Techno-economic rationalities as a political practice in urban environmental politics in China

Abstract

This article argues that techno-economic rationalities dominate urban environmental policy interventions and sustainability discourses in China. This is so despite recent trends toward diversification of actors and participatory approaches in environmental governance. The paper is based on material collected through interviews with public officials, urban planners, researchers, companies, and nongovernmental organizations working with sustainability issues in cities in China. Our empirical material shows that diversification of actors does not translate into a diversification of policy discourses. Instead, groups with technical expertise or economic resources dominate processes of environmental governance. To explain this tendency, we draw on insights from theories of technocracy. We argue that the concept of techno-economic rationalities explains why considerable leverage over sustainability-related policy decisions is created for non-state actors with access to technical expertise or economic resources, while groups who lack such resources are permanently excluded. In the case of China, this means systematically overlooking social and environmental priorities, which may cement nondemocratic decision making and increase social tensions.

Keywords

Sustainability environmental policy governance technocracy non-state actors

Introduction

Little room is left for meaningful debate, let alone the free play of political interests (Fischer, 1990: 15).

With this quote Fischer (1990) expressed his frustration toward the illusion that there was an apolitical way to make public policy decisions, especially in a contentious area such as the environment. Like others at his time (e.g., Fiorino, 1989; Jasanoff, 1987), Fischer sought to characterize the production of environmental knowledge as a political process. Fischer’s (1990) observations related to public policy in the US, but his sentiment was widely shared by environmental activists internationally and became a concern in the debates that led to the Rio Declaration on Sustainable Development in 1992 (e.g., Lélé, 1991). Fischer (1990) described the rise of technocratic forms of governance in the post-industrialized society as political processes that are co-opted by technical experts, isolated from public debate, and characterized by ostensibly value-neutral policy options.

Much has been written since Fischer’s influential essay, and though concerns with technocracy have remained, there has been ample responses to the recognition of the blurred boundaries of science and policy (Jasanoff, 2004; Miller and Edwards, 2001), the need to involve a wide range of publics in environmental policy making (Fischer, 1999; Nowotny et al., 2001, 2003), and the development of forms of citizen science that help reimagine the production of environmental knowledge and the development of regulatory processes (Dickinson et al., 2012; Silvertown, 2009). This points toward a consensus about the contemporary relevance of communicative approaches to decision making in the environmental policy domain (Kolstad et al., 2014; United Nations, 1992).

Despite this apparent consensus, technocratic discourses continue to dominate the delivery of environmental policy in practice. This tension is re-conceptualized in current debates through Fischer’s (2017) characterization of the ongoing struggle between eco-authoritarianism and often marginalized democratic practices. Technocratic perspectives on environmental policy are particularly relevant in relation to the question of how local sustainability politics contribute to reconfigurations of agency and power (Bulkeley, 2015; Castán Broto, 2017). In new policy areas, there is a need to create logics, or rationalities, for legitimate intervention, which may paradoxically lead to further reinforcing existing hegemonies (Bulkeley et al., 2015). In this paper, we address such dynamics in the context of the delivery of environmental policy in China, a semi-authoritarian political system where environmental governance arrangements and processes are currently in flux.

During the 1990s and the early 2000s, China was experiencing a shift toward an increasingly decentralized political system where resources and decision-making power were distributed further from the political core. The concept of “fragmented authoritarianism” described how bureaucratic units in China gained influence over policy making processes in this previously highly centralized state, resulting in negotiation and bargaining within the political system (Lieberthal, 1992). In contemporary China, political power is diffuse, complex, and competitive. Bureaucratic offices, local officials, research bodies and think tanks, universities, and companies feed proposals into policy processes (Dumbaugh and Martin, 2011). In environmental policy, the range of actors and approaches involved in decision making are subject to increasing diversification (Carter and Mol, 2013; Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, 2015; Meidan et al., 2009; Mertha, 2008; Mol and Carter, 2006). However, our findings show that diversification of actors does not directly challenge the power of technocracies. Instead, techno-economic rationalities remain embedded in contemporary environmental policy practices and serve to delineate a series of exclusions and inclusions of actors and arguments that shape the dynamics of political participation. We examine this argument by analyzing policy makers’ narratives of participation in local environmental decision making in China. The analysis suggests that the deployment of techno-economic rationalities explains how participation is structured, and why certain non-state actors enjoy leverage over policy decisions. These rationalities produce a specific style of sustainability policy that systematically excludes conventional social considerations and health priorities of the public.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 (Techno-economic rationalities in environmental politics) presents a review of research on environmental governance, focusing on technocratic principles and their influence on environmental politics. Section 3 (Emergent actors in contemporary environmental governance in China) discusses trends in climate governance in China, with particular focus on non-state actor participation in sustainability issues. Section 4 (Methodology) outlines the methodology of the study. Section 5 (Techno-economic rationalities in urban sustainability policy in China) discusses the empirical results, which demonstrate how techno-economic rationalities exercise a powerful influence over environmental politics in China. Section 6 (Conclusions) reflects on the drivers of this trend and potential systemic consequences arising from this phenomenon.

Techno-economic rationalities in environmental politics

Despite academic interest in the reproduction of technocracy in China, this concern has so far not been fully acknowledged in analyses of reconfigurations of environmental governance processes. This paper addresses this concern by focusing explicitly on how techno-economic rationalities shape environmental policy in China. In the sections below, we explain how techno-economic approaches influence environmental politics. First, we clarify how theories of technocracy relate to the concept of techno-economic rationalities. Second, we examine their influence on environmental politics from the perspective of inclusion in decision-making processes. Third, we explain how techno-economic rationalities are embedded in sustainability discourses.

Technocracy and techno-economic rationalities

Fischer (1990: 17) defined technocracy as a “system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions.” The concept encompasses at least two phenomena. The first relates to the nature of policy processes. Fischer observed that technocrats regard political processes with scepticism and prescribe their replacement with knowledge-informed decisions. Thus, he described technocracy as a form of governance, or a meta-phenomenon; an invisible “apolitical” political practice. He saw technocratic governance as defined by rejection of moral criteria, rational decision making, and separation of experts from the “irrational public” (Fischer, 1990: 22). In this view, politics are seen as a problem, rather than as a process that provides solutions. The second phenomenon relates to technocratic policy substance, which is characterized by its apolitical nature and emphasis on efficiency (Fischer, 1990). Technocratic ideals are epistemologically based in positivism, and the rational decision-making process described above prescribes policy solutions void of subjectivity. As a result, technocratic policy is characterized by questions of “how” rather than “why” and “for whom.” This leads to options conceived as “value-neutral” that gloss over conflicts of interest (Fischer, 1990).

While Fischer (1990) traced the emergence of technocracy in Western societies to the Enlightenment and subsequent philosophies of modernity, Chinese scholars perceive Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda at the end of the 1970s as the dawn of technocratic politics in China (Cheng and White, 1990; Ouyang, 2003; Zang, 1999). China’s modernization campaign was associated with the promotion of leaders identified as “technocrats.” This included the appointment of scientists and engineers to political positions and the establishment of influential think tanks connected with the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Cheng and White, 1990; Ouyang, 2003; Zang, 1999). China’s leadership also uses technocracy as an ideology that resolves ideological conflicts between socialism and capitalism and legitimizes politics in the face of declining faith in communist principles (Cheng and White, 1990). According to Ouyang (2003: 188), technocratic principles have transformed China into a society in which “managerial effectiveness and economic utility become the ultimate moral values… [where] the greatness of the State amounts to nothing more than promotion of technological and economic power.”

Building on these debates, we define techno-economic rationalities in environmental politics as discourses that combine technocratic ideals with growth-oriented sustainability paradigms, such as ecological modernization and eco-efficiency. Techno-economic rationalities represent approaches to environmental policy that favour expert-provided technological solutions over normative moral debate and emphasize investment, economic growth, and industrial expansion (Davison, 2001). Thus, technocratic environmental policy discourses build on claims of efficiency and objectivity, while techno-economic discourses encompass these claims in combination with an additional teleological mission of providing economic growth as a solution to environmental challenges.

Expertise in environmental politics

The public policy literature has long approached policy making as a form of interaction between government authorities and non-state actors. The shift from societal steering through formal, top-down channels toward coordination of social systems is theoretically conceived as a shift from government to governance (Pierre, 2000; Rosenau, 1995). Trends such as globalization, decentralization, and emergence of multi-scalar environmental challenges have advanced a paradigm of cross-sector, collaborative governance approaches in the environmental policy domain (Backstrand, 2010; Carmen Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Newell et al., 2012). On a global level, an ever-increasing number of actors and institutions are involved in addressing environmental concerns (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008). Similarly, there is ample empirical evidence that both public and non-state actors formulate and implement climate change responses (Bulkeley and Newell, 2015; Hoffmann, 2011; Okereke et al, 2009; Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014). While non-state actor involvement in public policy can produce benefits in terms of inclusion (e.g., Glasbergen et al., 2007), it can also be problematic in terms of democratic performance (Backstrand, 2008; Bogason and Musso, 2006; Forsyth, 2005; Sørensen, 2002). Shifts of authority in environmental governance frequently occur by delegating decision-making influence to experts. According to Fischer (1990, 1991), the increasing reliance on technocratic practices in decision making is associated with the emergence of a new class of “policy experts.” Fischer (1990) referred to hidden hierarchies of professional associations and technical advisors embedded in modern bureaucratic structures, which exercise significant power over policy through their intimate connections with political elites. Technocratic decision making was a growing trend in environmental politics in particular, due to a combination of increasing scientific and technical complexity of environmental challenges, a perceived need for specialized skills, and a shift of environmental politics from a grassroots issue to (public) environmental management (Davison, 2001). Networks of experts, also known as epistemic communities, play a central role in environmental policy processes by conditioning policy options through presentation of environmental discourses as scientific facts (Litfin, 1994).

Further, nonexperts, such as political leaders or other actor constellations, can gain leverage over environmental policy by strategically using scientific advice to create legitimacy for certain agendas (Dunlop, 2014; Grundmann, 2007). Gough and Shackley (2001) demonstrate that green NGOs exercise authority in international environmental policy by becoming part of epistemic communities. Green movements may reformulate their agendas from overtly ethical or social framings toward approaches more compatible with science-technical framings (“respectable politics”), in order to gain influence in policy making processes. Thus, expertise becomes a “key commodity essential for political control” (Fischer, 1990: 17), which limits access to influence for actors and publics who cannot claim access to science and technology.

Techno-economic environmental policy discourse

Contemporary environmental problems are fundamentally intertwined with social issues (Berkhout et al., 2003). Environmental policy is shaped through contestation over meaning that plays out between heterogeneous groups in society (Feindt and Oels, 2006; Hajer, 1995; Meadowcroft, 2011). By contrast, techno-economic policy practices portray sustainability solutions as scientifically sanctioned, self-evident, and value-neutral. A review of international environmental policy documents reveals that one of the key changes in policy framing since the 1970s is a shift from a political to a technocratic focus (Gomez-Baggethun and Naredo, 2015), which removes elements of social contestation from the policy process.

Techno-economic approaches to sustainability are reproduced through their attachment to theories of social change. For example, the theory of ecological modernization (EMT) studied how industrialized nations cope with ecological issues by presenting science, technology, and market forces as key solutions (Mol, 1997). EMT represented an attempt to explain how capitalist societies could become reflexive and deliver an environmentally sustainable future (Dryzek, 1997; Gibbs, 2000). At the same time, EMT presupposed a key role for firms that could profit from environmental friendly technology (Janicke, 2006). Before the establishment of EMT, environmental management approaches constituted dominant technocratic worldviews in the 1990s, framing global environmental challenges as “solvable” through top-down, managerial and/or market-based interventions (Adger et al., 2001; Dryzek, 1997). Many fundamental assumptions of these discourses remain embedded in new proposals of green growth as pathways to a sustainable future (e.g., The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2015; World Bank, 2012).

The risk associated with techno-economic sustainability agendas is that they constrain the range of available solutions to environmental problems. For example, disproportional focus on technological innovation and industrial progress can lead to overlooking complex social and political contexts (Romero Lankao, 2007). Faith in technology to deliver sustainability solutions allows policy makers to disregard “hard” choices, such as changes to lifestyles or dramatic restructuring of socioeconomic systems (Davison, 2001). Further, sustainability plans fixed in technocratic, “politically neutral” visions tend to sideline issues of equity and inclusion, which may facilitate replication of economic and ecological disparities (Checker, 2011). In the promotion of technology- and investment-intense projects, sustainability discourses are mobilized by political decision makers to legitimize investment decisions, rather than employed as a framework for balanced consideration of social, ecological, and economic benefits (Owens and Cowell, 2011). These restrictions call for careful examination of the ways in which techno-economic rationalities inform sustainability agendas. Nowhere is this need greater than in rapidly developing China, where environmental issues are becoming increasingly salient.

Emergent actors in contemporary environmental governance in China

Although China’s political system is characterized by a strong central government, a multiplicity of voices influence environmental policy making on a central and local level. This study departs from the notion that diversification of environmental governance strategies in China is producing greater social inclusion and deliberation, as well as sustainability strategies better aligned with local priorities. This notion is critically examined by shedding light on principles of inclusion and exclusion of different non-state actors in environmental policy processes. The sections below examine, in turn, the emergence of a new set of actors in environmental policy making and planning, and new spheres of influence for these actors.

As explained above, China’s authoritarian state has undergone decades of fragmentation. National-level environmental policy-making processes today involve multiple non-state actors. Parastatal think tanks and research centers are frequently involved in consultations and policy debates (Meidan et al., 2009). These institutions were established to provide officials with professional advice, but have in some cases gained considerable autonomy (Dumbaugh and Martin, 2011; Wu, 2003) and can act as advocacy coalitions that promote certain policy options (Francesch-Huidobro and Mai, 2012). Large corporations—in particular state-owned enterprises—have a pronounced influence over agenda setting and often operate research institutes regularly consulted in environmental policy processes (Meidan et al., 2009; Tsang and Kolk, 2010). China is becoming an increasingly active participant in international programs and international policy cooperation. The Chinese leadership has expressed commitment to the United Nations Climate Partnership for the Global South (Xinhua, 2016) and recently launched major outreach projects, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Chinese green NGOs collaborate with foreign counterparts and participation in international networks can facilitate absorption of new policy elements into domestic politics (Schroeder, 2008; Yang, 2005).

Green movements in China suffer from weak grassroots connections, poor organizational capacity, lack of local funding, difficulties related to legal registration, and the need to avoid sensitive political issues or confrontational standpoints (Ho, 2007; Lu, 2007; Zhan and Tang, 2013). Yet, civil society and the Chinese public have in recent years gained stronger recognition in environmental policy issues. China’s recently revised Environmental Protection Law points to the importance of public participation and highlights the role of society in protecting public interests (National People's Congress [NPC], 2015). China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) for carbon emission reductions calls for diversified paths of low carbon growth, introducing a stronger role for the public and media in low carbon development (National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2015: 15). Environmental NGOs are among the most active in China’s emerging civil society space. While these movements are embedded in an authoritarian context with depoliticizing and self-censoring tendencies, it has nonetheless been successful in placing environmental issues on the public agenda and drawing attention to specific environmental concerns (Ho, 2007; Tang and Zhan, 2008). In recent years, environmental organizations have engaged in campaigns, lobbying, and attempts to block policy options (Han et al., 2014; Zhan and Tang, 2013). International green movements, like Greenpeace and the World Resources Institute (WRI), are gaining increasingly visible positions in Chinese environmental politics through campaigns, research, and local projects (Greenpeace, 2017; WRI, 2017). In parallel with the increasing severity of environmental degradation, the public and media are becoming more outspoken on environmental issues (He, 2014; Mertha, 2008). Online forums, in particular microblogs, create new spaces for public deliberation and criticism (Tang, 2014; Zheng, 2007). The frequency of environmental-related protests and demonstrations increases steadily and environmental issues are a leading cause behind public protests (Duggan, 2013).

The central government is also creating new roles in environmental protection for authorities at a subnational (provincial and municipal) level. As part of a long-term process of decentralization, the central leadership is increasing the autonomy of local governments, while fiscal decentralization is creating stronger capacity for local action (Cai and Treisman, 2006; Liu and Salzberg, 2012). Today, municipal authorities in China are in charge of urban spatial planning, economic development strategies, and provision and funding of public services and infrastructure: electricity, transport, water and wastewater, and waste management, education and health, and enforcement of environmental protection legislation (Saich, 2008). In the environmental policy domain, the central government calls for municipal governments to take on responsibility for policy development. The administration of local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) has shifted toward greater independence in determining local priorities, strategies and financing arrangements (Lo and Tang, 2006; Mol and Carter, 2006). Local impacts of climate change and increasing knowledge and awareness are, at the same time, contributing to the engagement of municipal authorities in independent climate action (Qi et al., 2008).

In local planning, government authorities use consultative meetings, public hearings and citizen evaluation meetings are used to illicit opinions on various policy issues (He, 2006; Zhou, 2012). Other interactive elements include limited experimentation with participatory budgeting, deliberation in village politics and elections, and public internet forums for citizen discussions (He and Warren, 2011). Local government authorities actively encourage participation of non-state actors, such as professional groups and NGOs, in climate policy processes, to mobilize resources, facilitate innovation transfers, improve awareness, and generate political support (Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). Mertha (2008) describes the increasing heterogeneity of nontraditional actors able to influence local environmental policy as a process toward political pluralization. This refers in particular to how public opposition to large-scale projects opens up new political spaces and opportunities for local officials, nongovernmental organizations, and media to build coalitions and act as policy entrepreneurs. He and Warren (2011: 271) propose that the concept of “authoritarian deliberation” captures such local spaces of communicative participation within China’s authoritarian political system. Leib and He (2006) refer to the modest experimentation with local participation as dynamics of moderate democratization that avoids radical political reform yet enhances political legitimacy.

Yet, the ability of a diverse set of actors to influence environmental policy making needs to be reevaluated in the light of recent political change. Attempts to maintain control over the country’s vast geographical territories have produced cycles of centralization and decentralization, in vacillation since times of imperial rule (Chung, 2000, 2016; Donaldson, 2017). China witnessed relaxation of political control under the leaderships of Jiang Zemin (1993–2002) and Hu Jintao (2003–2012) (Shambaugh, 2016). Under the Xi Jinping administration the cycle is now turning, with the political center closing its grip on power (Lam, 2015; Zhao, 2016). This consolidation of authority encompasses the environmental domain, through a development which Kostka and Nahm (2017) describe as “recentralization” of environmental governance. This development points to the need for further studies to carefully consider what type of actors are included in local environmental politics and how certain actors are able to exercise influence over sustainability-related decision-making processes. In particular, this relates to opportunities of civil society organizations and ordinary citizens to intervene in sustainability politics at the local level.

Methodology

This paper is based on material collected through interviews in Beijing, Shandong Province and Hong Kong in 2013, 2014, and 2016. The sections below explain the rationale for selection of respondents, interview design, and analysis of data.

Selection of respondents

In accordance with the study’s focus on local policy making and non-state actor participation in decision-making processes, the selection of respondents targeted a heterogeneous sample of individuals with direct experience of local policy making and planning. The selection included respondents from local and national government authorities, international organizations, academic institutions, NGOs, industrial units, and consultancy firms with known involvement in local sustainability policy agendas. To maximize insight into policy-making processes, we targeted respondents with multiple years of direct experience of work with environmental issues in cities in China. Thus, all respondents either had experience from sustainability projects in several cities or deep knowledge of policy making in one particular setting.

In total, 55 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Beijing, Shandong Province, and Hong Kong. Fourteen interviews were carried out in Shandong Province and in Beijing between January and May 2013, 20 interviews were held in Hong Kong in June 2014, and a further 11 between January and July 2016 (a list of respondents is available in Appendix 1). All interviews were conducted in Mandarin (on the Chinese mainland) or English (in Hong Kong) in the format of face-to-face interviews of approximately 1-hour duration.

The respondents represent experience and insights from a geographically diverse set of cities, direct policy involvement over many years, and across multiple sectors. While we make no claim to have captured the full diversity of sustainability discourses in contemporary China, we believe that this set of interviews covers a depth and breadth necessary to capture pervasive trends in substance and participation in local environmental agendas. While further investigation is necessary to understand marginalized voices, this data reflects dominant views and persistent practices in local environmental policy making practices.

Interview design

All interviews followed a semi-structured format, which included a set of core questions as well as additional questions tailored to the specific experiences or knowledge of the respondents. The core questions evaluated participation in decision making in relation to environmental planning and local sustainability projects, and the nature of participation of different actors in these processes. Specific questions included which actors were involved in decision making, which interests were expressed, what conflicts of interests emerged, how decisions were made, which actors were able to influence decision-making processes, as well as drivers and barriers of sustainability action. Tailored questions included nature of involvement of the respondent organization, why the organization was invited to participate in a policy process, how the organization was able to influence policy making, and perceived barriers to influencing local sustainability agendas. Due to funding constraints, the interviews conducted in Hong Kong focused on the energy sector, while the rest of the interviews had a broader sectoral remit.

Data analysis

All interviews were transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis. The thematic analysis consisted of a systematic review to identify by coding: which actors participate in local policy making or planning in relation to sustainability, rationale for inclusion in decision making, type of influence over sustainability policy, and specific character of sustainability agendas. Each of the above elements was analyzed to search for trends in relation to actor type (defined as local authorities, academic institutions, green movements, foreign governmental partners, and the general public). Next, the analyzed interviews were interpreted to examine the prevalence of techno-economic rationalities in the discourses deployed by different types of actors. We evaluated the extent to which inclusion in decision making and character of local agendas may be explained in relation to science-based authority and expertise, value-neutrality and rationality, and technology- and investment-based sustainability objectives. The pervasiveness of trends was assessed by considering how frequently themes occurred in the 55 interviews, in combination with a subjective assessment of how important a theme was perceived to be by the respondents, and the likely influence of those arguments in actual action on the ground. The analysis led to a synthesis of the dynamics of technocratic consolidation, as presented in the results.

Techno-economic rationalities in urban sustainability policy in China

The empirical data collected through our interviews confirm that a diversity of actors participates in local decision making; however, this diversification does not include all types of actors. Instead, access to either technical expertise or economic resources is a precondition for inclusion in local policy processes. This inclusion follows six types of techno-economic dynamics, visible in ongoing discourses of environmental policy. As our analysis shows, technocratic discourses are reproduced through the continuous local demand for technical progress, the alignment between local sustainability agendas and economic opportunities, the elevation of the “external expert,” the reconfiguration of NGOs as expertise repositories, the consolidation of technology-driven international partnerships, and the systematic exclusion of any public from environmental policy making.

Local demand for technical progress

Multiple interviews confirmed the influential position of local political leaders in shaping municipal plans and policy priorities. Several respondents explained that the strongest influence over urban (sustainability) planning lies with the Mayor’s office, and that their decisions override those of other local authorities. For example, a planner at a research institute stated that “if Qinghua [University] has done a plan and it says one thing, it will still be done according to what the government wants … if there are contradictions, the outcome will be decided by the Mayor” (Interview with planner, 8 March 2013, Beijing). A respondent that had drafted low carbon plans in a number of cities stated that “the most important factor is what the municipal leadership wants … Our plans change with the ideas of the leader” (Interview with researcher, 6 March 2013, Beijing).

Multiple interviews suggested that Mayors favor sustainability policy with an investment-oriented and technical profile, and that such strategies are perceived to benefit political careers (Interviews with: Researcher, 29 February 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing; NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 13 March 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 22 March 2013, Rizhao; Beijing; NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 19 April 2013, Rizhao; Researcher, 25 June 2014, Hong Kong; Planner, 13 June 2016, Beijing; Local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing). A representative of an environmental organization that regularly works with municipal authorities in development of sustainability projects explained that policy dialogues often depart from an interest in broad sustainability agendas but end up with a single focus on technology (“when you present options, they want the technical ones”) (Interview with NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing). According to the same logic, sustainability approaches that do not involve technology or infrastructure investments, such as agendas for nonmotorized low carbon transport, are less likely to be prioritized (Interviews with: NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing; Planner, 13 June 2016, Beijing). A planner that had been involved in designing multiple low carbon cities in China described a blind focus on technology, which causes negligence of factors such as lifestyles and local socio-environmental settings:

In the future, cities should not blindly choose technologies, but base them on local conditions. There should be more influence from markets and public participation, more system-level planning and construction and more consideration of the fact that traditional lifestyles run deep … we are just blindly importing technology (Interview with planner, 24 April 2013, Beijing).

A policy advisor working at a national policy research made a similar statement about sustainability plans:

There is a strong focus on new technology. For example, in low carbon transport there is a lot of talk on electric vehicles and subway projects. However, this is because such projects can create GDP growth. Big infrastructure attracts investment, especially if it is new technology (Interview with researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing).

A policy advisor also observed that experimentation with new ideas is structured by a rational/logical search for technology that “works” (Interview with policy advisor, 25 January 2013, Beijing). By contrast, there is a near-complete absence of accounts of political leaders favoring sustainability-solutions that are practice- or lifestyle-oriented, shaped by deliberation, or related to social issues. The dominance of techno-economic discourses in urban sustainability policy is consistent with previous research that criticizes the definition of “eco” and sustainability in China for communicating potential of investment and sophisticated technologies to local governments, high-end developers, and high-tech corporations (Caprotti, 2014; Joss and Molella, 2013).

Alignment between local sustainability agendas and economic opportunities

Evidence collected in this study illustrated an intimate alignment between local sustainability agendas and economic opportunities. This is expressed through a conjunction of environmental and economic objectives, overbearing emphasis on investment opportunities in local sustainability strategies, as well as the prominent position of economic stakeholders in local policy making processes (Interviews with: Researcher, 29 February 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing; NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing; Company, 11 March 2013, Rizhao; Researcher, 13 March 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 22 March 2013, Rizhao; Beijing; NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 19 April 2013, Rizhao; Researcher, 25 June 2014, Hong Kong; Planner, 13 June 2016, Beijing; Local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing; NGO, 27 June 2016, Hong Kong). Respondents identified the direction of the local economy as the strongest influence on the type of sustainability plans that a city adopts (Interviews with: Researcher, 29 February 2013, Beijing; Planner, 6 March 2013, Beijing; NGO 7 March 2013, Beijing). For example, cities with a high-tech economy care about renewable applications, cities with a large traditional industrial sector prioritize energy efficiency, and cities with tourist attractions make greater efforts to prioritize environmental clean-up (Interview with planner, 22 March 2013, Rizhao). An advisor at an international NGO stated that municipal leaders want low carbon solutions, but only if they have an economic application: “only then will they be seriously considered … this is something that municipal governments do in order to create a city brand and attract more investment” (Interview with NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing). A representative of a local environmental office stated that their policy suggestions only were recognized if they were perceived to contribute to economic benefits:

As an environmental department, we do our own research in this area. We will come with policy suggestions to other departments. Our feeling is that if the solutions are helpful and can contribute to earnings in some way, they follow them. If the suggestions are expensive, they ignore them (Interview with local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing).

Several respondents noted that economic departments (such as Development and Reform Commissions) have a stronger influence over local sustainability plans than departments responsible for environmental issues, such as Environmental Planning Bureaus (EPBs) (Interview with policy advisor, Beijing, 18 January 2013; Interview with NGO, Beijing, 18 April 2013; Interview with local NGO, 27 June 2014, Hong Kong). Respondents also observed that local leaders favor sustainability projects that create access to economic funding (Interviews with: NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing; Policy advisor, 24 April 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 25 June 2014, Hong Kong; Foreign consultancy firm, Beijing, 3 June 2016). The close alignment between sustainability agendas and local economic development strategies is not only supported by testimonies from a large share of respondents in this study, but also by previous studies that confirm the dominant role of economic agendas in local environmental politics in China (Kostka, 2014; Liu and Salzberg, 2012; Ma and Ortolano, 2000).

The elevation of the “external expert”

Interviews performed in this study confirm that experts from parastatal research institutes and universities regularly are invited by local governments to draft planning documents and sustainability strategies, and that that such “external experts” often have significant leverage over local decision making (Interviews with: Policy advisor, 18 January 2013, Beijing; Planner, 6 March 2013, Rizhao; NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing; Policy maker, 8 March 2013, Beijing; Company, 11 March 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 22 March 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 10 April 2013, Beijing; Planner, 18 April 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 19 April 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 24 April 2013, Beijing; Planner, 17 May 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 27 May 2013, Beijing). A researcher described this as a tendency of local authorities to “delegate the actual planning to experts” (Interview with university professor, 19 April 2013, Beijing). In particular, this is the case in settings where local planning bureaus lack experience and knowledge (Interview with planner, 10 April 2013, Beijing). A policy advisor stated that “one problem is the lack of knowledge. Leaders have to make ad hoc decisions…This means that governments often rely on advice from academics” (Interview with policy advisor, 18 January 2013, Beijing). A policy maker attributed this influence to China’s emphasis on “scientific policy-making,” which leads political decision makers to favor expert involvement in local planning (Interview with policy maker, 8 March 2013, Beijing).

Numerous examples were provided to illustrate expert influence over local sustainability planning. For instance, a planner involved in designing a low carbon city in Wuxi Municipality explained that their organization suggested protecting a larger amount of green area and water resources, whereas the local government preferred to develop a larger area to generate more profit from the project. The advice of the external organization was accepted, illustrating the authority of the expert opinion in spite of conflict with local development interests (Interview with planner, 27 May 2013, Beijing). In a similar case, a planning institute suggested to protect the coastal area of a city from development, with reference to long-term socioeconomic and ecological considerations. The local government followed this advice in spite of intense pressure from economic stakeholders to develop the area (Interview with planner, 22 March 2013, Rizhao). Whether expert advice usually prevails over economic interests in planning processes is yet unknown; the data also included accounts of cases in which the opposite occurred (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 22 March 2013; Interview with central planner, Beijing, 19 April 2013). In these two examples, the expert opinions appear to have aligned with (long-term) political priorities, which possibly contributed to decision makers favoring this advice. A policy advisor at an international environmental organization explained that political decision makers also use expert advice strategically to legitimize predefined planning priorities (c.f. Dunlop, 2014; Grundmann, 2007). The respondent stated:

The Mayor’s office basically decides the development direction of a city… For example, the Mayor’s Office will decide where the subway lines will be drawn. Then they will ask for research to support this decision. Research organizations that are invited to provide consultancy on urban planning are placed under the government, and therefore their function is to provide results that show the political office’s decisions are correct (Interview with NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing).

The role of expert organizations in local planning represents a tendency to rely on expert decision making in the environmental domain, matching previous observations of technocratic rule in China (Cheng and White, 1990; Ouyang, 2003; Zang, 1999), as well as previous research documenting the strong role played by parastatal think tanks in shaping policy agendas (Dumbaugh and Martin, 2011; Francesch-Huidobro and Mai, 2012; Wu, 2003).

The reconfiguration of NGOs as expertise repositories

While the influential position of think tanks in Chinese policy is relatively well documented, interviews related to the role of green NGOs in local sustainability agendas revealed new trends. Our interviews confirm that public mobilization activities are difficult for green movements to perform (Ho, 2007; Tang and Zhan, 2008; Zhan and Tang, 2013). However, we also found evidence of environmental organizations reframing their activities as expertise-based in order to gain greater impact (Interviews with NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing; NGO, 17 April 2016, Beijing; NGO, 5 May 2016, Beijing).

For example, a representative of an international NGO explained that core functions of their organization—environmental activism and awareness rising—are difficult to realize in China. As online information platforms are blocked and publications are censored, the movement has sought new strategies (Interview with NGO, 5 May 2016, Beijing). The organization now engages in research and has joined a public partnership where it participates as technical policy advisor (Interview with NGO, 5 May 2016, Beijing). Another environmental NGO performs research into energy and emission trends and functions as an “expert advisor” in local low carbon policy (Interview with NGO, 17 April 2016, Beijing). The respondent stated that their advice is considered by central and local policy makers because it carries scientific authority:

Our role in this becomes an expert advisor of sorts … These [research] results in turn serve as policy advice through our domestic partners. Our recommendations can have a lot of impact on central and local decision makers, because they see it as scientific (Interview with NGO, 2016.04.17, Beijing).

The NGO works directly with local policy makers in developing strategies to reduce the economic impact of emission reduction programs and to shift away from reliance on coal. This advice incorporates social and ecological aspects (e.g., promoting the concept of ecological capacities and welfare or insurance policy for laid-off coal workers), but (according to the respondent) these are often framed as technical and managerial agendas. Policy advocates at two other environmental organization describe their activities as strongly research-oriented and identify their key function as that of a technical advisor, for example in development of low carbon markets (Interview with NGO, 7 March 2013, Beijing; Interview with NGO, 18 April 2013, Beijing).

Techno-economic rationalities explain why NGOs act as technical advisors to access political processes. Green organizations frame their activities as scientific in order to gain epistemic authority and political leverage (Gough and Shackley, 2001). This throws further light on Schroeder’s (2008: 522) conclusion regarding how NGOs introduce foreign climate policy elements into domestic politics in China. She states that “the conveyers of the message, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in constructivist terms, do not seem to have been the transnational advocacy network of like-minded NGOs, but rather scientists that shared information with policy-makers.” Additional explanation is provided by considering that NGOs are seen as legitimate policy advisors only when guised in robes of scientific and technical expertise.

Technology-driven international partnerships

The interviews provided numerous examples of engagement in partnerships between Chinese authorities and foreign partners acting as technical advisors. The tendency to frame collaboration in terms of provision of technical expertise is not as strong as with NGOs; however, there is a similar tendency among this group of actors.

For example, a representative of a central government authority explained that dialogue, workshops, conferences, and collaborative pilot projects with foreign partners is one way in which Chinese environmental policy is developed (Interview with central authority, 28 May 2016, Beijing). According to the respondent, this creates opportunities to draw on existing knowledge, technical experience and foreign best-practice in Chinese policy development. Similar patterns of collaboration are reflected at the local level. A local authority described how bilateral cooperation projects contributed to adoption of new environmental standards. This project took the form of research-based development assistance (Interview with local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing). Interviews with local authorities in Shandong Province revealed collaboration in relation to development of energy efficiency building standards (Interview with local authority, 13 May 2013, Rizhao). The type of environmental policy developed through foreign collaboration included predominantly technical and administrative guidelines and regulations, such as low carbon building standards, risk assessment procedures, and development of pollution sanitation technology. While collaboration with foreign authorities may fill multiple purposes, there is a tendency to view these partners as conveyors of technical knowledge and expertise, and the preferred domain of collaboration is administrative policy and projects that may facilitate technology transfers.

The exclusion of publics from environmental policy making

Our interviews reveal scant evidence of opportunities for the public to participate in environmental policy processes. Multiple interviewees considered public opinion largely irrelevant for environmental policy (Interviews with: Researcher, 29 February 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 22 March 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 10 April 2013, Beijing; Researcher, 19 April 2013, Rizhao; Planner, 24 April 2013, Beijing; Planner, 17 May 2013, Rizhao; NGO, 5 May 2016, Beijing; Local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing). A researcher at a national institute expressed that citizens “have almost no say. It seems more like suddenly there will be a plan and nobody knows where it came from” (Interview with researcher, 8 March 2013, Beijing). A policy advisor pointed to the lack of public participation as a weakness of sustainability planning in China, stating that plans regularly are based on technological considerations and divorced from local priorities and lifestyles (Interview with researcher, 24 April 2013, Beijing). A local environmental official claimed that the public and civil society is not “mature” enough to be involved, and that public influence over local environmental issues would result chaos and irrational compensation claims (Interview with local authority, 20 June 2016, Beijing). A researcher expressed a similar opinion of the limited sophistication of the Chinese public, which allegedly makes them unable to provide helpful opinions (Interview with researcher, 29 February 2013, Beijing).

Nearly all respondents who mentioned public participation expressed similar views on this issue, suggesting that expert rule is the norm in local decision making in China. These observations match the principle that groups lacking expertise, such as ordinary citizens, are seen as illegitimate participants in environmental policy. The logic of exclusion of publics from environmental decision making based on irrationality—as reflected in the public “deficit model”—overlooks how environmental knowledge is produced through mutual construction of multiple societal actors (Eden, 2000; Michael, 1992). These views fit with the technocratic philosophy that citizens should be excluded from political processes to avoid inefficient, uninformed policy decisions (Fischer, 1990). Thus, due to their lack of special technical skills, citizens are seen as the subjects of rule rather than rulers.

Conclusions

This study documents how techno-economic rationalities shape participation in environmental policy-making processes at the local level in China. The material collected through interviews reflects the following tendencies: inclusion of actors based on their expertise or economic leverage; actors drawing on scientific authority to gain influence over policy processes; and exclusion of actors from decision making due to lack of expertise or with reference to their “irrationality.” Accordingly, actors representing technical expertise are considered authorities on public issues, and solutions proposed by groups representing technical skills or investment capacity are seen as legitimate. The interviews also document a strong tendency to fix local sustainability policy in techno-economic discourses, which is expressed as an emphasis on technology-intense, investment-oriented sustainability projects.

In a political system with strong technocratic traits, expertise and techno-economic agendas are perceived to be the norm. Rather than to open up for democratization and social deliberation, China’s transition to a modern environmental state is reproducing existing structures of power and entrenched ideologies. As a result, diversification of actors is unlikely to produce a shift toward broad and inclusive participation, in terms of representation of a heterogeneous and socially representative set of actors and opportunities for public debate. In terms of adoption of new local agendas, we are also unlikely to witness experimentation with new strategies and proliferation of ideas, but rather replication of urban sustainability projects characterized by an emphasis on technology and investment. Introducing truly innovative and socially inclusive agendas would require opening up debates and decision-making processes to a diversity of actors with a stake in environmental policy; however, so far, we see scant evidence of opportunities of such inclusion.

In China, a consequence of the dominant role of techno-economic approaches to environmental policy is that participation amounts to window dressing rather than a societal transformation toward inclusive forms of governance. Through techno-economic practices, social considerations continue to be framed as subversive and unnecessary elements in sustainability initiatives. This promotes cementation of nondemocratic decision making, and allows decision makers to frame alternative interests, such as grassroots movements and environmental activists, as irrelevant and illegitimate. In Western liberalized democracies, public distrust in technical, rational management of sustainability created an “unravelling of the mainstream agenda” in the 1990s (Berkhout et al., 2003: 6). This historical development points to the difficulty of evading the politics of the environment in the long run. The attempt of decision makers to portray sustainability as a rational, technical policy domain makes it difficult to address urgent social aspects of environmental challenges, such as victims of pollution and laid-off workers in the fossil fuel industries. Failure to introduce social dimensions, such as public health and citizen well-being, into sustainability concerns may therefore deepen public distrust, erode political legitimacy, and heighten social tension.

Beyond China, there are potential international implications of these trends. China is currently heralded as a leader in global climate action (Carbonnel, 2017; Friedman, 2017). Recent calls for green growth increasingly rely on accounts of achievements in China (UN Environment, 2017). These imageries may contribute to an increasing acceptance of top-down, eco-authoritarian strategies as legitimate environmental policy interventions. The diffusion of perceptions of China’s success in delivering technocratic environmental policy could thereby pave the way for international environmental policy to adopt techno-economic attributes.

Finally, the way in which dominating ideologies and practices shape inclusion and exclusion into sustainability policy in China is of broader theoretical relevance. While China’s historical and political background explains the particularly strong resonance of techno-economic rationalities in this context, ideologies and political practices are likely to similarly empower or exclude certain groups in emerging sustainability fields, such as climate mitigation politics, in other jurisdictions and locations. Understanding how policy practices are embedded in ideologies and established rationalities therefore constitutes a strategy to reveal patterns through which agency and influence is produced in local sustainability politics.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by a research grant from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), and a research grant from the Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA).

Linda K Westman is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Geography and Environmental Management at University of Waterloo. Her research relates to governance aspects of climate change and sustainability, with an emphasis on how non-state actors contribute to transformative change. In particular, her research addresses notions of collaborative governance, approaches to participation and inclusion, and justice dimensions of environmental governance.

Vanesa Castán Broto is a professor at the Urban Institute of the University of Sheffield. Her research addresses the possibilities to deliver just transitions toward low carbon, climate resilient cities. Her current research focuses on the interactions between energy access and low carbon technologies in Mozambique; and low carbon transitions in urban China.

Appendix 1. List of respondents

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