Abstract
Dr B. R. Ambedkar dreamt of a society based on modern liberal ideals of ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’, throughout his life. To translate his dream into a reality, Dr Ambedkar strove harder to put ‘Depressed Classes’ under the ‘Minority’ category. While arguing in favour of his argument, he put forth the socio-economic status of Dalit before the Southborough Committee in 1919. After a long struggle, he was able to achieve constitutional safeguards for dalits. Dr Ambedkar had roped in all the principles into India’s Constitution in the post-independence period to peaceful social revolution. However, after independence protection of Dalit came under the Scheduled Castes category. Nonetheless, his epistemological origin and engagement with the minority as an ‘idea’ and creating favourable space within the democratic political structure has been still relevant. This article has engaged with Dr Ambedkar’s idea of minorities and their political and economic welfare in a communal majoritarian polity. To operationalise the ideas, this article has discussed the implementation of the constitutional promise of ‘rights’ in the case of Muslims. The article also looks at successive governments’ approaches vis-a-vis Muslims’ development to ascertain the trajectory of policies.
Introduction
In the contemporary period, Indian politics has been centred around Muslims. There are two dimensions to the debate—negative and positive. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) into parliamentary politics and establishing social and political hegemonic dominance over every institution has been propelled by the Muslims’ issue. Right-wing social and political mobilisations are imprinted with Muslims’ history, present and future. The negative image of Muslims presented as an existential threat to Hindus seems to be an apparent modus-operandi.
On the other hand, some individuals and organisations invoked secularism, rights of minorities, sectarian violence, and institutions’ failure to deliver what they are meant to raise a concern of dwindling space for Muslims in Indian democracy. Going through the various Commissions reports on Minorities status, the latter group argued about the protection of Muslims through the special measure. However, the former group termed it as a ‘pseudo secular’ approach and ‘appeasement’. The debate is still not settled. Nevertheless, consensus on Minorities issues is ever elusive in Indian democracy and, since 2014, tilted heavily toward the right-wing interpretation.
This deadlock also brings forth the question of the development of a minority community with or without rights. Without focusing on an individual’s identity, a developmental benefit can be served, argued the majoritarian expert on politics and economy. In this context, the article has delved upon factors contextualising the debate on democracy from the point of view of B. R. Ambedkar. The uniqueness of this article is about engaging Dr B. R. Ambedkar with minority’s questions, who had so far been talked more in the context of Dalit’s rights. Also, through factual presentation, this article aims to establish majoritarianism politics in democracy with its minority underpinning hope on meagre constitutional provision for their security and development becomes insignificant.
Ambedkar’s View on Minority Rights in a Democracy: A Politico-Economic Ideas
‘Democracy is incompatible and inconsistent with isolation and exclusiveness, resulting in distinguishing between the privileged and the unprivileged’, argued B. R. Ambedkar (1989). To protect Minorities,
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B. R. Ambedkar advocated for ‘Free India’ and argued in favour of making democracy safe there. B. R. Ambedkar put forth that,
Free India should be made safe for democracy. Starting with this aim, they (untouchable) say that on account of the peculiar social formation in India, there are minority communities pitted against a Hindu Communal Majority, that if no provisions are made in the Constitution to cut the fangs of the Hindu Communal Majority, India will not be safe for democracy….
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(Ambedkar, 2020e, p. 199)
To protect a deprived section, Dalit and Minority, in the democracy, B. R. Ambedkar advocated for extraordinary measures. Making a presentation before Southborough Committee in 1919, Dr Ambedkar argued for a separate electorate as he was aware of the politics of communal majority. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity have been enshrined in our Constitution as rights to all citizens of this country. These principles have been fundamental for any democracy and ideal for a society, emphasised by B. R. Ambedkar.
Moreover, any society or politics bereft of these ideals cannot be called a modern society or polity. Political democracy is the onset at the continuum of democracy. ‘By parliamentary democracy, we mean “one man, one vote”’. However, B. R. Ambedkar realised that the success of political democracy rests on social democracy. He claimed that ‘A democratic form of Government presupposes a democratic form of society’ (Ambedkar, 2020a, p. 222).
In the context of the dominance of the caste system, the claim for freedom and Hindu Raj is against the principle of democracy. B. R. Ambedkar argued that
If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account, it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. (Ambedkar, 2020d, p. 384)
Thus, the annihilation of caste from Indian society is a foundational step toward forming political democracy.
Otherwise, the parliamentary democracy will bring majoritarian rule, which may not respect the minority’s will. Dr Ambedkar was apprehensive of the majoritarian will. He said that ‘…Is this majority tolerant? Does this majority recognise equality, liberty and fraternity? Will this majority permit me to live, to breathe, to grow?’ (Ambedkar, 2020a, p. 270). To protect the minority from majoritarianism, Ambedkar suggested specific provisions mentioned in a memorandum on behalf of the All-India Scheduled Caste Federation to the Constituent Assembly. Ambedkar argued for protection against the communal executive, social/official tyranny and social boycott. He advocated for the appointment of Superintendent of Minority Affairs, whose main task is to prepare an annual report on the treatment of minorities by the public and government and communal biases. Furthermore, instigating social boycott of the minorities would be liable to offence and illegal.
However, apprehension came to be accurate, for the Muslims, with the rise of rightist majoritarian politics. Ambedkar’s modernist principles to organise India’s polity and society have been vitiated. Although economic backwardness has been recorded before the rise of religious majoritarianism, today, Muslims face physical threats daily at the hand of organisations emboldened by the political ascendency of Hindutva. The killing of Akhlaq Ahmad and Pahlu Khan in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, respectively, two Muslim cattle traders in Jharkhand, and life-taking assaults on Muslims in the name of cow protection are some of the brutal pictures of larger menace. Forty-four deaths have been recorded between 2015 and 2018 due to lynching by right-wing mobs. There has been a change in the definition of secularism and the majority community vis-à-vis Muslims. The scholars have reckoned with the journey and argued that India is turning into ‘Ethnic Democracy’, ‘Competitive Authoritarianism’, ‘Illiberal Democracy’, ‘Schizophrenic nationalism’, ‘Electoral Autocracy’, and ‘Dysfunctional Democracy’. 3 In essence, India has been witnessing a transformation from secular to the cultural majoritarianism. Mohapatra (2014) claimed that once the feeling of insecurities increases in the minds of the minorities, then the presence of secularism as a mere policy of intent or the existence of constitutional safeguards alone is not enough.
The current government claims to be a genuinely secular government by treating everyone equally and not favouring special programmes for the minority. Recently, the government has ordered to withdraw Maulana Azad Scholarship for the minorities’ students. Also, government has taken back pre-matric scholarship for class I to VIII of minorities’ student. They refer to it as appeasement. However, scholars of identity politics like B. R. Ambedkar argued that,
‘Treating unequal equally is wrong’. ‘He highlighted that this nation is constituted of different social groups and all these groups are unequal in their position and progress. He maintains that if they are to be carried to the level of parity then the only solution is to adopt the principle of inequality and to give preferential treatment to those who are at the lower level’. (Sridevi, 2020)
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Another scholar I. M. Young argued that a polity or a ‘neutral’ nation-state treating everyone equal could produce inequality. Young calls it the ‘paradox of democracy’ where equality makes some people more powerful citizens. Jain (2018) too pointed out that ‘on the doctrines of neutrality, liberal democracy subscribes to the formulation of common laws that apply equally to all citizens, which by default marginalises local cultural variances…. Such policies are superficial in nature and conformist in orientation’ (Shaban, 2018).
Hindutva’s understanding of treating everyone equal leads to maintaining the status quo and pushing minorities to the category of second-class citizens. In this situation, Muslims are continuously reminded that their welfare schemes and their existence depend on the benevolent nature of Hindus. In recent years, what has happened in India is the ‘convergence of communal majority into the political majority’, where ‘receptivity’ for data, discrimination, and development deficit of Muslims has been dwindling.
On the question of economic equality in democracy, Ambedkar argued that ‘While we have established political democracy, it is also the desire that we should lay down as our ideal economic democracy’ (Ambedkar, 2020b, p. 379). Dr Ambedkar discussed the various ideological means, such as liberal, socialist and communist, to achieve economic democracy. Ambedkar knew that there is an inherent problem in economic structure propagated by liberalism and not suitable to toiling the masses of India. Jatava (2001), in Political Philosophy of Dr Ambedkar, noted down that Ambedkar was not a votary of capitalism. Jatava argued that ‘It is his firm belief that capitalism in its unalloyed form cannot sustain itself long, because, in pure capitalism, pauperism, unemployment, hard labour, long hours, dangerous and insanitary condition and oppressive supervision are a common lot to the millions of people’ (Jatava, 2001). Among the number of available models of socialism, Dr Ambedkar opted for ‘State Socialism’, which keeps the correct balance between the private and public enterprises. In ‘State and Minorities’, Ambedkar spelt out his detail plan of ‘Economic Justice’. Article 2, Clause 4 of Section 2 contains ‘Protection against Economic Exploitation’. There have been proposals like welfare state and redistribution of resources in the context of social justice.
However, the ‘Washington Consensus’ idea has started projecting market over the State in the post-reform period. The welfare state has shrunken. The reform has reduced the percentage of poverty but certainly, deepened the gap between rich and poor. In the last 10 years, billionaire count (with $1 billion net worth or more) in India jumped by 333% to 78 persons from 18 in 2006. In 2021, the total number of billionaires rose to 140. However, as per Socio-Economic Caste Census (Registrar General of India, 2011), 75% of rural families earn less than ₹5,000 per month. Caste put this inequality in a particular perspective. It pushes us to ask questions like ‘who are these 75%’, what are their castes, and so on. The economic structure adopted by reform within the democracy is certainly does not guarantee ‘equality’. The idea of S. M. Lipset that economic development and democracy has a direct relationship, although not linear, seems a failed proposition. Later on, the argument entangled over deciding the priority between redistribution and recognition of the identity. 5
Backwardness Recognised
Census 2011 data of non-workers India show that the percentage of beggars among the Muslim community is higher than their share of the total population. In absolute number, a total of 92,760 Muslims were categorised as beggars. Interestingly, more women than men from the community were begging, which was reverse for other religious communities. 6 This is a manifestation of the Muslims’ development that has taken place since independence. However, it was not the case in the initial years of independence. According to Sonalkar (EPW: 1993), Muslims were 32% in defence services, which came down to a mere 2%. Similarly, Muslims have employed merely 2% in both the private and public sectors. The current decline displays institutional and social exclusion of a community, a sign of frail democracy. Hasan (2009), Khalidi (2006), Sachar (2006), Mishra (2009), Basant and Shariff (2009), Fazal (2013) and other scholars have pointed out the declining status of Muslims in India.
Researchers have also pointed out the reason for the current socio-economic status of the community. Mazeland (2020) summarised that they (Muslims) have faced discrimination in every aspect of life for decades and are forced to live in ghettos and encounter obstacles in everyday life. The Constitution, a written document, has been to safeguard the rights of minorities and deprived sections. The Constituent Assembly designs chapter three, the Fundamental Rights chapter, in the Constitution to protect any encroachment on the rights of an individual citizen. In the case of minorities, some special rights have been guaranteed under Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Census (2011) report on ‘begging Muslims’ under non-workers group indeed emerges as a cracked mirror. Saxena (2020) has recognised the problem and argued that despite sufficient provisions in the Constitution ensuring justice and equality for all, Muslims in India have regrettably faced enormous difficulties since independence, such as violence, ghettoisation, and discrimination. Basu (2018) further highlights that the country’s statutory design and lawful administration instantaneously fashion a secular, self-ruled state and privileges the comforts of the religious majority. The constitutional outline has enabled the judiciary, governments, and political parties to undercut religious liberties and minority rights within the democratic structure.
Development of Minority in the post-reform period and before it has been elusive and patchy. Sachar (2006) broke the myth of ‘Muslim Appeasement’ by the secular government. As per Table 1, the work participation ratio (WPR) of rural Muslim males has decreased by 6.6% (larger than the national average, that is, 6.4%). WPR of urban male Muslims has gone down by 2.8% (again larger than the national average of 2.7%). Urban Muslim female WPR has gone down starkly by 4.1% against the national average of 2.8%. In the lower educational categories, the percentage of unemployed is the highest among Muslims, closely followed by SC and ST.
Usual Status WPR (as a Percentage) for Those Aged 15 Years and Above for Religious Groups Since 1993–1994.
Table 2 shows that Muslim WPR has been increasing across the gender and areas. However, it is below the national average of all the religious groups. Rural male WPR in 2017–2018 was 47% which goes up to 50.6%. Similarly, for urban males, WPR was 50.9 in 2017–2018 but rose to 52.7%. These figures are before the COVID-19 lockdown. Female WPR has shown increment over a while. However, two facts are clear enough from the data shown in Table 2. First, the WPR of Muslims, both male and female, is lower than the cumulative national average. Second, it is lower than its Hindu counterpart.
Religion-Wise Trend of Work Participation Ratio Among Urban and Rural Areas.
According to Table 3, the percentage of unemployed among educated youth (higher secondary and above) is higher than that of the less educated. As high as 18% of the educated urban Muslim youth report unemployment. Unemployment among youth is a factor that has adverse social consequences, and differences in these rates can easily be traced to social and economic discrimination.
Unemployment Rates for Youth Considering the Principal Status for 2004–2005 and 2011–2012.
Table 4 shows that in 2018–2019, unemployment among rural males of all the religious minority groups was higher than Hindus. Muslim, Christian and Sikhs had 6.7, 6.9 and 6.4% of unemployment against 5.7% among Hindu rural males. The trend continues 2019–2020, with the highest percentage of unemployment found in the Sikh community. Among rural women, the unemployment rate is highest among the Christian community throughout the period. In the urban male category, again unemployment rate has been higher in Christian. However, Muslim women suffer the highest unemployment rate among all the categories.
Religion-Wise Trend of Unemployment Rate Among Urban and Rural Areas.
In terms of Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE), it is seen that the ST Hindus are at the bottom of the ladder in rural areas, followed by SC and then by the Muslims, their ranking remaining unchanged over the past two decades, as also the period after the adoption of the JSCR. The relatively higher consumption expenditure for the rural Muslims can be attributed to their being outside agriculture—into small manufacturing and service activities—where earnings are higher.
MPCE has gone up for the entire category between 2004–2005 and 2011–2012. Nevertheless, the MPCE rate of growth is lowest among rural and urban Muslims (Table 5). All Hindus MPCE increased by ₹40.6, whereas all Muslims MPCE increased by ₹34.7. Hindu OBCs grow by ₹44, whereas; Muslim OBCs grow by ₹33; ₹132.2 is the difference between the MPCE of urban Hindus and Muslims. The increase in MPCE of Muslims has been ₹34.7 above ST (33), but certainly below the national average of ₹40 in rural India. In Urban India, the increase of MPCE of all Muslims is ₹59.7 as compared to all Hindus (93) and the national average (86.7). Amartya Sen’s argued that ‘Development as capacity Expansion’. Low income certainly pushes Muslims into the bracket of a lower class. Moreover, the poverty level among Muslims is above the national average.
Social Category Wise Average MPCE (MRP) at Constant Price (1987–1988 = 100).
It has a direct bearing on other developmental indicators such as education and health. Muslims had the lowest literacy level (70%) compared to 74% among Hindus and 83% among other religious minorities. Poverty levels among Muslims in rural areas are higher than the national average during 2004–2005 and 2011–2012. Poverty among Muslims is significantly higher than the UCH and other religious groups but less than the SC/ST population at both time points. When the SC and ST populations are excluded, Muslim poverty works out to be much above the national figure. The rate of poverty reduction among Muslims has been similar to that in the general population and other communities.
In urban areas, poverty among the OBC Muslims is almost twice as high as that of the general population in 2004–2005, maintained in 2011–2012. It is higher than that among the SC and similar or marginally lower than that of the ST population. Shockingly, the OBC Muslim poverty is four times that of the other religious groups and UCH. Non-OBC Muslims, however, record somewhat similar or marginally lower poverty levels compared to SC/ST population during the period under consideration. The figures nonetheless are three times that of other religious groups and four times that of UCH. Notably, Muslim OBC reported higher poverty than the Hindu OBC in the base year, and the gap went up in 2011–2012 both in rural and urban areas.
The economic conditions among the OBC Muslims are thus worsening as compared to their counterparts among the Hindus. While the gap in poverty between OBC and non-OBC Muslims has gone up marginally in rural areas, it has remained relatively stable in urban areas. The rate of poverty reduction for urban Muslims is similar compared to the national average and other communities. Despite the dwindling economic status and weaker capacity, there have been call for social and economic boycott of Muslims by the few right-wings organisation. This brings us to the point earlier mentioned about the protection of minorities from boycott and treating it as an offence by Ambedkar.
We do not know of any weapon more influencing, than this group boycott which could have been conceived for the conquest of the Dalit. The technique of overt violence diminishes away before it, for it has the most effective and numbing effects. It is the very treacherous because it passes as a legal method dependable with the theory of liberty of contract. We concur that this autocracy of the majority must be put down firmly, if we are to offering the Depressed Classes the freedom of speech and action essential for their upward mobility, argued Ambedkar quoting Starte Committee Report 1928.
In 2011–2012, about 74% of the population six years and above were literate (Figure 1). Among the broad socio-religious categories, Muslims had the lowest literacy level (70%) compared to 74% among Hindus and 83% among other religious minorities. The lowest literacy level was among the SC/ST Hindus, followed by OBC Muslims. OBC Muslims had a lower literacy level than the OBC Hindus, with a gap of 5 percentage points between them in 2011–2012. These are some of the indicators which outline the ‘Development Deficit’ despite the remarkable efforts of the government. Indeed, the idea of ‘unruly practices’ is underway. 7
Level of Literacy for a Person Age Six and Above, 2004–2005 and 2011–2012.
According to Table 6, Muslim males and females both are lagging in terms of education. In the age group of 5 and above, the literacy rate among Muslim males in rural is 78.6% compared to 81.4% among the Hindus. In an urban area, for same age group, Muslim male has 83.4 literacy rate as compared to 91.8% among Hindus. The difference is much higher in urban areas for the male category. Christians and Sikhs, too, have higher literacy rates. For the female category, the literacy rate among the five and above age group is 77.2% compared to 82.6% for Hindus. However, that difference is very little when comparing the female literacy rate of Hindus and Muslims in rural areas. For Muslim females, the literacy rate among the 5 and above age group is 64.7% compared to 65.7% of Hindu women. It can be said that literacy in urban is problematic.
Religion and Gender-wise Literacy Rate.
A Hurdle to the Ambedkar’s Ideal in the Context of Muslims
In undivided India, although their political and economic position was on the decline, Muslims as a whole were in a better situation. Its urban middle class was vocal for their rights. With partition, the Indian Muslims were left without organisation, ideas and leaders. Although he supported the demand of the Muslim League, Ambedkar had better suggestions than the creation of Pakistan. ‘For the Muslim alternative is a frightful and dangerous alternative’. 8 By analysing Nationalist Muslims, Muslim League and Azad Muslim Conference demand to safeguard the Muslims’ cultural, economic, and political interest, Ambedkar had drafted essential Muslim representation in the entire sphere of government and informal institutions. For instance, 50% of representation in Legislative, Central and Provincial, has to be through the separate electorate. He also urged Hindu leaders to pay heed to these demands if they wanted to avoid the division.
Just before independence, in reply to Cripps proposal and Sapru Committee on Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar found that communal representation in Constituent Assembly was the only issue that needed attention. Ambedkar rejected the idea of fixing the number of members and the method of joint representation. He found that a simple majority cannot deal with questions related to the Constitution. This would bring non-minorities view imposition on minorities. For him, representation in public services, executive and legislative, should be decided on the principle of the relative majority rather than an absolute majority.
The principle that all communities should be represented in the Public Services in a prescribed proportion and no single community should be allowed to have a monopoly has been accepted by the Government of India. This principle has been embodied in the Government of India Resolutions of 1934 and 1943, and rules to carry it out have been laid down…the representation of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes should be equal to the quantum of their representation in the Legislature.
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Tejani (2013) noted Ambedkar’s assessment of communalisation of society in Indian democracy may left minority groups vulnerable. Thus, it needed a safeguard in liberal constitution. According to the Tejani, Ambedkar, hence, made a case for minority reservation under separate electorate against the argument that reservation may cause national dis(unity).
Minorities who argued for recognition did so precisely on the grounds that public life and political power had been monopolised by a majority that was also Hindu and upper caste. Reservation would ensure their voiced were not drowned out by the majority and, by legitimising their citizenship, inculcate national unity.
Teltumbde (2003), Thorat (2020) and Chakrabarty (2019) too noted Ambedkar’s effort for minority protection in similar vein.
Ambedkar reasoned that in Indian political structure enabled communal majority rather than the political majority and to defend minority, religious and untouchable, he suggested few measures based on three principles, namely the principle of relative representation of majority and minority in the central and state legislatures, the principle of unanimous decision in some spheres and the principle of confidence in Executive. Ambedkar was of the view that his proposed scheme would allow an effective representation of minorities and their role in political governance. (Thorat, 2020)
However, the view remained as it was, and a partition took place. Furthermore, as has been argued above that Muslims have been lagging on many development indicators.
Why there has been such a gap, the advocates of redistributive justice argue that it is an economic structure to be blamed. The strengthening of the model would take care of the ‘inequality’ that it produces. However, this article distance itself from the proposition made by such scholars who contemplate the present situation of Muslims as rooted merely in the economic structure of society such as exploitation, economic marginalisation, and under-paid work and that it could be overcome by readjusting the structure of the economy. As many distributive theorists have done, the wrong diagnosis led to the State’s demand for poor policy treatment.
Counter-theory would be the ‘theory of recognition or a combination of redistribution, recognition and representation’. Let us test this theory first. According to Charles Taylor, ‘misrecognition of one’s identity is oppression’. Some of the misinformation is: Muslims are a homogenised community, due to commonness of their faith—political implication: they vote en-masse; social implication: they do not have category or hierarchy. Muslims have a caste hierarchy similar to Hindus. Muslims are poor because of their choice; they go to madrasas, keener for religious education. Consequently, they are not in high earning jobs. Muslims are the most patriarchal element manifested in the debate around the issues of Burka, triple-talaq and multiple marriages and other such cultural issues.
This imagination has been constructed and propagated mainly by informal institutions with the help of the government. Moreover, now it has been a normal perception among the general population. With the incident like September 11 and rise of Al-Qaida and ISIS, media biases replay those notions. This perception, in and outside government, has reinforced discriminatory approaches against the minority. Exclusion and discrimination take place in everyday living. Joseph (2021) gives a chilling account of state agencies’ biased and brutal approach to Muslims. State, market and civil society development and sustain the multiple forms of discrimination, such as—(a) institutional bias, (b) social closure to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligible; (c) selective or no data/information. 10 Muslims face roadblocks in the labour market. Thorat and Attewell (2007), Shaban (2018), Bhalla and Luo (2013), Saiyed (2021) and others have highlighted the discrimination against Muslims in general and in the market.
But, one has to mark changes and continuity these imaginary goes through, especially in public. With the change in the position of the dominant ideology in politics, it also changes. With the centrist ideology in power, the commission and committee and specific programmes are explicitly directed to the Minorities. However, the centrist does proceed with caution of not being perceived as ‘Anti-Hindu’. Second, the institutional staff is over-represented by Non-Muslims and dominated by Upper Caste Hindu (UCH); indeed, not many enthusiasts for such a programme. One can identify this as a half-hearted attempt of centrists as their piecemeal democratic approach toward the minorities.
Once right-wing ideology comes to power, both the policies and Implementing Agency (IA) overtly support each other. The general prejudices turned into overt discrimination. For instance, the Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA) stated that Muslims are not a minority. Others stated that ‘All Indians are Hindus’. How do institutions support this thought? In an RTI reply to a query by a Muslim candidate for rejection of his candidature, CRPF DIG replied that ‘since the applicant is a Muslim, a religion associated with terrorism, he could not be given the information sought by him due to security reasons’. It resonates with the idea of the current Home Minister, who argued that no information would be released about the representation of Muslims in the police force. Data of Muslim employment in external and internal intelligent agencies are nowhere in the public domain.11
A little focus on their idea of Minorities, especially Muslims, and secularism bring forth the alternate idea of democracy. The current government claims to be secular by treating everyone equally and not tailoring a particular scheme for the minority, as these are appeasement. However, Ambedkar argued that ‘Treating unequal equally is wrong’. We also see the deepening, vertical and horizontal, of right-wing ideology in politics and society. The atmosphere for ‘receptivity’ for data, discrimination and development deficit has been dwindling. It is ‘convergence of communal majority into the political majority’, explained Ambedkar.
‘The minorities in India have loyally accepted the rule of the majority, which is a communal majority and not a political majority. It is for the majority to realise its duty not to discriminate against minorities. Whether the minorities will continue or will vanish must depend upon this habit of the majority. (Sammadar, 2007)
Muslim Needs Ambedkar’s Constitution
The BJP government has promised, ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas’ as a mantra for an inclusive approach at the policy level. Looking at the socio-economic situation of the community, it seems they need special attention. However, there are forces at work to push minorities, especially Muslims to a relegate position. At the current juncture, we see the market joining hand or having compromised with socially regressive forces with the State acting as a facilitator. The combination has been quashing the space for the ideas of Dr Ambedkar, that is, liberty, equality and fraternity, principles of democracy. Hence, Muslims need Ambedkar, both as an idea and practice, to tilt Indian democracy favouring social justice.
We must not only be staunch in our faith in democracy, but we must resolve to see that whatever we do, we do not help the enemies of democracy to uproot the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. The single most important value of democracy is non-discrimination. (Ambedkar, 2010, p. 27)
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
