Secular Democracies,Governance and Politics of Religion in South Asia

Introduction

The issues taken up in this article are both contestable and debatable. We are dealing with the idea of politicised religion which forms a tenuous relationship with the idea of secularism. It is not only political version of religion that confronts the idea of secularism. Rather, it is the idea of religion per se that is placed and understood in contrast to secularism. The global emergence of politicised religion—religious terrorism, fundamentalism, religious violence and greater visibility of religio-political parties—has brought the idea of secularism under scrutiny. Religio-political parties have also succeeded in forming government in various states. The religious political parties attempt to establish hegemony of dominant community, homogenise the cultural pasts and redefine nationalism. The public reappearance of religion and its politicisation has alarmed the scholars about the possibilities of secular society. The normative understanding of secularism has been challenged and understood in terms as ‘crisis of secularism’ and ‘limits of secularism’. In no way the issues dealt in this article provide linear and simple answers as there are no straightforward and clear-cut answers for these questions. The public reappearance of religion has not only distorted the possibilities of secular, just, equitable and liberal society but it also asks for revisiting the univeralising principles of Western modernity. Apart from resorting to violence and discrimination, the religious groups revisit their histories, demand for greater participation and representation in socio-political and economic spheres, and reframe the terms of nationalism. Communalism—conflict between religious communities1

In this article, we will explore: politicised religion in South Asia with respect to Western conceptualisation of secularism and secularisation, and religio-political formations in South Asia after the 1950s. It is beyond the scope of the article to delve into colonial history of South Asia and how colonial policies dealt with the issue of religion. I am limiting my focus on post-colonial period when South Asian states embarked on the path of modernisation and imagined creation of secular democratic states. It needs to be taken into account that religious politicisation, in the form of religious communalism, existed in South Asia during the colonial period. In post-colonial period, religion played an important role in the formation of nationalisms and modern secular states. Since the early 1980s, religion has become overtly politicised. The continuous presence of religion in society at large and use of religion for political interests by population groups—majority or minority—are also associated with the functioning of economy and the modes of governance. The article concludes that several ideas, used in the West, fail to grasp the functioning of politics and religion in these societies. Therefore, one needs to be a little cautious in using sociological concepts in South Asian situations.

South Asia offers an opportunity to understand and expand various ideas proposed by modernist thinkers, particularly the ideas of secularism and secularisation. The notions of ‘return of religion’, ‘resurgence of religion’ and ‘reappearance of religion’ are, nowadays, used frequently to describe greater visibility of religion in public sphere. Scholars, public statesmen and intellectuals are perplexed by the enhanced visibility of religion in contemporary times. In fact, ‘the return of religion’ is a surprise moment for many, at least in the West. It poses a question mark on modernist dream of demise of religion and weaning of religious authority in modern society. It was imagined by modernists that with modern scientific knowledge and scientific rationality, religion will be relegated to private domain and gradually lose its significance in society. I must assert that unlike the West, there is no such ‘return of religion’ in South Asia. It shall not surprise us as religion never disappeared from politics, market or society at large. It has been a potent force that determines all spheres of life: polity, economy or everyday life. One must not relate this to Oriental constructions of Indian subcontinent. We need to take this into account that religion forms an important aspect of life in South Asia. We may ask: why religion could not be dissociated from politics, market or everyday life in South Asia? What is the trajectory of development of secularism when secularisation has not been achieved? How modern nation-states in South Asia dealt with religion and religious communities? How majority community circumscribed political space of minorities? How minority religious groups responded to the challenges posed by majority? Do governance and state policies help in survival of religion?

For a few decades after independence/liberation, countries in the region claimed to be welfare and secular state. Then why did communities never gave up religion for social and political gains? These are a few questions that we will be dealing with in this article. The article has made a modest attempt. In this short article, it is not possible to discuss various ways in which religion survives or has taken key forms in the recent times. The article discusses few broad patterns of intertwining of religion with politics in South Asia. It discusses how governance, state policies and practices of secularism helped religion survive that in turn influences politics in South Asia. We take up cases from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal to elaborate on the key concerns of this article. In the coming sections, we will discuss fusion of religion and politics in South Asia since the early 1950s. We will discuss ethnic violence, communalism, fundamentalism and religious nationalism to unfold religion’s association with politics. Furthermore, the article takes up key issues such as underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and governance of services, political economy of welfare and marginalisation of minorities; and how these factors contributed towards persistent presence of religion in politics in South Asia. Towards the end, we will take up these issues and discuss South Asian form of secularism.

Religion, Secularism and Secularisation in the West and South Asia

It is overtly clear now that non-Western societies did not experience transformations the way the West experienced it. Much of the exposure to the modern ideas and implantation of them in non-Western societies were through the colonial masters who gauged the colonies and its institutions though their own templates. Peter van der Veer (2001, 2011) stresses the centrality of imperialism in shaping of secularism in India. In the wake of imperial encounter, religion in India was not denounced. Rather internal tensions were reformed. Furthermore, modern Indian state imagined being a secular state but religion was an important factor in mobilisation against colonialism. Similarly, the idea of Pakistan (a pure land) emerged during the colonial times which demanded for a separate country for the Muslims of Indian subcontinent. After Independence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was at the centre for demand for Pakistan, called for the creation of secular Pakistan. It is important to note that the initial leadership in South Asian (e.g., Nehru in India and Jinnah in Pakistan) countries imported the idea of liberal secularism model from the West. However, such proposals were forwarded due to the religious violence that countries had seen immediately before the Partition. In order to remove religious prejudice and help in creation of modern nation, the leaders required to moot a new idea for nation building.

As we will discuss in the coming sections, religion was either accommodated or it entered the political scene in South Asian nations but it was recognised as an important factor and was not assigned or forced in the private realm. ‘In the West secularism historically sought the separation of spheres of state and religious authority, broadly to correspond to the domains of public and private life’ (Needham and Rajan 2015: 20).2

The recent emergence of public religion not only questions the credo of secularism but also the way religion has been defined and imagined in the modern world. The differentiation between private and public domains cannot be defended as the boundary between them is crossed regularly. People do not live in two distinct worlds. It is more appropriate to say, as Martin Marty (2003) suggests, that we live in religio-secular world and we cross the domains regularly and frequently. An associated idea to secularism that was deployed by modernist thinkers is secularisation which demarcated public and private domains. It was said that along with modernisation, secularisation will assist in pushing religion in private domain and gradually it will help in the removal of religious influence even from the private sphere. Casanova (1994) expands the idea of secularisation and suggests three dimensions that are important with regard to secularisation and modernisation. These are: structural differentiation and separation of religion and other value ‘spheres’, privatisation of religion and decreasing significance of religion. All the three dimensions in South Asian context fails. To some degree, value spheres look differentiated but other aspects, privatisation as well as decreasing significance of religions, are not tenable. As said earlier, the term religion itself has come under question because it does not correspond to or clearly translate faiths and traditions in non-Western societies. ‘Many people have begun to argue that the concept “religion” requires jettisoning because, instead of helping us understanding the phenomenon of religion, it merely hinders’ (Balagangadhara 2013: 10). It became important to highlight that the concept of religion is a Western and Christian construct and has a debated history. W. C. Smith (1962) argues that terms like faith and tradition were more conveniently used than religion before the Enlightenment. Similarly, Talal Asad (1993) has also shown how universalising definitions of religion are the product of Western and Christian thinking. As Balagangadhara (2013: 245) shows that ‘Christian theology is the theoretical framework within which investigations into religions [in other cultures] have taken place’ .

Having discussed the problem of uncritical employment of concepts of religion and secular, we can understand religion’s role in politics in South Asia, at least, at three levels. One, religion in South Asian states has been recognised in Constitutions to safeguard cultural interests of minority religious communities. This means that religion was not dissociated from the state policy and this has been a matter of contestation for majority religious community. Two, a majority of states in the region also profess specific religions as state religion which creates problems for the minorities and their integration in the political society. Three, religious and ethnic violence in the region have existed for a long time but in the recent decades, aggressive ethnoreligious nationalism has made religion more apparent and these groups have either formed their own political parties or are supported by other political parties. Almost all religions of the world live in this region—Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Not only this, these religious communities do not form homogenous and unitary group. The religious groups are internally divided. As Mann (2005: 474) asserts for India, ‘No one knows how many ethnic groups there are, but they are so numerous that no one could rule the country merely by mobilizing ethnic loyalties.’ Therefore, Rawls’ (1993: xx) question is highly pertinent to be asked again, ‘How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ Religion in South Asian case is interesting for two reasons. One, the modern South Asian states were imagined to grow as liberal and secular democracy. Two, at the same time, secularisation has never been achieved and religion remained a dominant factor in determining socio-political choices. Religion always remained in public sphere. It took centre stage in assertion of ethnic identity, formation of ethnoreligious nationalism and execution of ethnic violence.

Religion and Politics in South Asia

As said earlier, South Asian countries are polyethnic and have substantial minority population. Secularism in the region has taken a variety of trajectory. For example, in order to safeguard minorities and integrate them in modern Indian nation, Indian state recognised religious minorities in the Constitution and promises to intervene in religious matters to promote their culture. The principles such as sarva dharma sambhav (equal treatment to all religions) and dharmanirpekshta (non-partisan) are the facets that unfold secularism and religious pluralism in India. Article 44 of the Constitution of India calls for the creation of Uniform Civil Code (UCC). The Indian state realises this historical problem of codifying UCC as civil matters are dealt through customs of religious communities. The Indian state not only promotes religious pluralism but also follows legal pluralism. Therefore, the matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance are dealt by codified customary laws of each religion, for example, Muslim Personal Law. The inability of the state or the impossibility of enactment of UCC is one of the contentions for Hindu nationalists.

The pressures from elites, instable governments and military coups in Pakistan have made the state adopt Islam as state religion. Similar is the case with Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, like India, the majority groups regularly pressurised the state to announce ‘their religion’ (read Buddhism) as state religion. Similarly, use of religion for political means was always a state of affair, though it did not surface till the 1980s. From the early 1980s, the overt public appearance of religion has emerged in the form of ethnic violence, religious nationalism and fundamentalism. Globally, it is related to phenomenon of growing nexus between religion and politics. Internally, it is related to changing political economy, practices of secularism and various forms of marginalities which contest for greater share in political power and legitimisation of authority.

In terms of modern political principles, South Asia constitutes of newborn countries. Nepal which was a monarchy till the last decade announced itself a Hindu nation in the year 1959. In the transition phase from monarchy to secular–liberal democracy, religion may have been denounced but there is an overt use of religious symbols and beliefs to garner popular support by prominent political parties. The three countries—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—‘emerged from the dissolution of the British colonial empire in South Asia’ (Ganguly 2007: 70).

All these countries announced and claimed that they will be secular and democratic countries. However, political developments within these countries have seen virulent forms of religious conflict and intertwining of religion with politics. Sri Lanka recognised special rights for specific religious community in the early 1970s. Since the early 1980s, it is an observable fact that religion has grown powerful and used as instrument in mobilisation by political parties in the region. Similarly, religious fundamentalism is on rise since the early 1980s in all the countries in South Asia. The countries in the region have different yet similar religio-political developments. In this section, we will look at association between religion and politics in these countries and attempt to trace similarities in order to arrive at some broad conceptual framework.

In the West, the authority of the church was challenged and alternatives were developed. Such was not the case in South Asia. South Asian region, unlike the West, neither had a central religious authority nor a unified religious community that binds discrete communities around a single sacred scripture or single religious belief.3

The countries—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—were created on the basis of religion. The unified Pakistan emerged out of religious confrontation and Islam remained an important factor in its creation. The prominent political leaders and dominant voices within India also forwarded the demand to announce India as Hindu nation. Though such demand was never approved by Indian state but religion had already divided the society at social and political level. The state of Pakistan and India emerged out of mass scale religious violence and contestations. Millions of people were displaced, particularly from undivided Punjab. Muslims moved to Pakistan while Sikhs and Hindus moved to India. Amidst such violent situation, the states of Pakistan and India emerged.

Despite demands from elites and the majority, the initial leadership in India made concerted efforts to create a secular and democratic society. Nevertheless, religious animosities and divisive politics remained operational. The decade of 1950s was quite a silent period but from the 1960s onwards, communal/ethnic violence has defined a dominant character of Indian politics. By the 1980s, religious fervour came to such a height that communities which had silently been casting their votes on religious lines, started affiliating themselves with particular political parties. Like other regions of the world, the 1980s was a turbulent decade in South Asia. In India, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) started mobilising Hindus around issues of Hindu rashtra (Nation). The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a self-proclaimed Hindu representative, had been active since the colonial period but could not garner popular support till the late 1980s. In its political programme, Muslims are considered outsiders and they need to be treated as second grade citizens. In fact, they have called to send Muslims to Pakistan. The Congress party was blamed to be ‘pseudo secular’ that ‘appeases’ Muslims and differentiates Hindus. To some extent, certain political decisions such as Shah Bano4

The BJP which was a marginal political party till the early 1980s grew powerful in this period. Its vote share grew and seats in the Parliament and legislative assemblies of several provinces increased. The demolition of Babri Masjid-Ram janmabhoomi in Ayodhya saw a series of communal violence across India. The most destructive was in Bombay (Mumbai). In these incidents, the religious communities were polarised politically as well as divided socially. The political power and authority that came to the BJP boosted their confidence in divisive politics and the party workers began to assault other religious groups, especially the Christians. Shiv Sena, a regional political party in the state of Maharashtra and an ally of BJP, is also known for its aggressive politics around Hindu–Muslim divisions. There are several other smaller parties with local appeal that also follow the principles of RSS and BJP. However, Muslims have also found political patronages from regional parties such as All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) in Hyderabad, Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh and so on. They are also organised and prefer to vote for these parties.

The late 1970s and the early 1980s was a period when terrorism and separatist movement in the state of Punjab (India) was at its height. The Khalistan Movement, assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and political assassinations of several political leaders in the period created a state of terrorism in the state of Punjab. Mahmood (1996: 2) says, ‘Sikh militants in the northwestern state of Punjab in India have been engaged in an armed insurgency … Their ultimate aim is the formation of a sovereign nation of Khalistan, [land of the pure]’. She further says:

With the beginning of this millennium, the Gujarat carnage redefined violence in India. It has been observed that communal violence over the last 50 years has grown in degree and intensity. Instead of being spontaneous and random, violence in India has become systematic, calculated, deliberate and planned. Brass (2004) argues that most of the cities in India have developed riot systems that have been institutionalised and become active during elections and communal violence. Gujarat violence is also indicative of prominent role played by the state machinery in execution of violence. However, Gujarat violence was not the first instance when police and constabulary participated in violence. What lessons one can learn from such incidents? One, religion plays a prominent role in creation of identity in India. The secular identity is superseded by Hindu, Muslim or Sikh religious identity. The majority population in India, that is, Hindu, and dominant and elites within Hindu community are claiming to carve India as Hindu nation and Muslims and Christians are considered outsiders. Other minority religious groups such as Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists are often subsumed and assimilated within larger Hindu community. Various communal events have systematically called for making India a Hindu rashtra wherein the masculinities and machoisms are staged and performed. As Mann (2005: 474) says, ‘Some Hindu movements have been tempted toward organic nationalism, the ideal of an essential Hindu-ness, Hindutva, buttressed by a Hindu state, rashtra, granting only second-class citizenship to non-Hindus.’ Two, even if the state remained neutral on religious issues, the dominant majority forwarded and demanded for official recognition of their religion as state’s religious identity. The rift created by such demands and execution of violence raises serious questions on practices of secularism. The political miscalculations or short-term political gains by aligning with specific religious communities by the Congress have given reasons to Hindu nationalists to forward their demand and marginalise other religious communities. ‘Such argumentation was directed at the modern ideas of secularism, liberalism and democracy and was meant to create a basis for differentiated rights instead of equal rights of individuals and groups that were outside their community’ (Ahmed 2011: 2).

The case in Pakistan is more severe. Though created alongside India, the initial leadership did not succeed in creating a secular nation. Islam and Muslim identity were the mobilisational tools in the creation of Pakistan. The paradoxical moment came when it tried to install secularism in the newly created state. The religio-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) opposed Jinnah’s effort to install secularism in Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan was enacted quite late than India and immediately suffered successive military coups. In 1958, General Ayub Khan replaced the government. The populist governments have been removed several times during the past 70 years. The decisive moment came with the military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was removed. During the reign of General Haq (from 1977 to 1988), a series of reforms were introduced to Islamise Pakistan. As Ahmed (2011: 10) demonstrates:

However, the seeds of Islamisation were already sowed during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s regime. ‘The wavering between socialist rhetoric and Islamic symbolism of the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto … created opportunities for the Islamists to colonize the political arena’ (Riaz 2011: 19). As Riaz (2011: 19) further argues, ‘In the early days of Pakistan, Islam was invoked nominally to hold the precarious balance between various segments … the situation changed in subsequent years, as the elites faced challenges from the ethnic nationalities (i.e. Bengali, Baluch etc) based in various parts of Pakistan’. As said earlier, religion–political parties such as JI wanted to create a theocratic state in Pakistan. It shared power with military regimes. However, JI is not the only party that uses Islam as its political principle. A six-party coalition named the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)6

Like India and Pakistan, there are several smaller parties which have made religion as principal political ideology. Bangladesh which was curved out of Pakistan in 1971 has a somewhat similar story. East Bengal joined Pakistan during the Partition of British India. East Bengal was predominantly Muslim dominated and they were mobilised on the name of Islam to join Pakistan’s demand for separate land for Muslims. However, hegemonic controls of elites from West Pakistan and lower chances of representation of their voices created rift which culminated in civil war and later creation of a separate country. Like Pakistan, the early leadership (particularly Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) in Bangladesh tried to accommodate secular ideals alongside Islamic law and principle. Here again, like Pakistan, the Bangladesh military overthrew populist government short after Independence. This again brought back Islam in formal political arena. The two prominent political parties—Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—have accommodated religion into their political rhetoric. BNP was supported by a coalition of smaller parties which subscribe religion as political creed between 2001 and 2006. The coalition of such smaller parties called as Islami Oikya Jote (Islamic United Front) along with Bangladesh JI was an ally of BNP. In the preceding decade of 1990s, the Awami League used religious language to counter the influence of BNP (Riaz 2011: 16).

The two major population groups—Sinhala and Tamil—in Sri Lanka are divided not only culturally but also politically. In 1931, when first election was introduced, the Tamils, based in the northern region, opposed the elections while the Sinhala leadership keenly contested the elections. One of the major developments that have continued to this date in Sri Lanka is the insidious inclusion of religion in politics. Since the early 1980s,

As Riaz (2011: 16) asserts, ‘In Sri Lanka, religious ideologies are blended in almost all parties’ ideological stance towards national issues.’ The Sinhala population in Sri Lanka is the dominant community. The community is represented by two major political parties: Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and United National Party (UNP). Both parties have been using religion in their political discourse to counter each other and garner popular support. Riaz (2011) argues that these parties not only represent Sinhala population but also the dominant Buddhist tenets. In doing so, the political parties marginalised Tamils that culminated in civil war between the state and the separatist group LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). Unlike India,

Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP, People’s Liberation Front), the Sinhala Youth Party played an important role in ethnic cleansing during the 1980s. Tambiah (1992) has demonstrated how these parties have adopted Buddhist restoration as essential planks of the party platforms. ‘Therefore the two major Sinhala political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, not only grew closer ideologically regarding Buddhist restoration but also became alternative choices in subsequent elections’ (Tambiah quoted in Riaz 2011).

Like Hindu nationalists in India, the dominant population group has pressurised the state to announce their religion as state religion. Unlike India which did not succumb to the pressure of Hindu nationalist, Sri Lanka in the 1970s started promoting Buddhism and privileged majority population. Hindu nationalism in India got much support from various religious groups and sadhus (saints). They played an important role in the mobilisation of Hindu population towards Ram janmabhoomi movement. Though the sadhus and religious organisations did not form any political party of their own but they supported the BJPs Hindutva ideology. In Sri Lanka, the Buddhist monks supported the cause of Buddhist restoration and aligned with SLFP and UNP. The monks came together and formed their own political party called as Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). As Spencer (2007) says, ‘what divides Sinhala from Tamil are not necessarily “incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” … as what Taylor calls “the search for recognition and respect” and the collective hurt occasioned by misrecognition and disrespect’ (Taylor 1992 quoted in Spencer 2007: 155).

Nepal, located in the Himalayan region, was a monarchial state till 2006. The King was replaced by a self-conscious democratic revolution as it imagined forming a secular democratic nation. Alongside, the Maoist revolution also began in the country. Richard Burghart (1993) discusses political development in Nepal in the 1980s. After a brief stint of politics around political party in the decade of 1950s, King Mahendra dismissed party system and in the early 1960s, a new constitution was adopted in which panchayat was supposed to advice the King. The monarchial state had already announced Nepal as Hindu rashtra. It is too early to talk about the role of religion in politics of modern Nepal. However, struggle for power amidst protests and contestations has marred the successful creation of modern Nepal. As Riaz (2011: 16) suggests that ‘avowedly religio-political parties have emerged in the late 1990s, for example the Nepalese affiliates of the India-based Hindu political party Shiv Sena, locally known as Pashupati Sena, Shiv Sena Nepal and Nepal Shiv Sena’.

Governance and the Practice of Secularism

It is evident from the above discussion that it is highly untenable to keep religion away from politics in South Asia. It is not possible to maintain boundary between religious and secular, or public and private sphere, or modern and primordial identities. These boundaries are porous and fuzzy. In the 1980s, a few scholars maintained that secularism in India cannot sustain as a political ideology. Nandy (1998) and Madan (1998) opined that secularism has been forced upon in a religious society. This line of argument looks fine in the context that we discussed above. However, such arguments restrict understanding larger forces that contribute in the failure of secular practices. One shall ask: Is religion really responsible for the crisis of secularism? To some extent, one may affirm it and could answer in a positive sense. Nevertheless, looking at the larger issues and other forms of discriminations and marginalisations (e.g., regional, linguistic, gender and caste), I claim that religion alone cannot be held responsible for the failure of secularism. Religion provides ground for contestations and develops unity but it is not responsible for failure of secularism. The failure of secularism is a culmination of several factors: the weakness of the states, unwillingness to execute secular principles and ideals, historical legacies, scarce public good, and a larger tendency of the dominant/majority to override other sections of population. Within these, the religion is inserted and politicised. The majority community is threatened by the loss of power and authority in the wake of modern secular practices and affirmative actions. Any support or recognition to minority in such situation is understood as appeasement or favoritism.

The confused stand of the state on religious affairs is another aspect. Nehruvian era in India had already brought religion in political sphere (e.g., the debates around codification of Hindu Code Bill and unwillingness of the state to modernise the Muslim Personal Law). Similarly, Indira Gandhi used religious card to expand Congress party’s appeal. The worst decisions in this line were taken by Rajiv Gandhi. The Shah Bano case was politicised and the government came under scrutiny for distorting secular ideals.

There are other dimensions that need to be taken into account. The historical legacies, colonial administration, Muslim separatism, assimilative attitudes of majority and the Partition have contributed much in the polarisation of Hindus and Muslims in post-Independence period. Any effort for the growth and development of minorities are considered as encroachment in majorities’ domain. The majority in these countries have remained apathetic towards the minorities. Similarly, in other countries of the region, the tendency to marginalise minorities is apparent. The military regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh have used religion in order to legitimise their authority. The ulema (Islamic scholar), monks and sadhus have also played their role in inserting religion in political institution. As Spencer (2007) argues that division between Sinhala and Tamil in Sri Lanka emerges from the

Conclusion

Our problem with secularism is not because of political inefficacy or it tries to keep religion away from polity, economy or society at large. Perhaps, much of the problem is conceptual as well as practical. Conceptually, secularism in normative sense was forwarded as a programme to contain tensions and conflicts in modern society as much of the conflict in pre-modern world emerged from religious institutions. The Thirty Years War in the West and thereby the Peace of Westphalia are the remarkable points that asked for containment of religion. With this a universal ideal and singular trajectory of secular modern world was conceived. Eisenstadt (2000) asserts that various societies have followed different trajectories of modernity. From this, it follows that secularism must have taken different trajectories in non-Western world. At practical level, many of the non-Western countries, after Independence, imported Western idea of modernisation in which secular practices were implicit. Nehru calls this ‘pillars of modernity’ (Calhoun et al. 2011). Perhaps, such importation has rightly been questioned by Nandy and Madan and the cases discussed in this article are indicative to this fact. In South Asia, the states might have tried to separate out the domains of religious and secular but these domains do not form watertight boundary. As Bhargava (2011) suggests that we shall not abandon the idea of political secularism as it is still the best available bet in the modern world. He also suggests ‘it is time we shifted focus away from doctrines toward the normative practices of a wide variety of states’ (Bhargava 2011: 92). We shall be in agreement with Bhargava’s thesis that we shall see secularism differently as a critical perspective not against religion but against religious homogenisation and institutionalised religious domination (2011: 92). Lastly, as we have seen that the problem of religion or secularism is not a problem. The problem lies in the way religious and political matters are dealt by the states. This is also a problem of the majority which does not try to integrate to minority. Rather, the majority asks for differential treatment. A strong state with judicious approach may contain conflict in South Asia.