).

Thus, Saudi Arabia found itself effectively isolated in the post-invasion Iraqi politics, following everything mainly from the sidelines (Ibish, 2018, p. 6). Its outreach became further limited after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki took office in 2006. For Riyadh, the main reasons for Iraq’s problems were the policies of Maliki and that the latter was taking steps in favor of Tehran by alienating Sunni figures and promoting sectarianism. Saudi King Abdullah even refused to meet the Iraqi leader at a regional summit in 2007 due to the tension between the two sides (The New York Times, 2007). Partrick (2016, p. 137) defines the Saudi-Iraqi relations in the post-Saddam era as “personal animus between Al-Maliki and King Abdullah played a large part in the poor state of bilateral relations from 2005-14.” Following the domestic turmoil and loss of support from Washington and Tehran, Maliki resigned in 2014 and Haider al-Abadi replaced him. Saudi King Abdullah and many other international leaders congratulated the new prime minister as a sign of rapprochement (Ibish, 2018, p. 11).

Despite having problematic relations with the Iraqi government, particularly during the second tenure of Maliki, Riyadh continued to keep its channels open to other actors, especially Kurds. According to Partrick, Saudis put money behind the main Kurdish parties in the KRG and even invested several billion dollars in projects in the KRG, although Iraqi Kurds say that this did not continue after the 2005 election but Iraqi Arabs assume otherwise (Partrick, 2016, p. 136). Also, Sherko (2016) argues that Saudi relationship with Kurdish nationalist parties began in the post-Saddam era; but Riyadh had links with the Muslim Brotherhood of Kurdistan, then the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, since the late 1980s as an attempt to wrest it from Iran. According to documents released by Wikileaks in June 2015, Saudi Arabia had donated US$500,000 to the Kurdish Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Islamic factions in Iraqi Kurdistan had links with some figures in the Kingdom (Gulmohamad, 2021, p. 140). The documents also revealed that several Saudi humanitarian NGOs (like the International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia) operated in the KRG (Egatha, 2016).

Although the post-Saddam era opened the avenue for Riyadh to influence the KRG’s policy, the relations intensified in the post-2010 era. In April 2010, King Abdullah met with Masoud Barzani and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. The meeting with two Kurdish figures was read as Riyadh’s aim to sway the Kurds in favor of the Iraqiya List (IL), dominated by Sunni Arabs, and away from the Shiite bloc, which has close ties to Iran (Ahmed, 2012) and honored both leaders for their role in keeping Iraq united. In this meeting, Talabani was awarded Saudi Arabia’s highest medal of honor of King Abdul Aziz (Gulmohamad, 2021, p. 140).

The US invasion provided opportunities for Tehran and the Kurds, who took a significant opportunity to influence Iraqi affairs while approaching foreign countries (Nader et al., 2016, p. 22). Starting in 2014, Riyadh launched a project to regain a degree of influence in Iraqi politics, and this policy involved consolidating ties with numerous leaders in the country (Ibish, 2018, p. 1). Riyadh tried to contain Iranian influence in the political, security, and economic spheres by expanding ties with Iraq (Aziz, 2021, p. 5). While rebuilding a diplomatic presence in Iraq by sending its first ambassador to the country after 25 years in 2015, Riyadh cultivated closer ties with Erbil and opened a consulate there in 2016 (Rudaw, 2016). For the Kurds, such moves signify their entry into the international arena as important regional player with an international role (Charountaki, 2016, p. 201). Since the toppling of Saddam, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have worked hard to maximize their control over affairs in the northern part, garner international support for their presence and feed the idea of their future independence. The tension between the pro-Shiite government in Baghdad and the KRG regarding the distribution of resources and control over oil and disputed territories has led third countries remaining distanced from further engaging in ties with the north at the expense of Baghdad. However, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has been treading a thin line between the two sides to limit Iran’s influence in the country.

Key Variables in Saudi Policy Toward the Kurdistan Regional Government: Domestic and External

Until 2003, Saudi Arabia sought to contain Iran’s regional influence; however, in the wake of the invasion, the international and regional system changes offered space and opportunities for Iran that had not existed before (Phillips, 2019). Rising Iranian power in the region not only has affected the evolution of Saudi foreign policy or led to sectarian tensions but also had some regional implications (Çetinoğlu, 2010, p. 101). The balance of power in the Gulf in the post-2003 era rested on a bipolar system in which Saudi Arabia and Iran struggled for influence in the sub-complex and the Middle East in general (Aslı, 2016, p. 27). On the regional level, following the Iraqi invasion of 2003 and the Iranian nuclear crisis, regional security received a severe blow, and from this, Iran has risen with strong momentum. This led Saudi Arabia to undergo an evolution in its foreign policy due to the changing situation in the Middle East.

This policy was further consolidated after the Arab uprisings that started in Tunisia and spread to the rest of the region resulting in the ouster of the regimes of Zain al-Abidin bin Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, as well as the emergence of civil wars in Syria and Yemen (Ogbonnaya, 2013, p. 5). Riyadh was quite comfortable with the old Arab order, in which it had stable and long-term partners (Al-Rasheed, 2015, p. 32). Riyadh now began to diversify its political, economic, and security partnerships, seeking new and local partners. The driving forces behind Saudi Arabia’s closeness with the KRG are related to both domestic and regional factors.

Domestically, this article identifies two key variables and their role in Saudi foreign policy towards the KRG: domestic political structure and perceptions of threat on the part of policymakers. The Saudi royal family experienced a significant change (Mo, 2016, p. 49). Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s coming to office in 2015 and appointing his son MbS as the crown prince led to a more assertive and centralized foreign policy in pursuing national goals. Salman and his son started to change the nature of decision-making, which now concentrated in the hands of only one person—MbS—who became the most influential figure driving Saudi foreign policy. The young leader entertains global ambitions and seeks greater international legitimacy. According to several observers, the current Saudi foreign policy under MbS is a departure from Saudi norms (Mansour, 2018, p. 1; Rundell, 2020). From a decades-long policy based on “patience and pragmatism,” relying heavily on using national wealth to win allies (Eilts, 2004, p. 219), it has transformed into having allies to “balance threat,” a term coined by Walt (1987). Thus, Iran’s attitude in the Gulf and the broader region largely shapes the GCC states’ policies and determine their attitudes to the events in Iraq and elsewhere (Hadzi-Janev, 2014, pp. 84–85). Currently, Saudi leadership, driven by deep concern and suspicion over Iran’s regional expansionism, approaches all regional matters through fears of Iranian influence. Therefore, Saudis are pursuing active diplomacy to increase both regional and global partners that could understand their concerns. MbS, who adopted a pragmatic and assertive approach to containing perceived Iranian influence, has particularly approached partners with whom Iran does not share common interests.

In terms of regional factors, Iran’s military expansion is viewed in Saudi Arabia as a security threat both in terms of internal security and regional stability (MacGillivray, 2018, p. 8). Thus, to understand Saudi Arabia’s constellation of threats, it is important to characterize the dual nature of the security threats. In the words of Zeino-Mahmalat (2012, p. 55), Saudi Arabia perceives both “hard” and “soft” threats to its security from Iran: “These threats are directed against Saudi Arabia’s both external and domestic security. The threats to Saudi external security have been overwhelmingly (but not necessarily) hard power threats. In return, threats to Saudi domestic security are rather (but not exclusively) based on soft power threats.”

Regarding a soft power threat, the prospect of Iranian influence on Saudi Arabia’s Shiite population in the Eastern Province is important. The concern and suspicions that the Saudis have felt after the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979 and the outbreak of Shiite uprisings in the Eastern Province in the final days of November 1979 and early February 1980 are still relevant (Aslı, 2016, pp. 27–28). At that time, the demonstrations were stopped only after the dispatch of the Saudi National Guard to the Eastern Province, which later became a place where the Saudi royal family kept special attention. The Saudi Shiite population identifies itself with the Iranian revolution and has repeatedly revolted against the Saudi government and its policies. When protestors took the streets in Bahrain in February 2011, Saudi fears about Tehran’s use of Shiite populations again came to the surface (Ulrichsen, 2014, pp. 330–351). Thus, Riyadh remains sensitive to the possibility of a Shiite-led government in the region that incites its own Shiite population (Matthiesen, 2014) and hence, reads the Iraqi politics through its domestic structure (Gause, 2013, p. 265).

According to Lucas, “regional foreign policy is not just about preserving the survival of a particular monarchical regime but ensuring the leadership of a particular set of individuals within the ruling family” (Lucas, 2017, p. 31). The issue of regime survival is crucial for how the Saudi leadership conducts its policy in the region and on a much wider scale, shaping its relations with the KRG. Thus, Riyadh’s key interest in Iraq is to limit Iranian influence, which has been powerful since the fall of Saddam in 2003 and since then, Riyadh was unsuccessful in achieving its main aim of curbing Iranian influence. In pursuing its goal, Riyadh has attempted to employ a range of tools to build trust with both the Baghdad government and the KRG (Mansour, 2018, pp. 2–3). In the words of Ibish (2017), several Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, consider an opening in the KRG to expand “the pro-Arab Sunni Muslim bloc in the Middle East, enhance the position of Sunni Arabs in other parts of Iraq, and to frustrate Iran on a number of fronts.”

Saudi Arabia and Iran are two countries that share borders with Iraq, having cultural, historical, and religious links. Tehran is well-known for its long-standing policies to meddle in Iraqi and Kurdish affairs. The KRG-Iran relations are also strained regularly by Iranian cross-border artillery strikes and incursions into northern Iraq against militias from the Iranian Kurdish Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). A certain measure of Tehran’s influence over Kurdish leaders is rooted in the fear and intimidation the Iranians exert (Eisenstadt et al., 2011, p. 6); for instance, in August 2015, when Barzani’s extended term as president of the KRG expired and a bloc of four parties in the region, two secular and two Islamic, tried to expel him from the presidency, Barzani and his party, KDP, accused the Shiites and Iran of encouraging a coup (Sherko, 2016). The perceptions of the Iranian interventionist role on the part of Saudi policy-makers play a significant role in developing closer ties with the KRG. The KRG remains neutral over the sectarian rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran, as Barzani himself stated that the Kurds are not taking part in the sectarian conflicts as their cause is of ethnic origin and orientation. Yet, as a Sunni element in a Shiite-dominated Iraq, the KRG is considered by Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries concerned over Iran’s hegemonic tendencies in the Gulf and the wider region, as a reliable ally in Iraq that could serve as a balancing force.

However, the Iranian factor is not the sole driving force behind the developing Riyadh-Erbil ties. KRG has played significant roles, like a mediator in regional conflicts and a collaborator in the fight against ISIS. In August 2021, it was reportedly argued that KRG President Nechirvan Barzani had played a key role in the rapprochement between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), putting a clear emphasis on the international role that the KRG plays as a mediator (Zaman, 2021). This development was also important for Saudi Arabia, a key UAE ally being at odds with Turkey. Also, the rise of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS) in 2014 and its occupation of parts of Iraq provided a new opportunity for KRG to show its international importance (Aziz, 2021, p. 1). The KRG’s attempts to distinguish itself from the rest of Iraq gained even more attention internationally in its fight against ISIS (Abbas Zadeh & Kirmanj, 2017, p. 599). The meetings between the KRG officials and high-level delegations from Turkey, the USA and Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, as part of the fight against ISIS, increased the KRG’s diplomatic significance. Facing an existential threat from ISIS, the KRG embraced new security and military measures that became critical in the efforts of the anti-ISIS coalition. As Stansfield (2014, p. 1) noted, ISIS’s takeover of Mosul, the second-largest city of Iraq, in June 2014, “changed matters for the Kurds, and American policy-makers now need to take stock of the reality of the Kurdistan Region.” When the ISIS offensive shifted toward Erbil in August of that year, alarm bells rang in the regional countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, another country that was seriously challenged by the rise of ISIS. This development created the environment of a new regional coalition supported by Turkey, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the war against ISIS was one of the major drivers promoting and enhancing the KRG-Saudi Arabia relations.

Overlapping with this is the trade dimension. Saudi Arabia also seeks to expand its economic presence in the Kurdish region. In September 2021, the Saudi ambassador to Iraq paid a visit to Erbil, where he expressed Saudi readiness to cooperate with the KRG on key issues of shared interests, including more investments by the Saudi companies (GOV.KRD, 2021). The Saudi envoy was received by the KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the KDP President Masoud Barzani. In 2018, an official delegation from the kingdom, including Sami Bin Abdullah al-Obeidi, chairperson of the Council of Saudi Chambers, accompanied by the Saudi ambassador to Iraq and the consul general to Erbil, and business people visited the KRG, where they met with Kurdish officials to explore economic opportunities in the energy, agricultural, industry and tourism sectors. The KRG officials have also made it a priority to encourage foreign investment in their region by rolling out an extensive public relations campaign promoting “Kurdistan: The Other Iraq.” Although no agreements were signed, the parties agreed to work toward expanding economic relations, as Saudi Arabia plans to establish a direct trade link from its Arar border crossing into Anbar province and on to the Kurdistan region (Hawramy, 2018).

Although Qatar and the UAE undertook significant investment in the Kurdistan region’s energy and infrastructure sectors, Saudi Arabia has yet to meet the rhetorical expectations. Unlike other Gulf countries, Riyadh’s interests to invest in the KRG’s business, oil, and infrastructure materialized when the bilateral relations with Baghdad improved (Gulmohamad, 2021, p. 140). During Barzani’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2015, there was speculation about financial aid for the region and it was reported that King Salman had asked the Kurdish leaders to organize a 100,000-man armed force, similar to Shiite militias, to fight against the latter and undermine Iranian influence (Sherko, 2016). King Salman also allegedly assured Barzani that if successful, Riyadh would financially support the KRG (Sherko, 2016). According to Hawramy (2018), Iran, one of the main investors in Iraqi Kurdistan, sees the region as its backyard and looks suspiciously at Saudi activities; thus, posing challenges to Saudis entering the Kurdistan market.

In recent years, Riyadh engaged in efforts to secure the power of MbS at home and counter Iran regionally. For Saudi Arabia, two major threats to Saudi security, ISIS and Iran, converged on Iraqi soil, prompting a rapid change in Saudi’s Iraqi policy. This new policy focused on pulling Iraq and the KRG out of the Iranian orbit and preventing these areas from turning into a battleground for terrorist elements like ISIS (Zeidel, 2018, p. 49). Thus, a combination of all these developments, the threat perception it receives, and the change in the royal family’s decision-making patterns have led Riyadh to search for new regional and local actors as partners and go into a major change in its foreign policy strategy. However, despite excellent relations with the KRG, Riyadh aims to have an internal ally to counterbalance pro-Iranian actors in Iraq and the political and security cooperation between the KRG and Saudi Arabia within the anti-ISIS coalition, Riyadh did not officially support KRG’s independency referendum. Thus, the positivity in relations did not necessarily translate into full diplomatic support for the referendum.

Saudi Interpretation of the Kurdish Independence Referendum

Since establishing a de facto autonomous zone in the wake of the first Gulf War, Kurdish independence has been brought to the table by Kurdish leaders of other countries (Nader et al., 2016, p. 1). Barzani’s Gulf tour in 2015, and the recent enhancement of ties between Riyadh and Erbil, were aimed to garner support for the Kurdish independence referendum. Before the referendum, there have been several expressions of support in Saudi media for Kurdish independence. Barzani announced in June 2017 that a referendum would take place on 25 September of the same year, despite concerns raised by international and regional actors, particularly by Iran, which has a considerable Kurdish minority and is concerned over Kurdish attempts toward independence. On the other side, Riyadh is quite aware that possible Kurdish independence would represent an important conundrum for its regional nemesis. The KRG has been an autonomous region managing its own affairs for the last two decades (Omar, 2014, p. 173). However, the autonomy of the KRG under Masoud Barzani has been challenged by Baghdad as the former forged its own external relationships with international oil companies and other countries (Salem, 2013, p. 3).

Moreover, as the Maliki government has moved closer to Tehran, the KRG needed to find new alliances to guard against the growing power of the central government in Baghdad (Salem, 2013, p. 20). The Gulf States, whose relations with the Shiite-dominated Maliki government have been frosty, have appeared potential partners. According to Wikileaks documents released in June 2015, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated the importance of having a close relationship with Barzani against Al-Maliki (Gulmohamad, 2021, p. 140). Before the rise of the Shiite-dominated rule in Baghdad, Gulf countries conducted their relations with the KRG via the Central Government. However, Maliki’s policies and policies led the Gulf countries to develop relations with the KRG directly.

Tehran raised eyebrows, which alarmed the growing relations between the KRG and the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. This concern escalated particularly after Barzani and several Kurdish organizations, delegations, and religious personalities visited Saudi Arabia in December 2015 (Hassan-Yari, 2018, p. 59). The further development of Saudi-Kurdish relations through such visits caused a disturbance in Tehran that the Revolutionary Guards even threatened the KRG with severe punishment (Hassan-Yari, 2018, p. 59). An official from Iraq’s Shiite Fatih (Conquest) coalition that has ties with Iran had even denounced a Saudi visit to the KRG in 2018, saying that Riyadh has “dirty hidden intentions by opening ties with Kurdistan” (Rudaw, 2018). He also warned Baghdad to take a strong stance against Saudi-Kurdish cooperation. According to Tehran, as in the words of Ali (2017, p. 3), Barzani is “part of the Saudi-led axis of power” and was being used as a tool to destabilize Iran and damage its interests abroad. Tehran’s discomfort is based on the growing influence of Saudi Arabia in the KRG and the impact of this situation on the regional balance of power. Tehran, which desires to completely control of all Iraqi groups, including Kurds, considers growing relations between Riyadh and Erbil as a threat to its regional hegemony.

These good relations have been reflected even before the 2017 referendum for independence. Although the official Saudi stance stood with the unity of Iraq, behind closed doors, figures close to the Saudi Royal family were sympathetic to the Kurds’ desire for independence. According to Hearst, “behind the scenes, the Royal Court dispatched a series of emissaries to encourage Barzani in his project to split the Iraqi state and question the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran” (Hearst, 2017). When examining Saudi approach towards the 2017 referendum for independence, it is useful to examine the reports of the media, think-tanks and institutions owned by or close to the royal family for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the Saudi views on the KRG. There have been expressions by prominent Saudi academics and journalists close to the decision-makers in promotion of Kurdish independence.

For example, in 2015, a retired major general in the Saudi armed forces, Anwar Eshki, currently chairman of a think tank in Jeddah named the Middle East Centre for Strategic and Legal Studies, argued that the establishment of a Kurdistan would mean “restricting the Iranian, Turkish, and Iraqi ambitions in the region. Great Kurdistan is to seize one-third of the lands of each of these three countries” (Daily Sabah, 2015). He, on several occasions, reiterated this stance, saying the kingdom would not stand in the way of the people’s will. He believes that “the Kurds have the right to have a state of their own” (Hearst, 2017). Similar support came from another Saudi official, Abdullah al-Rabiah, an adviser to the Saudi Royal Court. In remarks to the Saudi Okaz Daily, he said, “Kurdistan had the necessary grounds for independence and defending its existence” (Hearst, 2017). This remark came after he met with Barzani, with whom he agreed to open the “King Salman Center” for refugees in the region.

Prominent voices in the Saudi media have also shown their stance. Abdulrahman Al-Rasheed, who is the former general manager of Al-Arabiya television and a prominent media figure with close ties to the royal court, wrote that it is “almost certain that most Arabs outside of Iraq sympathize with Kurdistan’s desire for independence. Personally, I am with Iraqi-Kurds’ right to establish their own state” (Al-Rasheed, 2017). Saudi social media have been similarly supportive of Kurdish independence. Saudi social media users initiated the #SaudiWithKurdistan campaign to show their support for the referendum in the KRG (Homa, 2017). Even the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS) based in Riyadh held a panel discussion on “Does the Kurdish nation have any friends other than mountains?” in early February 2020, with only an invited audience.

Among the Gulf nations, Saudis seem highly sympathetic to Kurdish desires, considering a strong KRG as a significant bulwark against the Iranian domination of the whole country (Ibish, 2018, p. 13). On the other hand, Iran has been one of the harshest critics of Kurdish independence. The Kurds in Iran also called for independence soon after the referendum and celebrated in the Kurdish cities of Baneh, Sanandaj, and Mahabad (The Economist, 2017). Iran had previously also accused Saudi Arabia for supporting Kurdish militias that take up arms against the Iranian regime (Dehghanpisheh, 2016).

Since the demise of the Saddam regime, Tehran’s policies in Iraq have been based on preserving Iraq’s territorial unity. From the Iranian perspective, any tendency towards greater federal autonomy in Iraq would lead to a major regional instability that might trigger Iran’s ethnic geopolitics (Barzegar, 2010, p. 178). Ibish (2018, p. 13) elaborates on the Gulf Arabs’ support for the Kurds as follows: “Some also quietly suggested that one of the best ways of promoting the shared interests of Gulf countries and Iraqi Sunni Arabs would be to extend Iraq’s federal arrangement with the KRG to the Sunni-majority provinces in Iraq’s western regions.” He adds that it would not only help disperse power in Iraq, strengthen Sunni and Shiite moderates, and weaken Iran, “but a strong Sunni region in the west combined with a robust the KRG in the north would make an Iranian-controlled ‘land bridge’ from Tehran to Beirut, running through Iraq and Syria, virtually impossible” (Ibish, 2018, p. 13).

However, although the traditional and social media expressed their opinion in favor of independence, Riyadh, through King Salman, officially advised Barzani not to hold the referendum to save its newly developing relations with Baghdad, and perhaps, due to the possibility of negative outcomes of the vote. Following the referendum, Riyadh had taken important steps to improve its relations with Baghdad, particularly after the change of government in Iraq. The reopening of the Arar border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in November 2020 after three decades is important for developing relations between the two neighbors (Al Jazeera, 2020). Following the reopening of the Arab border, Iraq’s new Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi paid a visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2021 to reaffirm his commitment to bolster ties with Riyadh and develop a dialogue with the KRG—a move that plays into the hands of Riyadh at the expense of Iran.

Conclusion

Amid geopolitical uncertainty, with shrinking US power in the region and rising Iranian influence, there has been an increasing rapprochement, especially from 2015 onwards, between the KRG and the GCC member states. This article analyzed Saudi policy towards the KRG as part of its new foreign policy strategy as a response to changing situation in the Middle East after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Riyadh’s close relationship with Erbil is part of its broader strategy in the region. Overlapping external and domestic components define Saudi foreign policy toward the KRG.

In the external sphere, Riyadh acts to prevent the appearance of a regional hegemon. By cultivating closer ties with a potentially strong local actors—the KRG, it aims to curb Iran’s overall influence in Iraq. In the domestic sphere, it acts to limit Iranian influence on groups that could jeopardize regime stability. Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid threats against its leadership by countering threats by Shiite groups supported by Iran. In addition, Saudi Arabia aims to curb Iranian influence in the region by collaborating with actors perceived as threats by Tehran. Riyadh is quite aware that possible Kurdish independence would represent an important conundrum for Iranian policymakers. However, the article underlines that it would remain cautious, as the consequences of such independence may threaten regional stability and security. Saudi Arabia, fundamentally a status quo power and fears the change in the regional political map. The neutral stance taken by the royal family is also largely due to the international context, which is not in favor of an independent Kurdish state. Riyadh would be careful not to harm its newly developed friendly relations with Baghdad after nearly 20 years. Also, the KRG’s internationally unrecognized status does not guarantee the sustainability of relations as it can be reversed under any circumstances when the central government in Baghdad is stronger or Iranian influence is weaker.

However, to curb the increasing influence of Iran, Saudi Arabia may be keen to use the Kurdish card, at least behind closed doors, knowing that an independent new Iraqi state would deal a severe blow to the realization of Iran’s long-term agenda of establishing a Shiite Crescent. Therefore, just as Iran uses its influence on the Shiite population in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia as a card against Riyadh, the kingdom would use the Kurdish card against Iran. For the Saudis, Kurdish independence is not a problem as they do not have a Kurdish population to be concerned with. But the situation is different in Iran.

From the Kurdish perspective, although Saudi support lacks an ideological basis, a major Gulf country throwing its support behind the Kurds is very significant, and the closeness between Riyadh and the Kurds signals a mutually beneficial scenario. Therefore, although Saudi Arabia–KRG relations seem unlikely to evolve into a formal alliance in the foreseeable future, the Iraqi Kurds would continue to be considered significant actors by Riyadh, which seeks to enhance its regional position.