Haredi Anti-Zionist Ideology as the Driving Force Behind the Ultraorthodox Protests in Israel

Abstract

Since its establishment as an independent state, Israel has witnessed waves of protests, sometimes violence, from the Haredi (ultraorthodox) community. Focusing on clashes between Haredi protesters and the police from 2000 onward, this study suggests a new theoretical explanation for Haredi protests and violent activities. By using a mixture of the following three major theories—primordial, constructivism, and contingency—the article provides a new model for analyzing Haredi patterns of confrontation with the Israeli authorities. It concludes, inter alia, that the Haredi community is a permanent passive protest movement that responds, usually immediately, to official initiatives to change the status quo involving the state, politics, society, and religion in Israel.

Keywords

Haredi Israel protests status quo ultraorthodox Zionism

Introduction

Israel is a multicultural society. From May 1948 to the present, the Israeli population (more than 9 million people at the end of 2020) has been a mixture of Jews and non-Jews (Muslims, Christians, Druze, and others without a religious or ethnic affiliation) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Concentrating on the Jewish majority group, there are at least four main subgroups: secular, traditional, religious, and Haredi. In 2011, the last comprised about 10% of the population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

All these groups have a history of protests, violence, or both against the Israeli establishment, each one of them based on various interests. This study strives to explore Haredi protests and violent activities since the beginning of the new millennium. When do these occur, and why? Who are the participants, and who refrains from participating in the protests?

The literature on this group lacks a study that offers a theoretical framework for analyzing protests and violence against the Israeli establishment. Zicherman and Kahaner focused their research in recent years on two topics: an attempt to characterize the new middle class of the ultraorthodox in Israeli society and a comparison between the political movements with an emphasis on the role of the leadership in these movements (Zicherman & Kahaner, 2012). Zicherman, who holds a doctorate in law, has also sought to examine the relationship between the ultraorthodox and the judiciary (Zicherman, 2019). Malach’s studies deal with the public policy regarding the ultraorthodox in various fields, including the master plan for ultraorthodox employment, ultraorthodox education in Israel, and the five-year plan for integrating ultraorthodox people in higher education (Malach, 2021; Malach & Kahaner, 2021).

Leon (2006) has examined the growth of a political movement for non-Ashkenazi ultraorthodox (especially the Shas movement), while Brown has considered, inter alia, the characteristics of ultraorthodox criticism of democracy in Israel, including the legitimacy of a secular Jewish regime (the ultraorthodox hold that there is no legitimacy for a regime that does not follow the Torah); arguments against the fundamental values of a democracy (according to the ultraorthodox position, the core values of democracy, which are the fundamental values of culture, are invalid in the eyes of Judaism,—especially the value of freedom); and arguments against the principle of sovereignty of the people (Brown, 2012, pp. 9–11).

However, while all these studies deal with the interface between the ultraorthodox group and Israel as a sovereign state and pluralistic society, they lack an analysis of ultraorthodox protests’ characteristics. This study seeks to do and thus contribute to the literature on this subject. The first section of the article delineates the different Haredi communities. The second part introduces the three major theories for explaining protests or violence and the new model, which combines all three. The last part analyzes case studies of protests and violence in Haredi society over the last two decades.

Sociocultural Features of Haredi Society and Its Internal Subdivision

The Haredi (ultraorthodox) world is characterized by rejecting modern secular culture. The term Haredi (plural: Haredim) means “fearful” or “God-fearing,” and it denotes those who tremble at God’s word (Heilman & Friedman, 1991, p. 199). This stream of Judaism arose as a reaction to social changes, including emancipation, the Haskalah movement (Jewish enlightenment), acculturation, secularization, religious reform, and the rise of Jewish national movements. According to Haredi beliefs, “Anything new is forbidden by the Torah,”¹ and a fence must be built around the Torah (Pirkei Avot 1:1), not only to safeguard and protect it but also to protect the individual who might haphazardly violate one of the commandments and thereby be subjected to the consequences thereof. Building on this, Haredim have sought to segregate themselves from the mainstream societies they live in by building spiritual, educational, communal, geographical, and linguistic “fences” to protect them from the contamination of the modern world.

Haredim live in self-imposed segregated neighborhoods that have often been referred to as enclaves (Abramac, 2014; Berman, 2000; El-Or, 1994; Friedman, 1991). Rosen and Razin (2008) define them as “traditional ethno-cultural enclosed communities, in which forming an environment that protects unique cultural values, lifestyles, and social cohesion serves as a major motive for enclosure.” In addition to an internally governed lifestyle and a set of codes, as well as separate judiciary and educational systems, Haredi neighborhoods are characterized by defined borders that include signs warning outsiders about the code of behavior within their enclaves, separate transportation networks, and the complete closure of traffic access during Shabbat and other religious holidays (Rosen & Razin, 2008, p. 2899). In the cities where Haredi neighborhoods exist alongside secular ones, clashes over the character of the public space often arise (Shukrun-Nagar, 2014). Despite that fact, Haredi individuals have become involved within Israeli society during the last two decades: many of them joined the labor market, while others joined the army, and they have faced state authorities whenever they were asked to abide by laws that contravene their religion.

The Haredim are not an institutionally cohesive or homogeneous group. Their society differs by spiritual and cultural orientations, specific ideologies and lifestyles, as well as by the degree of stringency adopted in religious practice, the rigidity of their religious philosophy, and the level of isolation from a wider culture they maintain. When the Zionist movement appeared in the 1890s, Haredi Jews staunchly opposed it. According to their beliefs, the Third Temple and Israel will be rebuilt upon the arrival of the Messiah. Ushering in the reconstitution of Jewish rule in the Land of Israel before the Messianic age—and through secular and nationalist ideas, movements, and political institutions—was heresy. The relationship between Haredim and Zionism faced new challenges after the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. Each of the Haredi streams has pursued its relationship with the state; some have adopted more pragmatic positions, while others have maintained a hardline rejectionist position.

The four main groups of Haredim are the Jerusalemites, Litvak community (originally from the territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), Hasidim, and the Oriental Sephardic Haredim (Baumel, 2006). Hasidic society is further subdivided into an array of sects, broadly divided into groups of Polish Hasidim, Hungarian Hasidim, and Chabad-Lubavitch, a movement of Russian origin that stands apart from other Hasidic sects. In addition, Haredi society also includes ba’alei teshuvah—the returnees to faith, that is, those who were not born into religious homes but decided to embrace an Orthodox belief as adults. The ba’al teshuvah movement came into existence in the 1950s. The Jewish group most identified with cultivating ba’alei teshuvah is the Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidic group, whose emissaries have been setting up outreach operations worldwide. Their outreach movement, in which they actively look for non-observing Jews who they could bring back to the fold of orthodox beliefs, has made them more open to contact with the outside world (Fishkoff, 2005). In addition, their philosophy, historical differences, and the legacy of their late leader Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson, have made them different from the rest of Hasidic society. Although baa’lei teshuvah have embraced the Haredi lifestyle, their status in Haredi society is often rather low, and they continue to struggle to assimilate and be recognized as equals in Haredi society.

The Yerushalmi community can be traced back to the Yishuv ha-Yashan (“Old Settlement” or “Old Yishuv”). The Old Yishuv denotes Jewish communities in the southern Syrian provinces from the Ottoman period up to the onset of the Zionist immigration and the consolidation of the New Yishuv at the end of World War I. This community is concentrated in one area in Jerusalem, the Me’ah She’arim neighborhood, and its environs. Due to the demographic expansion of Me’ah Shea’arim, in the 1990s, a new neighborhood was built in Ramat Beit Shemesh, west of Jerusalem, for members of the Yishuv ha-Yashan community. The standard of living in Yerushalmi communities is much lower than in other Haredi circles. Women rarely work outside their homes, and men who work have low-paid jobs requiring no training. The Yishuv ha-Yashan community does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel, does not vote in elections, and does not accept government funding (Cohen, 2006). The Porush family, which sends representatives to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), is part of the Yerushalmi community.

Lithuanians are considered the elite of the Haredi community. They represent a “community of learners” that views religious studies as the core value of life (Etkes & Tikochinski, 2004; Stadler, 2002). Even after marriage, most men study in kollelim (a study center for Haredi after marriage) and yeshivot (general study center) for many years. The community is commonly divided into Israeli Lithuanians and foreign Lithuanians (American and Western Europeans) who come to Israel to study. They are further differentiated by the yeshiva they study at or by their connection to a certain rabbi (Alfasi et al., 2013). Lithuanians are also referred to as misnagdim or mitnagdim (“opponents”) because they fiercely opposed the Hasidic movement when it appeared in the eighteenth century. Although Lithuanian leaders still engage in criticism of Zionism, which they see as a heretical movement, this group votes in elections. The most radical Lithuanian group is the so-called “Jerusalem Faction,” founded in 2012 by Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach (1931–2018). This group is the one that has been protesting most vehemently against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) draft.

The Hasidic community is characterized by stronger social cohesion than the Lithuanian community. Hasidim are organized into different sects or dynastic groups known as “courts” that follow a certain leader known as the Rebbe (Baumel, 2006). The major courts are Gur, Belz, Chabad, and Vizhnitz. Sects are named after Eastern European towns where a group originated. Many of these sects are connected through family or marriage, and many of their customs overlap, although most also have some peculiar customs of their own. The Hasidic community is considerably more involved in gainful employment than the Yerushalmi or Lithuanian communities. As far as their political stance toward the State of Israel is concerned, Hasidic groups range from those that do not recognize Israel and are active in opposing it (Toldos Aharon, Toldos Avraham Yitzchok, Mishkenot Ha-Ro’im, Satmar, Neturei Karta), groups that oppose secular Zionism but recognize the State of Israel (Gur, Belz), and Chabad-Lubavitch, which, as previously mentioned, stands apart from other Hasidic streams by, for instance, its young men serving in the Israeli military.

The Haredim of Sephardic (Oriental) origin lacked their own institutions until the 1980s. This made them dependent on the Ashkenazi Haredi educational system, which discriminated against the students of Sephardic origin. Graduates of Ashkenazi yeshivot were rarely able to marry into Ashkenazi families, nor were they able to integrate into Ashkenazi society. Similarly, the Sephardic Haredim community was politically weak and prevented from reaching any positions of power by the dominant Ashkenazi elite. In 1984, under the leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (1920–2013), the Sephardic Haredim founded a party called Shas, which has since had a permanent representation in the Knesset and was the seventh-largest party in the twentieth Knesset (2015–2019).

Although many Sephardic organizations and rabbis actively oppose the State of Israel, Sephardic Haredim are generally more supportive of the state than other Haredi groups. In 2010, Shas joined the World Zionist Organization, becoming the first Zionist Haredi party. Shas also founded the Ma’ayan HaChinuch HaTorani (the Fountain of Torah education), which has helped obtain government funds for many of its educational institutions and created public service jobs for young Sephardic Haredim. Being active in outreach activities, they have gained adherents among ba’alei teshuvah, but they are also strongly supported by mesorati (traditional Sephardim). In addition, Sephardic Haredim are often viewed as more willing to compromise on political issues than their Ashkenazi counterparts.

Recently, a new subculture, known as the New Haredim, has appeared within Haredi society. These are people belonging to the ultraorthodox sector who are open to the modern world and to general society. This is not a defined stream but rather encompasses Haredim, whose thinking is more liberal. They can be found among communities of Lithuanians, Hasidim, and Sephardim. Haim Zicherman, a researcher of the ultraorthodox society, estimated that they constituted about 9% of the total Haredi population in Israel or about 70,000 of its 900,000 ultraorthodox population (Zoldan, 2019). Modern Haredim consume Western culture, and their engagement with modernity includes the usage of secular media and the internet. Most have cell phones that are not kosher, and some even have a television at home. Some of them support enlistment in the IDF (these are not part of the protest circle on the issue of enlistment), and some of them live near secular Jews in communities like Jerusalem or Beit Shemesh (west of Jerusalem) (Zoldan, 2019, pp. 14–16, 21–22).

Of all these groups, the most radical faction is Ha’eda HaHaredit (“the Haredi ethnic group”). This group is estimated to comprise approximately 70,000 members who live mainly in Jerusalem (Me’ah She’arim), Beit Shemesh, and Ashdod. Ha’eda HaHaredit includes groups such as Toldos Aharon, Satmar, Toldos Avrohom Yitzchok, Kehal Chasidim, and Kehillat Dushinsky. This group represents extreme anti-Zionism and leads major struggles against what they see as the desecration of Shabbat and anything they perceive as blasphemous.

Theoretical Literature

Some scholars have argued that protest as a preferred mode of action for a particular group mainly requires stability and leadership that all members must accept (Turner & Killian, 1972). If such leadership exists, the odds of a certain group achieving its goals are improved. In the case of the Haredi community, there is always clear and acceptable leadership for the group members.

Throughout the years, scholars have tried to define social protest movements by focusing on various aspects. Some have emphasized the developmental processes of the movements, while others have focused on the external circumstances that were used as a relevant platform for the emergence of this kind of movement (Blumer, 1951; Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Eyerman & Jamison, 1998; Tarrow, 1982). Other scholars have paid attention to the crystallization process involving the sharing of identity among the group’s members and the methods the movement adopted to promote its ideas. In any case, with these different approaches in mind, scholars generally agree that social movements are informal networks based on solidarity and beliefs that enter into political confrontations with the regime and aspire to change the sociopolitical status quo and the dominating rule of the state, as adherents of the political process approach argue. Focusing on the history of protests in Israel, Lehman-Wilzig (1993, pp. 129–130) argues that sociopolitical protests in Israel were a common phenomenon from the 1980s onward and that the Arab minority in Israel copied the ancient protest patterns of Jews when fighting for civil or national rights. Three decades later, Hitman noticed that protests within Israeli society reflect the heterogeneity of the Israelis, as three different and separate protests were registered in 2020 (Hitman, 2021).

Let us take a brief look at the four basic approaches to the criteria of sociopolitical protests: the collective behavior theory, resource mobilization theory, the theory of collective identity, and the political opportunity theory.

Collective Behavior Theory

This theory is defined as the behavior of aggregates whose interaction is “affected by some sense that they constitute a group” (Turner & Killian, 1957, p. 301). This approach advances the belief that a social movement is one that acts outside of the establishment, looks to change the current situation and seeks cohesiveness among its members regarding its goals. Indeed, this approach can explain what, why, when, and how people coalesce, but it suffers from a major lacuna: it does not take into consideration the possibility that protest can emerge from within the public-political establishment, usually supported by opposition forces, as has happened in Poland, Bolivia, Burkina Paso, and Egypt (Hitman, 2020). Even Smelser’s original and inspiring study, which outlined six steps to crystallize a collective identity, examined audiences and groups outside the official establishment and seems to have neglected the social activity of state mechanisms such as the army or police forces (Smelser, 1963). Touraine addresses the protest as an outcome of a certain group’s collective and organized behavior. The basic idea is to struggle against social dominance and define community moral values (Touraine, 1981, p. 81). This definition asserts that a social movement is a frame for creating identity, mainly that of opposition against the existent sociopolitical order.

Melucci characterized the social movement as a special form of the collective phenomenon made up of the following three components: (1) a collective action based on solidarity; (2) the existence of an opponent who claims ownership of the very same values; and (3) a social frame that crosses norms and conventions without changing society (Melucci, 1989, p. 29). In contrast to previous scholars, he did not see political conflict as necessary for the existence of a social movement. If the movement acts to create values or new codes of culture, that is sufficient to call it a social movement. Based on Melucci’s argument, the Haredi community is a social movement with distinct values, dress codes, norms, and culture.

Resource Mobilization Theory

This theory focuses on conditions that may urge social movements to act and stresses that the odds of changing the reality increase if there is an identified and agreed-upon leadership inside the movement and if this leadership has had previous political experience (Diani, 1992). McCarthy and Zald (1977) developed this theory, arguing that no social movement can act without several components. They defined a social protest movement as an array of beliefs and ideas aiming to change the social structure. They focused their study on the conditions that make ideas into a tangible activity and emphasized, as others have, that the existence of an experienced and accepted leadership makes it easier for the social movement to achieve its goals.

This theory discerns five types of resources: material, moral, organizational, human, and cultural (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Material resources are the time, money, and people needed to act to achieve goals. Moral resources refer to identification with the ends connected to society’s moral and normative values. Organizational resources refer to the maximum exploitation of resources. What is important here is the strategic effort and coordination existent between the members of the movement for them to utilize their collective abilities so that the joint activity around a shared purpose can be carried out with full coordination (Pagnucco, 1996).

The resource mobilization theory asserts that a social protest movement’s strategic targets aim to change the regime’s policy and gather public support. The ways to achieve this are organizing demonstrations, signing petitions, and sometimes even instigating violent action.

Theory of Collective Identity

This approach emerged from criticism leveled at scholars who emphasized resources as necessary for social protest movements. It emphasizes that sociopsychological aspects and beliefs are key to the ability to convince people to participate in protests or violent acts. This can be achieved through shared beliefs, symbols, or language, leading people to cooperate when political situations allow it (Melucci, 1989). Identity consists of the emotional, moral, and cognitive connections an individual has with a certain group, community, or movement (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Ultimately, it does not matter whether the contexts involved in this are real or imagined. The group’s identity is expressed by shared values, a common language and customs, agreement upon cultural symbols and signs, ceremonies, and even identical dress styles. When this collective identity is solid enough, members of the group may consider protest activity against an incumbent regime, especially if they express dissatisfaction with the social and political order within the state.

Political Opportunity Theory

This theory is used to explain how, when, and where social protest movements can form, act, and concentrates on the question of whether or not the regime allows people to gather in the streets (or other central public places such as squares). McAdam, quoted in Giugni, has delineated four main dimensions of what constitutes political opportunity: the degree of openness or closedness of the institutionalized political system; stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; presence or absence of elite allies; and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. Some scholars believe that this approach is the dominant paradigm in studying social movements and contentious politics (Giugni, 2009).

But as with the previous theories, this approach has been criticized over the years. The diversity of understandings of political opportunity has led critics to warn that the concept of political opportunity structure is “in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Other critics have been less optimistic about the concept’s utility, arguing that it promises to explain too much, effectively neglecting the importance of activist agency, and explains too little, offering only a mechanistic understanding of social movements that do not apply to many cases (Giugni, 2009).

Haredi Society as a Social Movement

Tilly sees the protest movement as a political process and defines it as an ongoing series of contacts between power holders—the regime—and people who usually speak on behalf of a constituency that does not have any official representation. The speakers (or the leaders) of the protest movement strive to change power distribution through rallies and demonstrations. According to Tilly’s study, establishing a social movement is a rational choice based on cost-benefit calculations. Since the focus here is on the interaction between the movement and the authorities, if the latter forbids any form of protest, the activists and their supporters cannot carry out their objectives (Tilly, 1978).

As a distinct group, despite the internal variances between the subgroups shown above, Haredi society meets the criteria of a social movement even when they want to protest. The group has, in practice, the required components that a social protest movement needs. First, they have the material, moral, organizational, human, and cultural resources to mobilize a protest when they believe it will help them achieve their goals. Second, they have a strong collective identity that makes it easier, when necessary, to call all the community to the flag. This occurs particularly when they feel or identify that the central (non-Haredi) regime asks to change the status quo. And third, people who live under a democratic regime have the option to protest. Therefore, for this study, the Haredi community can be defined as a social movement involved in protests and violent activities to maintain the status quo between the state and religion.

Based on the existing literature on social movement, this study suggests a new theoretical frame for analyzing Haredi protests and violent activities against Israeli authorities. This is an amalgamation of three theories: primordial, constructivism, and contingency.

Primordialism, in short, means being part of a certain group from the moment one is born. Family, ethnic, religious, linguistic, territorial, and national linkages are fundamental for creating a joint communal life. Primordial scholars see conflicts as clashes of civilizations between Islam and the West and perceive cultural and religious differences as insoluble unless the winning side takes all (Huntington, 1993). A compromise with the enemy is not an option since, according to divine order, the enemy excluded themselves from the “right community” (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). This theory is relevant for collective political protests or violent acts between Muslims and Christians in the Balkan region during the 1990s, the global jihad of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and the civil war in Sudan, which eventually split the country into two different political entities in 2011. It is also pertinent for this case study because Haredi society perceives non-Haredi as non-Jews or even sinners—whether they are Zionists, secular, or traditionally religious—so making a stand against them is a religious command. Despite all of them being Jews, there is sub-primordialism due to significant differences in lifestyle, beliefs, and realities.

Constructivism sees a process of building knowledge through thinking. It can be one person or a group that starts to think abstractly, and after a process of forging “team spirit,” the next stage is how to make an idea a reality. The hard core of this theory is a combination of norms and ideas because people strive to test different attitudes and pour new meaning(s) into them (Weber, 1949, p. 81). This theory can explain, for instance, why one group of people lives in a certain way and another group lives differently. It can also analyze protest or violence as an act undertaken to preserve the social status quo or change it. Naturally, Haredi society views the way of life of the individual and the collective differently from those with a secular outlook, as demonstrated above. When there is a conflict of interest between the two groups, one of the possible consequences is a clash, which may even be violent, between the parties.

The contingency theory argues that every case study of political violence depends on unusual developments that create the potential for a significant change compared to the current situation in any given society (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, p. 13). This theory seeks to understand the factors and circumstances that led to certain developments such as war, revolution, or economic crises. A group uses violence to ensure its interests after considering nonviolent actions and internalizing the idea that only violence will achieve its goal(s). In the present case, contingency refers to government decisions that directly influence Haredim’s lives, such as the sanctity of the Shabbat. This theory is also relevant for this case study because Haredi society—at least parts of it—has responded to the government’s or authorities’ decisions that affect their lives ideologically and in practice.

Our hypotheses are as follows:

Primordialism and constructivism are necessary independent variables for the occurrence of Haredi protests or violence but are not sufficient conditions for it;

The contingency approach, based on primordial and constructive differences, can explain the research query; and

The Haredi community is a constant passive protest movement that responds to government policies that might change the socioreligious status quo.

Case Studies

Over the past two decades, mapping issues leading to protests by the ultraorthodox community include the following cases.

Recruitment Law

Since a bill was submitted in 2002 that requires the enlistment of 18-year-old Haredim for military service, Haredi communities have begun to protest. As a result, cities with an ultraorthodox population, such as Jerusalem, Bnei Brak (east of Tel Aviv), and Beit Shemesh (west of Jerusalem), have become permanent arenas for protests and violence. In one demonstration in Jerusalem on 28 March 2017, more than 10,000 Haredi (Yerushalmi faction) demonstrated against the detention of yeshivot students: “We passed Pharaoh, we will pass you too,” said the leader of the assembly. “In the army, ultraorthodox soldiers are being abused, and they are being transferred through the seven circles of hell.” The main speaker added, “We will fill the prisons as we did in exile” (Nachshoni, 2017).

In his speech, Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach compared the struggle against the law of enlistment to the physical and spiritual war of the Jewish people in Amalek in November 2017: “It is really the uprooting of all that is precious and holy, and this is what we have shed our souls in every generation. Our job is to stand up for our souls and not be drawn into any compromises and easements, they have already reached the schools of Midrasha, they are trying to mobilize, and this is the most difficult exile we can imagine.” Seven months later, the ultraorthodox renewed their protests, which reached the city of Safed in the north of the country. The day of rage included blocking major traffic arteries, setting fire to garbage cans, damaging police vehicles, and physical clashes with police. In total, 120 Haredim were arrested in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh. Some demonstrators declared that they would be happier to go to jail than serve in the Israeli army (Adamaker et al., 2017).

The above quotes can be explained according to the primordial approach. In fact, since the conflict in question is only between Jews, this article suggests analyzing it as a sub-primordial clash. The leaflets and speeches underscored the Torah’s sanctity that other Jews long ago forgot to sanctify (and therefore, as Brown (2012) pointed out, there is no legitimacy for a human being’s sovereignty). Despite the internal division of Jews into four groups (Haredim, religious, traditional, and secular), mass protests, sometimes violent ones, do not break out regularly. This study suggests a combination of the primordial and the contingency approach: sub-primordial diversity is a constant situation within the Jewish-majority society, but it is an insufficient variable for Haredi protesting. Once the (non-legitimate) sovereign (the Israeli government) decided to promote the enlistment law, the new policy is the contingency variable, which, together with primordialism, explains the outcome of a violent process. In this case study, the protest also had a constructivist goal: to maintain the status quo of the social order. The protesters asked to keep going to the yeshivot instead of joining the IDF. Preserving the current situation ensures that the Haredim are not exposed to the temptations offered by the modern world, of which the IDF is part of, and thus the social order is maintained according to the Haredi constructivist view.

Arrest of Deserters from Military Service

Based on the constructivist approach, Haredi society views service in the army as sacrilege. Therefore, when military police try to arrest ultraorthodox deserters, it encounters strong resistance from Haredi activists. For example, Meir Brodiansky, the grandson of an ultraorthodox rabbi, was arrested in March 2018. He was sentenced in a military court to 45 days imprisonment. In response, the radical Jerusalemite faction took to the streets and blocked the main traffic artery. The members of the ultra-Jerusalemite Lithuanian faction clashed with police on 22 March and blocked Highway 4 (a main traffic artery) for more than three hours. At least 30 protesters were arrested. In the evening, dozens of Haredim from the Jerusalemite faction arrived in Ramat Gan (near the Haredi town of Bnei Brak), causing damage to vehicles and throwing stones at policemen. The police said that “hundreds of demonstrators arrived in the Dan district, threw stones at the police, threw objects, sprayed tear gas on the police, and caused damage to vehicles in the area” (Blumenthal & Nachshoni, 2018).

In this case, an amalgamation of constructivism and contingency provides the theoretical analysis for Haredim’s violence. According to the perception of the ultra-Jerusalemite Lithuanian faction, a young Jewish boy should dedicate his time to learning the Torah, which is the basis for a just and proper society. Therefore, when the state, which in any case is not recognized as a sovereign entity by this faction, arrests an ultraorthodox youth who has deserted his civic duty, the right response is a violent protest since the right social construction is in danger.

The power of primordialism and social construction was expressed in joyous parades of deserters released from detention. The statements made by the protesters to do everything to preserve the social status quo are expressions of their view of the state institutions as foreigners who are not part of the right camp, which conducts community life based on God’s laws, as outlined in the Holy Torah (Porat, 2018).

Working on Shabbat

Working on Shabbat is a clear case study for demonstrating the linkage between the three approaches (primordial, constructivism, and contingency). Construction work on the Tel Aviv Light Rail system started in 2015, and in 2018 it reached the section near the Haredi city of Bnei Brak. The executive company warned that stopping work endangered human life and that there was no alternative but for non-Jewish workers to work on Shabbat. The court approved the execution of the work despite calls by ultraorthodox to resist by protesting against it. In response, the ultraorthodox held a mass protest rally, blocking main roads near Bnei Brak and disrupting the traffic movement (Ravid & Dolev, 2018). Both primordial and constructivism offer conceptual reasons for Shabbat as a day of rest. Working on Saturday near a religious city like Bnei Brak is an explanation according to the contingency theory because, without these works, the Haredim protests would not have taken place. The fact that non-Jews executed this work did not matter for the ultraorthodox because they were concentrating on the effort to prevent the desecration of Shabbat.

Postmortem Analysis

The past decade (2011–2020) was marked by protests by the ultraorthodox, some of them violent, in response to police demands to conduct an autopsy on bodies suspected of involvement in criminal activity. This protest has a primordial explanation. One of the most difficult halachic questions is the question of respect for the dead, including postmortem analysis. Halachically speaking, there are several prohibitions against the analysis of the dead. First, the command is to bury the deceased and give him his last respect; therefore, medical intervention certainly humiliates him. The commandment of “The commandment of ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself’” also demands that we treat him with respect. If the burial is delayed by the day, the prohibition is passed on the prohibition of “not praying” also demands that the body is treated with respect (Deuteronomy 21:23). Despite that, for the past 200 years, the medical profession has been demanding operations be carried out on the dead. For this purpose, many surgeries have been performed in which bodies were dismembered to determine the condition of the organs, bones, blood system, and more. The halachic command and the needs of medical science have consequently collided several times in recent years:

In 2006, Israel Wells, a 19-year-old yeshiva student, was charged with killing his son. The Haredi community warned the Israeli authorities that “Jerusalem will burn if Wells is not released” and compared his arrest to the arrest of Jews in Europe for anti-Semitic reasons (Marciano, 2006). As part of the investigation into the baby’s death, the police and the State Prosecutor’s Office sought to analyze his body, but this was met with fierce opposition from the ultraorthodox community (Yoaz, 2006).

In May 2006, the baby daughter of an ultraorthodox family died in the city of Ashdod. The initial examination revealed that the parents did not give her antibiotics despite the doctor’s orders. The police wanted to conduct an autopsy on the body to investigate criminal activity. The parents objected for halachic reasons (Hadad, 2006; Priel & Fogel, 2006). When the court ordered an autopsy, a protest by some 500 ultraorthodox took place in the Ashdod cemetery. A few protesters opened the grave and grabbed the baby’s body to prevent the body from being operated on. The riots spread to Jerusalem, where Haredim damaged property, attacked policemen, and burned garbage cans. During the clashes, a policeman was seriously injured. The riot only ended after one of the rabbis, accepted as an authority among the demonstrators, ordered them to leave (Hadad & Marciano, 2006).

When the grandson of the mayor of Beit Shemesh died in January 2016, the police requested an autopsy as part of the investigation. The grandfather, an ultraorthodox man, objected and argued that autopsies are forbidden according to Jewish law. Following a court’s decision to analyze the body, violent confrontations erupted between hundreds of protesters and police officers in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh in protest against the decision. Ten protesters in Jerusalem were arrested, and three demonstrators were arrested in Beit Shemesh (Greenbaum & Twil, 2016).

In April 2018, an ultraorthodox baby died in a hotel during his family’s vacation in Ashkelon in southern Israel. Despite the family’s opposition to the operation, a court ordered an autopsy. Significant police forces were deployed around the court after protests broke out among the ultraorthodox, as instructed by Rabbi Tuvia Weiss, the most senior figure in the ultraorthodox community (Rozen, 2018). There were demonstrations by Haredim in Jerusalem (the city where the family lived) and in Ashdod. In this case too, a combination of a primordial approach to the decision to analyze the body (contingency) explains the protest action by the ultraorthodox.

In all cases, constructivism supplies the basis for building values, norms, and traditions for a given society. In these cases, if the Halakhah forbids an operation on a dead body, then any other decision means undermining God’s will. The non-legitimate Israeli authority’s decision to operate on the bodies reflects the contingency explanation, which, combined with constructivism, provides a theoretical explanation for these case studies.

Conclusions

An analysis of ultraorthodox protests shows that this is a permanent and passive protest group. They are united in the view that social life must be based on sacred texts such as the Torah and the rulings of rabbis (despite disagreements between different streams). They also have a distinct group identity and have the resources to protest. In Israel, they live under a democratic regime that allows them to protest. But despite this, the ultraorthodox do not initiate their protests but respond to the government’s moves. Ostensibly, they have situational reasons to protest, such as high poverty rates, but they do not unless the state undermines the religious status quo. The explanation is that the Haredim cling to their faith in the Torah, and if they live in poverty, it is a decree from Heaven. The Haredi group’s cohesion is based on spiritual norms that govern their way of life. If that is imperiled, they will take a stance to protest to protect their way of life, which is built around the Torah.

Following that, the Haredi anti-Zionist ideology meets the criteria of constructivism combined with the primordial approach. Their religious way of life, derived from the holy book, is the correct construction of reality. Any deviation from it removes the deviant’s belonging to the right group and order. When this group of deviations becomes a sovereign state entity that acts to change the status quo in matters of a lifestyle built on their interpretation of Torah values, some groups within the Haredi streams, especially those on the fundamentalist end of the spectrum, feel strongly about a contested issue and will be vocal and organize protests.

Not all Haredim participate in protests. But when a protest is based on religious issues, no one from the ultraorthodox will call to stop the protest. Therefore, as long as most of the ultraorthodox public remains passive and despite internal rifts within Haredi society, if protests are the best way to act, it is expected that these will continue with the participation of the militant factions within this group. As Haredi numbers grow and their values continue to clash with those of the secular Israeli state, we are witnessing an increased number of issues that need to be negotiated between the two parties in the fast-paced and changing contemporary society.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note

ORCID iD

Gadi Hitman

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