Discord in Matrilineality: Insight into the Khasi Society in Meghalaya

Abstract

The matrilineal society of the Khasi tribe in Meghalaya is now undergoing a transitional phase, whereby, on the one hand, the government is attempting to destine its traditional political institutions into more efficient instruments of democratic decentralisation, resulting into contradictions over the ‘manoeuver of village-level governance’ between the government and the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC), and, on the other hand, a section of Khasi men presuming themselves to be deprived of the property rights wanting to be recognised at par with the Khasi women. Given such a situation, this piece of work attempts to analyse the status of both Khasi males and females in terms of their involvement in social, economic and political affairs under matrilineality. It also critically evaluates the fecundity of the Village Administration Bill (VAB) of 2014 keeping a gender perspective in focus. The article, however, argues that despite having claimed to have placed women in higher position than men in the society, the Khasi matrilineality vitriolically relegates the role of women in politics and governance, thus portraying a contradiction. This contradiction even vividly exists in the recent VAB passed by the KHADC. Our primary survey also reflects that the female workforce has mostly established a foothold in the low-profile economic activities while dominance of the male workforce is found in those economic activities that are associated with a higher social status.

Keywords

Matrilineality Khasi tribe Meghalaya Khasi political affairs

Introduction

The state of Meghalaya in Northeastern India is the homeland to three indigenous tribal communities: the Garo, Khasi and Jaintia who practise matrilineality by law. Matrilineality is a social system in which the family line, unlike the patrilineal society, is traced through women. The children adopt the mother’s surname and the property and wealth are inherited by the daughter from the mother, not by the son from the father. Among these three tribal communities, the Khasi is the largest one contributing about half of the state’s total population. However, the Khasis and Jaintias have resemblance in religion, culture and social structure and form more or less a composite group (Lyngdoh 2012; Narzary and Sharma 2013). Before the arrival of the British and their colonialism in undivided Assam,¹

Till March 1970, Meghalaya was a constituent district of Assam. It achieved the status of an autonomous district on 2 April 1970, and was subsequently declared as a constituent state of India on 21 January 1972.

the entire Khasi community followed their traditional indigenous religion called Ka Niam Tip Briew Niam Tip Blei, meaning thereby the ‘Religion of Knowing Man, Knowing God’ (Mawrie 1981). However, with the establishment of Shillong as the headquarters of the undivided Assam Province by the British colonial rule in 1874, the land of these indigenous tribal communities started facing a breeze of change, especially in religion, marriage²

In Meghalaya, marriage as a legal institution came into force only after the advent of the British and Christianity. Prior to this, the Khasi society recognised cohabitation between a man and woman.

and education. Numerous British Christian missionaries and their incessant attempt in the dissemination of tenet, language and Western education brought a surge in religious conversion from their indigenous religions to Christianity. Today, a majority of the Khasis are Christian and only a small proportion follows the traditional indigenous religion. According to the population census of 2011, three-quarters (74.59%) of total population in Meghalaya now belong to the Christianity. Moreover, a growing number of migrants from the patriarchal societies of the neighbouring plains and the penetration of resonating media, modernity and education have been playing a catalytic role in bringing about changes in social milieu in a once close-knit egalitarian Khasi society with long-drawn-out traditions consorted with higher status of women, values and strong community feelings (Mukhim 2014; Nongbri 2008, 2014; Pakyntein 2000). This changing social milieu is weakening the sanctity of the age-old Khasi matrilineage which is now passing through a sociopolitical transition. The family lineage through the mother is still practised by the majority but not, as asserted by Pakyntein (2000: 31), by all. She also holds that some men ‘purposively marry non-Khasi women and give the off-spring a clan name of their own’ and surprisingly, the traditional ‘attitudes towards preference for girls is also changing’ (2000: 31–32). Today, changes to the traditional inheritance pattern are also eminent due to the enactment of the Meghalaya Succession to Self Acquired Property (Khasi and Jaintia Special Provision) Act of 1986. Alongside them is the latest Village Administration Bill (VAB) of 2014 passed by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) which sarcastically aims to democratise and restructure the traditional ‘village governance system’ keeping its many traditional undemocratic elements intact. These aspects are elaborated later in this article.

A large number of scholarships have been published on the Khasi society thus far. The majority have focused on the traditional societal structure that places women in a higher position than the men under the Khasi matrilineality, keeping the inheritance rights, social freedom and family lineage in view (Acharya 1988; Bareh 1997; Ehrenfels 1955; Gurdon 1914; Mawrie 1981; Nongbri 1988, 2008). A handful have, however, contradicted and argued that Khasi women practically enjoy no power and freedom as they are often intervened by their elder brother or maternal uncle in all socioeconomic affairs (Mukhim 2014, 2015; Pakyntein 2000). War (1998: 71), however, considers the traditional Khasi political institution ‘democratic’ as it follows ‘majority, consensus, accountability, representation and so on’. I, however, argue that such a proposition calls forth a contestation. This is because the Khasi political institution is carefully constructed to make it male centric, and one should not blank out that even today, about half of the population (women) has virtually no voice in it. Hence, such a proposition is nuanced neither adequately nor carefully. Another line of theoretical debate has emerged from the usage of the word ‘traditional’ preceding the ‘Khasi political institution’ functioning in the present day. The idea has been challenged etymologically and refuted by Kharbani (2015) who categorically considers such usage unsubstantiated and argued that the ‘age-old’ or ‘traditional’ institution that existed since time immemorial vanished with the arrival of the British and their footing for Christianity; today’s Khasi political institution is a product of British creation and recognition—‘a sacrificial lamb at the hands of unscrupulous elite’. Lately, the proposed VAB of 2014 as a substitute of the Draft Meghalaya Village Council Act, 2011, of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj has been a focal point of controversy and has captured the attention of politicians, social activists, policymakers and the Khasi citizenry. While one section opposes the bill in its present form and prefers changes or ramifications, the other section suggests its passage with the governor’s assent without even a replacement of words in it. The central point to this contestation has, inter alia, been the proposed restructuring of the existing dorbar shnong (village dorbar or village council). The conservativists criticise the bill on the ground that ‘it fails to protect the traditional village autonomy’ but ‘helps metamorphose into a legally consistent institution to meet the modern day calls for transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and women participation’ (TUR 2015). However, I argue that the bill is insufficient, undemocratic, diabolical and unhelpful for explaining the generosity of women participation and embodies vocabulary that still intends to keep the women relegated.

Against this backdrop, this piece of work attempts to bring forth the emergent sociopolitical issues that glare in the present-day Khasi matrilineal system and excogitate an illumination on the fecundity of the recently passed VAB of 2014 from a gender perspective. It also aims to understand and analyse the social position of both men and women in terms of their involvement in social, political and economic spheres in the Khasi society. With the underlying characteristics of matrilineality, it would be logical to assume that women are likely to play a greater role in social, political and economic affairs. Based on the primary information obtained through a sample-household survey carried out in a village named Smit near Shillong and the information embodied in the existing competent literature on the Khasi society, this study has categorically sought to identify the cogency of such assumption in the context of the Khasi matrilineal system which is now experiencing an undercurrent of change in its age-old social milieu. The household information was complemented by a discussion with the Sordar (headman/chief) of Shnong-Smit, secretary and treasurer of the dorbar shnong, local school teachers, NGO workers and the block development officer during the celebration of Ka Pomblang Nongkrem³

The five-day long Ka Pomblang Nongkrem is the most important festival of the Khasi tribe in Meghalaya. Central to this festival is the pomblang ceremony (sacrifice of animal), aiming to appease the powerful Goddess Ka Blei Synshar (Goddess of the Creator or Supreme Goddess) for rich harvest, fortune and prosperity of the people.

in November 2015.

Meghalaya and Shnong (Village) Smit: Study Area at a Glance

‘Meghalaya’ meaning literally the ‘abode of clouds’ has a geographical area of 22,429 square kilometres and a human population of 2.97 million (Registrar General of India 2011). It is a hilly state comprising three hill ranges: the Garo, Khasi and Jaintia hills and seven districts: East Khasi Hills, West Khasi Hills, East Garo Hills, West Garo Hills, South Garo Hills, Ri Bhoi and Jaintia Hills. Among these districts, East Khasi Hills inhabited largely by the indigenous Khasi tribe with matrilineality in practice by the law is the most progressive one with regard to per capita net state domestic product, literacy, banking, vital statistics, health and family welfare and so on (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Meghalaya 2016). The state capital Shillong is situated in it. Hence, East Khasi Hills was selected as a panoptic study area keeping the assumption of this article scripted in the preceding section in view, and based on the testimonials of the concerned district agricultural officer as well as a handful Shillong-based NGO workers, a progressive Khasi village named Smit located only 12 km away from Shillong city was purposively chosen for conducting the primary survey. Also, Smit being recognised as the Khasi Culture Centre meted out its selection for collecting primary information.

Smit is a pollution-free village with an enthralling scenic beauty situated in the Mawryngkneng community development block just outside the capital city Shillong. The village has received ample recognition for the Ka Pomblang Nongkrem festival which is celebrated every year in the month of November. The festival commemorates the evolution of the ‘Traditional State of the Khasi People in the Khasi Hills’ of Meghalaya known as Hima (Nongkinrih 2002), presently functioning under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The Primary Census Abstract, 2011, had recorded a total of 947 inhabiting households in Smit with a population size of 5,034 persons. However, while conducting the primary survey in 2015, the chief of Shnong-Smit reported a total number of 956 inhabiting households consisting of a population size of 5,117 persons, of which 160 households were randomly drawn for collecting information to investigate the genderwise profile of the economic activities. The entire population of Smit belongs to the Khasi tribe and follows Christianity.

Understanding the Khasi Matrilineality, Property Rights and Discord

Khasi people mostly reside in Khasi and Jaintia hills. A significant number of this indigenous tribe also live in Bangladesh. The mythology portrays that Khasis are the descendants of the Hynniewtrep (seven huts). God put up the human race among 17 huts in heaven. The residents of seven huts climbed down a ladder resting on the peak named Sohpetbneng in Meghalaya. These residents and their offspring on the Earth are known as the Khasi tribe. Historians, however, claim that the Khasi tribe descended from an ancient Tibetan group who crossed the Himalayas southwards and settled in Meghalaya or perhaps migrated from the Khmer areas of Southeast Asia (Ehrenfels 1955; Gurdon 1914).

The fundamental point of matrilineality is that the lineage comes from the mother’s clan and women perpetuate the clan (Das and Bezbaruah 2011). The strength of matrilineality lies in the greatest respect that the society bestows on women, especially on mother and her clan. Family life is structured around the mother’s house, which is guided by the maternal grandmother. The youngest daughter called Khatduh acts as the custodian of ancestral property and is expected to take care of the property for the longest possible time. The Khatduh never leaves the house and subsequently becomes the head of the family in the absence of her mother. In the Khasi society, a man moves out of his mother’s house to join his wife’s household after marriage. Older daughters make separate houses with their husbands around their mother’s house. Children adopt their mother’s surname. Unlike the other patriarchal societies, the father has little authority in a Khasi family. It is the maternal uncle, whether married or not, who acts as the children’s mentor. Anyone in blood relation squeezed in distress gets shelter at khatduh’s home. Khatduh is virtually an institution constituted by the Khasi society with a woman who is likely to have the strongest bondage for the entire family with a great solitaire. Therefore, a man married to a khatduh is expected to be accommodating and open hearted about including every member of her extended family under the same roof. The clan known as kur is the strongest root on which the Khasi society stands. The social and political interests of a clan are determined by the maternal uncle who draws his strength from his own maternal clan. Matrilineality safeguards women with children from social ostracism when they remarry. No matter who the father is, the children will always have the family name of women even after their remarriages. The fundamental integrity of matrilineality lies in the tenet that mother is the source of life and God has bestowed upon her this power.

There are two different propositions about the evolution of the matrilineal system. First, in the ancient period, men were traders and warriors. Men had to often go to war for a long period of time leaving the women and children at home. Returning home with safe lives was usually quite uncertain for the men. Consequently, they preferred passing down ancestral property from the mother to the daughter and decided to make women the keepers of the family, culture and property. Second, the Khasi and Jaintia kings had entrusted the households’ responsibilities to their queens when they went out to the battleground. This act of entrusting household responsibilities to the queens by their kings in the ancient Khasi society was considered as great pride and respect towards the women, and the custom continues to be followed by the Khasis ever since.

Gregory et al. (2009: 594) consider the land ‘a political instrument, an element in social struggle, an object of consumption and a site for identity formation’. The Khasi tradition prescribes the handover of ancestral property to the female line. Therefore, sons have legally no rights to it except for those families which have no female child. The recognition of only women being the inheritor to ancestral property by the law and tradition has led to a contestation and social struggle by a group of radical Khasis aiming at an institutional transformation. A slow but an incisive deviation from traditionality is evident now and again, especially among a section of progressive Khasi families who adhere to the equity and equal rights for all children on ancestral properties regardless of their gender and positions among the cognates. It is these families that have started distributing their properties equally among their offspring. Education, modernity, acculturation and above all rationality have led them to surpass the savvy of such an age-old traditional stigma and social injustice that do not recognise the rights of a male being an heir. However, legal provisions over the disposal of self-acquired property,⁴

A self-acquired property means any moveable or immovable property or title which is not inherited as an ancestral property.

which is of recent origin, do exist and are now in force due to the ‘Meghalaya Succession to Self Acquired Property Act (Khasi and Jaintia Special Provision) Act’ enacted by the Government of Meghalaya in 1986 to enable the Khasis and Jaintias to dispose of their self-acquired properties by will (Government of Meghalaya 1986). Nonetheless, the provisions for disposal of self-acquired properties are markedly distinct from Khasi women to Khasi men and, therefore, such a duality in the act requires a nuanced illustration.

A married woman or a widow may pass on her self-acquired property anytime to her adult son and/or daughter. However, on her demise without a will, it will be inherited by the youngest daughter. And on the demise of an unmarried woman having acquired a self-acquired property, the heritor would be her mother or sister. On the contrary, disposal of the self-acquired property by a Khasi man is little complex, especially if he passes away without making a will. Property earned or acquired by a man before his marriage would legally go to his mother or sister after his death. Such property is called ka kamai ing kur (earning of the clan). However, property earned or acquired by a man after marriage would go to his wife and daughter after death. Such property is call ka kamai ing khun (earning of the children). Furthermore, the profits earned by a married man from his self-acquired property-based commercial enterprise at the uxorial family would be counted as his own property. And on his demise without a will, such property will be owned by his mother or sister. Nongbri (1988), however, argues that Khasi men often merge their self-acquired properties with the properties of their wives, and when such amalgamations take place, wives and children become the heirs of the property. Consequently, their mothers and sisters end up with nothing. Despite having gained the title to ancestral land, women have no customary rights to sell off the property without the consent of her maternal uncle, elder brother or father. Furthermore, the notion that all women inherit property in present-day Meghalaya is a hyperbole. The latest Socio-Economic Caste Census (Ministry of Rural Development 2011) shows that three-quarters of rural households (75.98%) in Meghalaya are landless, which implies that the majority of the Khasi women are actually landless. The question of rights to inheritance is, therefore, attached with the category of haves only.

Khasi Political Affairs and the Women

Alongside the conceptual construct sketched earlier, it would be imp-erative to look into the historical evolution of the Khasi traditional political institutions and the advent of modern polity which would help determine the role of women in the Khasi politics from a gender perspective. Giri (1980: 93) holds that the kur or clan is the nucleus from which all social, cultural and political institutions of the Khasi tribe evolved. Bareh (1997) substantiates the existence of two independent ‘politico-religious’ entities of Ki Basanship and Ki Lyngdohship in the pre-Syiemship (prekingship) period or before the establishment of the Hima (state). These institutions were governed by the superior Ki Basan (noble males) and Ki Lyngdoh (priests) in consonance with the councils of people who help legislate and formulate policies. With a growing population in the years that followed and for the sake of societal protection, the Ki Basanship and Ki Lyngdohship eventually conflated to form the Ki Hima which was ceremonially headed by the Syiem (king/chief). However, the real power to rule the Hima, as noted by Bareh (1997), was bestowed upon the dorbar of these two, not upon the Syiem. But under colonialism, this power relation and structure were altered by the British who made the Syiem once a ‘ceremonial head’ to a ‘real head’ by means of issuing the Sanad (letter of appointment) which entrusted full power to the Syiemship, yielding the once powerful dorbar of Ki Basan and Ki Lyngdoh peanuts (Kharbani 2015). This power restructuring happened to be imbued even to the Dorbar Shnong (village council) headed by the Rangbah Shnong (head of a village). And surprisingly, the postcolonial Indian state ordained a constitutional status to the colonial excogitation with the formulation of the Sixth Schedule and constituted the Autonomous District Council (ADC) that preferred to deal with Rangbah Shnong as an institution at the village level.

The two systems of modern polity or governance that infringed the traditional local Khasi political institutions were the Municipal Board introduced by the British in Shillong City in 1878 and the ADC by the postcolonial independent India in the rest of Meghalaya (excluding the municipality and cantonment). Despite having applied the municipal administration in Shillong, until the late 1960s, the dorbar shnong continued to exist in its various wards with a scrimpy relationship with the municipal board, only with an exception during the election of the ward commissioners who used to be both Khasis and nonKhasis (Lyngdoh 2015: 12). The power relation, however, underwent a structural change in 1973 with the dissolution of the Shillong Municipal Board, which has not been reconstituted through election ever since. The Shillong Municipal Board is now administered by the chief executive officer, and both the modern and traditional institutions of local governance actively exist and function. The strong oppositions raised by the latter (dorbar shnong) each time on the Shillong Municipal Board’s endeavour to conduct elections for its 27 ward commissioners lead to the deferral of the election. The traditionalists fear that the nonKhasi representatives would take hold of a majority of the posts through election and hegemonise the municipal administration which would act against the interests and welfare of the Khasi community (Lyngdoh 2015: 14).

There are six stages of traditional Khasi Dorbar: Dorbar iing (family Dorbar), Dorbar Kur (clan Dorbar), Dorbar Shnong (village Dorbar), Dorbar Pyllun (a small council of a group of villages or localities), Dorbar Raid (Dorbar of a cluster of villages) and Dorbar Hima Pyllun (full-state Dorbar). However, in recent times, the first two seem to have lost their importance while the last four have survived their political existence.

The Dorbar Shnong is the smallest council and a political institution of people entrusted with the power of administration (including financial and judicial functions) at the village level. It is traditionally an assembly of all ‘adult males’ that function under the headship of an elected chief (headman, ‘not headwoman’) called Rangbah Shonog and is recognised as the highest authority in a Khasi village. It may perform functions at any time of the day. As an administrative institution, it works independently and serves the people under its jurisdiction, implements welfare schemes sponsored by the government and maintains peace, prosperity and law and order among its inhabitants. A shnong (village) consists of a number of smaller areas or neighbourhoods called dongs which are the integral parts of a dorbar shnong. Each dong is headed by a male called Rangbah Dong who acts as a member of the dorbar shnong (village council). The executive committee of a dorbar shnong comprises Rangbah Shnong, assistant Rangbah Shnong, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and sports and cultural secretary. War (1998: 75) argues that the outlook of the smallest council that has solely functioned following the uncodified laws and practices is now being changed to comport with present-day requirements, especially in and around urban centres. In some villages, including Smit (sample village), as claimed by the chief of Smit, the dorbar shnongs collaborate with the government functionaries and NGOs for the effective delivery and efficient management of drinking water supply, electricity, roads, schools and so on.

The Dorbar Pyllun is a small council and a local form of governance, consisting of four or more dorbar shnongs. It is constituted just to look after the common interest and general welfare of the inhabitants of their respective shnongs. Its functionality is vested on a three-tier system, at the top of which remains the president followed by the Rangbah Shnong and Rangbah Dong. Dorbar pyllun convenes meetings at least twice a year and with the presence of one-third or more members. All decisions taken are based on a simple majority.

The Dorbar Raid (regional dorbar) as an assembly and a politico-administrative council of local adjacent Khasi villages coordinates the social, political and judicial affairs of constituent shnongs. One of the village headmen or a Lyngdoh⁵

A Lyngdoh is of two types: one who is entrusted to perform all religious rites for a clan, shnong, raid or hima called U Sohblei or a religious priest and the other who is confided to both the administration and religious rites called Lyngodh Synshar or priest chief (Synniang 2010: 11).

(priest) presides over this assembly while the others work as advisors. The Dorbar Raid administers civil and judicial matters, resolves the boundary dispute between villages and monitors land and forest resources under its jurisdiction.

The Dorbar Hima Pyllun is the highest legislative and supreme authority in the traditional Khasi society (War 1998) which has the power to adjudicate and execute the law. Several raids or communes combine together to form a hima headed by an elected chief called syiem who is the highest traditional political authority. Hima is an administrative unit within the ADC. All adult males are allowed to participate in the discussion of the Hima Dorbar.

The Khasi society, however, seems to be vitriolic due to its ‘cus-tomary code of conduct’ that had carefully been constructed with a notion to forefend women from participating in politics, governance and decision-making bodies and refracted them to be engaged in domestic affairs. Hence, women play the least or no role in the Khasi political system called Dorbar. Since the 1990s, despite a clamour raised by a minority of progressive Khasi citizenry, feminist scholars and social activists for implementing the guidelines of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj for the inclusion of women in the local governance, the dorbar shnong consciously continues to be loathed on the pretext of ‘tradition’. Nevertheless, a miniscule deviation does occur, although albeit slow in pace and inferior in position. A few scholarships (Laloo 2014: 47; War, 1998: 74) have reported the participation of women as executive committee members in the Dorbar Shnog in a few instances.

Politics is surprisingly a male-centric affair in Meghalaya and reflects a strong patriarchal biasness. A majority of the Khasis until today, as claimed by the chief of Smit, believe that ‘the war and politics are for men’ only. Till date, not more than 10 Khasi women have been elected to the state assembly (Mukhim 2014), which helps prove that women in Meghalaya are deliberately side-lined. The traditional Khasi institutions regulate the political affairs at the village level. Consequently, the dorbars are always headed by men, not by women. This scenario, as argued by Khymdeit (2011), implies that the matrilineal women in the Khasi society actually do not rule. Despite being one of the progressive shnongs in Meghalaya, our sample village Smit also reflects an analogy. No woman holds a position in the dorbar shnong. Interestingly, any debate or discussion on gender equity and inclusion of women in political affairs was considered acrimonious by the chief of Smit and his dorbar members who argued that women are already empowered as they hold rights to the lineage and ancestral property. However, Mukhim (2015) argues that the Khasi women enjoy no special power other than that the children carry the mother’s surname; women are merely considered the ‘progenitors of the race’. The traditionalists, on the other hand, assert that women are meant to be in hearth and home and, therefore, should not be involved in political affairs. Khasi society pejoratively calls a woman involved in politics a ‘crowing hen’ (Planning Department 2008).

Women wings do exist in the broad political system but remain mute to the decision-making process of a dorbar. They are primarily set up merely to strengthen the political parties through their social networks. The male-centric Khasi politics has always been eluding women except for some miniscule instances of women electoral members in the state assembly since the recognition of Meghalaya’s statehood in 1972. The number of seats held by women in the state legislature or parliament is an important parameter of the Women Empowerment Measure introduced by the United Nations Development Programme in 1995. However, till date, this parameter unfortunately continues to be very low. The unwillingness and lack of a political goodwill of the male-centric political parties happen to be the major obstacles in attaining a substantial participation of Khasi women in state and national-level political affairs (Planning Department 2008). Therefore, the notion of considering the existing Khasi political institution a ‘democratic one’ (War 1998) is practically an illusion. The present-day functioning traditional institution is basically a polarised political institution that deliberately truncates the political voices of Khasi women and fails to establish the basic principles of equal rights in political decision-making. Even historically, absolute democracy lacked in Khasi politics. The founders of the shnong known as ‘original clans’ enjoyed exclusive privileges and made the position of Rangbah Shnong hereditary. Lyngdoh (2015) claims that the dorbars in many shnongs are not held in regular intervals; Rangbah Shnongs are not a subject to the financial audit and, therefore, were capable of manipulation and misappropriation.

Although the Constitution (73rd Constitutional Amendment) Act, 1992 of India had brought about a provision with 33 per cent elected seats to be reserved for women at grass-roots governance of the Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI), the provision has not yet been implemented in Meghalaya. In the last two decades, despite having attempted to bring about modifications in the ADCs to implement the 33 per cent reservation of seats for women, nothing tangible has happened. A bill was first introduced in the parliament in 1996. However, it lapsed with the dissolution of the 11th Lok Sabha in 1998. The same was reintroduced in parliament twice as the 84th and 85th Constitutional Amendment Bill successively in December 1999 and August 2000 but it could not be passed due to irrepressible resistance from a few political parties which virtually subdued the women voice in the Khasi political system.

The Village Administration Bill and Political Discord: A Gender Perspective

In January 2011, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, put forward the Draft Meghalaya Village Council Act of 2011 to the Government of Meghalaya for its implementation. The central notion to this stride was, as claimed by the concerned ministry, to empower the state, ADCs and village councils by making them qualified for receiving various central government-sponsored rural development programmes through democratic governance, as Meghalaya misses all but the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) of such programmes. The draft was formulated keeping largely the democratic principles of the PRI in view. In May 2011, the ministry also sent a draft law for constituting the state election commission to democratically conduct elections for the village development councils (VDCs) (to be constitutionally responsible for the implementation of various rural development programmes) and recommended for the establishment of the state finance commission. In a few months that followed, the Government of Meghalaya declared the constitution of the state finance commission. However, this joint stride by the central and state governments to bring about transformation in the existing political institutions was unanimously opposed by the three ADCs (the Garo, Khasi and Jaintia) of Meghalaya on the grounds that the Village Council Act contravenes the provisions of the Sixth Schedule, undermines the prevailing traditional customs and practices under matrilineality and belittles and ‘snatches away’ the power and functions of the ADC.⁶

Till date, the ADC appoints the headman and constitutes the dorbar of a village.

The executive committee of the KHADC eventually drafted its own VAB which was passed by the KHADC in July 2014 and now is awaiting the governor’s assent (or dissent).

The KHADC arrogates that the VAB empower the institution of grassroot governance (dorbar shnong) in a democratic way and render a constitutional status that would facilitate receiving funds for various development programmes of the central government. Despite the bill being an attempt to amend the existing political institution in terms of good governance, community participation in decision-making, transparency and accountability at the village level, it has been handicapped on many counts and has failed to yield loftiness, especially on the long-drawn-out issue of women participation in local governance and administration. The bill seems to have inclined more towards the preservation of the undemocratic customs than omitting them for a democratic transformation and ushering in an efficient system of village administration.

The applicability and fecundity of the constitution of two analogous fundamental institutions Dorbar Shnong (Section 4) and ‘VDC’ (Section 13) in parallel in a village under the VAB appear to be bewildering. Both are legitimate general bodies of the same status consisting of Khasi inhabitants above 18 years of age. A VDC is a people’s council, while, etymologically, a dorbar shnong connotes a general meeting of a village. Hence, the former should execute the decision-making process in a village. However, the bill mandates the VDC to function under the dorbar shnong, which implicates a trimming down of the institutional power of the former.

The central contestation over the VAB from a gender perspective is the usage of Khasi vocabulary Rangbah (Sections 2.10, 4.1, 8.2 and 10.7) meaning thereby an ‘adult male’. The bill lays down minuscule importance to the inclusion of women in the local governance and administration and is thus a conscious formulation of the masculine Khasi politics. The dorbar shnong and dorbar hima are resolved to be headed by a Khasi man, not by a ‘Khasi woman’. An attempt by a section of protagonists to justify the bill by calling out Rangbah as only ‘an adult’ without tagging a sex to it is deceptive. A careful dictation of the bill and the vocabularies used therein (e.g., ‘chief and his dorbar’, ‘rangbah and his misrule’, or ‘rangbah himself’ and so on) vehemently corroborates the gender bias and prejudice.

Matrilineality and the Question of Male Identity

Women in Meghalaya are believed to be better placed than their counterparts in the rest of the country. In various parts of India where women are usually crying out for rights, equality, respect, protection and relief from violence and dowry, it is Meghalaya where men are demanding for their rights in the society, especially equal rights to ancestral property. In the decades that followed independence, the Khasi society has witnessed a slow but steady change in the traditional sociocultural milieu. The post-colonial cultural acculturation caused by the social contact of the Khasis with the in-migrants from patriarchal societies has been changing the perceptions of many Khasi males of Meghalaya about the traditional societal values, norms and customs to a significant extent. A social group called Syngkhong Rympei Thymmai (SRT) meaning ‘a new hearth’ formed by a section of radical Khasi men and women in 1990 considers the Khasi matrilineal society ‘backward’ and an obstacle to community development. The protagonists of this doctrine aim to bring about structural transformations in the traditional Khasi social institutions in substantial ways by mobilising the Khasi citizenry against it keeping two fundamental goals in focus: first, to set equal rights to ancestral property and social status for men and, second, to convert the centuries-old matrilineal system of Khasi succession into a patrilineal one. Many protagonists of the SRT are actually silent supporters as they are too afraid to support this rebellious ideology openly. The followers, however, strongly believe and contend that the progress and survival of the Khasi community lies with the patriarchal society.

In many cases, Khasi kinship imposes dual loyalty upon men (especially upon the eldest son) in the sense that, on the one hand, they protect their wives and children residing at uxorial households, and, on the other hand, they spend much of their time in mothers’ or sisters’ households (Nakane 1967; Van Ham 2000) to look after their maternal family’s property and guide their sister’s children in upbringing and social welfare (Planning Department 2008). The uxorial household virtually recognises no authority and social role to a husband and expects him to work for its gain. Having no rights to own property has given birth to a sense of insecurity and identity crisis among a section of Khasi males. Alongside them is the mounted feeling of deprivation and selflessness sprung from being stripped out of family inheritance. Ahmed (1994) and Van Ham (2000) contented that such a peanut status of men in the Khasi society has led to the formation of the radical SRT. Although the SRT is taking forward the campaign of patrilineal society today, the idea has, however, been contested by the Khasi traditionalists and feminist scholars. Nongbri (2008, 2014) argues that the matrilineal system is not diminishing the status of men; although women are the custodians of the ancestral property and the family line is traced through them, it is the male who actually possesses and exercises power. The Khasi women have no control over resources within or outside the family (Mukhim 2015) and nor do they have the power to decide things for themselves. Moreover, even a khatduh can be stripped out of the right of inheritance if she fails to come along with the customary code of conduct accepted by the society or fails to execute her responsibilities at her natal home.

Economic Activities of Male and Female: A Portrayal of Smit

The nature of economic activities reflects the social and economic status of workers across societies. Keeping the assumption posited at the outset in focus, it is now necessary to introduce a more thorough assessment of the status of Khasi women (with regard to men) in terms of their involvement in various economic activities in Shnong Smit, recognised as the Khasi cultural centre, where I focused my field study in 2015. In so doing, I consider only the main economic activities performed by both male and female workers of 160 sample households who were categorically above 15 but below 60 years of age at the time of conducting the survey. The total count was 264 workers, of which 134 (50.76%) and 130 (49.24%) were males and females, respectively.

While technically falling just outside the urbanised city limits of Shillong, the economy of the village is overwhelmingly non-agrarian in nature. A total of 83.33 per cent of total workforce of the sample households has, unlike a distinctive village economy, established their foothold in non-farm activities that include regular salaried jobs in both government and private sectors, businesses (grocery, garments, restaurant, medical store, electronic shop, household hardware, tea stall, fruits and vegetables shop, etc.) and non-farm waged workers. Regular salaried jobs and businesses have, however, been reported as two major sources of economic activities by the working population in Smit, and a little more than two-thirds (67.43%) of the total workforce has established a foothold in either of these two activities. Agriculture appears to be less of a preferable activity primarily because of the rainfed nature and undulating structure of the arable land. Only 16.67 per cent of the total workforce has reported themselves as cultivators and agricultural labourers. A small proportion (11.36%) happens to be proletariats who work as either construction labourers and waged carpenters or daily-wage earners under the MGNREGS.

The gender and economic activity-wise cross-category analysis sub-stantiates a contrasting picture with regard to the ‘better position of women’ proclaimed by the Khasi society in general under matrilineality. The share of female workers engaged in agriculture (12.88%) to total workforce has outnumbered the male workers (3.79%). In agrarian families, women do, as claimed by the chief of Smit, more rigorous farm work than men, and more often they work from dawn to dusk. On the contrary, of more than one-third (35.61%) of total workers who engaged in regular salaried jobs, the share of the former is only 12.12 per cent while the share of the latter has almost doubled (23.48%) the former. It is assumed that business in the matrilineal Khasi society is predominantly female centric. However, the present study shows that male workers have even established their foothold in business equally with their female counterparts, and each one alone added 15.91 per cent to the total workforce. The chief of Shnong Smit, inter alia, swanned that the menial businesses like selling vegetables and fishes are still in the hands of Khasi women across the state. Mukhim (2014) argues that enjoying a greater social mobility by the women enables them to pursue such menial economic activities without any inhibition. The foregoing narration, therefore, bespeaks a growing prevalence of Khasi males over those economic activities that are associated with comparatively a higher socioeconomic status. Sexual division of labour among the Khasi tribe is highly noticeable. Women do all menial daily household activities, such as fetching water, bringing fuel wood home, cooking and washing dishes and clothes. Women are also expected to care for the sick and elderly.

Challenges and Constraints in the Present-day Khasi Matrilineality

The present-day Khasi society is confronting a large number of socio-political restraints and challenges. The gradual erosion of position and functions of the rangbah shnong in many instances has hit hard the traditional dorbar (Kharbani 2015). In absence of the financial audit and monitoring, greed and personal self-interests are looming large in the dorbar affairs. Today, the major political challenge in the Khasi society is to amend the functionality of local governance following the guidelines of the PRI.

A majority of rural Khasi households being landless, as reported by the latest Socio-Economic Caste Census of 2011, earn their living from daily wages. Mukhim (2015) argues that the Khasi women do not have reproductive rights, and despite being nutritionally deficient, they are forced to conceive, resulting in the larger size of an average family and a grievous maternal mortality rate (MMR), 291 per 100,000 live births. Poverty-driven anaemia among the pregnant mothers is a major cause for higher MMR (Roy Choudhury and Bhattacherjee 2013). The Khasi society is laden with poverty and unemployment. Women workforce in the formal sector in Meghalaya is only 4 per cent (Mukhim 2015). Despite being matrilineal, Khasi homes are not entirely free of domestic violence. Marital discord and divorce are now common phenomena due to adultery, bigamy, physical torture or maladjustment. Moreover, modern strenuous life has made partners intolerant towards each other (Planning Department 2008).

Conclusion

From the analytical discourse portrayed in the preceding paragraphs, the fact that has come forth vividly is that ‘Khasi women in Meghalaya have a higher social status than men’ is not entirely true in actual practice. The masculine construction of the present-day functioning Khasi political institution has deliberately truncated the voices of women and sub-stantially relegated their presence in the governance and administration.

The VAB in its present form is an unfinished shoddy piece of conservative Khasi masculine legislation, lacking fineness, immensity and inclusiveness from gender and ethnicity perspectives. It fails to be generous to render the electoral rights of women for key positions at par with men in the shnong (village) and hima (state) dorbars. While scripting the proposed legislation, the KHADC pretermits the century-old traditional political institutions of the non-Khasi tribes (the Karbis, Lalungs, Rabhas, etc.) inhabiting under its jurisdiction and proves no greatness to safeguard their micro-minority tribal traditions. Despite having followed some elements of democratic measures, neither the existing Khasi political institution nor the proposed VAB reflects an instrument of true democracy. The field observation substantiates a preponderance of female workforce in low-profile economic activities that primarily include agricultural activities, selling vegetables and fishes and non-farm wage earnings (proletariats). On the contrary, male workforce has predominantly established their foothold in those economic activities (regular salaried jobs and business) that are associated with a higher social status.

Governance at any level requires the best skills and statesmanship, which a woman is equally endowed with just as a man in any society in the world. No society can progress at a desired and commendable pace keeping its women in polity and governance at a backseat. Tradition must be valued, but it should not be a pretext for avoiding a change that leads to sociopolitical empowerment and keeps the society vibrant. Such a perception exhibits only a sheer ignorance that hinders the pace of overall societal development and collective welfare. The Khasi society as a whole, therefore, needs to endorse the 73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution at grass-roots governance to make it a democratic, transparent, accountable and inclusive institution.

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