Social Instability in Fragile State Context: Exploring the Dynamics Between Syrian Refugees and the Lebanese Host Community in Lebanon

Introduction

Lebanon’s history of instability, insecurity, war, and peace has never been consistent. The country’s years of instability are far greater than its stable ones. If we look through the time-laps perspective from 1943 up till today, Lebanon witnessed civil wars, Israeli occupation, Syrian occupation, terrorism, political assassination, financial crisis, economic collapses, health emergencies, refugee crisis, and powerful intragovernmental or paramilitary forces, to name a few. As a result, Lebanon has always been categorized as a fragile state, ranked 27^th according to the Fragile State Index 2022 (Fragile State Index, 2023). Correspondingly, the history of refugees in Lebanon is not novel. At least in its recent history, the country has experienced a huge wave of human mobilization and welcomed refugees from neighboring and nonneighboring countries intentionally or unintentionally, by force or by choice. Surprisingly, despite its long history of refugee involvement, Lebanon has never had a plan or road map to deal with such crises or to mitigate their impact on social, cultural, economic, and political levels.

Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol (Janmyr, 2017), both of which define the exact rights of refugees, including the duties and obligations of involved parties. At the national level, Lebanese legislation does not generally grant refugees a legal status that distinguishes them from foreigners and does not even define or accept the term “refugee.” It mainly considers them as “displaced.” While in the specific Palestinian refugee case (1948 and 1967), they have been provided limited freedoms and rights. Lebanese legislation considers Palestinian refugees as “foreigners,” with the law sometimes applying a “special category” to them, that of foreigners, depriving them of some rights such as the right to own property and right to work in specific fields or under defined requisites (Hanafi, 2012; ILO, 2012). They live in designated “Palestinian refugee camps.” Refugees are not entitled to Lebanese governmental and institutional services such as education, housing, and healthcare (Roberts, 2010). Palestinians heavily rely on United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) facilities and are subject to additional security controls when they enter and exit the country (Asylos, 2023). As a result, the exclusion of Palestinians from the political, social, and economic sectors increased over time, leading to a wide marginalization of the community.

However, some refugees were welcomed, integrated, and granted citizenship, such as the Armenians fleeing genocide, who comprised the last mass migration into Lebanon’s territories before the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920, or the 2003 Iraqi refugees who did not settle in Lebanon but used the country as a temporary station or a gateway toward Western countries. Others were a source of insecurity and conflict, such as the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967, or tension as the Syrian refugees (as of 2011). However, the refugee topic has always been a source of internal division among political parties and religious and sectarian groups, leading to its politicization. Being a weak state, underdeveloped, and subject to international and regional intervention, refugees were an additional variable that added another layer of tension and conflict to the country; Syrian refugees were no exception.

Usually, the cause of countries’ instability is either destiny or mismanagement. Lebanon, with no doubt, has these two traits. However, the destiny of Lebanon is categorized by two bordering conflicting countries: Syria and Israel. The establishment of Israel in 1948 (nakba—catastrophe) and the 1967 war (Naksa—the defeat or setback) flooded the country with Palestinian refugees transferred to specific refugee camps in precise geographical areas. The ongoing civil war in Syria resulted in around 1.5 million refugees (UNHCR, 2022) settling in Lebanon. Unlike the centralization of Palestinian refugees in camps, Syrian refugees were spread all over the country. The mismanagement of the refugee crises in Lebanon—from 1948 till the present day—led to drastic challenges at the state, institution, sovereignty, infrastructure, economic, political, social, security, and cultural levels.

Thus, the demographic perceptions of refugees and migration flows are constantly changing, assuming the dimension of national security over time, especially with the 1948 arrival of Palestinian refugees. Since Lebanon is heavily affected by the demographic balance of religious sects and their representation in power, some—Christian—political parties considered (and still consider) refugees an existential threat. Something that would constitute a leitmotiv in framing migration and refugee issues as destabilizing factors—which led, among so many other factors, to the 1975 civil war in which Palestinian refugees played an active military part. Indeed, the Palestinian refugees’ uncontrolled and militarized status within a supposedly sovereign state was at the center of the political and military debate among the ultra-right Lebanese Front led by the Christians Phalangists and the composite secular leftist coalition of the Muslim and communist Lebanese National Movement. This led to social instability that escalated into the 1975 civil war.

Lebanon’s experience with Palestinian refugees was worrying, challenging, and divisive. Their presence in Lebanon led to internal political, religious, and sectarian divisions and socio-economic marginalization. Palestinians who number around 4,89,292 as of mid-2023 live along with 31,400 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) (UNRWA, 2022) became the scapegoats for internal governance issues and political challenges, fostering suspicions and fear of refugees, which re-emerged with Syrian refugees in Lebanon. With the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government and officials were keen to act based on the lessons learned from the Palestinian refugee crises. These measures include not building formal and permanent settlements, unwillingness to define the flow of migrants from Syria as refugees—referring to them as displaced and reaffirming Lebanon’s role as a transit country and not as an asylum (Fakhoury, 2017). Thus, the Syrian refugee crisis forced Lebanon to be globally recognized as the country with the highest density of refugees per population and geographical area (UNHCR, 2022).

Additionally, as of 2015, Lebanon ordered the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to suspend the registration of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2015), aiming that their numbers were neither formalized nor binding for future negotiations. Syrian refugees belonging to both rural and urban parts of the country, from different social classes, and witnessing various educational backgrounds have found refuge in different areas of Lebanon, settling in informal, tented settlements that are under construction and rooms or houses. Hence, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the profile and needs of the Syrian refugee population changed; indeed, education levels dropped significantly, health assistance requirements increased due to harsh living conditions, and family and individual needs increased (Verme et al., 2015).

After 2015, the massive refugee flow and the understanding of a long-lasting crisis contributed to the rise of feelings of resentment among many Lebanese with different religious/sectarian backgrounds. The political shift was accompanied by a strong popular feeling of economic dislocation and social instability attributed to the presence of the refugees. They were driving the Lebanese government and its security apparatus to tighten its policies on Syrian refugees, adopting a securitization policy resulting from the growing perception of Syrian refugees as an existential threat (Buzan, 1991). Progressively, relations between host communities and refugees worsened, sometimes leading to aggression, tension, and de facto social instability (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2023).

Although the pressure of more than one and a half million people is significant in Lebanon, the multiple crises the country is experiencing are not exclusively related to the presence of the refugees. The country’s structural issues—political, social, cultural, and economic—are at the core of the diverse crises and the staple components of the Lebanese protracted social conflict. The lack of forward-looking economic policies, the absence of infrastructures and services, and systemic deep-rooted obstacles lay the foundation for chronic injustice and inequality, thus favoring the continuation of a system destined to reach a breaking point increasingly. Indeed, these systemic and structural contradictions foster a deep and lasting internal and vertical conflict among Lebanese communities and the state (mainly the post-civil war elite), of which the uprising of October 2019 manifested (Karam & Majed, 2022).

Based on what has been tackled and to better understand whether or not Syrian refugees have diminished (political, social, economic, and security) stability in Lebanon, this article will try to find answers to the most challenging internal topic within Lebanese politics. The answers will be found by addressing why Lebanon’s Syrian refugee case has been used and politicized. Can Syrian refugees cause instability and insecurity in Lebanon? What role does the international community play in mitigating the roots of instability in Lebanon (an already unstable country)? Furthermore, does the international community’s agenda lead toward improving or worsening social stability in Lebanon?

This article will first explore the existing literature on the relationship between host communities and refugees in general and the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. It will later introduce the methodology and approaches used to answer the research questions, detailing data collection methods and highlighting fieldwork observations and challenges encountered during the process. It will then explore the Lebanese-Syrian relation from the political, economic, and social sectors, considering the past and present perceptions. It seeks to add to the existing knowledge of the economic and demographic aspects of the crisis and its impact on social instability from the conflicting length of Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community. Finally, it will address the issue of aid distribution and inequality as one of the main sources of tension between the host communities and the Syrian refugees.

Literature Review

The global gauge of refugee flows has led research in various fields to focus on the relationship between the host community and the refugees. This interaction and dynamics between host communities and refugees have been analyzed using different perspectives and diverse settings (Agblorti & Miledzi, 2011; Aukot, 2003; Fajth et al., 2019; Rabil, 2016). Part of the existing work emphasizes how refugees impact ethnic balance in the country of asylum (Rüegger, 2019) and the propensity for conflict due to a large influx of refugees from a neighboring country (Böhmelt et al., 2019). Welfare and economic outlooks have been used to explore how competition over employment opportunities impacts attitudes toward migrants (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), and it has been demonstrated how poverty perceptions constitute the most prominent factors for triggering a conflict (Goldstone, 2001), and how worsening economic conditions in settings with a huge refugee flow influence political stability (Ek & Karadawi, 1991). The struggle over available resources has been evaluated, showing it is crucial in influencing the local population’s perception of refugees (Baylouny & Klingseis, 2018; Martin, 2005) and the intersection between demographic growth and environmental issues (Goldstone, 2001). Personal experiences of individuals in host communities have been studied to understand better whether or not they imply openness toward refugees (Braithwaite et al., 2019), and several studies showed that threats toward security issues constitute a considerable variable in understanding the local populations’ behavior toward refugees (Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch, 2019; Gleditsch, 2007; Rüegger, 2019; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Turkoglu, 2022).

The Syrian civil war and the resulting flow of refugees into neighboring countries gave a further impetus to research in this domain (Betts et al., 2017; Sahin Mencutek & Nashwan, 2021; Shteiwi, 2020; Tan, 2015; Yildiz Nielsen, 2016). The recent focus also includes an emphasis on social cohesion and social integration. Social cohesion is a broad concept that describes the community’s sense of belonging and the relationships among its members. It is also considered a process to reduce inequalities, socio-economic disparities, and social fractures among the citizens (Manca, 2014). According to Chan et al. (2006), social cohesion has a vertical and horizontal dimension, and important aspects of social cohesion are trust, a sense of belonging, and people’s willingness to be an active part of the society (Chan et al., 2006).

While the notion of social cohesion in the context of the Syrian crisis characterizes the approach to differences in other countries where Syrians found refuge, the term has not been homologated in Lebanon. Indeed, the past differentiates Lebanon from Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, which have received in proportion a similar number of refugees from Syria and where a debate on social integration has also been initiated (Akar & Erdoğdu, 2019; Lenner & Turner, 2019; Şimšek, 2020; Zihnioğlu & Dalkıran, 2022). In Lebanon, the relationship between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities falls under the social stability label, which excludes a priori refugees from the Lebanese communities creating a substantial difference between the two groups and considering the context as unstable and not cohesive since social stability is a precondition for social cohesion (World Bank, 2022).

Since 2011, due to the influx of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2022), the international community—including United Nations (UN) agencies, the European Union (EU), the United States, single countries development agencies, and to some extent, Gulf Countries—and civil society actors have begun to focus on the emerging tension between the Lebanese nationals and the displaced Syrians (Chatty, 2022). Indeed, international actors have altered their approach to Lebanon, shifting the aid schemes from a conflict mitigation strategy to overcome the intersectarian tensions and promote liberal democracy in Lebanon (Yahya, 2009) to a humanitarian approach to support refugees’ needs (UNHCR 2022). The post-2011 pressure on the already weak Lebanese infrastructures, deteriorating economic situation (before the collapse in 2019) as well as other structural factors, has exacerbated pre-existing hostilities and created tensions between refugees and host communities, enhancing that the international organizations and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) work in the country (Aoun & Zahar, 2017). Thus, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in conjunction with the UNHCR and the Ministry of Social Affairs, has taken the lead role in exploring social stability in Lebanon, developing a social tension monitoring system, and promoting conflict sensitivity research (UNDP and House of Peace, 2022b, 2022a).

The literature shows that the lack of social stability in Lebanon is due to a combination of structural and behavioral factors, among which the job competition and the deterioration of livelihood opportunities (Harb & Saab, 2014), access to basic services and infrastructures (Alef, 2023; Cherri et al., 2016; Mourad & Piron, 2016), and perception of intergroup threat (Enna, 2020) stand out. These ingrained sources of tension and violence have been further inflamed by the current socio-economic crisis (post-2019) and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic that elevated the stress and psychological burdens over the entire population. As a result, as reported by the 2020 tension mapping, the tension among Syrian refugees and host communities increased due to the amplification of the existing sources of tension, increase of social inequalities, and the deteriorating economic situation (UNDP & Ark, 2020). Thus, the Lebanese perception of the Syrian refugees as a threat augmented, and their opinion of the displaced as a burden and a support/aid have become even more common among the Lebanese communities.

The implementation of numerous projects and programs aiming at promoting social stability had limited impact, even though research highlights some success in terms of increased interactions among host communities and Syrian refugees through shelter and protection programs (Parker & Maynard, 2018) and livelihood projects (Lehmann & Masterson, 2020). However, many Lebanese perceive an imbalance in aid/support distribution between Lebanese and Syrian refugees (Samuels et al., 2020). International stakeholders’ efforts in responding to the Syrian and the multiple crises that the country is experiencing seem to be unable to meet the social stability goals promoted by the UNDP and the sector partners, increasing the resentment toward refugees and promoting programs and projects that fuel inequality sentiments in the Lebanese host communities. Indeed, as already investigated in Lebanon, looking at intracommunity violence, foreign interventions may aggravate existing patterns of tension (Aoun & Zahar, 2017; Zahar, 2012). Literature has poorly investigated the aid bias perceptions of the Lebanese host communities in the aftermath of the multiple crises following the Lebanese revolution of 2019.

Methodology

The knowledge production on Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community has been recently raised, and most of the work was either from the UN agencies, think tanks, and INGO reports or through the investigative journalistic articles. Many researchers have focused on the Syrian refugee crisis; but so far, the relations between the Syrian refugees and the host communities have not been addressed by the academic literature on the Syrian refugee crisis in general and its implications on social stability in the Lebanese community—as mentioned in the literature review section. This article will add sufficient knowledge to the existing literature on the mentioned topic using the qualitative method.

The data collection for this article will be based on key-informant interviews (KIIs), in-depth interviews (IDIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs) as a primary source of data and the available literature as a secondary one. In this regard, this research seeks to represent the voices of Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community. During the data collection phase, we covered most Lebanese territories, including Mount Lebanon, South, Bekaa Valley, and Akkar provinces, to test the perception of both groups vis-a-vis different sectarian and religious identities, along with urban–rural dichotomies.

The data collection included 89 people divided between KIIs, IDIs, and FGDs. We have conducted 60 IDIs equally divided between Lebanese and Syrian refugees. These interviews covered 42 females and 18 males. The KIIs covered 10 participants in INGOs, local NGOs, and governmental institutions. As for the FGDs, it covered 19 people, divided between 10 Lebanese and 9 Syrian refugees. It is important to mention that most participants in this research preferred to be referred anonymously.

The data collection phase was conducted in person over around six months in 2022. It was based on an open-ended question methodology and questionnaire. Before each interview or FGD, participants were informed about the study and its dimensions. They have given us consent to represent their point of view on the condition of anonymity. Interviewees expressed that there would be no recording and that all the information was handwritten. It is worth noting that interviewees were cooperative and talkative and expressed themselves freely without constraints. However, during the data collection phase, we faced challenges due to the inability of some participants to attend the FGDs or the IDIs due to several factors, including financial (transportation cost) or time constraints. Many interviews and discussions have been postponed to address this challenge based on the participants’ agenda. In addition, some participants were keen to answer diplomatically as they were worried about possible repercussions because of their statements. However, after ensuring the anonymity of the interviewees, their attitudes changed drastically.

Lebanese and Syrians: A Brief of a Long and Turbulent Historical Relation

The complex bond between Lebanese and Syrians results from their geographical proximity, historical events, social connection, political dominance, and past occurrences that have had a major influence on the relationship between the two countries at multiple levels (Picard, 2016). The roots of such a complex ancient relationship lie in the Sykes–Picot agreement in 1916, which led to the creation of these two countries and many others in the region. The establishment of these countries was not a consensus among all the religious and sectarian components, especially Sunnis, who voiced out loud the rejection of the new entities—especially in Syria. Groups like the Christians did not contest the two-nation choice, endorsing the new geopolitical asset favored by the French mandatory power (Salibi, 2003). The anti-Syrian attitude grew and guided Christian political parties during and after the Lebanese Civil War. Christian groups and political parties became antagonists of Syrian politics in Lebanon and targets of the Syrian regime’s longa manus (influence) in the neighboring country through Aoun’s defeat in 1990, the imprisonment of Geagea in 1993, and the exile of anti-Syrian leaders during the Syrian occupation era (1990–2005) (El-Husseini, 2012).

The arrival of thousands of Syrian refugees rekindles the “refugee phobia,” particularly among Christian political parties, mindful of the experience with the Palestinians including Christians and their military involvement in the Lebanese Civil War—even before 1975. While the political debate and policies against Syrian refugees were headed by the Christian political parties at the beginning, the circumstances changed amid the worsening of the economic situation; thus the antagonism involved other sects as well. Indeed, considering the difficulties resulting from the economic downturn, Sunnis and Shiites have added their voices to the anti-refugee rhetoric previously espoused by Christian political groups (Marie El-Hage, 2023). This process led to the progressive politicization of the Syrian refugee question and the subsequent restriction policies toward Syrian refugees in 2015—including the limitation of the right of movement, end of UNHCR refugee registrations, beginning of curfews in many municipalities, citing safety concerns as the primary justification, and military raids in refugee camps with discretionary arrests—and launched the beginning of the return debate (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 2014; SACD, 2022).

On a socio-economic level, the two countries have maintained a relationship of interdependence after the independence, enhanced during the Syrian occupation through the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination of 1991, which established freedom of movement and favorable conditions to allow labor mobility (Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic, 1991). The treaty, mainly promoted by the Syrian government, was advantaging Syrian population injection into the Lebanese labor market, thus allowing thousands of families to work in specific sectors, mainly agriculture and construction, enhancing the periodic and nonperiodic migration of a significant population segment into Lebanon (Chalcraft, 2014).

The Syrian occupation in Lebanon (1990–2005) left a considerable wound in the Lebanese population. During FGDs and interviews, several participants reported that their families or acquaintances suffered from the Syrian military presence and thus grew up with a certain prejudice toward Syrians. The memory and the trauma suffered by many still influence younger generations who negatively perceive the Syrian population and blame them for the violence against civilians in the time of peace perpetrated by the Syrian army during the occupation. This perspective was expressed by several Lebanese involved in the study. However, many recognize that this sentiment is an anachronism and that the Syrian population should not be held accountable for the violence perpetrated by the Syrian army.

Refugees: A Burden on the Lebanese Demography and Economy?

As reported by various interviewees, the anti-refugee sentiment expressed by politicians quickly resonated among the Lebanese population. Considering the political context and the Palestinian legacy, demography is of utmost priority for the Lebanese, particularly among the Christian communities. As acknowledged by most Lebanese interviewees, Syrian families are larger than Lebanese, and despite the economic difficulties, Syrian refugees continue to grow their families through polygamy or by a high birth ratio. The Lebanese family unit typically consists of no more than five members, with an average household of 3.8 (ILO, 2019)—while Syrian families have an average of five members (UNHCR, 2020) or 6.5, including extended family members (Beirut Research and Innovation Center, 2013). Lebanese men and women stressed that family planning and the traditional Syrian family structure are dangerous to the Lebanese society. Thus, data from the interviews and FGDs confirms that the increasing number of Syrians in Lebanon worries a portion of the Lebanese population, mainly Christians and other minority groups.

Lebanese interviewees have also accentuated the cultural contrasts, emphasizing that many refugees come from the most rural and disadvantaged areas, producing a cultural and communication gap between the two communities. Cultural differences were also highlighted in describing the lifestyle of the two communities. Lebanese emphasized their need for luxuries such as traveling, taking weekend trips, and having an active social life or living in beautiful and fully furnished houses with all comforts, pointing out that Syrians are not fans of such services or luxuries. They are mainly satisfied and convinced with their simple lifestyles. According to several Lebanese host community interviewees, Syrian refugees are satisfied with sharing their room or house with multiple families and living in high capacity, a ritual that most Lebanese families do not practice. Additionally, Lebanese interviewees stressed that certain Lebanese (mainly mid- to high-income families) view the Syrian way of life and family values as being extremely dissimilar to their own, causing divergence, exclusion, and rejection of any association between the two communities.

On the other hand, Syrian refugees do not perceive the same cultural differences and easily denounce their poor situation, challenging accommodation, and extremely bad living conditions. Discussions with Syrian refugees revealed that some Lebanese take advantage of the situation by exploiting refugees for labor and raising housing and running costs. Discussing the host population abuses and exploitation, Syrian interviewees revealed that the economic crisis, such as increasing rent prices or provision of supplies, impact both populations equally.

Data from the interviews with Lebanese individuals indicate a stronger consensus concerning the belief that Syrian refugees are a burden to the Lebanese economy, particularly in the labor market. As a result of the economic crisis, there has been a significant slide of many Lebanese families below the poverty line (ESCWA, 2021). All Lebanese interviewees indicated that the presence of Syrian refugees further complicates the already intricate circumstances. A prominent point of the conversation concerning the economic sector was Syrian’s dominating position in the labor market, which has caused a decrease in the livelihood prospects of Lebanese and their access to the job market. Wage parity, especially after the 2019 economic collapse, has been identified as a major obstacle for Lebanese citizens seeking employment since Syrians provide cheaper labor and are more attractive to employers. In particular, it was highlighted that the salary of one Lebanese could be leveraged to hire two or more Syrians. According to a Lebanese male interviewee, “They [Syrian refugees] are taking over our jobs. Syrians earn half of what Lebanese workers receive, work extra hours, and don’t need to fulfill any qualifications for employment. They are the most preferred option for employers.”

Most Lebanese interviewees attributed their lack of work to Syrian refugees; yet they realize that refugees are willing to take jobs that the Lebanese would not, even for a meager salary. During interviews, Syrian refugees centered their discussion around this point, noting that they are ready to accept wages and employment opportunities, which the Lebanese usually reject. The expectations of prospective job holders differ among the two groups. Syrian refugees explain that Lebanese individuals desire to be reimbursed using US Dollars or the unofficial currency exchange rate. On the contrary, Syrian refugees focus on obtaining the necessities for their homes, aiming for modicum survival means, thus accepting the lowest remuneration. Subsequently, numerous Syrian refugee interviewees pointed out their exploitation by Lebanese employers, particularly since the onset of the economic crisis; according to a woman Syrian refugee, “Employers exploit our work, taking advantage of the situation and our need to support and nourish our families.”

Both Lebanese and Syrian refugee interviewees believe that the situation is caused by employers who take advantage of the underpaid workforce, leading to a comprehensive devaluation of the labor market and consequently reducing wages and increasing working hours. All interviewees acknowledged the Lebanese economic system and employers as the main ones responsible for maintaining the status quo. All parties concurred that the dire economic situation and the crises enhanced the job competition between the two groups causing economic and social instability.

Lebanese host community members and key informants also made evident the efforts of the international community and INGOs to integrate Syrians into Lebanese society. However, the Lebanese have a consensus that any social and economic inclusion plan to integrate Syrian refugees is not conceivable. Some Lebanese described this top-down process for Syrian refugees’ inclusion process as an imposition and intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon as a sovereign state that will impact its demography, social, and political role. According to a Lebanese local NGO worker from the Bekaa Valley, “[International NGOs] Programs include both Syrian and Lebanese, but Lebanese do not want to mix with Syrians. They are angry and not willing to accept them.”

Indeed, as many Lebanese observe, the pressure exercised by the Syrian refugees on the already weak infrastructures is worsening the access to basic services. The host community interviewees discussed the issues related to infrastructures, stressing how the presence of Syrian refugees impacts basic utilities, health, and education facilities in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. Lebanese interviewees have described all services under pressure due to the growth of the Syrian refugee population. Basic utilities, such as water and electricity, have been evaluated as scarce and insufficient to cover the entire population’s needs, while health and education centers lost their quality due to higher affluence.

Aid Bias and Inequity: Adding an Extra Layer of Frustration

Lebanese exasperation with the dire economic circumstances is heightened by the Syrian refugees’ preferential access to international aid. While the Lebanese are burdened with the repercussions of a banking sector failure, a dire economic situation, and the lack of a feasible solution to recollect their money (Guеchаti & Chаmi, 2022). Aid and support from international stakeholders were a prominent part of the discussions. Humanitarian aid schemes could be categorized as the heart of instability making in Lebanon. During the interviews, all Lebanese discussants shed light on the discrepancy in the aid and support provided to the Lebanese host community and Syrian refugees. A support system considered discriminatory toward Lebanese and a possible reason to fuel any future tension. According to many Lebanese interviewees, Syrian refugees have access to aid and resources for food, shelter, housing, livelihood, education, including aid support provided by UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, and other international organizations, and INGOs, while Lebanese encounter difficulty in obtaining the limited and minimal aid offered by the INGOs.

Therefore, Syrians can generate income through low-paying jobs to sustain themselves, aided with support from international organizations and INGOs, whereas Lebanese remain unemployed due to their higher remuneration with no consistent and well-balanced assistance. Sharing these thoughts, many Lebanese interviewees have expressed fears that Syrian refugees are taking over their economic opportunities, jobs, and resources. Indeed, there was a widespread belief among Lebanese interviewees that the aid assistance schemes, along with the job opportunities and international protection, would force Syrian refugees to reject any future possible offer to go back to their own country. According to a Lebanese female interviewee:

Syrians have the support and easier access to international organizations and NGOs programs. Lebanese are unable to access the same opportunities offered to refugees. They have jobs and international support. Now that the circumstances are challenging for the Lebanese, it is harder to accept this. We feel that our rights are taken away from us, and they are enjoying our entitlements.

Moreover, many Lebanese interviewees openly stated that many international organizations and INGOs did not add them to support or aid schemes. If they had been added, the support would have been minimal as compared to the Syrian refugees’ aid schemes. Data from FGDs with Lebanese host communities shows a shared belief among them that the living conditions of Syrian refugees are much better compared to those of Lebanese in the most disadvantaged and poor areas. This sentiment was widely echoed by many Lebanese interviewees, emphasizing the inequality of aid among both groups as the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis was and still is devastating to the Lebanon’s economy, infrastructure, and employability. Indeed, according to a few Lebanese interviewees, Syrian refugees are taking advantage of the international aid schemes, which favor them, enlarging their families to get more support. Nevertheless, this idea was discredited during the discussions by other Lebanese participants who suggested that the issue is unrelated to the assistance but rather to the idea of family structure that Syrians have. Indeed, as confirmed by UNHCR representatives that we met by chance during our fieldwork, the aid schemes cover up to five family members. Hence, it was unclear if this includes or excludes polygamy, as the numbers will differ significantly.

Within the context of international aid assistance, many Lebanese interviewees stressed the social protection schemes granted to the Syrian refugees along with other mentioned aid programs. There is a consensus among Lebanese interviewees that international organizations and INGO programs permit Syrian refugees and facilitate their access to the Lebanese healthcare system and education institutions as well as other basic facilities. In comparison, the Lebanese host community’s access to these services and institutions is subject to payment. The issues of social protection, education, and provision of health services are the thorniest points for the Lebanese people, adding another layer to the increased tension between the two groups. “They have insurance and aid, or they go, for example, to the UN and seek financial or different support, getting it. While for me, I’m paying, even when I have insurance and social security,” a Lebanese male stated during FGD.

According to some Lebanese interviewees, the lack of a national social security strategy to grant Lebanese citizens the right to access social assistance and protection leaves space for international stakeholders to promote a parallel “social protection” program, replacing the Lebanese government of its duty. These programs reflect donors’ agenda and funding and are closely linked to the Syrian crisis’ hidden agenda. As further explained by the interviewees, this implies that the parallel social protection system implemented through INGO programs and projects favors, by definition, the Syrian refugee population, including, in a very contained manner, the Lebanese host community. Aware of this governmental institutional deficiency, the Lebanese interviewees did not trust the institutions responsible for providing social assistance and protection. According to them, the ministries and bureaucrats in-charge are willing to support the Syrian refugees at the expense of the Lebanese host community as the only way to get financial support from international organizations regardless of the Lebanese needs and national sovereignty. Examining the government’s stance, Lebanese interviewees consider the institutions accountable for the current chaotic situation and for admitting a decentralized Syrian refugees’ status without establishing refugee camps since the beginning.

Since 2012 in Lebanon, it is mostly for Syrian refugees’ assistance. As practitioners, we struggle a lot to include Lebanese in our programs. If there is the will to work on a social protection program with the Lebanese, it is mandatory to include also Syrian refugees; otherwise, we won’t get the funds. The greatest result we get is a fifty-fifty ratio. This inevitably creates some tensions among the two communities. (Lebanese NGO Officer stated during a key informant interview)

On the another hand, INGOs have been severely denounced by many Lebanese interviewees for their corruption, mismanagement of funds, and favoritism in selecting beneficiaries. There was a consensus amongst government officials that the agendas of international nongovernmental organizations and international institutions were being implemented through a top-down strategy and were imposed on Lebanese public structures. “We perceive that our efforts are solely executing the plans of international actors operating in Lebanon with clear agendas coming from the EU or USA sort of top-down approach that we implement,” Lebanese NGO Officer stated during the interview.

Study participants reported evident inequality in humanitarian support and aid distribution. According to some, the percentage of participation in livelihood or other INGO-funded programs shows that the Lebanese constitute 20–30% while Syrians make up 70–80%. One international INGO employee explained that unequal distribution is the fundamental reason for tensions between communities, especially in cash-for-work programs. “One of the negative aspects of cash-for-work activities we observed is the increased competition over jobs, for which such programs can increase social tensions instead of mitigate conflicts,” Lebanese INGO Project Manager observed during the interview.

The inequality and discrepancy in the aid distribution strategy by donors fueled the Lebanese perception that the two groups have distinctive rights. Some Lebanese interviewees stressed that Syrian refugees enjoy more rights in Lebanon than in the host community or the home country. This has also been noted by Syrian refugee interviewees aware of the misconception regarding aid and its distribution mechanisms. Apparently, and based on the FGDs with Syrian refugees, the support from UN agencies and international NGOs has been reduced over time (Atallah et al., 2023). However, as reported by the Syrian refugees, the multiple crises that hit Lebanon increased the misconception surrounding aid; even though Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community are currently facing similar difficulties, the latter remain in their country and do not face the same level of risk in comparison to the Syrian refugees, a Syrian refugee expressed.

Social Instability

As per the existing literature and data gathered during interviews and FGDs, tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees increased over time. Many Syrian refugees reported that since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the Lebanese host community was not truly welcoming. However, both groups explained during the FGDs, that the relationship between the Lebanese host community and the Syrian refugees varies depending on the region and the sect of the host community. But over time, the rising frustration toward Syrian refugees is becoming a nationally widespread sentiment regardless of the region or sect.

The reported tensions encompassed not only the intercommunity relations but also the intracommunity disputes. Indeed, as specified by the Lebanese and the Syrians, tension is rising and is inherited in families, neighborhoods, and society. All study participants have also reported statements of increased criminality conducted by the Syrian refugees. Statements from both groups during the interviews and the FGDs convey that, besides the amplified tensions, Lebanon is registering an insecurity rise among its local communities due to the dire economic crisis. Considering the increased insecurity and social instability, the strain and limits imposed upon Syrians in all municipalities are escalating. Many reported the imposition of curfews for Syrian refugees in many municipalities, followed by intensification in security controls of camps.

Syrian refugees have voiced diverse opinions concerning their interactions with the local community. A few have depicted the relationship as ordinary, while others have underscored the hardships, discrimination, and biases they confront daily. Overall, Syrian refugee interviewees were more specific than Lebanese in reporting incidents between the two communities. Indeed, they reported several cases of verbal harassment and violence, focusing on each instance and providing a thorough account and explanation. The Syrian refugee interviewees pointed out that the economic crisis and the current conditions have amplified animosity toward refugees, intensifying tensions and social instability. According to a Syrian female interviewee, “We are discriminated by Lebanese. We face discrimination in the streets, in the shops. Children are bullied and harassed in schools, and men are objects of abuse in their workplaces. It is unsustainable. I have been insulted multiple times.” While interviews with some Lebanese confirmed this perception, they described Syrian refugees as an “oppressive burden” that is sluggishly taking over the Lebanese nation, forcing the host community to become a refugee community. According to a Lebanese female interviewee, “it is our country, and we are already facing many issues. They are a burden, and we feel like refugees in our own country!.”

Still, a limited number of Lebanese interviewees have expressed strong resentment toward Syrian refugees and their presence in Lebanon, asserting that the local lifestyle has been deeply altered since their arrival and viewing their presence as an imposition of their culture and traditions. Some added that it is impossible to cohabitate with Syrian refugees, and their social inclusion could not be attained due to the differences in culture, way of life, and lifestyle. According to some statements by Christian Lebanese, Syrian refugees are perceived as a potential security threat and a ticking bomb, identifying them as a potential trigger of upheaval, and social unrest, as happened with Palestinian refugees before the 1975 civil war.

As already explored, throughout time, multiple organizations have been providing Syrian refugees with basic provisions and aid. However, as the economic downturn has become increasingly severe, this has fueled Lebanese rage toward Syrian refugees, leading to more strained relations between the two groups. Information gathered through the data collection phase showed that the Lebanese understand that the Syrian refugee community needs humanitarian assistance and aid; yet the current situation and the disparity in aid distribution have become a source of insecurity, social instability, friction, and disruption. The increasing poverty ratio (Makdissi et al., 2023; World Bank, 2021) and the dire economic crisis significantly impacted Lebanese households, now needing the same support to deal with daily expenses to survive. Many study participants have identified the perception of inequality and aid mechanisms as the main drive for social instability. “In UN and NGOs programs, the repartition of beneficiaries is unfair. The percentage favors mainly Syrians, and this is unfair. This is why tensions are rising among host communities and Syrian refugees and why Lebanese do not want Syrians,” expresses a Lebanese female governmental officer.

Some Lebanese interviewees rejected being included in the existing Syrian refugee aid programs and projects funded by the international organizations or INGOs. They stressed the need for a tailored package of support from international stakeholders that consider the impact of the Syrian refugee (along with the dire economic situation) on their livelihood and social needs. As a conceivable solution, many Lebanese interviewees urge Syrian refugees to return to their country. They claim that the security of some areas in Syria permits Syrian refugees a safe return to their homeland and villages. Syrian refugee interviewees rejected this claim, as they see their return to Syria as unfeasible given the current security, economic, and infrastructure situation.

Finally, many Lebanese interviewees stressed the need for equal and fair humanitarian aid, support distribution, and strict employment and social regulations for Syrian refugees. Without these conditions, tension would increase, and social stability cannot be attained. Other Lebanese (mainly Christians) interviewees went further by relating social stability in Lebanon to the Syrian refugees’ return to their home country. Some concluded that Lebanon is now on the edge of a conflict between Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community. They related economic prosperity and political and social stability to the Syrian refugees leaving Lebanon.

Conclusion

Local and national events have influenced the dynamics and relations between Lebanese and Syrians. The Syrian Civil War and the associated refugee crisis contributed to another element of the intricate history and association between the two populations. The large number of refugees who have arrived in Lebanon since the Syrian Civil War began has brought to the surface the “refugee phobia” of the Lebanese society and the trauma of the Syrian occupation.

Over time and with the protraction of the crisis in Syria, the refugee question became politicized. Originally confined to the Christian political and civic community, the phobia and resentment eventually spread to all sections of the political and sectarian groups, leading to the politicization of the issue. Data collection evidence shows that political groups have used Syrian refugees, which played on citizens’ fears and distress, to promote policies against refugees to attract votes and divert their attention from economic and social issues. Within this process, the prejudices and stereotypes of Lebanese people, as well as the demographic considerations, held a noteworthy influence. The politicization of the refugee crisis did not include a debate on the plan to resolve the crisis; rather, the political groups promote the return of the refugees to Syria, and in certain cases, they facilitate the border crossing. Hence, this proves the government’s inability and refusal to confront the emergency and shows political groups’ failure in addressing the crisis.

Data gathered during this research indicates that the presence of Syrian refugees is a source of instability in Lebanon. Interviewed host community members confirmed their perception of Syrian refugees as a burden on the country. Syrian refugees have been regarded as a cause of distress for the entire economy, and particularly, the labor market dynamics have been significantly affected due to their inclusion based on international community aid programs. The market’s distortions and the crises’ effects on the entire population have invariably strengthened the current tension between Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees. However, as emphasized during the interviews with the Syrian refugees, the strain is reciprocal. Many refugees reported that the abuse and harassment suffered daily in the workplace and the mistreatment (verbal and physical persecutions) are increasing their anxiety and mounting resentment toward the Lebanese population.

Besides the economic matter, Syrian refugees have been identified as a burden on the infrastructure and the distribution of available resources. Water, electricity, and services shortages have been attributed to the demographic growth due to the Syrian refugees’ settlement in all Lebanese areas. Overall, the presence of Syrian refugees in the country has once again revealed the fragility of the state and its institutions and their incapacity to cope with rapid demographic growth—due to the refugees—and to respond to emergencies.

Another layer of tension that became more pronounced due to the compounding crises is the inequality of aid distribution. Despite the efforts of International organizations and players to promote social stability and reduce tension, programs and projects in Lebanon create a further level of frustration in the host communities. Evidence indicates that the inequality and differences in aid and support aggravate the tensions and stress the relationship between the two groups. Observations from the interviews and the FGDs confirm that the international actors operating on a specific interest and planned agenda are fueling tensions rather than reducing them. This alarming aspect highlights the limits and lack of foresight of social stability programs and reveals that most of the funding is allocated to the Syrian crisis and not to a country at the mercy of one of the most severe economic crises of the last century. Thus, findings highlight that INGOs are not covering the intermediary role they aspire to mediate among the populations but have become an additional source of tension, anger, and instability.

More than a decade after the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the situation has not been “normalized” despite all efforts to naturalize the impact of the crisis. As Syrians aim to have the same Lebanese lifestyle, the challenging contexts are still not welcome in a country that faces constant instability. Due to multiple crises that Lebanon is experiencing and the biased support of international organizations, the tension between the two groups is rising, potentially leading to accentuated social instability and unpredictable conflict.

Finally, it should be noted that this article does not aim to suggest any recommendations, as there are many policy briefs, reports, and toolkits to address the Syrian refugee crises in Lebanon. It is somewhat theoretical and does not reflect any practical process to mitigate the crisis and control its challenges and dynamics. Moreover, the international community directly or indirectly funded many of the available policy briefs to serve a specific political agenda. Therefore, we believe that any recommendation or roadmap to tackle this topic should be based on an inclusive approach of all local actors to find sustainable and realistic solutions to this ongoing dilemma.