The historical but missed role of Chinese sociology

Introduction

Despite its long history, sociology is still a problematic discipline in some countries. Its adaptation as an academic discipline in China, even though that adaptation began decades ago and is long in the historical past, offers a case study that can help us understand the current situation of social sciences in non-western countries, such as Iran’s Islamic Republic.

One of the reasons why this branch of the social sciences is so challenging is that it unveils the mechanisms by which order and authority are established. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the ruling forces could use sociology to strengthen their grip on the political or social power; but on the other hand, those who want to jeopardize this same order could be equally inspired by this discipline. Thus, almost all the non-democratic regimes face a paradoxical choice regarding either promoting sociology or restricting it. If they leave a large space for the growth of this discipline, it could provide a comprehensive and analytical tool that will increase the effectiveness of social and intellectual forces that endeavor to change the established situation. This is very compromising for such regimes. Nevertheless, if they want to curb sociology, they will deprive their administration of useful and necessary information for the macro-management of the country.

This paradoxical situation could help us describe the evolution of sociology in China. However, I do not want to relate the history of Chinese sociology here, since this subject has long been discussed (e.g. Lin & Palmer, 2016). Instead, I would like to pose a theory for the consideration of Chinese sociologists themselves, who, after all, are in the best position to judge the relevancy of this hypothetical assessment.

The roots of this hypothesis

What led me to the hypothesis, described below, was the specific fate of sociology as an orphan discipline of social science in China. Let us have a glance at this tormented history.

Social thinking has a long history in China, but the first signs of sociology as a discipline within the social sciences could be found in China at the end of the 19th century. It came from Europe with translations of books by European sociologists as well as from the first Chinese students returning from study in Europe. At the beginning, the discipline was named “research on groups.” Qunxue Yiyan was the Chinese title of the 1874 book by British sociologist Herbert Spencer, Study of Sociology. The Chinese title roughly means “discourse on the study of groups” (see Yuhua, Peilin, & Shiding, 2008, for further discussion).

The advent of sociology in China goes back to the 1920s, when for the first time this discipline became known in the country. With the blustery history of China in the 1930s and 1940s, this discipline remained very marginal in the academic sphere of China, slowing its development.

The first serious slowdown to this young discipline in China was imposed in 1949, when Mao Zedong decided to ban sociology as a “bourgeoisie discipline.” The French founder of sociology, August Comte, was denounced by Lenin as “capitalism’s thinker.” In 1952, Marxist social philosophy (historical materialism) was introduced in the Chinese universities as a replacement for this quasi-abolished scientific field. For 27 years, Chinese sociology was impeded from any theoretical development based on the basic principle of the scientific method: research objectivity. The absence of this objectivity in studies, papers, and courses during all these years was a colossal impairment to social science in this country. The fact that the objectives of research were, in one way or another, predetermined was a fatal blow to the substantial quality of the discipline. The biased results of the semi-research undertaken during that time created a tradition of superficiality in social understanding in China. This superficiality reflected the mandatory emptiness of the expectation that research would always be affirmative and almost never fundamentally critical of the government’s policies.

The first effect of this academic desolation showed itself in the excessive levelheadedness of the discipline once it was restored in 1979–80 as a field of study at Chinese institutions of higher learning. Chinese sociologists responded to this restoration by excessively emphasizing the utility and practical aspects of their discipline. Even though this trend had the potential to build a base of support for Chinese sociology that would allow it to last and develop, we should not forget its tendency to weaken theoretical production in the field, placing it at a relative disadvantage in comparison to other intellectual arenas in which China has shown creativity and abundance.

The second effect of the deprivation of sociology from free-thinking and objective research for almost three decades, which inspired our main theory (explained below), could be seen in China’s lack of preparation for the new era of industrialization and capitalism in the 1980s. While Chinese sociologists complied with the restrictions and limitations related to the Cultural Revolution, the country was missing out on important knowledge about the historical drift it was soon to adopt. The entry of China into the new era of left-capitalism was evidently the result of a political decision and seemingly not the result of a socially grounded inclination. How can we be sure about that? We simply can not, since the most appropriate tool for knowing this to be true is absent from the Chinese universities and research centers.

Sociology was called to retake its place in academics when the decision to change the historical development of Chinese society had been made by the policy-makers in power. It was not inspired by any sociological suggestion or by any sociological grasp of its necessity. The fact that sociology became a very practical and useful tool for managing the social problems of the hasty economic changes of the time could not fool us about its critical absence earlier. Sociology was re-authorized to function when decisions concerning structural changes in China had already been made. The damage was already done when sociology was called to duty with the expectation that it would limit the bleeding of the new national adventure. ¹

Our theory

Sociology, if not banned, could have suggested another way to Chinese leaders and policy-makers – perhaps a different way by which China could leave its outdated economic structure without turning to the semi-capitalism that is causing significant damage to social cohesion, the environment, and the country’s natural resources. What other social science besides sociology could play such an important role in this area?

It appears that the chronological interruption in the normal evolution of sociology caused a muddled development of this discipline in China. The same upshot could play out in other countries where political changes directly affect the fate of sociology as a social science. Our theory is that each imposed break in the evolution of this discipline creates a vacuum of theoretical production that cannot be filled simply by increasing the magnitude of scholarly production in this field. In other words, the discipline cannot become qualitatively productive when it undergoes continuous stoppages in its regular development.

We can compare this unfortunate evolution of sociology in China and its omitted role in the historical evolution of Chinese society with the more fortunate fate of sociology in Europe in the 19th century. In Europe this discipline, along with other social sciences, enabled capitalism to make fundamental choices in such a way that upheavals associated with a conjectural trial-and-error process were avoided. Sociology helped European capitalism make choices that would not cause immediate and massive social shocks. This was possible thanks to a continuous process of free-thinking theoretical improvement within western sociology. ²

Chinese sociology did not have the advantage of being able to shape this theoretical background for itself. Once in 1949, for almost 13 years thereafter, and again in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square protests, it had been badly restricted. These interruptions did not allow Chinese sociology to create its own accumulative theoretical experience that could handle the macrostructural problems of the country. Chinese sociology was, for years, essentially a microsociology that focused on concrete, limited issues to be solved. It did not have the chance to accrue knowledge and experience over time to create its own theoretical frame about Chinese society as an overall structure. The political sensitivity and the imposed breaks in its evolution made Chinese sociology a dwarf discipline that could not touch the general or global issues of the country in a period when this kind of approach was highly necessary and demanded. The internalized fear of Chinese sociologists prevented them from approaching the themes that likely would have revealed the negative path of the evolution of Chinese society – a path posing serious dangers for 1.4 billion inhabitants.

The theoretical basis

The main issue in theoretical discontinuity of this discipline is the weak linkage between the microsociological scope and the macrosociological undertakings of Chinese sociology. While an adherence to Marxist historical determinism pushed social research in China towards a macroconception of social issues for decades, changes of a microsociological nature were taking shape at all levels of Chinese society. The government’s semi-sociological understanding of the discipline impeded objective research, thereby thwarting any comprehensive analysis of societal problems for almost three decades.

On the other hand, the reappearance of sociology, properly speaking, in the Chinese academic world was, before anything else, an effort to answer this lack of microsociological understanding of social issues. But before the discipline could even try to repair its deficiency by combining both the micro and macro dimensions of the social sciences, another assault hit it. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were, just 10 years after the return of this discipline, a reminder to Chinese sociologists not to concentrate on the micro-level of sociological endeavors that might put in question the structural facets of the Chinese regime’s new policies.

Caught in this vicious circle, Chinese sociology missed its historical role in this country. First, it missed in the 1950s and 1960s, its microsociological mission when lots of tiny interactions and small changes in Chinese society were shaping a new configuration that, if studied and understood at the time by this absent discipline, could have suggested another historical route for China. ³

I have to be precise in that I, personally, believe in the views of Anthony Giddens (1984), who says that the micro and macro levels overlap in ways that help sustain objectivity in both approaches. This means that we could and should not artificially detach these two levels, ignoring one in favor of the other. The tricky issue with the fate of Chinese sociology is the non-natural pressure by the authorities to focus on only one of these two analytical levels and to disregard the other for reasons of political consideration.

Conclusion

Even though sociology is flourishing as never before in China, it appears that Chinese society could have had another historical destiny if this discipline had not been restricted in China’s academic arena between 1953 and 1979. Sociology, deprived of the intellectual freedom necessary to its objectivity and effectiveness, could not grasp or suggest another prospect for the Chinese nation, while possibly would have avoided the experience of 1979–80. Had sociology been free of these restrictions, we might be living in another world now.