Divergent Paths of Protestantism and Asian Nationalism: A Comparison of Two Social Movements in Korea and China in 1919

The March First Independence Movement in Korea

The March First Movement, also known as the Man-se Demonstrations or Samil Undong, was planned and organized by students, educators, and religious leaders, with the support of diaspora Korean nationalists. As with most other social movements, it was triggered by a sequence of largely negative events: Japanese encroachment upon Korea after winning two wars (against China in 1895 and against Russia in 1905), the peaceful annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and the sudden death of Korea’s former emperor Gojong from poisoning in January 1919. Large crowds were planning to gather in Seoul for Gojong’s funeral in early March.

On March 1, thirty-three activists gathered at a restaurant and read aloud their newly drafted Korean Declaration of Independence. These individuals were soon arrested by the police, but massive crowds continued to assemble. The next day, a Sunday, the Japanese authorities forbade churches to hold services. Instead, many people met in the mountains or in private homes. Arrests and suppression turned into violence and massacres, fueling the movement to become a nationwide uprising with over two million Koreans participating, roughly one-tenth of the whole Korean population. The movement catalyzed the founding of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea by exiled Koreans in Shanghai. Thirty years later, South Korea designated March 1 as a national holiday.

What was unique about this Korean movement was its Christian representation in leadership, locations, and participants. This feature can be explained by the church’s unique place in society during early colonial rule. Under the repressive Japanese rule, which began in 1910, social organizations were dissolved, all newspapers were censored, and Koreans were excluded from politics. ³ The Japanese were not particularly anti-Christian, but their religious policies functioned to control Korea society; religious organizations and locations were therefore allowed a measure of freedom. Beginning in 1907, Korea experienced a continuing Christian revival that by 1910 had brought the number of Korean converts to around 370,000. ⁴ Meanwhile, since churches were among the few places that provided public space for exchanging and spreading ideas, almost all nationalist activities occurred in and around the Protestant religious community. Indeed, twenty-four of the forty-eight leaders of the March First Movement were members of the Protestant church. As historian Park summarizes, “The Korean Protestant church had been the largest center of progressive reform activities in late Confucian Korea.” ⁵ Even some more radical socialists also reckon that Protestant Christianity was “the mother of Korean independence.” ⁶ For example, the provisional government, founded soon after the movement, adopted its anthem from the 1908 union hymnbook, including the line “Long live our nation under the protection of God.” ⁷ The March First Movement thus seamlessly fused together Korean patriotic identity with Protestant Christianity.

This movement also dramatically changed the attitudes of Western missionaries toward Japanese rule. Initially, most missionaries in Korea accepted Japanese rule and remained neutral in Korean-Japanese relations. These missionaries sidestepped progressive ideals and simply preached “obedience to the powers that be,” despite the oppressive circumstances. ⁸ For the most part, the Western missionaries then in Korea were theologically conservative Protestants. “The typical missionary of the first quarter century after [Korea’s] opening was a man of the Puritan type. . . . In theology and biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and he held as a vital truth the pre-millenarian view of the second coming of Christ. The high criticism and liberal theory were deemed dangerous heresies.” ⁹ This mind-set explains the missionaries’ initially passive submission to Japan’s takeover of Korea, although Japan annulled Korea’s extraterritorial rights. Indeed, the mission boards of the leading Presbyterian and Methodist denominations even welcomed the annexation. ¹⁰ The Japanese authorities in turn did not want to upset this relationship. They allowed the churches to grow, while other spheres of society came under strict surveillance. The relationship between these Western missionaries and the Japanese government remained outwardly friendly until the latter’s violent suppression of the 1919 movement. Faced with the brutal treatment of Korean demonstrators by the Japanese authorities, such as the massacre at Che’am, missionaries put up slogans like “No Neutrality for Brutality.” In addition, they actively assisted and sheltered the wounded demonstrators. ¹¹

But how did the primarily fundamentalist missionaries in Korea breed progressive indigenous disciples? Why did these conservative Korean converts adopt progressive and reformist social views? ¹² When one considers the Korean circumstances, what may seem counterintuitive actually is not. Since the revival, a fundamentalist theology with an emphasis on millenarian and eschatological hopes had been attracting many Koreans to the growing Protestant church. Such doctrines fulfilled people’s longing for deliverance from Japanese colonial rule. At the same time, this seemingly otherworldly theology strengthened Korean political activism. ¹³

One must consider Korea’s social setting in order to comprehend this metamorphosis. Koreans viewed Protestant Christianity as a new religion from the West, where people lived in an advanced civilization with modern means. By embracing this new Western religion, the Koreans made a decisive break with their Confucian heritage. They were also taught by conservative missionaries to consider Confucianism a form of paganism, ¹⁴ which meant a revolutionary change in their moral outlook and social practices. Churches, mission schools, hospitals, and other outreach agencies started by conservative missionaries and their indigenous assistants increasingly improved society in tangible ways. For example, the emphasis on equality appealed to disadvantaged Koreans who were trapped in old Korean social groupings. As a result of mission outreach and educational efforts, some members of the poor and oppressed class became not only the first Koreans to receive a modern education but also conscientious leaders in spreading nationalistic awareness against colonialists. ¹⁵ Interestingly, the Korean converts lived out their individual piety and gradually manifested their broader concerns in a social gospel. By 1910, most Koreans lived with the daunting fear that their independence was lost. Church leaders saw parallels between the colonial reality of Korea and the history of the Israelites in slavery. ¹⁶ They preached against the widespread despair of colonization and called for repentance and perseverance during a period of tribulation. ¹⁷ This eschatological preaching not only sustained the revival but also gave a new hope for Korea. Such hope was visionary at first, but it gradually became a motivating force for civic participation. One of the fruits of this ideological resource was the popular cohesion during the 1919 movement. All sections of Korean society joined the demonstrations, which broadened the movement so that it became a truly national event.

The May Fourth Movement in China

Two months after the uprising in Korea, a similar group of Chinese marched to protest its own government’s concession to colonial powers. Although both uprisings were anti-imperialist movements right after the Paris Peace Conference, the situation in China was more complex than in Korea. Even with foreign encroachments, China was divided among warlords but remained an independent country in 1919. Nevertheless, a sequence of events fueled strong nationalist sentiments, including the dethroning of the Qing Dynasty through Sun Yat-sen’s revolution (1911), Yuan Shi-kai’s restoration (1915), the New Culture Movement (1915), Japan’s Twenty-One Demands (1915), warlordism (since 1916), the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which gave Japan rights to Shandong, and the immediate trigger of the Chinese diplomatic failure at the Paris Peace Conference. American advocacy of self-determination at the League of Nations promised high hopes to Chinese intellectuals, but failure to follow through was a blow of betrayal.

On May 4, 1919, students in Beijing drafted a petition and marched in front of Tiananmen. They shouted dual protests against foreign powers and against their own government. They called for a boycott and a public burning of Japanese products. The next day, the movement spread to all universities in Beijing and to other larger cities. Patriotic merchants and workers also joined the protests. There were arrests but no large-scale bloodshed.

Compared to the movement in Korea, the May Fourth Movement was a success. Not only was the Beijing government forced to release students and dismiss the three officials demanded by demonstrators, but Chinese representatives in Paris also refused to sign the peace treaty. This movement gained unrivaled significance for China as “the center of a set of ideas that shaped China’s momentous twentieth century.” ¹⁸ Within two years the Chinese Communist Party was founded, a radicalized development of the May Fourth Movement sentiments. Even Mao Zedong himself claimed that this movement prepared the stage for “China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism.” ¹⁹ Some historians also conclude that “the May Fourth movement served to promote the diffusion of Marxism in Chinese radical thinking” and that “Comintern aid served as the catalyst in the precipitation of ideology into organization.” ²⁰ Lucien Bianco even argues that “the founding of the Chinese Communist Party can be seen as an extension of the May Fourth Movement.” ²¹

In comparison with the impact of Korea’s March First Movement, the Chinese May Fourth Movement not only fused patriotism with a Chinese identity that had little to do with Christianity but also served as a harbinger of a hostile intellectual trend among the educated elite against a foreign religion such as Protestant Christianity. In fact, Chinese nationalism also went through a process of metamorphosis: conceived in military defeat around 1905, born through the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and matured into a more radical anti-Christian form by the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. ²² In this process, the May Fourth Movement was a critical conjuncture of the radicalization of Chinese youth and the popularization of activism.

The ratio of Christian representation in the May Fourth Movement remains unknown because religious identities of participants were not prominent, unlike in the Korean movement. Researchers have found through memoirs and recollections that many students in Christian universities, such as Yenching University, were active in the Student Union and strikes. Some explained to their Christian institutions that the movement was “a golden opportunity to show that they too were loyal patriots”; one Yenching student was among those imprisoned on May 4. ²³ But the overall representation of Christian leadership went largely unnoticed by the Chinese public.

Most of the college students who actively participated in the Chinese movement embraced a type of Protestantism that was on the opposite side of the spectrum from that of their Korean counterparts. Understanding the developments of Protestant mission prior to 1919 is essential in order to grasp this contrast. By 1917, over 70 percent of American Protestants working in China came from theologically liberal groups, as estimated by historian William Hutchison. ²⁴ They generally embraced ideas such as evolution, progress, moral virtue, social service, individualism, and other Enlightenment ideals. ²⁵ They considered outdated the traditional fundamentals of the Protestant faith, such as repentance from sin, Jesus’s virgin birth and resurrection, and the authority of the Scriptures. Unlike fundamentalist missionaries, who prioritized evangelism and church life over social reforms, these missionaries in China devoted themselves primarily to bringing China into the modern world. ²⁶ In post–Boxer Rebellion China, they chose educational mission as a better strategy both to win respect from the local elites and to expand their mission base. Thus, by the 1910s, higher education had become a niche market for liberal Protestant entrepreneurship. This surge in educational mission was an acknowledged anomaly in mission history. ²⁷

While liberal Protestantism was spreading in China, a market of free ideas flourished. For example, Yan Fu’s translations of Evolution and Ethics (Thomas Henry Huxley) and The Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith) opened vibrant discussions among Chinese intellectuals who converted from traditional Confucianism. The New Culture Movement emerged, which embraced vernacular literature, Western scientific theories, and democratic ideals. ²⁸ Liberal Protestantism was less effective in combating other rival ideologies, especially Communism. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of Christian universities invited antagonism from secular higher education institutions, leading to the first wave of the anti-Christian movement in 1922. Chinese liberal Christian intellectuals hoped to respond by conducting interfaith dialogues with secular liberals. These Christian intellectuals thus asked five leading Chinese intellectuals to write about their views of Christianity. Many first expressed admiration for the moral teachings and humanitarianism of the Christian religion but followed with warnings of “assimilation” of Chinese culture by Christianity through cultural infiltration. ²⁹ Viewing themselves as bearing the true spirit of the Enlightenment, the Chinese intelligentsia advocated the idea of separation of church and state to downplay the influence of Christianity. During that era of liberal Protestant dominance in China mission, fundamentalists retreated from intellectual engagement with public life into ghetto-like communities. The presence of two polarized groups of Christians failed to produce a public image of Christians as Chinese patriots.

How did Western missionaries respond to Chinese nationalism? As patriots themselves, most American Protestant missionaries were sympathetic. For example, the president of Lingnan University, James McClure Henry, regarded Chinese nationalism as inevitable and welcomed it as “a hopeful sign of China’s resurgence.” Many even expressed support for the rise of Chinese Communists, viewing them as effective “agrarian reformers.” ³⁰ Since the first anti-Christian movement in 1922, Christian universities became sites where ideas of progress were formally institutionalized and further spread. Some mission projects even became incubators for Communist mobilization. For example, in 1918 Yale-in-China’s Hunan campus, the predecessor of Francis Wei’s Hua Chung College, appointed the young Mao Zedong to be the editor of its Chinese journal, The New Hunan. The mission rented space for Mao to run a bookshop. Using this location as a base, Mao opened more stores, each of which sold Communist literature and funneled profits to the growing Communist movement in the 1920s. Within a few years, Soviet ideas and mobilization among young students grew. In the early years of Yenching, for example, students Rong Zhidong and a few others started the first Chinese Communist Party branch on campus. In 1927, missionary John Stuart, the president of Yenching University, accused Communists of inciting student activities on campus. ³¹ Stuart later reacted with an attitude of tolerance. At all Christian colleges, students protested compulsory chapel attendance, courses in religion, and Christian social service.

A variety of Protestantisms and nationalisms

Protestant Christianity entered Korea and China through treaty relations with Western powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In both regions, the impetus for missionary activities was attached to these treaty documents. The initial development of Christianity in both countries was therefore similarly tainted by colonialism. Changes within Korean and Chinese societies leading up to the March First and the May Fourth Movements also present similarities, including the collapse of Confucian leadership and the growth of Christianity through evangelism and education. However, the encounters between two different types of Protestantism and two variant forms of nationalism led Korea and China on divergent paths.

Because of historical circumstances, Korea’s Protestant converts occupied the country’s only public square (i.e., the churches) for ideological exchange and organizational mobilization. Their conservative tendencies in theology preserved the movement from radicalization. Missionaries did not create a dependency among indigenous converts to guide their role in society. In contrast, China’s liberal Protestant missionaries overexpanded their educational mission to the extent that it created both indigenous dependency and a sense of cultural superiority. Both invited antagonistic sentiments from secular intellectuals and educated Chinese. However, the response by missionaries and indigenous believers was, guided by their theology, mainly sympathy and uninformed tolerance. They were unaware of the new type of radical nationalism brewing among the Chinese, which took the subversive form of Communist mobilization attacking the integrity of Christian missions from within.

The diversity of the intellectual soil in which these two movements grew was a key difference too. In China, under the influence of progressive liberals, who translated and studied Western liberal ideas, a market of ideas was emerging with various competing streams of thought. ³² Printing houses, literature societies, and social organizations mushroomed. Protestant Christianity had to contend with a variety of ideologies, such as Bolshevik Communism, secular liberalism, and traditional Confucianism. Korea, in contrast, was a colony under a strict military government that left little room for intellectual development. Such intellectual restriction proved to be an unexpected blessing because progressive social ideals nurtured by conservative Protestant theology stood out as the most powerful alternative ideology.

Conclusion

The entry of Protestant Christianity into Korea and into China was equally associated with the gunboat diplomacy of the West. This beginning triggered lasting antiforeign sentiments among indigenous Koreans and Chinese, but the later development of Protestant Christianity in these two regions followed divergent paths. In China, becoming a Christian would make one appear unpatriotic. In Korea, however, the public image of Protestant Christians as patriots was officially proclaimed in the 1919 March First Movement.

Both the March First Movement in Korea and the May Fourth Movement in China erupted during a time of global tumult, including the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917) and the realignment of European powers after World War I. The movements were also inspired by Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance campaigns in India, as well as a speech in 1918 by US president Woodrow Wilson promising the right of self-determination to people of colonized regions. Both the Korean movement and the Chinese movement were triggered by the frustration and humiliation that immediately followed the Paris Peace Conference. Despite these similarities, the two movements and their aftereffects set the two countries on different trajectories.

Korea became the most Christianized Asian country, quite different from the case in postcolonial China, although the nationalistic fervor of the Korean Protestant church peaked in 1919 and has retreated since then. In response to international criticism against the military crackdown on peaceful civilians, Japanese authorities shifted to a softer cultural rule in Korea. Thereafter, small social and political organizations were allowed to exist outside the religious community. After winning ethnic approval as Christian patriots of the country and enjoying the status of an established religion, the Protestant church no longer occupied the center of later nationalist activities. This reversal later in Korean history also highlights the importance of two factors: the public space of the church and alternative intellectual resources.

In contrast, China has remained a Communist state, with Christianity continuing to be viewed with hostility. In September 2017, after having torn down crosses from approximately two thousand government-sanctioned Three-Self churches, the new leadership of Xi Jinping convened a forum in Beijing entitled “Chinese Culture and Religious Sinicization.” This campaign further confirms the regime’s efforts to rid China’s Christian revival of foreign influences. This same sinicizing rhetoric has been a recurring theme in the history of Chinese Christianity.