Abstract
Two well-known experts wrote this book on relations between Asian countries and the Persian Gulf region. Apart from the introduction, the book contains eight chapters in which the political, economic, strategic, and diplomatic relations of key Asian countries, including China, Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore and Pakistan, have been examined. Each chapter examines topics such as security cooperation, politics of religion, energy politics, the Belt and Road Initiative and Eurasian developments by using different theories of international relations, international political economy, and foreign policy.
The book underlines the growing importance of bilateral relations between Asian countries and their Gulf partners. The important point is that although the Asian powers do not currently have an important security role in the Gulf, they understand the region’s strategic significance in a changing international order. The United States historically maintained the regional security complex in the Gulf. The US security cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States has maintained a status quo allowing emerging Asian powers to pursue their interests without needing to contribute to regional security.
In addition, it is important to understand the implications of the decline in US interest in the Middle East and focus on containing China and to what extent this will force the Asian powers to enter the geopolitical competition in the Gulf region. For example, in the coming years, will China be able to advance the hedging strategy toward the countries of the region (GCC and Iran), and is it possible to continue the policy of neutrality in the foreign policy? Would not the countries of the region demand concessions from the major Asian countries, especially China, regarding the sale of arms or taking a stand on sensitive issues in the region for their own benefit?
Beijing is trying to avoid a cold war with the United States in the Persian Gulf and is encouraging the Gulf states to implement a hedging policy: retaining a security partnership with the United States while maintaining a political and economic partnership with China. Based on this, China is looking for pragmatic cooperation with all Gulf states and wants the United States to depoliticize Beijing’s advanced technology cooperation with Arab countries. China’s “zero enemy” policy has thus far successfully separated the US–China competition to enter the Gulf region. However, China’s proposal for collective security in the region, which is based on a “shared future for mankind,” is against the practice of US-led collective defense.
One of the innovative aspects of the book is the attention to the relationship between countries, such as Japan, Singapore, Pakistan, India and South Korea with the countries of the Gulf region, especially the discussions on energy and maritime security dynamics. This is important as the United States is reducing its regional security commitments. The Asian countries were able to bandwagon under the American security umbrella in the region, but now it seems more difficult to sustain.
The political and security environment in South Asia demanded maintaining strong ties with the Gulf countries. Based on this, India’s relationship with the Gulf countries, which is one of the interesting aspects of this book, has been examined. In addition to the importance of energy resources and transit lines, this region is important for New Delhi in the sense that a large community of Indian immigrants is working in the six GCC countries, which makes this region important in India’s domestic policy.
Pakistan and its historical rivalry with India and Gulf security concerns vis-à-vis Iran remain critical in shaping the interregional political interaction. In addition, the Muslim identity of Pakistan and its religious connection with the GCC states have also remained an important variable in this regard, and Pakistani immigrants have contributed to the nation-building and economic development of the Persian Gulf countries.
The change in the international order from a unipolar order to a multipolar system makes the Persian Gulf countries increase their strategic interaction with China and India. This development has reduced the strategic importance of Pakistan for the Gulf countries. Nevertheless, Pakistan remains an important player in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and in China’s security design in the broader Western Indian Ocean region. Therefore, it will continue to shape the interregional security environment of the Gulf and South Asia.
The change of the center of gravity of the global economy from the West to the East is important, and accordingly, the twenty-first century was called the Asian century, and it is so important that the “Asian NATO” and “Quad” contain China has gained special importance for Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Based on this, the decrease in the importance of the Middle East has caused the United States to follow the policy of “Pivot to Asia” regardless of the political changes in the White House. The first national security strategy of the Biden administration considers China as the most important threat and challenge to the United States as was the case during the Trump administration.
Although Persian Gulf’s regional order is not completely affected by the international order, it is greatly influenced by it. With the United States not dependent on Gulf oil and the transfer of the center of economic power from the West to the East, it is unlikely that the long-term interests of the Gulf and Asian countries for the security of their hydrocarbon and non-energy supply chains will only depend on the United States. Accordingly, the countries of the region seek to develop “balanced comprehensive” security partnerships with influential Asian countries, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea, without closing the door to Washington.
This book is useful for students and researchers in international relations, security studies, and international politics who work on Asia–Gulf relations.