“Revolutionary Youth” in Egypt: Interfaith Relations Since the 2011 Revolution

Introduction

It is a commonplace to assert that youth are a nation’s hope and future. Hence, in the official Egyptian discourse, youths are frequently depicted as “a gift to the country” (Egypt Today, 2022). For example, on the 2019 International Youth Day, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi posted on his official Twitter account to applaud “the enthusiastic and promising Egyptian youths who are proving day by day that they are the secret of the strength and vitality of our great nation” (Egypt Today, 2019). However, it only shows one side of the picture. Given the reality of “the youth bulge” in Egypt, government officials often implicitly insinuate that the young generation is a burden for the country. However, they have been incapable of addressing the demands of the youth (Singerman, 2013). According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), in 2021, 34.6% of the 102 million Egyptian population is between 15 years and 34 years of age. The government views that feeding the youth, giving them job opportunities, and enabling them to marry are already significant challenges (LaGraffe, 2012). The leaders often portray themselves as the provider for the young population and, in official discourse, have even projected themselves as “the father of the youth” (Sawaf, 2013, pp. 9–11). ¹ Moreover, the government constantly emphasizes that it devotes itself to giving young people a decent life, particularly after the upheaval of 2011. ²

During the Arab Spring, it is well-known that young Egyptians were at the forefront of the protests against the authoritarian regime. Because of this prominent role, the “revolutionary youth” (shabāb al-thawra) have attracted considerable attention from scholars since 2011. However, the main body of scholarship largely focuses on the role of the Egyptian youth as political actors (e.g., Abdalla, 2013; El-Sharnouby, 2017, 2019; Rennick, 2015). Only a few have researched their potential and influence in the interfaith relations between Muslims and Copts ³ in the post-revolution Egypt.

This article is a part of the qualitative study researching Christian–Muslim relations in contemporary Egypt. Based on the methodology of grounded theory, interviews have been conducted among more than 30 individuals since 2020. The interviewees are all interfaith practitioners, organization workers, or peace-making network leaders on the ground. They are from different faith backgrounds, ages, and genders with various experiences in religious dialogues at both official and grassroots levels. Most of them are based in Cairo, but their interfaith programs are not limited to Cairo. Due to the current inimical political climate toward people with different views, the article presents the interviewees’ opinions under pseudonyms. In addition, it combines other documents of the organizations and news as primary and secondary sources. Admittedly, some of the insights come from the author’s personal experience, who lived in Egypt for over 8 years before and after the 2011 revolution. Therefore, the article uses an eclectic mix of sources based on personal observations, interactions with interfaith practitioners, and government and media reports. In sum, qualitative data has been collected mainly through field research interviews, observations, and mini-focus groups with supplementary information from news, documents, and other written materials.

In post-revolution Egyptian society, the “revolutionary youth” has become a key theme of social discourse. This article examines how this group has influenced the progress of the Christian–Muslim relation in Egypt. Compared to the situation of the youth before the 2011 revolution, it is worth noting that the social change-oriented young people have become the focus of the interfaith relation-building that followed. Thus, this article argues that revolutionary youth have been a new driving force of the solidarity movement in general and of interfaith harmony building in particular since the 2011. To a large extent, the interfaith movement can be seen as an “activist” movement to maintain one’s ongoing revolutionary spirit by living differently in society. Even though the voice of the young people is still under repression after the revolution, they have begun to practice humanism, such as social equality and solidarity in the public spaces and their daily lives after undergoing the experience of the revolution.

Social and Cultural Situation of the Youth Before the 2011 Uprising

Unless they were fortunately born into affluent and influential families, most Egyptian youths experienced a certain degree of social exclusion. In their work, Ragui Assad and Ghada Barsoum (2007) have researched youth exclusion by mainly focusing on education and learning, work opportunities, potential for forming families, and channels for exercising citizenship. They discover that exclusion is not a single incidence in young people’s lives, but it is a collective grievance cumulatively and multi-dimensionally impacting the Egyptian youth. It also makes them one of the disadvantaged groups. The Hosni Mubarak regime could not include the majority of the youth in the national projects to help them pass through their important life transitions decently. The costs related to the youth issues, such as unemployment, early dropouts, unplanned pregnancy, and brain drain impacted young individuals and led to a tremendous economic loss on the national level (Chaaban, 2008). The prolonged social exclusion caused the low social status of the majority of the young Egyptians, especially in the rural areas and urban slums.

Among different forms of exclusion, the lack of civic engagement of the younger generation endangered social stability. Although it is difficult to reach a consensus about the term civic engagement, Richard Adler and Judy Goggin (2005) propose that it “describes how an active citizen participates in the life of a community to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community’s future” (p. 241). However, before making this ambitious definition, they have carefully noted that civic engagement can include many dimensions relating to community service, collective action, political involvement, and social change (Adler & Goggin, 2005, pp. 237–240). In several surveys before 2011, it was found that civic participation among the Egyptian youth was a problem. In 2004, one of the surveys noted that “56 percent of the sample had never participated in student union elections, 67 percent had never participated in any student activities, and 84 percent had never participated in a public protest or demonstration” (Quoted in Shehata, 2008, pp. 2–3). Another survey in 2002 discovered that 67% of the youth did not even register for a voting card (Shehata, 2008). According to the interviewees, before the revolution, university students did not want to participate or vote in the student union elections, not because they were disinterested but because they knew that the elections were usually rigged. There was no real democracy in the surrounding social or political spaces. ⁴

Similar to the reality of the gerontocracy during the time of Mubarak, various political parties and government failed to include the youth among the ruling elites. In the political space, the youth were either portrayed as a problem or even a threat to the Egyptian society. As Nadine Sika (2012) has noted, some political parties did devote time to mobilize the youth before the uprising, but they seemed incapable of encompassing a wide range of Egyptian youth. Therefore, some of the young resolved to make “new forms of youth political participation,” such as the Youth for Change movement and the Sixth of April movement (pp. 188–190). Sika concludes that the majority of “youths were civically and politically disengaged before the uprising” because of their deep understanding of “the nature of authoritarianism and corruption in their country” (p. 198). Although the younger generation was the main driving force in the history of the Egyptian revolutions, including the 2011 revolution (Abdallah, 1985; Chalcraft, 2020), the new generation’s voice was severely suppressed during Mubarak’s rule. Before 2011, in the political and social discourse, the youth were often closely related to problems such as unemployment, migration, vulnerability to extreme ideology, being marginalized, anti-social behavior, exclusion by society, and political struggle.

Authorities even believed that the youth only cared about their economic benefit and personal life. Sika (2016) has precisely summarized many commentators’ observations stating that:

On the one hand, the regime perceives young people as a force for development and positive change, while on the other hand, it perceives young people – and especially young political activists – as a threat to its own existence. This contentious story dates back to Nasser, however these dynamics were very visible in Sadat and Mubarak’s policies toward young people, and continued until the ascendance of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power …. The 2011 uprising in Egypt was a manifestation of the failure of regime policies to develop an equitable and just social, economic and political system in general and for young people in particular. (pp. 4, 9)

There were many discussions concerning the role of the youth in Egypt. Scholars continue to argue whether young people are the agents of change or the tools of those who intend to seize political power.

Aside from the social situation, there is a cultural factor causing the negative stereotyping of the young generation. From the Arab cultural perspective, many think youth are always intellectually and morally inferior to adults. Many grown-up Egyptians naturally think the youth are too immature to make the right decisions. There is a common parlance in Egypt to declare that akbar minnak bi-yom, a‘lam minnak bi-sana (older than you by a day, wiser than you by a year). For example, in the church, if an older leader attends a ministry leadership meeting, as a mark of respect, the younger Egyptian leader, who is holding the meeting, has to politely invite the older leader to conduct the meeting even though the latter may be unfamiliar with the details. If two youths fight in public, any man older than them has the authority to stop and chide them, even though he may be a stranger. In the family setting, if a father or grandfather says something, junior family members have to obey even though they may not agree with the elders’ decision. ⁵ The 2011 revolution, along with the gradual impact of globalization and internet use, the status of the youth has begun to change. However, the culture of honoring the elders is, to some extent, still an implicit social norm in Egypt. Before the 2011 revolution, the abilities and dreams of the younger generation were downplayed by the elders, who symbolize wisdom of the tradition. Consequently, the general impression was that young people have “no say” in society or “no one will listen” to their voices. Moreover, many believed they could not make a difference to the status quo in Egypt.

In Egyptian churches, young Christians have been further isolated from the outside community than their Muslim counterparts due to their Christian identity. The Christian youth, especially those from the Coptic Orthodox Church, are encouraged to do activities only within the walls of the church. They are told that politics is not for Christians, and they have to follow the stance of their mother church, which wants to protect them from getting hurt. This protective action is understandable for the minority community, but the consequence is that Christian youth are further marginalized in society. All the aforementioned problems contribute to the Egyptian youth feeling incapable of doing anything, and it is impossible for them to change the society. For the Christian youth, these feelings were even more pronounced. This also explains why many young Christians were afraid to be a part of the civil society before the revolution.

Definition of the “Revolutionary Youth” in Egypt

It is not only the role of the youth in the revolution that has become a contentious issue; to date, there is no consensus on the definition of who these youth are. In comparing the characteristics of the rebellious Arab youth with their earlier cohorts, Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal (2012), for example, conclude that “they are, on average, less religious, more educated, more likely to be unemployed, more likely to protest, and less likely to vote.[…] Young Arabs are generally more supportive of political Islam than their older counterparts and tend to support Shari’a law [It seems that Arab Christians were not taken into their consideration]” (p. 183). The authors did not explicitly define who is this group of “Arab youth” are, but the respondents of the youth group in their research were between 18 years and 24 years of age (p. 173). This is also a common approach that many newspapers have adopted. For example, Egypt Today defines “young people” as an equivalent to people “below 40 years, [who] represent about 60 percent of the Egyptian population” (Egypt Today, 2021).

Some studies differ on the idea of youth or how a generation is defined. For example, German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1952), arguing against the simplified definition of the “youth,” outlines the notion of generation as follows:

The unity of a generation does not consist primarily in a social bond of the kind that leads to the formation of a concrete group, although it may sometimes happen that a feeling for the unity of a generation is consciously developed into a basis for the formation of concrete groups […] the unity of generation is constituted essentially by the similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole[…] Similarity of location can be defined only by specifying the structure within which and through which location groups emerge in historical–social reality. Class-position was based upon the existence of a changing economic and power structure in society. Generation location is based on the existence of biological rhythm in human existence-the factors of life and death, a limited span of life, and aging. Individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process. (pp. 288, 290)

According to Mannheim (1952), a generation experiences the shared historical–social reality by participating in the same historical and social process called “similarity of location.” This shared experience affects the patterns of thoughts and actions within the members of the generation-unit. However, it does not mean that the members have only a unique way of thought while they are under similar influence in the same location. Even under a similar location, the individual could have various interpretations of reality (pp. 306–307). He also mentions that the quicker the tempo of the social change, the more distinct the generation will be formed in reacting to the charged situation (p. 310).

Based on Mannheim’s idea about generation, Emma Murphy (2012) discovers the generational narrative of the Arab youth and their shared “collective experience of frustration, marginalization and alienation which is not dependent specifically on age” (p. 7). By modifying Mannheim’s concept, Sarah Rennick (2018) delineates Egyptian “revolutionary youth” as “a distinct community of practice in the broader field of activism and contestation in Egypt” (p. 3). She elaborates that revolution is not necessarily to be a traditional understanding of overturning the state, power, or political systems, but it “should be understood in relative terms—the specific vision of power, state–society relations, and the nature of radical change as interpreted by the activists and the sense with which they vest the term. Revolutionary practice, in this case, involves the embodiment of these negotiated and situated understandings of revolution” (p. 6). In other words, the generation of revolutionary youth underwent an “abnormal” transition during the revolution, which is their similarity of location, and it equipped the youth with revolutionary practices and an enlightened mindset.

Another noteworthy concept regarding the youth is the global generation. June Edmunds and Bryan Turner (2005) acknowledge that there have been two waves of active global generation. According to them, the world is now in the era of the internet generation. The proficiency of electronic media can define this generation, and on the internet, “people can be linked through shared international experience rather than shared local experience” (p. 568). The global generation “shares its information and ideas across borders and acts with global impact” (p. 572). During the Egyptian revolution, the youth utilized social media tools to facilitate protests and collective actions and have kept in touch with fellow Arab and other youth movements even a decade later. Globalization further enables the Egyptian youth to acquire eye-opening experiences and an enlightened mindset. At the same time, the internet provides an efficient way for global networking with other young people worldwide. This cyber world provides opportunities for many revolutionary youths in Egypt to go global, even though it may be impossible to do it physically; at least, it is still possible mentally.

Along the same line, although many interfaith practitioners notice the importance of the revolutionary youth in their programs, they cannot find a unified definition of who they are. For example, an interviewee defines young people in Egypt as someone younger than 35 years and claims that this age group is easy to communicate with. ⁶ However, many think that the youth with a revolutionary mind might better be categorized by certain characteristics such as being open-minded, daring to experiment with new things and not bound by tradition. Others point out their skillfulness in information and communication technology, which helps the youth broaden their international horizon. In other words, many informants agree that the definition of “revolutionary youth” is not solely based on age; most of the time, they can be more accurately distinguished by their revolutionary mindset and action. According to Mannheim’s theory of generation, the revolutionary youth have been transformed by the Egyptian revolution’s experience and, most likely, acquired the revolutionary spirit and mission in the same historical and social process they underwent. Moreover, many of them have been a part of the global generation before the 2011 revolution and continue to be active in cyberspace. To use the words of one interviewee, the youth is “not only about the [Egyptian] Revolution, but also about the global revolution all over the world.” ⁷

Popular Recognition of the Revolutionary Youth in Egypt

As aforementioned, the Egyptian youth have been discouraged because of many sociopolitical and cultural factors. Given the constraints on the youth, many young people tend to execute “social non-movement,” which means “the collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations” (Bayat, 2013, p. 15). According to Asef Bayat, the “youth non-movements” are “characterized less by what the young do (networking, organizing, deploying resources, mobilizing) than by how they are (in behaviors, outfits, ways of speaking and walking, in private and public spaces)” (p. 111). It emphasizes the “collective being” of their “youthfulness” rather than “collective doing.” This kind of non-movement is, most of the time, “behind the scenes.”

Another group of Egyptian youth has chosen a different way to react to social constraints. Despite facing social exclusion and political marginalization, some youth still managed to participate in social activism by various means during the years preceding 2011. Gathering by a common grievance, the youth found their own way to engage with civil society in the restricted space allowed by the governing authority. Many youth movements have emerged with the help of the advance of the internet and communication technology. Kefaya (Enough), Youth for Change, 6th April Youth Movement, and We Are All Khaled Said are some examples (Rennick, 2018). However, not all adults appreciate the contribution of young people. For instance, the Kefaya youth movement founded in 2004, which later became prominent in the 2011 revolution, as an opposing force to Mubarak’s regime was criticized by the adult elites as ‘being a ‘foreign puppet’ or the pastime of ‘a bunch of kids’’ (Shorbagy, 2007, p. 176).

The leaderships of most of the movements were a mixture of young people from different religious backgrounds. Many movements were secular, but it did not mean they were necessarily anti-religious. The Kefaya exemplified the idea of “a cross-ideological coalition” (Abdelrahman, 2011, p. 418). Maspero Youth Union was among the few exceptional movements predominantly organized by Christians then, but it was still without official blessings from the church. Some Christians were willing to engage with civil society activists and went outside the walls of their churches. However, most Christians in Egypt were still afraid to go beyond the protective umbrella of their religious institution. Although the youth’s situation was problematic, they successfully created limited spaces to publicize their voices. This also paved the way for later social action. To the surprise of many, the youth eventually became one of the main actors in the 2011 revolution and devoted themselves to building a new Egypt.

The watershed moment of the 2011 protest transformed many young people in Egypt from being passive and conservative into becoming active and assertive. The activist role of the young people were a key element in the Arab uprisings. By comparing the time before and after the 2011 revolution, Sika (2012) describes the political engagement of the young generation as a pathway “from abstention to uprising.” For many Egyptian youths, it was a precious moment that they turned the non-movement into a collective action with many other Egyptians from all walks of life. The “rebellious” action of the youth was contrary to the traditional philosophy of insha’allah (if God wills). What happened on 25 January 2011 proved that Mubarak underestimated the impact of “this bunch of kids.” Led by ordinary people from all layers of society, protests developed in the famous Tahrir (Liberation) Square to fight for people living with social justice and human dignity. During this historic moment of change, the disillusioned youth made their voices heard and gradually earned their support and esteem in Egyptian society.

During the 18-day demonstrations, the young people in the street endeavored to change “the fate of the social map, or the political map, or the economic development.” ⁸ According to the memory of a leader of a well-known non-governmental organization (NGO) in Egypt, who has more than 15-year experience in civil society, she recalled observing the change after the 2011 revolution as follows:

… the change that happened was that more and more young people wanted to join the [social] project because there was a huge release of interest from young people to join the civil society generally in 2011. I saw it. The young people finally found interest in joining some projects and programs. They were so active within civil society. And that was the difference. ⁹

Although later, the Islamic and military camps manipulated the fruit of the revolution, and the democratic process has remained still in the aftermath of 25 January (Lavie, 2018), the revolution has undeniably challenged the traditional stereotype and some conservative thoughts toward the youth in the society.

Rennick’s (2018) research on various youth movements founded in the short time span around the revolution concludes the situation after the struggle between 2011 and 2013 as:

The demobilization of countless activists and, for many, their abandonment of political activism has in many cases been replaced by engagement in fields such as social entrepreneurship and the arts. Former activists today find themselves launching sustainable farming initiatives, urban beautification projects, extracurricular courses for school-age children, and underground performing arts centers, among numerous other initiatives. Crucially, these new forms of engagement, and the broader effort to instigate community-based and highly local social, economic, and cultural development are understood by the activists as other paths for continuing the revolution. These new forms of engagement directly manifest the revolutionary youth’s values of equality, tolerance, and social justice, as well as transformed social relationships, and as such represent a continuation of the practice of revolutionary prefiguration, though focused on small-scale, direct implementation rather than the recreation of the Republic of Tahrir via mass political protest. (p. 151)

After the July 2013 military-led removal of Mohamed Morsi, the democratic process was reversed, and the severe political repression of critical voices came back. While many people are disappointed, and some even quit the field of social activism, it is believed that “something changed inside the people after the revolution, which cannot be reversed.” ¹⁰ The young people in Egypt have devoted themselves to participating in “these new forms of engagement” through “other paths for continuing the revolution.”

Other than the youth’s engagement with the community based on their revolutionary mindset, they continue to be alert to the issues of their society and keep the momentum of the non-movement. Although Egyptians have been put under strong state surveillance in recent years again, the teenagers still found creative ways to express their grievances. For example, the sons of my bawwaeb (doorman) play with a toy called bandola (clackers pendulum; Egyptian people also call it “Sisi’s ball”) every day to indirectly show their dissatisfaction with the current economic situation and the performance of the government (The New Arab, 2017). Walking through the local areas in Egypt, the sound of the bandola becomes quite noticeable. It exemplifies one of the “shared practices” of ordinary Egyptian youths in their daily life’s non-movement.

Hence, it is not accurate to claim that the revolutionary youth have “emerged” since the 2011 revolution, but the revolution has put the Egyptian youth under the spotlight, especially among researchers. Throughout the years leading to the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian youth movement and non-movement have constructed the collective narrative of the young generation. The uprising in 2011 was only a consequence that showed the power of the social engagement of the youth, no matter what form it had taken. Nowadays, the revolutionary Egyptian youth still silently exists.

The Revolutionary Youth’s Influence on Interfaith Relations

The youth movement not only significantly impacts the political arena but also changes the landscape of the interfaith dynamics in Egypt. The 2011 revolution brought the downfall of Mubarak and, at the same time, provided a wider space for the youth to discuss social issues, including how to achieve “real” inter-religious coexistence. Many interviewees reported that it was a wonderful moment shortly after the revolution to see young Christians and Muslims listening to the life story of other faiths and engaging with the religious others. Gaining this “temporary freedom,” the youth used the opportunity to expose themselves to various ideologies and thoughts that they had not encountered before. ¹¹

Unfortunately, the public space for this kind of discussion was limited when the Muslim Brotherhood took power shortly after. It was also due to the shift of the public focus on the democratic transition and rebuilding the country in the aftermath of the revolution. Recognizing the important roles of the youth, the Sisi government seeks to influence their thoughts. For example, several initiatives were launched countrywide to protect the youth from radical religious ideologies. President El-Sisi frequently appeals to the new generation in his public speeches. In 2022, the regime organized various forums and conferences targeting the young generation. One of the examples is the National Youth Conference to conduct political dialogue in which the Egyptian youth was one of the main foci (Ahram Online, 2022).

Many scholars assess the outcome of the 2011 revolution and the later 2013 coup only from the political point of view and assert that the democratic transition in Egypt had utterly failed. However, from the perspective of interfaith relations, the grassroots leaders were overjoyed to see the potential of the youth. In the face of severe state paternalism, the youth sought alternative ways to participate in society building. Hence, as a by-product of their revolutionary thoughts and deeds, many began to embrace the improvement of interfaith relations in Egyptian society. Some interviewees often call this a continuous phenomenon of youth introspection as an “unfinished revolution” ¹² or “the spirit of revolution.” ¹³

According to the interviewees, there are many idiosyncrasies within this group of youth. For example, they are eager to express their thoughts via social media and “no one can stop them.” ¹⁴ Many controversial issues are now posted in the cyber world, and sometimes, hot debates such as #Metoo or the topic against discrimination prompt the authorities to take legal or security actions. Thanks to the rapid advance of social media, the Egyptian youth gain eye-opening experiences and become more enlightened than their previous generations. Communication technology, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, shortens the distance among young people in cyberspace around the globe (Alaimo, 2015; Herrera, 2014).

Moreover, the youth also learn about the Western standard of humanism despite the fact that they still live in another part of the world. In addition, the regime finds it difficult to control the information flow in the internet era fully. Every Egyptian becomes “a source of news” by using a mobile phone. Thereafter, the fuller picture of the inter-religious incidences of sectarian violence and conflicts can no longer be hidden. ¹⁵ The young generation plays quite a key role in this new trend of sharing news and facts via social media. Many Egyptians still believe that the youth continues to act as the champion of the cyber world, metaverse, and globalization. ¹⁶

The experience of the revolution has also transformed the mindset of the young generation. Many interviewees observe that “the fear was broken” after the historic upheaval in 2011. ¹⁷ Numerous young people have begun to stand up and speak up. They voice their diverse opinions without fear and are freed from their timidity in expressing themselves. This is more noticeable in cyberspace than in the public space. Thus, this is a significant breakthrough in the conservative society. Although many youth movements were suppressed after the reinstallation of authoritarianism, individual youths have continued their non-movement. In general, some of them support the concept of civil society and embrace inter-religious peace-building. They even help promote mutual dialogue, equality, and human rights in their social circle. One informant calls this youth group the “progressive liberal young people.” ¹⁸

Another attitude change is that the youth are now more willing to accept new things and ideas. One of the important ideas that they embrace is religious openness. After the revolution, young people are more eager to know “others” in their society, and some even show interest in reading other religious “books.” ¹⁹ More young people now dare to venture out from the “closed community” to engage directly with people from other faiths. ²⁰ They refuse the age-old social isolation between Muslims and Christians. This phenomenon is more obvious in the Christian community and is similarly seen among Muslim youth. Some have become “rebellious” against the pre-set “religious boundary” in Egyptian society and want to build new relationships with the religious others. ²¹ They began to ask, “why we are different, but we are all Egyptians” and to challenge the traditional religious institutions and their rhetoric. They hope to see real national unity. Many also began to recognize that there are many ways to be a “religious” person, and some people from another faith could not be as bad as they presumed. ²² This helps two faiths to foster interfaith friendship because “Christians start to open to Muslims; Muslims start to open to Christians.” ²³ Among them are individuals or groups experimenting with ideas such as agnosticism and even atheism. ²⁴ Some publicly confess their change and have faced social stigma and/or legal consequences. Thus, it, unfortunately, gives the impression that this kind of religious openness is negative for society. The freedom of religion and beliefs, other than the religions related to the people of books, remains a sensitive issue in the Egyptian society (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2016).

In addition, many youths today become highly critical of traditional society and traditional religions. Critical thinking is seen as one of the significant characteristics of the revolutionary youth. They have begun to question their faith, identity, and stereotype toward others, religious leaders, parents, the government, etc. They question almost everything. ²⁵ Quite a few people present powerful critiques of their own religion and its structure of authority. Some no longer accept religious institutions like churches or Al-Azhar to represent themselves unceasingly. They want to have their individual voice. Christians and Muslims alike criticize unconscionable teachings such as radicalism and the interpretation of the divine authority of religious institutions of their own religions. The critical thinking of the revolutionary generation has been developed within these few years, and “interfaith dialogue is one of the topics that the youth discuss nowadays without any fear.” ²⁶ Many look forward to experiencing the real harmony of interfaith relations on the ground rather than just watching the showcasing of inter-religious images in the official broadcasting networks.

Revolutionary Youth as Focus of Interfaith Activities

The youth are not only the agent of change but also have become the focus of interfaith initiatives. Most of the respondents in the study claim that young people are, in fact, their main target group for their inter-religious programs, especially after the revolution. Some grassroots practitioners of the interfaith network even find themselves only working with young men and women. ²⁷ One of the key reasons is that young people are more willing to listen to new ideas. Once they accept the rationale they learned, the youth can be transformed more easily compared to adults. Several interviewees also believe working with youth is more rewarding than working with adults. ²⁸ Many interfaith workers notice the importance of helping the new generation to establish a culture of peace and the culture of acceptance toward people who are different from them.

However, they are also more vulnerable to extreme thoughts. As such, many also see winning the new generation in the interfaith programs as a vital battleground between moderate or liberal forces and radical Islamists. One of the leaders elaborated on this idea as follows:

Why are we choosing the youth? Because in Egypt more than 50 percent of the population [Again, it depends on how you define ‘the youth’] is the young generation. So once you are leading a peace-making or peace-building project to promote peace, you have to work on the youth. It’s also because, in the core of the violence, they are using the youth. So young people are easily being brain-washed by the extremist groups, either Christian or Muslim. [……] youth are usually rebellious by nature. They want to have change. They want to be appreciated. Youth are agents both the young men and the young women are change agents to implement a certain change in the society. They are rebellious by nature. So when we orient this energy to the violence it’ll be really dangerous; but we are trying to help them and to orient them to become positive energy for the peace-building and peace-making. ²⁹

By adopting critical thinking, the youth today refuse “any direct guidance through religion and politics”. On the contrary, they welcome “open discussion” in the form of dialogue more than unidirectional teaching. ³⁰

From Grassroots Activism in the Revolution to Grassroots Movements of Social Solidarity

It is not easy to precisely delimit what grassroots religious dialogue can include. In the dictionary, the word “grassroots” means “ordinary people in society or an organization, rather than the leaders or people who make decisions” (Hornby, 2013). In many respondents’ minds, grassroots interfaith activity is always contrasted with the official religious dialogue with political overtones. However, while it excludes the top-ranking clerics such as the Coptic Church Pope and Grant Mufti of Al-Azhar, it does not mean that there is no “leader” in the grassroots movement itself, especially in a highly hierarchical society like Egypt. For instance, one of the acclaimed Egyptian leaders of the interfaith network redefines grassroots as “something happening on the ground by or with the people who are the members of a community” and declares that “I never know and cooperate with a ‘leader’” ³¹ even though in his network there are many intermediate community leaders. Many interfaith practitioners like him in the field of the interfaith network might not be “official leaders” appointed by governments or religious institutions, but they are the “leaders” in the sense of those who lead people within a certain community. The interfaith activity may be organized with or without the goodwill of top-ranking religious or political leaders, but, more importantly, the participants of the grassroots activity are mainly ordinary people. A similar situation was observed in the revolution itself when the youth movement seemed to be “leaderless,” but many informal “leaders” emerged. While many people frequently portray the Egyptian uprising as “leaderless,” some scholars correctly point out that the 2011 revolution should be described as “‘leaderful’ – a movement with many leaders working together toward common goals” (El-Sharnouby, 2019, pp. 32–33). This leaderful youth movement is largely repressed in the current political climate but, to a certain extent, it continues through other forms such as social solidarity building and interfaith peace-building in civil society.

The 2011 Egyptian revolution was undoubtedly bottom-up in nature; thus, the later solidarity movement has also been from the grassroots. After the revolutionary affairs calmed down, some young people searched for “real” unity and harmony in their society. By embracing the basic concepts of humanism, such as equality, anti-discrimination, and freedom, this generation of young people now closely engages in interfaith activities. As observed during participation in several interfaith confidence/trust-building activities, this author found that most participants are under 35 years of age, and equality is often the catchphrase. The participants do not mind sitting with people from different faith backgrounds and listening to their opinions because they believe everyone should have the freedom of speech. Some devote themselves to pursuing mutual understanding and acceptance between two faiths. ³² Several facilitators also mention the positive feedback of the youth in the interfaith reconciliation camps. ³³ Other workers continue to organize dialogue workshops to enhance the understanding among different social groups and hope to create a more cohesive and stable social fabric. ³⁴ In many developmental projects, people attempt to bring together the Egyptian youth, both Christians and Muslims, to serve the local community. ³⁵ Under the slogan of national unity, Egyptians offer a helping hand to other Egyptians without concerning the beneficiaries’ religious identity. Gradually, more young people advocate the concept of humanism, including equality, dignity, and religious harmony. In general, young people are more interested in the message of humanism than other age groups. ³⁶ Many are still willing to participate in different civil society programs.

The bottom-up approach of many youth projects has gradually become a new trend since the 2011 revolution. According to respondents interviewed for this study, the general atmosphere of society was the opposite in the past. At that time, only with a few exceptions, the interfaith dialogue was mainly initiated by top–down leadership or authority. In the media, people frequently saw that the high-position clerics were greeting each other, praying with each other, or having an iftar together during Ramadan. However, in everyday life, the relationship between Muslims and Christians was tense in some areas. Many felt tired of those showcasing illusions of interfaith unity in the media.

A high-ranking cleric, who was involved in both high-level and grassroots dialogue before and after the revolution, reflects on his lifelong experiences and states that:

Until 2011, I found that the dialogue between the religious leaders was good. But it’s not influencing the grassroots. So, I thought a lot how we can bring the influence of Christian-Muslim dialogue from the level of the religious leaders to the grassroots level. And I thought of this Culture Centre. That’s one reason. The other reason is … in 2011, and before, some people [a suspicion in some Muslim circles that Christians are planning to take over part of Egypt as their own and are wanting to establish a Christian state within Egypt] thought that the churches are full of weapons.… So, I thought that when we start the Culture Centre, we will bring people to see what’s going on in the church and to see that there are no weapons in the church. And experience a warm welcome and love inside the church. ³⁷

To many like him, grassroots activities effectively penetrate the ideas of interfaith harmony and peaceful coexistence to the ordinary Egyptian people. Moreover, it can remove the misunderstandings between two faith communities. Shortly after the 2011 revolution, this cleric successfully migrated the main focus of the interfaith ministry in his denomination from official dialogue to grassroots interaction in art. In their art activities such as drum circle, storytelling, movie night, book reading, drawing, dancing and the like, many participants are middle-class young people from different faith backgrounds. It is another good example of an indirect method that can build a peaceful community by gathering people to socialize with others from various faith backgrounds.

Conclusion

Before the 2011 revolution, the interfaith dialogue began from the top-ranking leadership level, and many times it was under the rhetoric of national unity. Some scholars call it official religious dialogue, mainly involving religious institutions and the regime. In a highly hierarchical society, the top–down approach might make more sense at the time. However, after the 2011’s revolution, it has been argued in this article that more interfaith movements have begun from the grassroots level, especially aiming at the young generation. Influenced by the dauntlessness lessons gained, the revolutionary youth dares to challenge the traditions and the social issues of the day. Their revolutionary actions and thoughts have brought a huge impact on Egyptian society. The youth broke through their fears of the past and are more willing to engage with the religious others in society. The social solidarity and interfaith movement have, in a way, kept their revolutionary spirit alive. Therefore, many leaders see the need to nurture the Egyptian youth for social change, together with interfaith trust and confidence building. This has also made the youth the focus of interfaith activities since the revolution. Moreover, with the help of the youth’s enlightened mindset, the humanist discourse gained significant momentum in post-revolutionary Egypt.