Abstract
Urdu is widely spoken in India, and due to historical, demographic, and political reasons, it is commonly associated with the Indian Muslim population. India has a vibrant Urdu press represented in both electronic and print media that caters largely to the Muslim population and reflects their views. Issues related to Israel, Zionism, and Jews, in addition to other Middle Eastern developments, are widely covered in the Indian Urdu press due to religious and historical factors. The coverage also reflects the ignorance, biases, and prejudices that are widely held among South Asian Muslims regarding Jews, Zionism, and Israel, which at times acquire extremist and anti-Semitic overtones. The Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the Israeli military response have been widely covered and commented upon in the Indian Urdu press, reinforcing the established ideas of the oppressive Israeli state and the perpetual Palestinian victimhood. However, one witnesses certain nuances and a diversity of opinion within the Urdu press. A systematic content analysis of the Indian Urdu press and its coverage of the Gaza crisis provides an understanding of views held among a large section of the Muslim population in India toward the Israel–Hamas conflict, in particular, and toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in general.
Introduction
The Hamas-led attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, termed Toofan al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Flood) by the Palestinian armed groups and referred to as Black Saturday or Simchat Torah Massacre in Israel, sent shockwaves across Israel, Middle East, and the wider world. The nature and scale of the coordinated attack by the Palestinian groups based in Gaza was not only unexpected and took the Israeli political and military leadership by surprise but also briefly overwhelmed the Israeli security apparatus (Goldman et al., 2023). In the process, nearly 800 Israeli civilians, including women, children, and elderly, and 400 soldiers were killed, thousands were injured, and close to 250 civilians, including women and elderly, were taken hostage by the Palestinian fighters (Times of Israel, 2023). Several videos and eyewitness accounts later emerged narrating the inhuman treatment of the Israeli victims by the Palestinian militants, including burning, beheading, rape, and torture (Kottasová, 2023). The initial Israeli response focused on mitigating the damage by taking back control of the border areas between Gaza and southern Israel and neutralizing any hidden Palestinian fighters.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began air strikes on the Gaza Strip soon after taking control of the situation inside Israel. They launched the ground invasion of Gaza on October 27, 2023, codenamed Operation Sword of Iron. The stated objective of the ground invasion was to free all Israeli hostages and destroy Hamas’s political and military capabilities (Eisenstadt, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel [MoFA, Israel], 2024). The air bombing and land battle have continued ever since, making it one of the longest and most devastating wars in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As of August 2024, nearly 40,000 Palestinians, including children, women, and elderly, have been killed in the retaliatory war in the Gaza Strip waged by Israel (Al-Jazeera, 2024). According to some estimates, the IDF has dropped nearly 70,000 tons of bombs on Gaza, leading to indiscriminate killings and destruction of residential, educational, and religious buildings (Çallı, 2024). On several occasions, hospitals and schools have been targeted, leading to a high number of casualties of children and wounded (Al-Jazeera, 2023). The war has proved to be one of the most devastating instances of violence within the broader Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian conflict, with both Hamas and IDF having been condemned for war crimes by the United Nations (2024) and the International Criminal Court (2024). While Hamas’s use of terrorist tactics has attracted widespread condemnation, the disproportionate use of force by IDF has evoked criticisms worldwide.
The situation as of August 15, 2024, was tense, with no end in sight. Several attempts at ceasefire yielded no result, and the assassination of Doha-based Hamas political chief Ismael Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31 reduced the possibility of an immediate ceasefire (Fleischmann, 2024). Moreover, there was a looming fear of the spread of the war to the wider region, especially due to the involvement of Iran and its regional proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shabbi or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq on behalf of the Palestinians and the firm US military and political support for Israel (Yacoubian, 2023). Although most of the regional Arab states have remained relatively quieter, they are sensitive to and anxious about the public anguish across the Arab and Muslim world over the continued targeting of civilians and indiscriminate killing of women and children in the Gaza Strip (Hamzawy, 2023; Malik, 2023). Except for Egypt and Qatar, none of the major Arab and Islamic powers tried to mediate or get involved in the conflict, and even these two countries were unable to exert influence to end the war (Cordesman, 2023). Notably, none of the four Arab states, namely, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, have opted out of the deal. 1
The Indian response to the Gaza crisis 2 has been measured and sensitive of its historic support for Palestinian statehood, its strong political and military ties with Israel, and its longstanding stand against terrorism (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India [MEA, India], 2024). Hence, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to denounce and condemn the October 7 attack as a terrorist attack (MEA, India, 2023; Modi, 2023). On October 27, India abstained from voting in a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, due to the lack of UN condemnation of the Hamas attack and Israeli hostages (The Indian Express, 2023). New Delhi, however, subsequently became cautious and nuanced its position as the number of Palestinian casualties increased in the Israeli bombardments and ground offensive, leading to a vote in favor of another UNGA resolution on December 12 calling for an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” (Abbas, 2024). Earlier on November 12, India voted in favor of another UNGA resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories (The Hindu, 2023). Broadly, the Indian position focused on stating an unequivocal stand against any acts of terror and an underlying support for Israel’s right to defend itself (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India [MEA, India], 2024). Concurrently, India was mindful of its historical support for Palestinian statehood and its strong ties with the Arab states. Hence, New Delhi has expressed support for a ceasefire and stated its position on resolving the conflict through the internationally accepted two-state solution (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India [MEA, India]).
Notwithstanding the official response of the Government of India (GoI), different sections in India— civil society, political parties, academia, the press, and major religious groups—reacted differently to the Gaza crisis. The diversity of opinion on various domestic and international matters notwithstanding, historically, no other international issue has resonated as starkly and as divisively as the Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts among Indian polity and society (Kumaraswamy, 2010). The same was visible in the case of the Gaza crisis wherein the position of GoI came in for criticism from the opposition parties including the Indian National Congress (INC) (Gandhi, 2023), the communist parties, namely, Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), the Communist Party of Indian (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML), and several provincial parties (The Times of India, 2023). Similarly, many right-wing Hindu activists and citizens were vocal in expressing support for Israel and condemning the Hamas terrorist attack on social media and other platforms (Pillalamarri, 2024). The majority of Muslim intelligentsia are supportive of the Palestinians without necessarily making a distinction between Hamas and Palestine (Khan, 2024; Naqvi, 2024).
This article looks at the response of the Indian Muslims to the Gaza crisis, as reflected through the Indian Urdu Press. The objective is to understand the positions taken by Indian Muslims by systematically looking at the coverage and opinions of select Urdu newspapers published in different parts of India. The newspapers have been carefully chosen, keeping the geographical span of India and the diversity of views within the Urdu press based on ideological, sectarian, and theological divisions among Indian Muslims. The findings of the article reiterate the findings of earlier studies (Quamar, 2012, 2021) on the broad support for the Palestinians among Indian Muslims. The article notes the prevailing ignorance, biases, and prejudices, as well as the proclivity to take extremist and anti-Semitic positions. Further, one finds the almost complete absence of the Indian Urdu press’s condemnation of the Hamas attack and massacre of innocent civilians, taking of captives and dishonoring and violations of women, including rape.
Indian Urdu Press
Muslims constitute nearly 15% of the Indian population (14.2% as per the 2011 census), with an estimated population of 204 million as of 2024, and this is the world’s third largest Muslim concentration after Indonesia and Pakistan (Pew Research Center, 2021; World Population Review, 2024). The Indian Muslims are geographically dispersed and live in different parts of the country, speak different languages, follow diverse customs, and identify with various cultural traits based on their place of origin and domicile (Farooqui, 2020). Even in terms of religious practices, the group is diverse and divided into firqa (sects), zaat (caste), madhab (schools of fiqh [jurisprudence]), nazariya (ideology), and political leanings. Most Indian Muslims belong to the Sunni sect of Hanafi-Deobandi, Hanafi-Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadees convictions, but many other smaller denominations exist. 3 Additionally, an estimated 10–15% are Shias, with a majority following the Ithna Ashari (Twelver) fiqh and a notable Ismaili–Bohra denomination (Jones, 2023). There are also other smaller denominations within both Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Urdu is one of the 22 languages recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India. According to the 2011 census, over 50 million Indians recognized Urdu as their mother tongue (Census of India, 2011a). The majority of those who identify themselves as Urdu speakers are concentrated in the northern states or union territories, including Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, but significant numbers are present in parts of West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, and Maharashtra (Census of India, 2011b). Urdu speakers are present in smaller numbers in other states. Many Indian states or centrally administered regions recognize Urdu as the second state language, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Telangana, Delhi, and Jammu and Kashmir. Besides those who explicitly identify as its speakers, Urdu is frequently used in popular culture, especially in the Mumbai film industry, commonly known as Bollywood (Ahmad, 2018). Notably, the majority (almost 75%) of Indian Muslims are non-Urdu speakers, identifying different Indian languages, such as Hindi, Kashmiri, Bengali, Assamese, Marathi, Tamil, Malayalam, and Telugu, as their mother tongues. Hence, Urdu is not the language of all Indian Muslims, and Urdu, in its Hindustani avatar, 4 is spoken and understood by a large section of the Indian population of different faiths (Abbi et al., 2004). Nonetheless, due to various historical, religious, and political reasons, the language is broadly identified as the lingua franca of Indian Muslims (Khalidi, 1986).
India has a vibrant Urdu press represented in both electronic and print mediums. According to the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI), in 2022–2023, the number of dailies published in Urdu was second largest (1,123) after Hindi (4,496). Urdu dailies had the fourth largest circulation at 20,296,475 copies with a share of 8.73% behind Hindi (46.45%), Marathi (10.94%), and English (9.78) (Registrar of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India [RNI], 2023). Among the states where Urdu dailies had the highest circulation were Uttar Pradesh (10.01 million), Delhi (3.15 million), Bihar (2.88 million), Jammu and Kashmir (1.80 million), and Telangana (1.38 million) (Registrar of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India [RNI], p. 53). Among the most popular Urdu newspapers in India are Taasir (Impact), with 13 editions and the main edition based in Patna; Inquilab (Revolution), with nine editions with headquarters in Mumbai; Roznama Rashtriya Sahara (National Sahara Daily), nine editions, with headquarters in Delhi, Sahafat (Journalism) a Lucknow-based newspaper with four other editions, Siasat (Politics) published in Hyderabad, Akhbar-e-Mashriq (Newspaper of the East) published from Kolkata and Urdu Times, based in Mumbai (Nielsen, 2019; Registrar of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India [RNI], 2023). In addition, other newspapers that have been studied for this article include Qaumi Tanzeem (National Organization), with three editions and headquartered in Patna, Hamara Samaj (Our Society) published in Delhi and Patna, Etemaad (Confidence) located and published in Hyderabad, Qaumi Awaz (National Voice), which has only an online edition, Roshni (Light) published from Srinagar, Munsif (Judge) published from Hyderabad, and the weekly Dawat (Invitation, Proselytization) based in Delhi.
These 14 newspapers have been carefully chosen to represent the geographical, political, ideological, and sectarian diversity among Indian Muslims, keeping in view the explicit and implicit affiliations and leanings of these newspapers. For example, Dawat, although a weekly with a relatively smaller circulation, has been selected as it is the mouthpiece of Jama-e-Islami Hind (JIH), which traces its origins to the South Asian Islamist movement launched by Abul Ala Maududi in 1941. Similarly, Qaumi Awaz, despite having only limited reach and an online edition, is included as it is the sister publication of the National Herald (English) and Navjivan (Hindi), the newspapers that are politically aligned with the Congress Party. The other newspaper that has a noteworthy political affiliation is Hyderabad-based Etemaad, which is published by the Owaisi family that leads the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), a prominent Hyderabad-based party that claims to represent the Muslim population of Telangana. Others, such as Akhbar-e-Mashriq, is the leading Urdu daily published in West Bengal with a liberal-left leaning. Similarly, Sahafat is a Lucknow-based Shia-sympathetic and Iran-leaning newspaper. Rashtriya Sahara, Inquilab, Taasir, and Hamara Samaj are the mainstream newspapers and hold relatively liberal views on most matters. The remaining five, namely, Siasat, Munsif, Roshni, Qaumi Tanzeem, and Urdu Times, have been selected due to their ideological leaning or geographic location.
Coverage of the Gaza Crisis
The coverage of Indian Urdu newspapers of the developments on the Israeli–Palestinian front since the October 7, 2023, attack can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasted only a few days, wherein the coverage and opinions reflected the initial reactions to the Hamas-led attack on Israel. The second phase started in light of the intensification of the Israeli retaliation, with air strikes starting soon after the Hamas attack, followed by a ground invasion beginning on October 27 and bombardments. Gradually, as the Israeli bombardments and ground invasion slowed, the coverage and commentaries reduced in frequency and acquired a relatively topical undertone.
Reaction to the Hamas Attack
The immediate coverage of the Hamas-led attack on Israel was almost euphoric and celebratory, with most of the Urdu newspapers choosing this as the front-page cover story. While the latter was not surprising, the tone was appalling given that the Hamas-led attack had mostly targeted unarmed civilians on Sabbath, coinciding with the annual holiday of Simchat Torah, marking the conclusion of the annual cycle of public Torah readings and beginning of a new cycle (Salkin, 2023). Incidentally, none of the newspapers took note of the choice, whether deliberate or incidental, of a weekly and annual religious holiday by Hamas and Islamic Jihad for mounting the attack. For the majority of the newspapers, the attack was daring and laudable. It was long overdue because of the provocative and violent Israeli military actions in the Occupied Territories in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem, including the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (Dawat, 2023a; Etemaad, 2023a, 2023b; Munsif, 2023a; Rashtriya Sahara, 2023a; Roshni, 2023; Sahafat, 2023a; Taasir, 2023).
The justification for the attack was given as an explosion of the anger of the Gazan population, who have been under occupation and “siege” for almost two decades. Moreover, the idea that Hamas and other Palestinian groups based in Gaza could breach the famed and “invincible” Israeli security apparatus on such a scale was viewed as a matter of pride for Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims (Dawat, 2023a; Etemaad, 2023c). Some of the newspapers had lauded the Hamas tactics of taking hostages, praising their actions as “daring” and “brave.” For example, one of the subheadings in Rashtriya Sahara’s first-page coverage on October 8 stated, “Hamas ke janbaz 35 Israeli faujiyon ko pakad kar le gaye” (Hamas’s brave hearts captured and took back 35 Israeli soldiers) (Rashtriya Sahara, 2023a). Many chose to blame Israel’s long-term policy of occupation as the primary reason for the attack, terming it a retaliation against the ongoing Israeli occupation and subjugation. Mumbai-based Inquilab, in its editorial on October 13, termed the attack as the direct outcome of policies being followed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the complacent behavior of the Israeli population that has been allowing the occupation of Palestinian territories (Inquilab, 2023c).
The majority of the newspapers were extremely critical of the Israeli retaliatory strikes inside Gaza that began within hours after the Hamas-led attacks, noting that the “indiscriminate” bombings by Israel have caused a huge casualty among Palestinians (Qaumi Tanzeem, 2023; Rashtriya Sahara, 2023b). On the other hand, one could see the near absence of any condemnation of Hamas’s targeting of civilians, women, children, and the elderly, although some newspapers did cover it without necessarily adopting a critical tone (Rashtriya Sahara, 2023a; Sahafat, 2023a). The only notable exception was an op-ed column in Sahafat on October 14 that underlined the need for adhering to certain principles and ethics in wars invoking Quran and Hadith without directly calling out Hamas’s action (Firdausi, 2023). Most newspapers called on the international community, including the US and the United Nations, to avoid escalation and stop the war. For example, Inquilab’s October 9 editorial urged the United Nations to take active measures to end the war (Inquilab, 2023a).
The Indian reaction and condemnation of the Hamas attack by Prime Minister Narendra Modi received attention among most newspapers’ front-page coverage on October 8 and 9, underlining the Indian position of condemning any terrorist attack. Some, however, urged the GoI to reconsider its position, terming Modi’s condemnation of the Hamas attack as siding with Israel and a departure from the historical Indian support for the people of Palestine (Dawat, 2023b; Hamara Samaj, 2023; Inquilab, 2023b).
Response to Israeli Retaliation
The celebratory reaction to Hamas’s attack gave way to calling for an immediate end to the war as the Palestinian casualties began to rise. Notably, the crisis coverage nearly disappeared from the front pages of the Urdu newspapers during the later phase of the Gaza crisis, especially since mid-November 2023. Most newspapers chose to cover the conflict either on the international page or through a dedicated page for Middle East affairs, if they had one, such as Etemaad, Munsif, and Dawat, that too only with limited coverage. The coverage was linked to major flare-ups or important developments such as the occasional Houthi attacks on Israeli and Western cargo in the Red Sea in November 2023 and the US–UK and Israeli retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen (Munsif, 2024a), the brief ceasefire in November 2023 (Inquilab, 2023h), series of student agitations in the US and European universities in April–May 2024 (Hafeez, 2024), and Israel–Iran exchange of fire in April 2024 and Israel–Hezbollah exchanges (Etemaad, 2024e; Munsif, 2024d). One of the factors that could probably explain the near absence of front-page coverage during the later phases was the focus on domestic politics, as Lok Sabha elections were to take place in India between April and June 2024. However, this did not mean the newspapers did not focus on the Gaza crisis. Regular editorials and op-ed columns were published, with most blaming Israel for the continuation and escalation of the conflict and the failure of any progress in the ceasefire talks (Habibullah, 2024).
While most newspapers refrained from terming the Hamas attack on Israel as a terrorist action, they were quick to call the retaliatory Israeli strikes in Gaza a terrorist attack. For example, an editorial published in Dawat on November 16 stated that even after a month of the beginning of Israeli bombardments in the Gaza Strip, the so-called civilized world remains a mute spectator as tens of thousands of Palestinians were martyred (Dawat, 2023c). The editorial termed the Israeli retaliation as a “terrorist act” and noted the complacency of the mainstream Indian media in terming Hamas as a terrorist organization and ignoring the Israeli use of terrorist tactics in its retaliation against the Gaza Strip and its people (Dawat, 2023c). One of the major points that many editorials and op-ed columns noted was terming the Israeli ground invasion as a “genocide” and a “planned ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2023; Etemaad, 2024b; Inquilab, 2024c). Others were critical of the US for its “blind” support to Israel, its “complacency” in the killings of Palestinians and its “historical failure” to resolve the conflict, despite having the power and influence to do so (Arshad, 2023; Munsif, 2023c; Qasmi, 2023b). Criticism of Arab and Islamic powers, especially Saudi Arabia, was also frequent (Faraz, 2024; Nadwi, 2023; Naqvi, 2023).
Broad Trends
One could identify nearly a dozen themes frequently raised in the newspapers. Broadly, a pro-Palestine, pro-Hamas, pro-Iran inclination and an anti-US, anti-Israel trend is discernible. The latter often ventured into misinformation and conspiracy theories or descended into outright vengeful, hate-filled and, at times, anti-Semitic utterances. The need for a humanitarian ceasefire and urging the Arab and international community to take strict action against Israel was common. The Iran–Israel exchanges of fire, actions by the Iranian proxies, and the killing of Haniyeh featured prominently. One of the key issues that remained nearly missing was the rape of Israeli women, killing of Israel children, and the abduction of the elderly by Hamas on October 7.
Unequivocal support for Palestine: The unequivocal support for Palestine is easily discernible and one theme that bounds all the Urdu newspapers without any exceptions (Agha, 2023; Dawat, 2023c; Inquilab, 2023e; Nadwi, 2023). The majority of the newspapers had no qualms in taking an unequivocal, unconditional, and blind pro-Palestine stand. The support is visible in most Urdu newspapers’ coverage, editorials, and columns (Faraz, 2024; Qasmi, 2023a; Shahab, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c). While understandable given the religious affinity and the historical support of the Indian Muslims and Urdu press for Palestine, the inability to take an objective view of the conflict and the unwillingness to see Hamas’s action for what it is was appalling (Inquilab, 2023f; Urdu Times, 2024a). Religious references were commonly used to underline the support for Palestine and predict the “fast demise” of Israel (Parween, 2024a). Support for Hamas: Many editorials and columnists expressed their solidarity with Hamas, calling its action daring and heroic (Ahmed, 2024; Munsif, 2024e; Qasmi, 2023d; Siasat, 2023a). While one can understand the support for the Palestinian people and the cause, the inability to see the difference between blatant violence and terrorist acts targeting civilians was surprising. Notable columnist Zafrul Islam Khan (2024), in his column in the weekly Dawat in May 2024, while criticizing the Arab rulers for their “inaction,” noted that “the Palestinians have utilized their right to resistance by mounting the October 7 2023 attack which is justifiable in international law for people under occupation.” In a similar vein, a column in Hamara Samaj expressed support for Hamas, saying that the tag of “terrorist” organization is wrong as the group was elected to govern Gaza and has been a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation (Fatmi, 2023). Although not so much in the coverage, the explicit support for Hamas’s October 7 attack was common among the columnists and editorials (Basha, 2023; Nasr, 2023). Abuse, hatred, and anti-Semitism: Abusive, hateful, and outrightly anti-Semitic references could be often found. At times, these seem like a deliberate reference based on prejudices, biases, and religiously informed views of the “other,” and on other occasions, these were casual without probably even recognizing the nature of such references (Gilani, 2024; Munsif, 2024b; Parween, 2024b). Such references are often thrown around casually, underlining the inability of the Urdu press to differentiate between stereotypes and facts (Markazi, 2024; Parween, 2024c; Sultan, 2023). For example, one of the columns published in Akhbar-e-Mashriq discussing the Saudi reaction to the Gaza crisis, referred to the historical context and noted that the Jewish population when they were looking for a safe home (after the Inquisition, though not mentioned explicitly) were welcomed and given refuge in Palestine. However, they gradually turned against their benefactors due to their azli Islam dushmani (Islamophobia or animosity against Islam since the day one) and dayimi munafaqat-o-makkari (permanent wickedness and hypocrisy) (Nadwi, 2023). Another columnist in the same newspaper, while writing on the Arab response to the Gaza crisis, reproduces a blatantly anti-Semitic reference, saying that Hitler was right when he said, “I have killed 90% of the Jews, and left the 10% so that the future world can see their sinister nature and understands why I killed them” (Alam, 2023). Historical and religious claims over Jerusalem: Status of Jerusalem is one of the most contentious issues in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most Urdu editorials and columns viewed Jerusalem as central to the historical conflict. They underlined the religious claims of Muslims over the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of Rock located in the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area (Basha, 2023). Several newspapers noted the city’s significance, especially on Al-Quds Day, which falls on the last Friday of Ramadan every year. For example, an editorial in Inquilab noted the continuing Israeli war on Gaza and the importance of Al-Quds Day, saying the Palestinian resistance will remain alive no matter the outcome of the ongoing war (Inquilab, 2024f). One often finds conspiracy theories arguing that through archeological excavations Israel wants to weaken the existing structures in the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area or plans to make secret tunnels to reach these Muslim holy places (Parween, 2024b). Criticism of the US: Anti-Americanism is a common theme found on the pages of Urdu newspapers. The history of US support for Israel and its inability to serve as a neutral mediator and failure to bring about a peaceful resolution are often criticized (Arshad, 2023; Munsif, 2023c; Qasmi, 2023b). The US is held responsible for allowing Israel to “get away with mass murder” and “genocide of Palestinians” without any repercussions (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2023; Etemaad, 2024b; Inquilab, 2024c). In the context of the Gaza crisis, most newspapers were critical of the inability of the Biden administration to “reign in” Israel. They frequently underlined the “hypocrisy” of the Biden administration that, on the one hand, calls for a ceasefire and, on the other hand, supplies weapons and finances to Israel to continue the war (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2024; Inquilab, 2023d; Munsif, 2023d). The newspapers lauded the pro-Palestine campus protests in the US, noting that though the Biden administration has lost its moral standing, the younger generation is ready to fight for the rights of Palestinians (Dawat, 2024; Hafeez, 2024; Roshni, 2024). Ignorance and misinformation: Unconfirmed reports, unsubstantiated claims, and conspiracy theories were commonly found in the Urdu press (Akhter, 2023; Munsif, 2023b; Urdu Times, 2024a). For example, an editorial in Inquilab (2024k) noted that the defeat of Israel was close and that the Israeli forces and people were keen to end the war. The reference for this report was a statement by an IDF spokesperson underlining the significance of Hamas’s ideology as a perpetual challenge. The editorial extrapolated this to note the possibility of serious fissures within IDF and the Israeli government on the possibility of winning the war. Undoubtedly, there have been differences within Israel’s war cabinet, and Benny Gantz, former Defense Minister and a political rival of Netanyahu, resigned from it in June 2024 over policy differences (Sachs, 2024), but they were likely policy differences and not strategic, as was noted in an editorial (Inquilab, 2024k). References to the war being started and fueled by the military–industrial complex in the US and Israel are often found. It was argued that the war is an outcome of conspiracies hatched by the US–Israel arms industry that wants to test new weapons on innocent civilians in Gaza (Inquilab, 2024j). Although the point about conflict and war zones becoming a testing ground for new weapons has some merit, extrapolating it as a “Jewish–Zionist conspiracy” reflects the propensity to fall for unsubstantiated claims, conspiracy theories, and anti-Semitism. Among ideas that were promoted by some was that the war was an outcome of an Israeli plan to annex the Gaza Strip as part of a policy to achieve Greater Israel (Aziz, 2023; Mujahid, 2023a; Shahab, 2023, November 13). Rape and crime against women: None of the newspapers gave any notable space to the incident of violence against women by the Palestinian fighters on October 7. Most either ignored it or reported it during the early phase in a matter-of-fact manner, attributing it to “unconfirmed reports” (Munsif, 2023b; Rashtriya Sahara, 2023a; Taasir, 2023). Only in one instance, this study found criticism of Hamas’s violent tactics, underlining the need for upholding ethics and values in war but without any direct reference to Hamas’s actions (Firdausi, 2023). Instances of Urdu newspapers calling out Israel and IDF for targeting women, children, and the elderly are common (Khan, 2024; Munsif, 2023f; Sahafat, 2023b); however, one hardly finds any reference to the targeting of Israeli women, children, and elderly population by Hamas and Islamic Jihad combatants during the October 7 attack. Iran–Israel conflict: The possibility of Iran and Israel entering into a direct war consequent to the Gaza crisis has been one of the major issues that has worried the international community. The Indian Urdu press was mostly emphatic in praising Iran and its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen for putting Israel under immense pressure (Etemaad, 2024a; Urdu Times, 2024b). On the brief Israel–Iran clash in April 2024, most underlined that Hamas has shattered Israeli deterrence and that Iran, being a regional military power, was able to penetrate Israel with ease (Etemaad, 2024f). However, most ignored that the Iranian strikes were calculated and coordinated to avoid any escalation, underlining the Israeli offensive deterrence. Likewise, many were hopeful that with a strong military capability, Iran would take retaliatory action against Israel and avenge Haniyeh’s killing (Munsif, 2024c; Urdu Times, 2024b). Arab response: Most of the newspapers were critical of the “subdued” Arab response and praised the Iran-led “axis of resistance” for its ability to take the fight into Israel and make it difficult for Israelis to live peacefully (Faraz, 2024; Naqwi, 2023). Among the issues that the Arab leaders came in for criticism was the reported discussion on bringing a multination Arab military to govern Gaza after the war (Abdali, 2024). Many Urdu columnists were critical of the continuation of the Abraham Accords and the US diplomatic push for a Saudi–Israel rapprochement (Jamaluddin, 2023; Parween, 2024c). However, the Saudi position was occasionally praised, especially the relief and humanitarian work (Nadwi, 2023). Some urged the Arab-Islamic countries to consider economic boycotts of the US and Israel to put pressure on them to end the war (Tariq, 2024). International response: Many urged the United Nations (UN) to step up and find a way to intervene to end the war (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2024; Inquilab, 2023a, 2024e; Munsif, 2023d). The “hypocrisy” of the “Western” powers and media was highlighted repeatedly (Qadeer, 2024; Shahab, 2023, October 30), especially in comparison to the Ukraine crisis where the US and European powers stood firmly with the “aggrieved” party while standing with the “oppressor” when it comes to Gaza (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2023; Etemaad, 2024b; Inquilab, 2023g, 2024d). The inability of the international community to end the war and the “complacency” of the “Western” nations in the Israeli “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” was a common theme in many editorials and columns (Akhbar-e-Mashriq, 2023; Etemaad, 2024b; Inquilab, 2024c). On the contrary, the newspapers welcomed the South African “initiative” and “courage” in taking Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Etemaad, 2024b; Inquilab, 2024b). Some did underline the growing international pressure on Israel due to the continuation of the war (Inquilab, 2024h, 2024i). Humanitarian appeals: The call for humanitarian relief and ceasefire and appeals to the international community to impose a humanitarian ceasefire were common themes (Inquilab, 2024g; Munsif, 2023f). Many rued the continuation of the war during Ramadan, blaming Israel for disregarding the holy month of fasting and indiscriminate killing when the Palestinian Muslims were observing fast (Munsif, 2024b). Issues such as food and water shortages, destruction of medical facilities, air contamination, use of phosphorous in Israeli bombs and war crimes by Israel were some of the issues that formed the basis for the humanitarian appeals (Etemaad, 2024d; Inquilab, 2024a). Many put the onus of upholding international law on Israel without making a similar demand to Hamas, which launched the October 7 attack, triggering the current war (Qasmi, 2023c). Indian response: The Indian response received some attention, mostly ruing the shift in Indian position, blaming it on the commonality between Zionism and Hindutva (Gilani, 2024; Munsif, 2023e). It was often argued that the historical Indian position has been pro-Palestine, which should be maintained by the GoI (Dawat, 2023b; Hamara Samaj, 2023; Inquilab, 2023b). One columnist did call for the government to see the crisis as an opportunity to explore mediation to end the conflict (Mirza, 2023). Many newspapers gave space to positions taken by opposition leaders who expressed a contrarian view (Mujahid, 2023b; Qaumi Awaz, 2023b; Siasat, 2023b). The most critical of the Modi government’s stand were Qaumi Awaz and Etemaad—the former is the mouthpiece of INC and the latter of AIMIM. Qaumi Awaz reported INC general secretary Priyanka Gandhi’s criticism of India abstaining from the UN General Assembly resolution on October 27 (Qaumi Awaz, 2023a) and her expression of grief on the indiscriminate killing of children in Gaza (Qaumi Awaz, 2024). Similarly, Etemaad was critical of the Indian decision to allow travel of Indian workers to Israel to be employed in construction work, calling it a measure that will have long-term repercussions on Indian foreign policy and relations with Arab and Muslim countries (Etemaad, 2024c; Mujahid, 2023b).
Conclusion
The Gaza crisis was covered widely in the Indian Urdu newspapers, often receiving front-page features and ample editorial space and regular columns. The newspapers largely depended on international agencies to report the war, as none had any personnel on the ground. The columnists were overwhelmingly Indian Muslims based in different parts of the country or outside from among the expatriates. Overwhelmingly, the newspapers reflected the views of Indian Muslims, with the narrative focused on Palestinian victimhood, statelessness, and subjugation. Israel was painted as a genocidal occupying power that is hell-bent on the expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the Old City to attain the Zionist dream of Greater Israel. One could hardly find any serious criticism or call for introspection of Hamas’s actions of October 7. Any historical and nuanced understanding of the conflict was completely missing. The general pro-Palestine and anti-Israel tone of the coverage was palpable, and unlike on other issues where one could see a discernible heterogeneity among the Urdu press based on diversity and divisions among Indian Muslims, the Gaza crisis evoked a homogenous response with little variation. Besides the solidarity for Palestine and Hamas, the solidarity for Iran was visible among the wider community beyond the Shias. Ignorance, biases, prejudices, and a penchant for taking extremist and anti-Semitic positions were discernible in the coverage of the Urdu press of the Gaza crisis.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
