Churaman and the making of the Jat state in the late 17th and early eighteenth century

I

The Jat revolts against the Mughal state from the second half of the seventeenth century represented a prolonged struggle mainly within the western parts of the Agra suba of the empire.

According to the Ā’īn-i-Akbarī, the Jats held few zamindaris in the parganas of Alwar, Sahar and Tijara sarkārs. ² In the late sixteenth century the Jats were not as significant as the Meos and Khanzādas, but by the mid-to-late seventeenth century they began to assert themselves. The rise of the Jats as a political force began with their revolt in the Mathura region in 1669 under the leadership of Gokula and Rāja Rām during the reign of Aurangzeb (1659–1707 ad). ³ After Rāja Rām’s demise in 1688, the reins of the Jat uprising fell into the hands of local zamīndārs, which, in effect, weakened the united force of the movement. We do not come across any capable leader among them during the interregnum between Rāja Rām’s death and Churaman’s ascendancy.

A noteworthy feature of these years is that both the repression of the Jats and their predatory activities continued side by side. When the imperial army turned in one direction, they created turbulence in another. Amar Singh, a powerful Jat zamīndār, possessed two fortresses, viz. Khair (16 miles north-west of Aligarh) and Ranth (8 miles east of Khair). Another powerful Jat zamīndār, Nanda reigned supreme in a tract stretching from Hathras and Mursan to Mahaban. On the other side of the Yamuna, Jat rebels built various garhis (fortresses), viz. Sogar, Awar, Kasot, Senkh, Pingora, Sewar, Dahara, Chakora, Undera, Bachhamadi, Chiksana, Ratanpur, Bhatawali, etc. Besides the prominent rebel Jat zamīndārs, such as Fateh Singh, Churaman and Nanda, there were others like Balram, Jagman, Banarasi, Lodha, Bukna, Maujia, Khemkaran Sogaria, Rati Ram Jat (of Jargaon), Aneram, Roop Singh, Govind Ram, Daya Ram (of Medu), Bhure Singh and Chattar Singh, who wielded great influence in their own localities, kept strong military contingents in their fortresses and divided the booty among themselves. For instance, Churaman made Rasulpur his base and raided the adjacent territories, while Fateh Singh operated from the fort of Pingora (14 miles south-west of Bharatpur). ⁴

In the wake of Jat depredations, emperor Aurangzeb appointed Rāja Bishan Singh Kachhwaha of Amber (r. 1688–99), to lead a campaign against the Jat rebels. Raja Bishan Singh gave an undertaking to the emperor that he would crush the Jats and capture their main stronghold, Sinsini (Bharatpur district, Rajasthan). In return, Aurangzeb bestowed on him the title of Raja, the tika of Amber, a khilat and mansab of 2000/2000 do-aspah. The emperor appointed him (30 April 1688) the faujdār of Mathura with orders to suppress the Jats. He was also granted the zamīndārī of Sinsini and other Jat mahals and was assured of further promotion and grants if he succeeded in his task. ⁵

In August 1688, Rāja Bishan Singh arrived at Mathura with 10,000 cavalrymen and 20,000 infantrymen to begin his campaign. ⁶ However, he could not succeed in his mission. The strategy adopted by Bishan Singh with regard to the Jats annoyed prince Bidar Bakht who was also appointed by Aurangzeb to assist him. The prince complained to Aurangzeb that the Raja was secretly in collusion with the Jats and was, therefore, not serious about his task. The reports of continued Jat depredations and Bishan Singh’s apparent delay in attacking the Jat rebels infuriated Aurangzeb who punished him by reducing his mansab (1690). ⁷ The charge against Raja Bishan Singh does not seem to be true because as per a Rajasthani source, a pitched battle took place between him and the Jats in which the Jats of Deswal and Sinsinwal gotras (sept.) and the Meenas of pargana Kathumber joined the fight. Both sides suffered heavy casualties; and two important commanders of Amber, viz. Roop Singh Kilanot and Sakta Singh Chauhan were killed. ⁸ The growing Jat power riding on the support of Meena peasants was a matter of grave concern for the Amber dīwān Vijay Singh who had alerted the Amber Raja about it earlier. ⁹ Moreover, though Rāja Bishan Singh failed in his campaign against the Jats, it weakened them considerably. Many Jat fortresses were destroyed and many rebel Jat zamīndārs were done to death in this campaign. Churaman and Nanda were dislodged from their garhis by Raja Bishan Singh’s army. ¹⁰ It was under such circumstances that the Jats sought the leadership of Churaman, the son of Bhajja and zamīndār of Sinsini. ¹¹

II

After his father Bhajja’s death (1694), Churaman took up the reins of Jat resistance, but by that time many Jat fortresses had been destroyed by Raja Bishan Singh. However, in 1696 Raja Bishan Singh was relieved of the task of dealing with the Jat menace by Aurangzeb. ¹² This provided Churaman the opportunity to make up for his losses and consolidate his position. Many prominent Jat zamīndārs offered their allegiance to Churaman. ¹³ Gradually, Churaman organised a large combat force and set up the centre of his military operations at Thoon, situated in dense forest, 11 km from Deeg near Bharatpur. ¹⁴ Shiv Das Lakhnawi, an eighteenth-century Mughal official, mentions in his account, Shāhnāma Munawwar Kalām, that Thoon was surrounded by so thick a jungle of thorny bush that even birds found it difficult to fly through it. Its rampart was as high as ‘heaven’, while the moat around it was so deep that underground water burst up from the bottom. It was stocked with abundant supplies of grain, salt, ghee, sugar, tobacco and firewood that would last for 20 years. ¹⁵

The predatory activities of Churaman went on unabated. He plundered first, the countryside of Agra and, then, Kota, Bundi, Hindaun and Bayana ¹⁶ —areas that constituted the jāgīrs of imperial manṣabdārs. In 1702 he recaptured the fort of Sinsini, the most prestigious of Jat strongholds that had been earlier seized by Bishan Singh, then faujdār of Mathura. The recapture of Sinsini not only provided Churaman with a safe base but also earned him the image of a formidable warrior-chief in the entire Braj region^{. 17}

Churaman clearly understood that any direct confrontation with the Mughal state would only harm his political ambitions, while it could also mean sharing the fate of Fateh Singh and Jorawar Singh, the two sons of Raja Ram, who had died fighting the Mughals. ¹⁸ It appears that barring a few skirmishes, Churaman did not involve himself in any confrontation with Mughal forces till Aurangzeb’s death (1707) and limited his depredations to those parganas in the Braj region whose ijāra and zamīndāri rights had been transferred by the imperial manṣabdārs to the Amber ruler (Jai Singh II, r. 1699–1743). These little displays of power were aimed at striking awe in the region and thereby impressing upon the other jāgīrdārs that the ijāra (farm) of their parganas be given to him, not to the Amber chief, since he could better manage the revenue administration of these areas. Thus, he followed a policy of conciliation towards the Mughal court and tried to impress upon Aurangzeb that he was different from (i.e., more trustworthy than) his predecessor Rāja Rām and, if given a chance, would fulfil his responsibilities as a loyal Mughal official. However, Aurangzeb always suspected Churaman’s loyalty. For instance, in 1702 he became very furious on hearing from traders that their goods had been looted on the way to Mathura by Churaman. ¹⁹ In 1705, when Aurangzeb came to know that Churaman was recruiting in his army peasants from the villages of the imperial jāgīrs, he ordered the faujdār of Mathura to keep an eye on him and prohibit the peasants from joining him. ²⁰

After Aurangzeb’s death, in the wake of the war of succession, between the two major rival claimants to the imperial throne, viz. Mu‘azzam (Bahādur Shāh), and Muhammad A‘zam Shāh, Churaman sided with Bahadur Shah, supplying him with 2,000–3,000 sawārs in the decisive battle of Jajau in 1707 against A‘zam Shah. ²¹ He presented himself before Bahādur Shāh through the dīwān Mun‘im Khān and obtained the rank of 1500/500 and the charge of the road between Agra and Delhi. Subsequently, he took part in Bahādur Shāh’s campaigns against the Sikhs, notably the sieges of Sadhaura and Lohgarh. ²² At the same time, he continued his plundering activities whenever an opportunity arose. A major and long-awaited diplomatic success came when Churaman’s plea to the emperor for the grant of the faujdāri of Mathura was accepted. ²³ All this brought about a change in Churaman’s image from one of a plunderer to that of an imperial manṣabdār. This elevation in status, in turn, also enabled him to establish cordial relations with the other imperial manṣabdārs at the Mughal court. Further, Churaman also improved his relations with Mun‘im Khān who helped him secure the ijāra and zamīndārī rights of several parganas in Agra, Mathura and Mewat regions from the imperial jāgārdārs. Moreover, he himself successfully persuaded the imperial manṣabdārs to assign him in the place of Amber Raja the ijāra and zamīndārī rights for the collection of land revenue (ḥāṣil) from their jāgīrs. Consequently, between 1707 and 1720 Churaman got the ijāra of a number of parganas from the imperial manṣabdārs in the Agra, Mathura and Mewat regions.

On the other hand, the political atmosphere of the Mughal court from 1707 to 1720, that is, from the beginning of Bahādur Shāh’s reign till the end of the Sayyid brothers’ dominance was increasingly unfavourable to the interests of the Amber Court. Churāman received tacit support from the Sayyid brothers (Abdullāh Khān and Ḥusain ‘Alī) and Nawab Khān-i-Daurān, who constituted the most powerful clique at the court (1713–19), in consolidating his position vis-a-vis the Amber Rāja. Their main motive for supporting Churaman was to eclipse the political influence of the Amber Raja at the Mughal court because Sawāi Jai Singh had been the supporter of a faction opposed to the Sayyid brothers. This patronage to Churaman continued till 1720 when the Sayyid brothers were overthrown.

From the late seventeenth century onwards, the Amber Rāja had secured from other imperial manṣabdārs the thanedari and zamindari rights of many parganas of the Mewat region ²⁴ that were contiguous to his own watan jāgīr (hereditary or patrimonial estate). This he did on the pretext of maintaining law and order, since during this period, especially after Aurangzeb’s death, the imperial manṣabdārs had been facing problems in collecting land revenue from their jāgirs in the wake of agrarian disturbances. ²⁵ For instance, in 1702 the Amber Raja secured the zamīndārī and thanedari rights of 14 parganas of Mewat from the Mughal authority and next year six more parganas. ²⁶

Underlying the Amber Raja’s bid to acquire the zamindari and thanedari rights of these parganas in Mewat were strategic calculations. First, taking the ijāra of the parganas in the vicinity of his watan jāgīr was motivated by his desire to expand his watan areas. Second, during seventeenth century the Kachhwaha Rajputs were speedily growing in strength and expanding their territorial control, and by the end of the century they had organised themselves into twelve khaps (septs). ²⁷ But the Amber Raja’s income from his watan jāgīr was not sufficient to remunerate his Rajput chākars (retainers) who were in large numbers his own clansmen. ²⁸ As a report of 1712 reveals, the Raja’s Rajput chākars had been plundering the jāgīrs of the imperial manṣabdārs and had thus turned into a menace. ²⁹ The taking of the zamīndārī, thānedari and ijāra rights of the imperial jāgīrs was meant to provide the Kachhwaha Rajput khaps and their sardārs (chiefs) with a larger and stable source of income (by way of sub-assignment of these rights), check their depredations and thereby secure their loyalty to him. ³⁰ Third, besides its obvious territorial and material gains, acquiring ijāra farms was essential for the Amber Raja to check the rise of Jat power close to his hereditary dominions (just as it was so for Churaman to expand his sphere of influence and resources). The Amber Raja’s efforts to expand his territorial and fiscal base brought him into direct conflict with the interests of the Jats and made a fierce competition between the two over the ijāra of parganas of Mewat inevitable. The Rāja’s vakil in his reports explains the exigency of acquiring the ijāra of parganas in Mewat and Agra, the gist of which is as follows:

We want to take ijāra of the jagīrs from the imperial manṣabdārs in the Mewat region. I have discussed this matter with the mutsadi of the dīwān of the Mughal court. But it seems to be difficult to get the ijāra of these jāgīrs. Though I tried to negotiate and offer three months’ amount in advance to the imperial manṣabdārs of their jāgīrs, I managed to secure the ijāra of only one pargana of Firozpur Jhirka in the Mewat region. Khān-i-Jahan Bahadur, an imperial manṣabdār, advised me that the balance of power at the court is tilted against you [the Amber Rāja], that if you want the ijāra of jāgīrs in Mewat, you have to maintain harmonious relations with the Mughal court. Churaman Jāt has already moved into these regions and secured many parganas in ijāra. They are our enemies and do not want the ijāra to be given to you. Further, a large number of our Rajput chākars who have become unemployed due to a reduction of our manṣab will get employment only if we could get the ijāra of these jāgīrs from the imperial manṣabdārs in the Mewat and Agra regions. ³¹

That Churaman capitalised on his influence at the Mughal court to make inroads into the Mewat and Agra regions is borne out by a report of 1710, which claims that he was becoming a favourite of the Mughal court; that he had got the ijāra of many parganas around the Agra region, as well as some parganas of Alwar sarkār such as Kathumbar, Bhushawar and Devati Sanchari from the imperial manṣabdārs; and that he had convinced the imperial manṣabdārs at the Mughal court that he could better manage the land revenue collection of their jāgīrs through ijāra than the Amber Rāja. ³²

Rivalry with Churaman turned into open hostility when the Amber Rāja took the zamīndārī and thānedari rights of parganas Khohri and Maujpur of Mewat in 1712. ³³ Khohri, a pargana with 342 villages, ³⁴ constituted more than half of the area of land in sarkār Alwar and was more fertile than other parganas. Besides, both parganas were contiguous to the Jat territories. So, Churaman, in order to buttress his claim over Khohri and Maujpur, removed all the thānas (police posts) of the Amber Raja in the villages of these parganas and set up his own thānas. ³⁵ A vakil’s report of 1715 describes Churaman’s audacity in taking over Khohri:

Maharaja, salutations from Akbarabad! Pargana Khohri is part of our jāgīr. Last year Churaman Jat had forcibly collected land revenue from half of the villages of this pargana. This year too, he forcibly collected the revenue from all the villages of the pargana. He also removed all our thanas from these villages. Everyone at the Mughal court is shocked at these developments. Nawab Khān-i-Daurān has said that if the Amber Raja is unable to collect revenue from the villages of pargana Khohri, then he would give [the ijāra of] these parganas to Churaman Jāt and the Amber Raja would have to forgo his claim over these parganas. Churaman Jāt is a big challenge for us because this matter is not just about pargana Khohri. Churaman Jāt will also forcibly extract revenue from pargana Devti-Sanchari that is adjacent to Khohri. All nobles at the Mughal court are not only shocked at these activities of Churaman, but are also making fun of us. This is why it is imperative to effectively deal with him. ³⁶

By 1714 Churaman had established his control over a number of villages of the two parganas. The āmil of the Amber state complained of physical assaults on Amber’s revenue officials by Churaman’s men, ³⁷ and the vakīl (Amber Rāja’s agent at the Mughal court), too, reported that the Jat chief had collected the entire land revenue of these two parganas by force. ³⁸ Another report of 1714 informs us that Churaman had by now established his control over many parganas of Mewat, viz. Devati-Sanchari, Baroda Meo, Sonkhar-Sonkhari, Harsauli, Naharkhoh, Todathek, Hodel, Kotqasim, Sogar Pahari, Khohri and Maujpur. ³⁹ By these acts Churaman threw an open challenge to the Amber Raja. The gravity of Churaman’s threat to the latter’s power is exemplified by the tussle between the two over pargana Khohri, as indicated by a letter from the vakil to the Amber Raja. The vakīl in his report of 1718 claims to have kept his master well informed of Churaman’s activities and to have been extremely careful about protecting his master’s interests at the Mughal court. He further informs the Raja that Churaman had sent a request to Nawab Khān-i-Daurān for assigning him the zamindari of pargana Khohri, and that Khān-i-Daurān, being his supporter, had recommended Churaman’s letter of request and sent it to Rai-rayan Gujjar Mal. The vakil also claims to have reasoned with Gujjar Mal that the pargana being demanded by Churaman had been part of the Amber Raja’s watan jāgīr and as such its zamīndārī could never be given to anybody, especially to Churaman who was a mufsid (rebel). ⁴⁰

The vakil of the Amber Raja tried his best to prevent the grant of zamīndārī and ijāra of pargana Khohri to Churaman, but the latter enjoyed the patronage of Nawab Khān-i-Dauran and the Sayyid brothers and tried to convince the imperial manṣabdārs at the Mughal court that he could better manage the land revenue collection there than the Amber Rāja. This open support of the most powerful faction at the Mughal court to Churaman infuriated the Amber Raja who complained to the Mughal emperor against Churaman. At the same time, the imperial manṣabdārs also complained to the emperor against Churaman whose men had plundered their jāgīrs since Churaman was aggrieved at not having got ijāra or zamīndārī rights from them. ⁴¹ The impunity with which Churaman carried out his depredations can be explained by the patronage he received from the powerful Sayyid brothers who, in turn, received presents (peshkash) from him. During this period, many battles were fought in which the Rajput forces were defeated by the Jat army. ⁴²

The power of Churaman can be gauged from the fact that in 1714 he forcibly collected the land revenue due from the entire pargana of Khohri over which the Amber Raja held zamindari rights obtained from the Mughal faujdār in 1712. ⁴³ The dīwān of Amber, Ramchandar, thus expresses his anxiety at the growing audacity of the Jats in his letter to the Rāja:

The Jats have become very powerful in the entire region. They have demolished our thānas in the villages of pargana Khohri, Sahār, Harsāna, Sonkhar-Shonkhari and Aau and set up their own thānas in these parganas. The Jats are also constructing their garhis in these areas. In every fortress they keep sawārs [cavalrymen] and masala [ammunition]. The fortress of Maujpur alone has 1000 men and ammunition: 600 topchis [gunners]; two rahakallas [small cannon], 400 pala-nafars [foot soldiers], 40 ramchangis [muskets] and 200 sawārs. Thus, every fortress has men and ammunition and every village of the pargana is occupied by their thānas. And our men have been shunted out from the villages and at many places beaten up. ⁴⁴

In another report, the dīwān gives an account of the battles between Churaman Jat and the Amber army and the latter’s heavy reverses:

We had sent a strong army of 3000 sawārs under the leadership of Kushal Singh Kumbani and Vijay Singh Naruka to crush the Jats. But the Jats turned out to be more aggressive in the conflict; Vijay Singh Naruka was killed and Kushal Singh Kumbani was badly wounded by the Jats.

 A few days ago, the garhi of Maujpur was captured by Churaman Jat. One day, news came from the harkara [spy] that at present 700 sawars are in the garhi of Maujpur. Therefore, we organised a military expedition under the leadership of Vidawat Nathawat, Devisingh, Chhatarsingh Kilanot and Jaitsingh Hamirdeka to recapture the garhi of Maujpur from the Jats. When our army reached there, suddenly, the army of the Jats increased, and 5000 to 6000 sawārs arrived there. A pitched battle took place between the two armies in which a large number of our soldiers, along with the Rajput commanders, were killed by the Jats. ⁴⁵

The Jat depredations also disrupted revenue collection by Amber officials. For instance, the āmil reported to the Amber Raja that despite good harvest in the villages, it would be very difficult for him to collect land revenue from them because Churaman’s men had already started moving in these villages, even before harvesting, to forcibly collect the revenue. ⁴⁶

Explaining the Amber army’s reverses, the dīwān writes:

Whenever we fight against the Jāts, their army increases in numerical strength. At times when we are about to score a victory over Jāts, suddenly their ranks swell which enables the Jāts to win over us. In many instances they had taken away our flag, emblem and drum. ⁴⁷

The dīwān chiefly blames for this the weaknesses of Rajput chieftains and the lack of resources:

The fault lies with the Rajput sardārs who, as has been the case previously, do not perform their military duties and many Rajputs do not even go to their kotaris [fortresses]. Earlier they performed their duties well, but these days they do not step out of their homes. All of them have become greedy and selfish. Everyone considers himself a chief [bhomia]. All this provides enough time to Jāts to fortify themselves. The second cause is that they are in trouble due to non-payment [of renumeration]. Sometimes there is no money for [paying their] salary. We need a big army and weapons to defeat the Jāts, and all this requires a lot of money. ⁴⁸

Time and again, the dīwān underscored the gravity of the threat posed by Churaman and beseeched the Amber Raja to take punitive action against him:

O Maharaja, Churaman Jāt is a bastard; nobody can gauge his mind. He can go to any extent for grabbing land. That is why he is grabbing others’ lands here and there. In the region of Mewat, he is causing us a great loss of revenue. We have to seriously think of a way of tackling him. ⁴⁹

The dīwān was particularly troubled by the fact that the revenue officials of Amber were often beaten up by Churaman’s men in the presence of peasants and put to flight. While this ignominy of state officials dented the image of Amber, these acts of Jats increased Churaman’s popularity as a valiant man. Referring to Churaman as a lion, ⁵⁰ the dīwān complained that, inspired by the valour of the Jat rebels like Churaman, ordinary peasants had also turned ‘treacherous and refused to pay the land revenue to our officials’. ⁵¹

The Amber Rāja, on his part, sent several punitive expeditions against the Jats and rebel peasants but these met with only mixed success. While in many instances, the Amber forces destroyed rebellious villages and captured and imprisoned peasants, in many other peasants fled en masse to Churaman’s stronghold at Thoon for refuge or simply refused to pay revenue. For instance, in 1709 many Jat villages of pargana Kama supporting Churaman were destroyed by the faujdār of Amber. ⁵² In 1711 Muḥammad Afẓal, the deputy faujdār of Narnol, went with 4,000 sawars to the parganas of Alwar sarkār to subdue the villages that were supporting Churaman. ⁵³ In 1716, in order to punish the peasants of pargana Khohri, Mukund Ram Vakawat, Raj Singh Kilanot and others were sent with an army to the disaffected villages. The army found the villages deserted because the peasants had run away to Churaman’s fortress at Thoon. However, they managed to capture and imprison some āsāmīs (peasants) of Rampur Khurd, Jainadipur and Sithadheri villages. ⁵⁴ In 1716 the Amber troops attacked the villages of pargana Maujpur where the peasants were instigated by the Jats and Kishan Naruka’s men to refuse to pay the revenue. ⁵⁵ The dīwān of Amber, upon receiving the news that the Jats were fortifying their villages in parganas Maujpur and Bharkol, immediately ordered Shyam Singh Khangrot and Jodha Singh Kilanot to march with their army to the Jat villages. The army occupied most of the Jat villages where Churaman was building his fortresses. In the Vanahni village the army destroyed the Jat fortifications, removed the Jat thānas, set up the thanas of the Amber state, and arrested many peasants. ⁵⁶ In 1716, when the peasants of twenty-seven villages in pargana Khohri did not come to deposit the land revenue, the faujdār’s army went to the villages for extracting the revenue only to find that a large number of the villagers had run away to Thoon. ⁵⁷ In 1717, the peasants of seven villages of pargana Mojpur that were contiguous to the territories of Jats, sought refuge in Thoon, fearing assault by the Amber army. ⁵⁸ In 1718 by the time the faujdār of Mathura reached the Jat villages in parganas Hodal and Palwal, the peasants had already fled to the Sinsini fortress^, since they had joined hands with the Jats of Sinsinwal gotra. ⁵⁹ In his reports, the āmil complained that the recalcitrant peasantry of the Khohri pargana had refused to deposit the land revenue with the officials, while Churaman and his men were going to these villages and recruiting the peasants in his army. ⁶⁰ In another report of 1712 the āmil complained that Churaman had enlisted in his army (fojbandi karai chai) peasants of villages in parganas Khohri, Hodal and Palwal:

O Maharaja, Churaman Jāt is recruiting the peasants (raiyatī) of the villages of parganas Khohri, Hodal and Palwal in his army. While the emperor has ordered us to stop Churaman from recruiting villagers, despite our efforts, the peasants support Churaman, disobey us and refuse to pay revenue (amal). They would not heed us without being punished. ⁶¹

Yet another report of 1718 claimed that all the Jat villages between Hodal and Palwal supported Churaman. ⁶²

Undeterred by the onslaught of the Amber forces, the Jats continued to carry on their predatory activities and consolidated their hold over villages by building thānas and gaṛhis. In 1709 in pargana Sahar (Braj region) and in many villages of Hodal, Bhikho Jāt (Churaman’s nephew) and Jait Singh (zamīndār of Kama) joined hands to build fortresses. They replaced the thāna of Amber state in Vichhor village with their own thāna. ⁶³ In 1716 in pargana Pahari too, the Jats removed the Rajput thānas even as the faujdār of the area expressed his inability to protect the thāna against the Jats who resided in the vicinity of Kama. ⁶⁴ In 1717 a caravan of merchants carrying 1,300 carts laden with leather bottles of clarified butter (ghee) arrived at Hodal, and instead of giving the usual notice to the local commandant Sanger Khan, the merchants started for Palwal in the belief that their own 100 matchlock men would suffice to protect them. But, when they had gone only two or three kos away from Hodal, they were surrounded by the Jats, the armed guards threw down their guns and fled, and the Jats drove off the carts into the neighbouring villages. About ₹20-lakh worth of property, as the merchants claimed, had been plundered. Sanger Khan soon reached the spot with his troops, but he was afraid to enter the villages. ⁶⁵

It has been argued that a large number of Jat peasants of the Braj region had supported the Jat revolts on the basis of caste affinity. ⁶⁶ It is to be noted that caste-based unity between the Jat zamīndārs and Jat peasants was found not only in the Braj region but also in the Bharatpur and Mewat regions, as also in pargana Kol (Aligarh) where out of 442 ½ villages 183 were under the control of Jats. Bhopat Ram, the ‘āmil of pargana Kol, informed the Amber Raja that the peasants of these 183 villages, led by Jat zamīndār Nanda, had not paid their land revenue to the Amber state, and that they could only be forced to do so by a large army’. ⁶⁷ In 1709, when emperor Bahādur Shah ordered the faujdār of Mathura to demolish the garhi of Sogar, a large number of Jat peasants assembled in the garhi to fight the imperial troops. ⁶⁸

Not only the Jats of various clans but also other castes such as Meos, Meenas and Gujjars too joined forces with Churaman. For instance, on being asked by the dīwān of Amber to prepare a list of peasants who supported Churaman, the āmil reported that the peasants belonging to Sinsinwal and Deswal clans of Jats, Meenas and Pahat Meos also supported the cause of Churaman. ⁶⁹ Another report of the dīwān also refers to peasants of various castes, viz. Jats of Sinsinwal and Deswal clans, Meos and Meenas, joining Churaman’s forces and fleeing to Thoon at the sight of the approaching army of Amber:

O Maharaja, I have asked the āmils for a report from every pargana and received the same from them. In the reports of the parganas adjoining the areas under the control of the Jats, the āmils have written that the entire peasantry (sagali raiyati) of the villages of these parganas, among whom are the Jats of Deswal and Sinsinwal clans, Meos and Meenas, is with Churaman Jat. When we sent an army to take action against them, all fled to Thoon. ⁷⁰

In another instance, in 1714, the Meo peasants of twenty villages of pargana Khohri left their villages because of the heavy land revenue demand and took shelter in the Thoon fortress of Churaman. ⁷¹ Churaman even employed a number of Afghans from Bareilly and Sahajahanpur at a salary of ₹3 a day. ⁷² There was also a powerful section of the Gujjars of Helak and Sihi in his army. ⁷³ It also appears that Churaman enlisted the support of non-cultivating castes such as blacksmiths (lohars) who made ammunitions in the garhis of Jats (though they may also have been coerced to do so). For instance, in one report, the āmil informed the Amber Raja that Churaman had captured some blacksmiths of parganas Jalalpur and Wazirpur and taken them to his garhi at Thoon to make ramchangis and rahkallas. In response, the Amber ruler issued an order to the āmils that blacksmiths be asked to deposit undertakings with the āmils that they would not support the Jats and that if any blacksmith was found helping the Jats, strict action should be taken against him. ⁷⁴

Churaman’s conflict with Amber adversely affected agricultural production and led to the over-exploitation of peasantry, as both Amber officials and the Jats forcibly collected land revenue from them. In 1712 when Churaman collected the land revenue from villages in pargana Khohri, the Amber state reacted sharply and many peasants were imprisoned because it was alleged that they had willingly paid land revenue to the Jats. ⁷⁵ The Meo peasants indeed protested that they could not pay land revenue twice on the same crop, since they had already paid their land revenue to the Jats.

In 1716 the āmil reported that the peasants of 127 villages out of 342 villages in pargana Khohri had deserted their villages fearing an armed assault by the Amber state. The āmil further complained that hāsil could not be collected from these villages because the whole of it,that is, the taxable produce, had been consumed by the peasants in defiance of the state. ⁷⁶ Similar were the conditions in pargana Pahari that comprised 209 villages. According to an arzdāsht of 1712, the standing crops of twenty-four villages were destroyed by the peasants due to fear of the Amber army. ⁷⁷ The āmil’s report of 1720 from pargana Sahar lamented that the decrease in agricultural production in many villages due to the Jat revolt. ⁷⁸ The āmil’s report of 1718 from pargana Khohri shows that since in the wake of Jat revolt the peasants did not deposit the land revenue, and the Amber army had thereupon destroyed the harvest of one village, the peasantry of three villages had consumed their entire produce before the arrival of the Amber army, while the peasants of two villages had fled to Thoon; the peasantry of twenty villages, many of which were contiguous to the Jat territory, had carried away the share of produce payable as land revenue to Thoon; and two villages were found to be completely deserted. ⁷⁹

The Jat revolts adversely affected the state of agriculture in pargana Kol, apart from Mewat and Braj regions. Bhopat Ram, the āmil of pargana Kol, informed the Amber Raja that 183 out of 449 ½ villages were under the control of the turbulent Jats; that the state’s revenue officials managed to collect the meagre sum of ₹1,300 only out of the total land revenue of ₹97,729 due from the villages; and that it would be difficult to collect the revenue from these villages unless the Jats were overthrown. ⁸⁰

III

The underpinnings of Churaman’s rise to power went beyond the socio-economic interests of his community. A singular inspirational force behind the mobilisation of several peasant castes in the Jat revolts was their perception of Churaman’s activities. The ‘heroic’ exploits of Churaman and his men—physical assaults on Amber land revenue officials, removal of the Amber Rāja’s thānas and establishment of their own thānas, victories over the Amber army—fired the imagination of the peasantry who looked upon Churaman as their liberator from the oppressive rule of the Mughals and the Amber state. Thus, Churaman received more and more support from the peasantry, and the number of peasants flocking to his garhi at Thoon in order to evade the payment of taxes increased day by day. As already mentioned, impressed by Churaman’s image as that of a ‘manly’ warrior, fearless of the state power and lording over the region like a lion, they mustered up courage to refuse the payment of land revenue, steal grain or consume the standing crops.

In the view of the Amber state Churaman was a cunning, crafty and unreliable rascal; a notorious freebooter, traitor, seasoned plunderer and robber-chief; and, so its arch-enemy. ⁸¹ The nobility at the Mughal court also considered Churaman a rogue and a crook, but reasoned that a courageous Jat zamīndār, when required, could be used for their own purposes. So, the Sayyid brothers and Nawab Khān-i-Daurān propped him up against the Amber Raja. Even Churaman was probably aware of the fact that he was being used as a weapon against the Amber Raja and hence had been given the ijāra of so many parganas of Agra, Mathura and Mewat regions.

An important factor in the rise of Churaman’s military power was his alliance with the Naruka Rajput bhomias, ⁸² originally chākars of the Amber state, who had their grievances against their own clan chief, the Amber Rāja. Up to the mid-seventeenth century, the Narukas, already a dominant clan in the Alwar sarkār, had acquired limited bhom rights over several villages, but by the latter part of Aurangzeb’s reign they had not only managed to consolidate their existing land rights, but had also emerged as virtual bhomias in several parganas of Mewat.

A majority of the Naruka bhomias did not have any legitimate bhom rights to begin with. When the Amber Rāja obtained several parganas of Mewat as part of his tankhwāh jāgīr from the Mughal emperor Shāhjahān, a number of Narukas gained employment as troopers of the Raja. As remuneration, they were sub-assigned the villages of these parganas as jāgīrs by the Raja, but thereafter it became a constant endeavour of such Naruka Rajputs to convert their temporary rights in these jāgīrs into bhom or zamīndārī rights. However, when these parganas were transferred from the Amber Raja to other imperial manṣabdārs, the sub-assignees stood to lose the villages, and so many Naruka sub-assignees, instead of giving up their sub-assignments, tried to establish their bhom rights in the villages assigned to them. This brought them into conflict with the Amber Raja, as well as the imperial manṣabdārs who were assigned jāgīrs in these parganas of Mewat. State officials such as faujdārs and āmils repeatedly lodged complaints against the Narukas for forcibly establishing their bhom rights. For instance, in his report (arzdāsht) of 1702, Shyam Singh Rajawat, the faujdār of pargana Bahatri, complained to the Amber Rāja that the Narukas were trying to establish bhom rights in many parganas of Mewat. But more importantly, it also details the genesis of the conflict between the Narukas and the Amber state. It states that many villages of the fourteen mahals or parganas acquired in 1643 by the Amber Raja as part of his tankhwāh jāgīr from the Mughal emperor Shāhjāhān were sub-assigned to ṭhākurs (the Kachhwaha Rajputs, particularly their sub-clan, the Narukas) for settling their claims to remuneration. When the jāgīrs of these parganas were transferred from the Raja to other imperial manṣabdārs, some of the ṭhākurs left, while others (mainly the Narukas) remained in the villages sub-assigned to them. Some of the Narukas even got the ijāra of these villages from the new jāgīrdārs and continued living there. When disturbances caused by the Jats of Braj region gathered momentum in the villages of Mewat, these Narukas withheld the entire hāsil (land revenue). The report further stressed that although they were behaving as de-facto zamīndārs, their zamīndārī amals lacked legal sanction from the requisite authority, but the political turmoil in the region and the resultant laxity of imperial administration only made them bolder. The Narukas contested this official claim and argued that they had got the zamīndārī of Jalalpur, Bharkol and other parganas of Mewat in 1689 with the consent of village-level officials such as muqaddams, chaudharis and qānūngos, and on the recommendation of the imperial faujdār of Mewat. The Amber Rāja’s officials, in turn, dismissed these claims as spurious. They asserted that whenever the faujdār of Mewat was transferred, these ṭhākurs (Narukas) created disturbances in the villages: they would send their men to every village with five-coloured flags, establish their own thānas there and collect rāhdārī and other zamīndārī taxes from them. After the Amber Raja took the zamīndārī and thānedārī of parganas of Jalalpur, Mojpur, Bharkol and Khilohra from Vazahdi Khān, the faujdār of Mewat, in 1702, the Naruka bhomias created disturbances in these parganas and started claiming bhomi rights and collecting rāhdārī from the villages. Kishan Singh Naruka, for instance, claimed his bhomi right over Varkhera village of pargana Bharkol, so did Karan Singh Naruka over villages Rajpur, Kajota and Kundla of the same pargana, and Devi Singh Naruka over village Khohra of pargana Mojpur. Bhom rights over the villages of pargana Nahar-Khoh were also similarly claimed by the Naruka bhomias. When the land revenue officials of the Amber Raja went to these villages to collect land revenue from the peasants, they were manhandled by the Naruka bhomias in the presence of the peasants. ⁸³

Rajasthani documents amply testify to the fact that the Narukas gradually extended their illegal bhom or zamīndārī rights and consolidated their position over a large area in Mewat by the early eighteenth century, and by doing so threatened the Raja’s authority, as also that of the imperial manṣabdārs who were assigned jāgīrs in these parganas. In order to protect and enforce their zamīndārī claims, they constructed garhis in the villages and forced the peasants and traders to pay zamīndārī, rahdārī and other taxes. At the same time, they also refused to fulfil their obligations as soldiers of the Raja. For instance, according to the āmil’s report dated 1685, the Naruka bhomias constructed their garhis in the villages of fourteen mahals that constituted the jāgīrs of imperial manṣabdārs in Mewat, and forcibly collected the bhomi cess from the villages. ⁸⁴ Another report of 1704 by the dīwān of Amber is to the effect that Kishan Naruka had established his thāna in the garhi of Mojpur, filling it with a large number of sawārs and ammunition. The garhis of Vachhgaon and Rini were similarly furnished with sawārs and ammunition. Hirderam Bargūjar, a henchman of Kishan Naruka, established his bhom right in the village of Ghat-Khuteta of Bharkol pargana. ⁸⁵ Other reports claim that the garhi of Mojpur alone was furnished with 1,000 soldiers and 600 gunners whose duty was to provide military assistance to other garhis in the villages of Bharkol and Mojpur parganas. ⁸⁶ Reports also recount similar instances of Narukas increasing their military strength in their garhis in parganas Khohri, Banawar, Khilohra, Rini, Jalalpur and Naharkhoh and asserting their bhom rights in the villages of these parganas that had been taken either in ijāra or zamīndārī by the Amber Rāja. ⁸⁷

Like the Amber officials who lodged complaints with the Amber Raja against the Narukas for asserting their bhom rights, many imperial manṣabdārs, too, complained to the Mughal emperor about the depredations of Narukas in their jāgīrs. There are numerous references to the demolition of Amber Rāja’s thānas and physical assaults on his officials by the Naruka bhomias. The inability of the local authorities to meet the challenge of bhomias is an index of the growing ineffectiveness of the administrative machinery. One Naruka chief, Rao Hathi Singh and his men proclaimed their zamīndārī rights in all the villages of parganas Bharkol and Jalalpur and refused to surrender the zamindari amal of these villages to the Amber Rāja. ⁸⁸ Other prominent Naruka bhomias like Kishan Singh, Karan Singh, Gaj Singh, Uday Singh, Devi Singh, Sawai Ram, Anand Ram, Fauju Singh and Daulu Singh became so powerful that acting in unison, they moved freely in the villages of parganas Mojpur, Alwar, Bharkol, Hasanpur, Pindayan, Khilohra, Umarni, Todathek, Naharkhoh, Nanawar, Sonkhar-Sonkhari and Bahatri. ⁸⁹

The Amber state took punitive action against the recalcitrant Naruka bhomias, yet at times the combined resistance of the Naruka bhomias was strong enough to abort all efforts to subdue them. Led by Rao Hathi Singh Naruka and Kishan Naruka, they, in effect, raised the banner of rebellion against all levels of authorities, that is, their own clan chief, the imperial officials and the imperial jāgīrdars. Towards the closing years of Aurangzeb’s reign, they came to be reckoned as the most turbulent rebels. ⁹⁰ For instance, in 1702, the Naruka Rajputs revolted in seven parganas of Alwar sarkār whose zamīndārī and thanedari rights were assigned to Amber Raja by the faujdār of Mewat. ⁹¹ It was this conflict between the Amber Raja and the Naruka bhomias that turned out to be so opportune for Churaman in that he was enabled to make inroads into the parganas of Mewat held by Amber, by making common cause with the Narukas against Amber. A report of 1703 alerts the Amber Raja to a meeting of Churaman and Naruka leaders in qasba Sanchari:

O Maharaja, Naruka bhomias Kisna, Karan, Sawairam, Phoju, Dol and Rao Hathi Singh all have assembled in qasba Sanchari on the occasion of a fair dedicated to the goddess in chait. On the pretext of attending the worship of the goddess, Churaman Jāt, too, is preparing to come there. This news has been revealed to me by my spies. ⁹²

In 1704, when the faujdār of Hindaun attacked the garhi in tappa Rini (pargana Bahatri) of Kishan Singh Naruka and Daulu Naruka, Churaman sent 1,500 sawārs in support of the Naruka bhomias. ⁹³ The military alliance between Churaman and the Naruka bhomias threw up a new challenge for the Amber Rāja. The same year, the āmil reported to the Amber Raja that the Naruka bhomias had created disturbances in seven parganas of Mewat, and had become bolder after killing Shyām Singh Rājawat, the faujdār of Bahatri. ⁹⁴ Yet another report of 1704 by the dīwān states that Kishan Singh Naruka had imprisoned some blacksmiths and taken them away to his garhi in Shanchari Rajgarh where they had manufactured eleven rahkallas and ramchangis for his men. ⁹⁵ The report also reveals that they had also built many new garhis in the villages of Bharkol and Mojpur parganas, and celebrated their construction along with the peasants in feasts known as nangal. They had also begun to collect bhomi and rāhdārī taxes from the peasants and traders of these parganas. When the Amber officials reminded Rao Hathi Singh Naruka that the zamīndārī and thanedari of Mojpur and Bharkol parganas belonged to Amber Rāja, ⁹⁶ he replied that he wanted his zamindari rights in the seven parganas of Mewat to be recognised because it had not been fair on the part of the Amber Rāja to deny his Naruka chākars important positions in the administration. The dīwān, nonetheless, expressed shock at what appeared to him an unprecedented development, and he explained this audacity in terms of the support they had from Churaman Jāt, the arch-enemy of Amber. ⁹⁷ A report of 1714 refers to the Narukas and Jats joining hands to build a fortress in Mojpur that was part of Amber Raja’s jāgīr. ⁹⁸

In any case, by the end of 1715, the Naruka Rajputs, as allies of Churaman, had consolidated their hold over many parganas of Alwar sarkār. According to a report of 1714, when a large army of the Amber state led by Nathawat, Man Singh Solanki, Vidawat, Hamirdeka and Jait Singh came to destroy these garhis, the Naruka forces were suddenly reinforced by 5,000–6,000 sawars of Churaman Jāt, so that the balance tilted in favour of the latter, and the Amber army suffered heavy casualties, including the deaths of its commanders. ⁹⁹

Churaman thus strengthened the Naruka bhomias in their struggle against the Amber Raja by not only providing them military assistance but also by helping Kishan Singh Naruka receive imperial favours. The vakil of Amber reported to his master that Churaman Jat had introduced Kishan Singh Naruka to Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān and Khān-i-Daurān at the Mughal court seeking for him mansab, while both had given Churaman the responsibility to demolish the garhis of rebel Jat zamindars between Mathura and Agra. In the words of the vakil:

O Maharaja, Churaman Jāt requested Nawab [‘Abdullāh Khān] for the faujdāri of Mathura. He also brought Kiran Singh along; he, too, was given the responsibility to destroy the fortresses in the vicinity of Mathura. On the Nawab’s recommendation, Churaman has received the ijāra of all the parganas around Agra. The Churaman problem is becoming dangerous for us, and all this is because of the Nawab. ¹⁰⁰

The next year, Churaman was assigned the task of protecting the trade route (rāhdārī) between Agra and Shahjahanabad (Delhi). ¹⁰¹

By avoiding confrontation with the Naruka Rajputs who could have been their potential rivals, the Jats under Churaman aligned themselves with the Narukas in openly defying the authority of the Amber Raja. The confrontation between the Narukas and the Amber Raja, thus, provided the Jats enough ground to establish their zamīndārī rights over many parganas of Mewat. Churaman supported and fought not only for the Naruka Rajputs’ claims to zamīndārī rights against the Amber Raja but also for those of Pahat Meos, Khanzadas, Meenas and Gujjars. Reciprocally, he also got military support from these petty bhomias, most of whom had been displaced from their ancestral zamīndārīs by the Amber Raja and so saw Churaman as their saviour.

IV

Churaman’s influence at the Mughal court gradually declined, particularly after the fall of the Sayyid brothers in 1720. Despite having been inducted into the Mughal nobility as a manṣabdār, his usual plundering activities in the parganas of the imperial jāgīrdars and on the highways continued unabated and made him unpopular at the Mughal court. The emperor received recurrent complaints that he was (illegally) levying road tax (rāhdārī) and secretly manufacturing arms, had usurped royal territories and erected a mud fort at Thoon that he used as his headquarters. ¹⁰² As one report of 1717 informs us, emperor Farrukh Siyar, furious at receiving a large number of complaints from traders and imperial manṣabdārs against Churaman for his collecting rāhdārī at high rates, ¹⁰³ decided to take stern action against him. In September 1715, Farrukh Siyar recalled Amber chief Sawāi Jai Singh I from Malwa. On 25 May 1716, when Jai Singh presented himself before the emperor, he was asked to lead a military expedition against Churaman. ¹⁰⁴ In September 1716, Farrukh Siyar gave a formal order to Jai Singh to proceed against Churaman. Other Rajputs such as Bhim Singh Hada of Kota, Budh Singh of Bundi, Gaj Singh Kachhwaha, Chhatarsal Bundela, Durgadas Rathor and Rao Inder Singh were also ordered to join Jai Singh. He was given ₹40 lakh to meet his expenses. Jai Singh marched with a big army of about 50,000 cavalrymen and many infantrymen. On 11 December 1716 Jai Singh reached Thoon, where a fierce battle took place between the forces of the Raja and the Jats. Although 7 months passed; no victory was scored by either side. The Jats continued to hold their ground, and Churaman could not be arrested. Emperor Farrukh Siyar got angry over this impasse and recalled Jai Singh. ¹⁰⁵ Jai Singh openly accused the wazir Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān and Khān-i-Daurān for secretly supplying war materials to Churaman. Emperor Farrukh Siyar was aware that Churaman was secretly supported by ‘Abdullāh Khān and Khān-i-Daurān and, therefore, it was not easy for Jai Singh to crush him. ¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, ‘Abdullāh Khān sought to blame Jai Singh for his failure to crush the Jats despite wasting a good deal of money, while he conveyed to the emperor that Churaman wanted to present himself before the emperor along with his son and wife for seeking pardon, and that he had also offered ₹30 lakh as peshkash to the emperor. Abdullah Khan also assured the emperor that Churaman would not engage in any activity that hurt the emperor’s interests. Therefore, in 1718, the emperor reluctantly pardoned Churaman, and on the behalf of emperor, ‘Abdullāh Khān wrote to Khān-i-Jahān to conduct Churaman safely to the court along with members of his family. ¹⁰⁷

However, the whole episode irreparably ruptured the delicate balance of power between the emperor and the influential Sayyid brothers and deepened ill will between Jai Singh and the Sayyid brothers. The emperor refused to grant an audience to Churaman the second time. ‘Abdullāh Khān recalled his brother Ḥusain ‘Alī from the south, plotted to depose Farrukh Siyar and wanted Churaman to join him in his endeavour. ¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, their common grudge against the Sayyid brothers helped bring Farrukh Siyar and Jai Singh closer. Churaman, as before, remained one of the closest adherents and allies of the Sayyid brothers and actively participated in their conspiracy against Farrukh Siyar. Farrukh Siyar was eventually dethroned, blinded and imprisoned by the Sayyid brothers. But the new emperor Muḥammad Shah, too, turned against the Sayyid brothers. Eventually, the battle of Hasanpur on 2–3 November 1720 between Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān and emperor Muḥammad Shah’s forces, in which Churaman fought for his patron, sealed the fate of Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān. ¹⁰⁹ With his patrons gone, Churaman’s position at the Mughal court changed for the worse, since he was viewed as the enemy of the Mughal state. The following year, that is, on 10 October 1721, he committed suicide by consuming poison. ¹¹⁰

During the initial years of Aurangzeb’s reign, Jat uprisings were in an embryonic state, but by the time of his death Jat power had reached its peak under the leadership of Churaman. After Churaman’s death, emperor Muḥammad Shāh in 1722 ordered Jai Singh to lead a campaign to crush the Jats. ¹¹¹ While the Jat struggle against the state continued under Churaman’s elder son Mohkam Singh, the infighting between Mohkam Singh and his cousin (Churaman’s nephew) Badan Singh enabled Jai Singh to seize Thoon and raze it to the ground. Since Churaman’s death, the Jat movement had been divided in the wake of the power struggle between Mohkam Singh and Badan Singh that centred on the crucial issue of real aims of the Jat movement. While Mohkam Singh adopted an uncompromisingly confrontationist approach towards the Mughal court and the Amber state, Badan Singh and the majority of Jat zamīndārs favoured a conciliatory approach since they felt that the Jats could not afford to resist the combined might of the Mughal empire and Amber states for long. Even the Kachhwaha Raja Jai Singh of Amber supported Badan Singh’s claims to leadership of the Jats; and Badan Singh became a feudatory of the Amber Rāja. Badan Singh’s policy of conciliation and compromise enabled him to consolidate his power and protect the Jat zamindaris. Eventually, in 1725 Badan Singh went on to lay the foundations of a Jat state in Deeg, later known as the Bharatpur state, with the help of the Amber Rāja. ¹¹² There is no doubt, however, that it was Churaman who had prepared the ground for its establishment by organising the Jats into an impressive force.