Educating Critical Thinkers

Abstract

Proliferating information and viewpoints in the 21st century require an educated citizenry with the ability to think critically about complex, controversial issues. Critical thinking requires epistemic cognition: the ability to construct, evaluate, and use knowledge. Epistemic dispositions and beliefs predict many academic outcomes, as well as whether people use their epistemic cognition skills, for example, scrutinizing methods in science and evaluating sources in history. The evidence supporting the importance of epistemic cognition, inside and outside of the classroom, has led to a growing body of intervention research. However, more research can reveal how to best position teachers and students to develop and enact productive epistemic cognition. Promising directions for future research and policy include developing learning environments that promote students’ epistemic cognition and subsequent critical thinking, as well as incorporating this work into educator preparation programs.

Keywords

epistemic cognition critical thinking learning teachers

Preparing students to be 21st century critical thinkers requires research on epistemic cognition—how to create, evaluate, and use knowledge.

Key Points

The challenges of the 21st century require students who can think critically.

A growing body of evidence demonstrates that people’s epistemic cognition predicts a wide variety of academic outcomes, including 21st century learning skills such as critical thinking and argumentation.

Educators can teach and promote epistemic cognition, but they need support and training.

More research can show how to foster both students’ and teachers’ epistemic cognition, which in turn will enable students to think critically in the modern world.

Introduction

The technologies of the 21st century have afforded unprecedented access to a wide range of information, opinions, and claims about many diverse topics, including controversial ones such as climate change, or why Southern states seceded from the Union before the Civil War (S. R. Goldman et al., 2010). Today’s learners encounter and must reconcile views from an increasingly complex, international, and interconnected world (OECD, 2013; The World Bank, 2011). This rapid increase in information, and ease of access to that information, has led to many calls for changes to the United States’ education system, such as those outlined in the Common Core State Standards and the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS; National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, 2010; NGSS Lead States, 2013). These calls share a common goal of preparing today’s students to (a) thoughtfully participate in a democratic society (Jefferson, 1829), (b) be successful in the modern workforce (Association of American Colleges and Universities, 2011), and (c) reverse negative trends in U.S. students’ academic performance in comparison with their international peers (National Center for Education Statistics, 2007). To achieve this goal, today’s students must not only acquire the basic knowledge and skills necessary for success in the 21st century (Anderman, Sinatra, & Gray, 2012), but they must also learn to think critically about the many complex and controversial issues of the modern world (Alexander, 2014; Bonney & Sternberg, 2011; Metzger & Flanagin, 2008; National Education Association, 2014). However, critical thinking is not something that the human brain does naturally, and teaching students to think in such ways is challenging (Kahneman, 2011; Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014; Stanovich, 2010).

A great deal of evidence reveals how the dispositions, beliefs, and skills that comprise critical thinking require epistemic cognition: How people acquire, construct, understand, and use knowledge both within and beyond the classroom (Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, in press; Hofer & Bendixen, 2012; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). Epistemic cognition is needed whenever people are required to do more than simply memorize information or conduct simple procedures; for example, people use their epistemic cognition to determine who or what to believe, and to decide among numerous alternates for addressing complex problems. Unfortunately, epistemic cognition research has not sufficiently informed public policy, educator preparation programs, or public discourse about the goals of education (Hofer, in press). In this article, we review scholarship showing that effective epistemic cognition is necessary for thinking critically about complex issues. In addition, we identify the work that needs to be done to advance the scholarship on epistemic cognition; this in turn will provide insights into how to teach today’s students to think critically about the 21st century’s many complex issues (Alexander, 2014).

Critical Thinking

Critical thinking has been defined as purposeful reflecting and reasoning about what to do or believe when confronting complex issues, taking into account relevant context (Ennis, 1987). Most definitions of critical thinking include two main components. Critical thinking dispositions are relatively stable psychological factors that influence how people respond in a variety of settings (Stanovich, 2010). Inquisitiveness and intellectual honesty, among other dispositions, increase people’s likelihood of thinking critically (Facione, 1990).

Definitions of critical thinking also include a skill component, which is the ability to interpret, analyze, evaluate, and infer, even when meanings and significance are not immediately apparent, as well as the ability to stay focused on the task at hand (Abrami et al., 2015; Facione, 1990). For example, to analyze the quality of an argument, one must make inferences about its author, and evaluate not only the logic of a proposed argument but also the evidence supporting it, the credibility of its information sources, and various counterarguments (Murphy, Rowe, Ramani, & Silverman, 2014). In sum, people must have the skills to think critically, as well as the will or disposition to do so (Huber & Kuncel, 2015).

Two recent meta-analyses of existing research studies shed light on how to foster critical thinking. In the first meta-analysis, Huber and Kuncel (2015) found the college experience was associated with a significant gain in general critical thinking skills and dispositions. However, they found little evidence suggesting that increasing curricular focus on general critical thinking skills will result in additional gains. Instead, more research should be conducted to determine how to teach critical thinking skills within majors or specific disciplines (e.g., science, history, psychology). Likewise, Abrami et al. (2015) found interventions targeting general critical thinking skills and dispositions were only moderately effective, but discipline-specific critical thinking interventions were more promising.

These meta-analyses shed light on a long-standing debate in the field: Whether critical thinking is best taught as a general set of skills and dispositions, a discipline-specific set, or both (Alexander et al., 2011; Ennis, 1987; McPeck, 1981; Willingham, 2007). Advocates for discipline-specific critical thinking instruction argue for significant disciplinary aspects to many of the most pressing contemporary personal challenges (e.g., How will a political candidate’s position on taxes affect my income?), policy questions (e.g., To what degree, if any, are humans responsible for climate change?), and workplace demands (e.g., How will increased expansion of the middle-class in China affect stock markets in other countries?). Successfully addressing these questions requires deep disciplinary knowledge, as well as understanding how experts in those disciplines engage in analysis, evaluation, and argument (Alexander, 2014; Sandoval, Sodian, Koerber, & Wong, 2014). It is not enough to tell students to “think critically” about these questions; students must learn the specific skills experts use in these disciplines (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011; Sandoval, 2012). Researchers in the field of epistemic cognition have investigated how to optimize students’ will and skill for critical thinking.

Epistemic Cognition

Epistemic cognition is a process involving dispositions, beliefs, and skills regarding how individuals determine what they actually know, versus what they believe, doubt, or distrust (Chinn et al., 2011; Greene et al., in press; Hofer & Bendixen, 2012). In general, when people say that they “know” something, it implies that they believe it to be an accurate “take” on the world (Chinn & Rinehart, in press). People tacitly enact epistemic cognition every day, from depositing money in the bank, because they know it will be available for withdrawal at a later date, to depending on experts such as medical doctors to tell them what is known, as opposed to believed or guessed, about various health conditions. However, the challenges of the modern world make it clear that today’s students need to know more than just what, but also why and how. For example, compared with students who are taught scientific facts and nothing more, students who understand how science works are better able to evaluate and decide among differing claims about vaccines, climate change, and genetically modified foods (Sandoval et al., 2014).

Scholarly efforts to understand how people engage their epistemic cognition, and how to help them do so more effectively in formal and informal learning and work environments, have spanned numerous academic disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and science, mathematical, and history education, among others (Greene et al., in press). The various aspects of epistemic cognition, and empirical research regarding their relations with learning outcomes such as critical thinking, group into three categories: epistemic dispositions, beliefs, and skills (Sinatra, in press).

Epistemic Dispositions

The term epistemic virtues describes dispositions that positively influence other aspects of epistemic cognition, whereas epistemic vices describes dispositions that impinge on them (Chinn et al., 2011). For example, dispositions toward dogmatism and need for closure (i.e., desiring definitive answers and being averse to ambiguity; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) have been associated with maladaptive epistemic cognition skills and poor academic performance (DeBacker & Crowson, 2009). On the other hand, dispositions toward open-mindedness and willingness to think deeply predict effective epistemic cognition skills and positive academic outcomes (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). Furthermore, these dispositions are contextual, meaning that a person’s likelihood of displaying an epistemic virtue or vice depends on conditions (e.g., invoking need for closure when a decision is needed in a short period of time) and can vary from topic to topic (e.g., thinking deeply about historical arguments but being dogmatic about science; Chinn et al., 2011). Much like critical thinking dispositions, epistemic dispositions are associated with whether people enact epistemic cognition skills.

Epistemic Beliefs

What people believe about knowledge is an essential but “neglected facet of critical thinking” (King & Kitchener, 1994, p. 1) because how people interact with the knowledge they encounter is greatly influenced by how they perceive it. Models of people’s epistemic beliefs, their personal theories about knowledge and the process of knowing, comprise a large part of the research literature. Most models coalesce around four phases of development, characterized by differences in people’s beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn et al., 2000; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006; Schommer, 1990).

In general, these models posit that young children initially have what is called a realist perspective, believing that knowledge claims (e.g., “the earth is round”) are copies of an objective, directly knowable reality. For realists, knowledge is a simple list of relatively unrelated, and unchanging, facts about the world (Schommer, 1990). Realists believe that the process of coming to know something requires nothing more than asking others, such as an adult or an expert, to tell them what is “true.” People in this phase of epistemic cognition development have no use for critical thinking because, to them, the world is directly knowable through the senses or through appeals to experts who are never doubted. It is uncommon to find people displaying realist beliefs once they have entered formal education (Felton & Kuhn, 2007).

In the next phase of development, absolutism, people believe that humans can have direct, objective knowledge of the world. However, absolutists understand that a particular person’s assertions about reality may be incorrect, and therefore they acknowledge the need to check assertions against reality. Nonetheless, they maintain unflinching confidence in experts and other authorities, seeing no need to critically evaluate their reasons for claims about the world. For absolutists, critical thinking is merely the act of comparing a claim to reality, to determine whether it is correct or incorrect. Absolutist perspectives have been associated with numerous undesirable academic outcomes, including sixth graders’ poor integration of multiple online information sources (Barzilai & Zohar, 2012), high-school students’ difficulty analyzing controversies regarding genetically modified food (Mason & Boscolo, 2004), and college students’ poor comprehension and course grades (Ryan, 1984).

With time and continued exposure to formal and informal education, some people enter a multiplist phase that brings with it a critical shift in their beliefs about knowledge. Realists and absolutists believe that humans have direct access to objective truth, whereas multiplists understand that what humans call “knowledge” is a construction of reality, which can change over time given new understanding (Kuhn et al., 2000). However, multiplists view knowledge as inherently subjective and uncertain, and see no use for critical thinking, because they do not believe that humans have the capacity to ever know the world in any “correct” sense (Kuhn et al., 2000). Multiplists’ unwillingness to critically think about differing views has been associated with numerous undesirable academic outcomes, such as poor interpretation of conflicting viewpoints in a text, and subsequent poor performance when asked to analyze, evaluate, and integrate multiple sources into a coherent written argument (Barzilai & Eshet-Alkalai, 2015; Bråten, Ferguson, Strømsø, & Anmarkrud, 2013).

As people begin delving deeper into academic disciplines and practice communities, some will transition out of the purely subjective multiplist level by adopting an evaluativist perspective. Evaluativists recognize the need to reconcile objective and subjective views of the world through critical thinking. They understand that although perfect knowledge of the world is likely impossible, humans can construct useful descriptions or models of the world, and that some are better than others, based on evidence and argument.

Many researchers have argued evaluativism is the optimal level of epistemic cognition development (Hofer & Bendixen, 2012). The beliefs about knowledge and knowing that come with evaluativism are necessary for people to engage critical thinking as advocated by philosophers (e.g., Facione, 1990), education researchers (e.g., Alexander, 2014), and education policy experts (e.g., NGSS Lead States, 2013). Indeed, evaluativists are far more likely than absolutists to display the kinds of critical thinking and academic performance necessary for 21st century success (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014; Dahl, Bals, & Turi, 2005; Hofer, in press; Hofer & Bendixen, 2012; Kuhn et al., 2000). Likewise, compared with absolutists, evaluativists (a) use more cognitive and metacognitive strategies (Cano, 2005; Garrett-Ingram, 1997), (b) are more likely to engage in conceptual change (Mason, 2010; Qian & Alvermann, 1995), and (c) perform better when evaluating and reconciling conflicting resources (Bråten, Britt, Strømsø, & Rouet, 2011; Kardash & Scholes, 1996), navigating the Internet (Jacobson & Spiro, 1995), and completing their coursework (Cano, 2005; Hofer, 2000; Mason, Boscolo, Tornatora, & Ronconi, 2013; Muis, 2004; Schommer, 1992).

Epistemic Cognition Skills

People who have epistemic vices, or absolutist or multiplist beliefs about knowledge and knowing, are unlikely to engage their epistemic cognition skills (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014), also called epistemic practices (Sinatra, in press) or reliable processes (Chinn et al., 2011). These skills include how people decide whether a claim is worthy of being called knowledge or not. In the philosophical literature, this process has been called justification, as in, justifying a claim as knowledge (Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008). Epistemic cognition skills, including the epistemic practices of making well-reasoned knowledge claims and the ability to evaluate others’ knowledge claims, are associated with many desirable education outcomes: interpretation and comprehension (Strømsø & Bråten, 2010), argumentation performance (Kuhn, 2003), successfully reconciling multiple, conflicting texts (Bråten et al., 2011; Strømsø & Kammerer, in press), and learning performance (Mason et al., 2013; Muis & Duffy, 2013).

However, the specific practices that experts and laypeople use to interpret, analyze, evaluate, and infer do vary within and across disciplines (Chinn & Rinehart, in press; Sandoval et al., 2014; Sinatra, in press), in ways similar to the research on critical thinking (Huber & Kuncel, 2015). Overall, much of the research on epistemic cognition skills, including both general and discipline-specific investigations (Buehl & Alexander, 2002; Greene & Yu, 2014; Hofer, 2000; Muis et al., 2006) group into three types of justification, including (a) testimony from reliable sources, (b) the use of normative reliable processes, or (c) some combination of justification types.

Justification by testimony

No one person can investigate, analyze, and infer about every knowledge claim, from the mundane to the important, to determine its veracity. Therefore, people depend on a “division of cognitive labor” wherein they rely on the testimony of trusted others to justify knowledge (Kitcher, 1993). However, although justification by testimony is a common method for substantiating knowledge claims across academic disciplines, determining which sources are reliable, and which are not, often depends on discipline-specific knowledge (Chinn et al., 2011). Educators must teach students to recognize the indicators of trustworthy versus untrustworthy experts and other sources of testimony (e.g., articles in journals or magazines), and to frequently reevaluate whether a particular source continues to be reliable (A. I. Goldman, 2011). These skills are increasingly important as people gain access to a myriad of perspectives via the Internet (S. R. Goldman et al., 2010).

Justification by reliable processes

Another way people can justify their claims as knowledge is by detailing the epistemic practices they used to derive that claim. Effective reasoning about complex issues often requires knowledge of the accepted, or normative, epistemic practices in various disciplines (Chinn & Rinehart, in press; Sandoval, 2012). In science classes, students are taught various kinds of epistemic practices such as experimentation and hypothesis testing. Yet, even within various subdisciplines of the hard sciences, the experimental method varies (e.g., experiments in biology often involve procedures that are dissimilar to those for experimenting in physics). Likewise, although the experimental method is a reliable process in many hard and social sciences, it has little utility in other academic disciplines, such as history.

What critical thinking researchers call analysis or evaluation is actually a complex set of often discipline-specific epistemic practices. For example, when students are exposed to epistemic practices in science, they become more adept at discerning among types of evidence, as well as producing and critically evaluating causal claims (Sandoval et al., 2014; Schauble, 1996). In history classes, students are taught epistemic practices such as how to interpret sources, triangulate across sources, and evaluate their own and others’ explanations of historical events (VanSledright & Maggioni, in press). Interventions designed to help students read texts using historians’ epistemic practices improve academic performance (Reisman, 2012; VanSledright, 2002). In mathematics classes, rules of logic and proof, among other epistemic practices, are taught so that students know not just how to solve problems, but also why those solution procedures are thought most reliable (Weber, Inglis, & Mejia-Ramos, 2014). Explicit instruction in the epistemic practices of mathematics has led to increases in students’ ability to engage in higher order mathematical activities, such as writing proofs (Weber, 2006) and using more than just empirical evidence to explore proofs (Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009).

Multiple kinds of justification

Finally, some of the strongest arguments for a knowledge claim include multiple kinds of justification, such as testimony by authorities and the use of reliable processes (Bråten et al., 2011; Greene et al., 2008; Murphy, Alexander, Greene, & Edwards, 2007). Students’ use of varied justifications predicts better interpretation, evaluation, and integration of multiple texts, such as when people search the Internet for information to solve complex personal and professional issues (Bråten, Anmarkrud, Brandmo, & Strømsø, 2014; Bråten et al., 2013; Ferguson & Bråten, 2013; Strømsø & Bråten, 2009).

Summary: Connections Between Critical Thinking and Epistemic Cognition

Epistemic dispositions and beliefs can activate, or deactivate, the epistemic cognition skills needed for critical thinking (King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn et al., 2000). These skills are often discipline-specific, suggesting the most promising avenues for further improvement in students’ critical thinking are found within particular courses, such as science, history, or mathematics (Abrami et al., 2015; Huber & Kuncel, 2015). Next, we summarize the growing field of epistemic cognition intervention research, and its implications for policy and practice.

Epistemic Cognition Interventions, Implications for Policy, and Practice

How can productive epistemic cognition be fostered among today’s students? Despite the challenges of teaching people to think critically, even young children can analyze, evaluate, and interpret, if provided proper support and instruction (Murphy et al., 2014). Researchers have developed several successful epistemic cognition interventions (Bråten, in press). These interventions illustrate the learning environments needed to help students acquire effective epistemic cognition and critical thinking skills, and use them within and beyond the classroom.

Classroom Instruction Interventions

Traditional classroom instruction (e.g., predominantly teacher-focused, lecture-based) does not change maladaptive epistemic beliefs or skills, whereas constructivist classrooms do (Bendixen, in press; Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, & Harrison, 2004; Muis & Duffy, 2013). Constructivist classrooms differ from traditional ones by being student- and learning-focused, using pedagogies that allow students to practice and receive feedback in class. The most effective instructional strategies for promoting both epistemic cognition and critical thinking involve teachers creating a supportive environment where small student-peer groups actively construct and critique arguments about problems specific to the discipline (Muis, Trevors, & Chevrier, in press). Before and within these discussions, teachers can directly instruct and model discipline-specific problem-solving methods, argumentation skills, and epistemic practices (Abrami et al., 2015; Bendixen, in press; Murphy et al., 2014; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). In classrooms where the teachers explicitly focus on the arguments and justifications for particular ideas in their discipline (i.e., emphasizing not just the what but also the why and how), students are more likely to engage in effective epistemic cognition (Murphy et al., 2014). For example, when middle school students receive proper support, they can engage in sophisticated epistemic cognition, such as creating effective criteria for evaluating different scientific models, and choosing the best among them (Pluta, Chinn, & Duncan, 2011).

Constructivist pedagogy requires that teachers engage in often unfamiliar practices, such as allowing students opportunities to take the lead in exploring and solving problems, as well depending on students to help their peers (Bendixen, in press; Brownlee, Schraw, Walker, & Ryan, in press; Murphy et al., 2014). However, teachers need not abdicate their responsibility to help students learn. Rather, in constructivist classrooms, teachers must guide students to construct and evaluate their own, as well as others’ knowledge claims, so they can transfer these skills to the outside world. Teachers often struggle with this role, as it is not what they experienced when they were in school, and is unlikely to have been taught in their pre-service training programs. Nonetheless, with proper training, teachers can effectively diagnose which students need help, provide just-in-time support, and then fade that support over time, until students can enact epistemic cognition and critical thinking on their own (Abrami et al., 2015; Bråten, in press; Murphy et al., 2014; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). Unfortunately, such training in educator preparation programs is still all too rare (Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). Overall, the goals of initiatives such as Common Core State Standards and the Next Generation Science Standards are unlikely to be met unless educators are taught how to foster effective epistemic cognition as a part of pre-service training, and supported in doing so, through professional development and in-service support (Murphy et al., 2014).

Teacher Preparation

Teachers’ own epistemic beliefs predict their likelihood of endorsing critical thinking as a desired instructional outcome, and their likelihood of using pedagogies that promote critical thinking. Also, teachers’ epistemic beliefs predict their students’ success at solving complex problems (Brownlee et al., in press). Unfortunately, more research is needed on how to integrate epistemic cognition into teacher preparation programs. However, given the resource challenges of providing in-service teachers with sufficient professional development and support to engage in constructivist teaching, it is likely the more effective, efficient route is to incorporate these ideas into pre-service teacher training (Brownlee et al., in press; Buehl & Fives, in press).

Summary: Interventions and Implications

The literature on epistemic cognition identifies the kinds of classrooms, and goals for teacher training and professional development necessary to promote critical thinking. The next challenge is implementing, evaluating, and scaling up these ideas. Increased support for epistemic cognition research, both basic and applied, addresses this challenge. In addition, calls for education reform (e.g., Common Core State Standards, Next Generation Science Standards) should incorporate findings from the research on epistemic cognition and critical thinking. Calls for continued emphasis in education on general critical thinking should also clearly state the need to bolster initiatives that incorporate discipline-specific critical thinking and epistemic cognition research within science, history, mathematics, and other coursework.

Conclusion

Most parents, policy makers, and educators share a goal of teaching students how to critically think about 21st century challenges. Ample evidence shows positive epistemic cognition can promote the critical thinking needed to address these complex challenges. Students with adaptive epistemic dispositions and beliefs are more likely to enact the kinds of epistemic cognition skills necessary for successful critical thinking, argumentation, deep conceptual understanding, and academic performance. However, more basic and applied research must show how to foster both students’ and teachers’ epistemic cognition, and then scale up successful interventions. Policies that support such work, in philosophy and with resources, will enable this promising area of scholarship to be fully explored and effectively translated into positive student outcomes (Hofer, in press). Preparing students for 21st century challenges will require research and policy initiatives that ensure epistemic cognition is no longer a “neglected facet of critical thinking” (King & Kitchener, 1994, p. 1).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Educating Critical Thinkers

Abstract

Keywords

Tweet

Key Points

Introduction

Critical Thinking

Epistemic Cognition

Epistemic Dispositions

Epistemic Beliefs

Epistemic Cognition Skills

Justification by testimony

Justification by reliable processes

Multiple kinds of justification

Summary: Connections Between Critical Thinking and Epistemic Cognition

Epistemic Cognition Interventions, Implications for Policy, and Practice

Classroom Instruction Interventions

Teacher Preparation

Summary: Interventions and Implications

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

References