Unrooted responses: Addressing violence against environmental and land defenders

Abstract

This study considers how participants in community forestry and development organizations respond to forest-related violence. The literature suggests that responses should seek to address the underlying causes of violence, enforce the rule of law, and promote human rights and political empowerment. Yet, these responses are often obstructed and neutralized by power relations and governance challenges, including pervasive corruption and patrimonialism. In Cambodia, the combination of distrust towards corrupt and abusive authorities, rigid legal-rational hierarchies and social conventions, as well as the belief that patrimonialism serves wealthy individuals and lack of awareness of rights makes it difficult to seek, and even less obtain justice for forest-related violence. Few communities, supporting NGOs and foreign donors appear willing and capable of addressing the roots of forest violence, leading to compromises undermining conservation objectives, systemic injustice, and continued exposure to violence for environmental and land defenders. The study points at four areas for further research to reduce the risks of physical harm for defenders, sustain community conservation objectives, and strengthen accountability for forest violence.

Keywords

Violence environmental defenders forests patrimonialism Cambodia

Introduction

At least 1,734 people were killed globally between 2002 and 2018 whilst seeking to protect their land and the environment, many of them rural community members defending their commons from logging, mining, dam building and agricultural conversion (Global Witness, 2019; Middeldorp and Le Billon, 2019). For every environmental and land defender killed, many others faced violence in the form of harassment, criminalization, or physical assault (United Nations Environment, 2018a), with much of the everyday violence experienced by defenders being largely invisible as often only spectacular violence is deemed newsworthy.¹ International human rights and environmental organizations, including United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have made three main types of recommendations to prevent or reduce such violence (Forst, 2016a; Khanna and Le Billon, 2019).² The first is to address the root causes of land and environmental conflicts, thus reducing the need for people to defend their land and the environment. The second is to improve the rule of law and accountability mechanisms against corporations and authorities responsible for this violence, thus ensuring, for example, that projects receive the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of affected communities before proceeding (Middeldorp and Le Billon, 2020), that their lives are not at risk, and that just redress is provided when abuses occur. Third is to support the human rights and political empowerment of rural communities so that their voices are heard, their rights respected, and that national level policies reflect their interests and aspirations. Yet, there is so far relatively few assessments of the feasibility and effectiveness of these recommendations (Forst, 2016b; Bruch et al., 2019).

Here, we aim to better understand the recommendations and practices by NGOs involved with protecting rural communities from violence associated with logging, agribusinesses, and ‘land squatting’ in the context of community-based forest management (CBFM) activities in Cambodia (Milne and Mahanty, 2015; Persson and Prowse, 2017). Forest-related violence manifests in ways such as threats, beatings, kidnappings, arsons, and shootings directed at Community Forest (CF) patrollers, mostly committed by illegal loggers and land seekers – including state/local authorities like the military – but sometimes also members of their own communities involved in prohibited activities (Grant and Le Billon, 2019). Threats of violence are common, if not constant for many CF members. As expressed by one interviewee: “Every step, every minute of breathing, we are scared. We expect that someone will kill us and maybe our families too”. Examples of forest violence have included about 60 local villagers armed with axes and machetes ambushing a CF patrol group that had been trying to prevent illegal logging and hunting; the house of a CF leader from the same village was burnt to the ground, likely in retribution of confiscating homemade guns and chainsaws from other villagers; as well as military and police officers (clients of logging tycoons) following and intimidating CF members and threatening them with violence if they do not cease patrols.

There is a strong rationale for CFBM organizations and sponsors to address such violence: it not only hinders CBFM activities and undermines their social and environmental benefits, but also endangers the lives, personal safety, and emotional and psychological well-being of CBFM participants (Baynes et al., 2016; Schoenberger and Beban, 2018). So far, the recommendations put forward by NGOs such as Global Witness (2017) are articulated around the need to address the ‘root causes’ of violence, support and protect defenders; and reduce the impunity of perpetrators. Yet, several questions arise out of this relation.

First, given that Cambodia is known to experience a high degree of corruption and patrimonialism (Un, 2019; Vuković and Babović, 2018), how does this context relate to the recommendations and practices taking place? Second, given that NGOs arguably put communities ‘in charge’ of protecting their forests, often without effective backing from local authorities or foreign project sponsors (Grant and Le Billon, 2019; Hennings, 2019),³ what responsibilities do organizations promoting community forest projects bear for forest violence? Third, given that the factors contributing to forest-related violence are so complex and deeply rooted in the Cambodian socio-political structure, how can and should CBFM participants and the NGOs that have assumed the responsibility of supporting them respond to forest-related violence (Global Witness, 2017)?

The study is based on data collected in Cambodia by the lead author over the course of eight months between April 2015 and February 2016. Cambodia was selected for the prominence of (international) community forestry initiatives, campaigns to stop deforestation, and efforts to protect ‘environmental and land defenders’; with our focus here on local villagers patrolling their Community Forest to detect, deter and if possible stop activities such as illegal logging and agricultural clearings (Pasgaard and Chea, 2013; Yeang, 2012). Methods included a national-level survey of 18 NGOs involved in CBFM, semi-structured or in-depth interviews with 150 informants including CF participants and NGO staff in 32 CBFM sites in three provinces (Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom) out of a national total of 339 projects, as well as participant observation in forest patrols and CBFM training sessions.⁴ In order to protect informants, we maintain their anonymity and have purposefully withheld detailed accounts of experiences of violence. Quotations and descriptions of specific incidents are shared with explicit consent from key interviewees.⁵

Our findings suggest that entrenched neo-patrimonialism and partial judicial system in Cambodia limit rule of law based recommendations and projects; that rights-based protection programs of NGOs risk constituting bureaucratic exercises failing to challenge injustices and power inequalities; and that these processes can unintendedly push some communities, or community members, to buy into neopatrimonal arrangements, thereby reproducing systemic inequalities. Following this introduction, the first section outlines the main responses to violence against defenders, the second examines specific responses in CBFM projects within Cambodia, and the third discusses factors limiting the range of responses by CBFM organizations, especially in terms of addressing the ‘root causes’ of violence. The conclusion points to four areas for positive change.

Responding to violence against defenders

Environmental and human rights organizations seeking to address violence against defenders put forward three main recommendations: addressing the ‘root causes’ of violence; supporting and protecting defenders; and reducing the impunity of perpetrators (see Table 1; Forst, 2016a; Khanna and Le Billon, 2019; United Nations Environment, 2018b). These objectives often translate locally into programs seeking to selectively address some of the causes of violence, to improve the rule of law, and to promote human rights according to international standards; approaches that have less directly threatened specific political and economic (local) elites and thereby been better tolerated (Beban et al., 2017).

Table 1.

Recommendations for the protection of defenders.

Approaches	Objectives	Specific actions
Tackle root causes	Address legal gaps increasing risks for defenders, including weak environmental standards and lack of protection for communities	Environmental laws
		Land rights, esp. indigenous
		Anti-corruption
		Free and Prior Informed Consent
	Reduce the risk of investments and foreign aid resulting in violations against defenders	Transparency on resource projects
		Rigorous human rights impact assessments
		Public participation throughout project life
		Grievance mechanisms
Support and protect defenders	Recognize the role and rights of defenders and prevent abuses, including by companies and security subcontractors	Legal protection for defenders organizations and activities
		Public statements in support of defenders
		Dialogues between governments, companies and defenders
	Protect defenders	Implement protective measures for defenders
	Protect defenders	Suspend projects when risks are not addressed
Ensure accountability for abuses	Scrutinize and denounce violations against defenders	Systematically monitor and report abuses
	Scrutinize and denounce violations against defenders	‘Name and shame' perpetrators of abuses
	Ensure investigations and accountability of direct perpetrators and those who commissioned or contributed to violations, at home and abroad	Prompt and impartial judicial investigation
		Trial and implementation of court decision
		Corporate accountability for lack of due diligence

Source: Global Witness (2017).

Addressing the ‘root causes’ of forest-related violence means identifying why conflicts occur and resolving them before they “escalate” into violence (de Koning et al., 2008: 17). The task is immense and challenging given the diverse contexts and the complex assemblages of socio-political, economic, institutional, and environmental factors involved (Peluso and Watts, 2001). Consequently, diagnoses of ‘root causes’ tend to be drastically oversimplified and “rendered technical” (Li, 2011: 57) – that is, they are subject to a set of practices concerned with representing “the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics … defining boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling information about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed” (Rose, 1999: 33). When the ‘root cause’ of violence has been attributed to poverty as a driver of illicit resource use, such as illegal logging or poaching (McElwee, 2004), recommendations often focus on developing alternative income-generating options and securing livelihoods (Sunderlin et al., 2005). When these roots have been attributed to the ‘informal’ land tenure, recommendations have frequently focused on a ‘formalization fix’ including on supposedly systematic – but often highly biased and counterproductive for many peasants – land titling processes (Dwyer, 2015). Such approaches are intended to support economic, cultural and land rights, thereby reducing conflict and preventing violence and contributing to other aspects of rights-based development.

In many cases, addressing root causes and supporting human rights may necessitate improvements in the rule of law and related institutions. Recommendations include improving land titling (Yasmi et al., 2010), consultation processes (Carter, 2015), just forms of resettlement and compensation (Franco et al., 2017), anti-corruption schemes (MacInnes, 2015; Le Billon, 2014), accountability mechanisms against patrimonial networks and corporate abuses (Borras and Ross, 2007; Global Witness, 2017), judiciary reforms to acknowledge and protect the rights of vulnerable groups and prevent their criminalization (Amnesty International, 2017), and more effective legal enforcement and citizen empowerment, including through greater access to pro-bono lawyers and judicial processes (Sotheary, 2019). Recommended legal reforms specifically include recognition of the right to maintain customary resource usage practices, especially for indigenous people (Munang, 2015).⁶ Beyond their legal implications, policy instruments also provide advocates with both a ‘language’ and references that are difficult for governments to dismiss (Subedi, 2015: 33), with greater public reporting on violence adding pressure on states to protect human rights and empowering citizens to demand rights protection and greater accountability.

As discussed below, rule of law objectives dominate recommendations within the Cambodian context,⁷ with specific recommendations including improving communities’ and authorities’ capacities to mediate conflicts by referring to legal guidelines (Yasmi et al., 2010, 2013), and eliminating corruption by improving the “capacity and willingness of government and investors to take a community’s interest into account” (Dhiaulhaq et al., 2014: 214). While well-meaning and identifying necessary long-term changes, these recommendations face several potential impediments.

Reforms of laws, policies, and institutions, and recognizing and prioritizing the protection of human rights require significant political will or even a change of political culture (de Schutter, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2015). These are gradual processes even when not complicated by governmental rent-seeking and by companies (and consumers) prioritizing profits over citizens’ rights (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005), and by the counterproductive effects of interventions by development organizations (Cock, 2017; Hall et al., 2012). Furthermore, proposed reforms must appropriately reflect local perceptions of ecological and social justice (Martinez-Alier, 2002), what counts as corruption and (im)moral behaviour (Robbins, 2000; Williams and Le Billon, 2017), and development aspirations (Sen, 1999). Moreover, the reductive identification of the ‘root causes’ of violence, such as ‘poverty,’ ‘corruption,’ or ‘lack of secure tenure,’ can dangerously overlook or mask other processes, discourses, and social, cultural, and political relations driving violence.

As political ecologists have repeatedly demonstrated, natural resource management (NRM) policies, legal and illegal resource usage patterns and conflicts, and normative expectations of rights are shaped by historically-rooted ideologies and cultural values, complex political and economic arrangements often involving domestic and foreign actors, and ‘best practices’ often rooted in flawed Western scientific discourse excluding local knowledge and priorities, among other factors (Leach and Fairhead, 2000). These processes are deeply involved in “green grabbing – the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends” through the reshaping values, property rights, and community practices (Fairhead et al., 2012: 237). Beyond long-established militarized forms of state control turning forested landscapes into “political forests” as means of territorialising power (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011: 587), a multiplicity of actors are “(re)making political forests at a moment when forests’ virtues as carbon sinks and biodiversity hotspots draw massive flows of capital and justify remaking socio‐ecological relations” (Devine and Baca, 2020: 1). Among these, many NGOs have followed a “green neoliberalism” path promoting carbon market schemes creating “new sites and expressions of territorialisation, governance, knowledge production, and subject formation” around environmental services (Ibid: 1); including through the neoliberal “conceptualizations and enactments of ‘community’ … making community forestry … supplementary, rather than oppositional, to neoliberal restructurings” (McCarthy, 2005: 995).

As discussed here, we suggest that forest violence in part results from the tensions and complicities between green neoliberalism and coercive forms of neopatrimonialism, pointing to the limitations, if not contradictions, of attempts to empower communities to protect their forests. Ignoring this, we suggest, means that ‘solutions’ to existing conflicts risk leading to more violence, displace them in time or space, or draw different actors into them (Le Billon and Duffy, 2018), while ultimately ‘entrapping’ communities in neopatrimonialism (see Vuković and Babović, 2018). Understandings of violence, its ‘root causes’ and potential solutions can also reflect utopian ideals of justice that do not account for unequal power relations as historically constructed injustices, normalized through symbolic violence (Baynes et al., 2016; Bourdieu, 1979). Consequently, they may overlook more pragmatic, incremental improvements to justice outcomes that could be obtained through existing, albeit flawed, structures and institutions (Sen, 2009).

Enforcing the rule of law is difficult when patrimonial networks pervade the justice system and encourage corruption. The rest of this paper thus specifically focuses on lived experiences of implementing ‘rule of law’ approaches, since these are recommended as a course of action. We take an actor-oriented approach to understand responses to forest-related violence in an effort to depict the ways in which people “manage the dilemmas of their everyday lives” and counter the structural and institutionalist nature of mainstream recommendations (Long, 2001: 10). We also use data from surveys and semi-structured interviews with eighteen NGOs and three donors regarding their knowledge and understanding of forest-related violence in the projects they support and their responses to this issue.

Responses to forest-related violence in CBFM projects in Cambodia

NGOs and communities in Cambodia have generally first responded to forest-related violence through efforts to see the ‘rule of law’ being implemented – an approach that aligns with the institutionalist ideology of CBFM. Yet, when directly pursued, such efforts to see legislation, such as Community Forestry Law, being respected have generally been ineffective against those illicit forest users who are most likely to use violence. This has led communities and NGOs to follow alternative ad hoc strategies primarily aimed at findings ways to get the political and judicial system to work in their interests and to reduce the incidence of forest-related violence, even if it is at the cost of reduced forest protection and reinforced neopatrimonialism.

Addressing violence through reducing forest conflicts

NGOs’ primary response to forest-related violence is to attempt to reduce the number of conflicts over forest resources, regardless of whether the NGO’s mission is oriented towards improving human rights, rural livelihoods, or environmental outcomes. When conflicts involve the military or Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), NGOs have supported communities and community leaders in negotiations, although this has infrequently resolved the conflict (c.f. Yasmi et al., 2013). When conflicts involve local loggers, all eighteen NGOs surveyed encourage and financially support CBFM groups to hold community education meetings to educate local loggers on the importance of sustainable forest management through which they hope to reduce local logging. However, loggers are often familiar with this rhetoric and claim they need the income from timber more than they need the forest in the future. Loggers find this approach patronizing since they are well aware of the role of the forest in local livelihoods or were even involved in establishing CBFM sites, but it also fails to address their motivations for engaging in illicit forest use.⁸ If they do agree to stop logging locally, they often continue elsewhere, displacing problems to other communities.⁹

Non-violent conflict resolution workshops

Addressing violence more specifically, six surveyed NGOs deliver training courses to communities on non-violent conflict resolution.¹⁰ Four of these NGOs promote human rights more broadly in Cambodia and the workshops draw on tools used to in other contexts, such as peaceful protests of land concessions, prisons, and political rallies. The other two NGOs coordinate with human rights-focused NGOs to deliver the workshops. An NGO employee explained the rationale for this training – “sometimes patrol members get very angry when they see someone cutting the forest because they have worked hard to protect it. We teach them not to lose their tempers and take some time to think before confronting loggers.”¹¹ Participants are also taught how to “educate” offenders rather than try to physically stop illicit activities, to de-escalate conflicts, and to walk away and call the Forestry Administration (FA) and/or police for assistance. Such approach, however, is inadequate as illicit forest users are knowingly in violation of bylaws and have more to gain by using violence to enforce their will than by entering into negotiations. Furthermore, CBFM participants do not need encouragement to avoid violence, as interviews and patrol observations suggest that they fear physical harm and are already prepared to back away from conflicts likely to turn violent. As one interviewee noted, “If I am hurt, I cannot provide for my family” (see also Schoenberger and Beban, 2018).

Using the justice system to implement the rule of law

In an attempt to implement the rule of law, CBFM participants and NGOs report incidents of forest-related violence as well as illicit forest use to law enforcement authorities, specifically, the police and the FA. The hope is that those authorities will in turn report to the courts, who would punish violent behaviour. NGOs are well positioned to assist in this regard as staff have the literacy skills and confidence to navigate the bureaucratic procedures of law enforcement. Yet, while all eighteen NGOs surveyed have reported illegal logging or deforestation to law enforcement authorities, only seven NGOs have supported communities in reporting violence. NGOs explained that this was because they only make reports if the victim suffered physical harm requiring medical attention and if the victim wishes to make a formal report. This support also appears to be inconsistent as at least three interviewed CBFM participants declared having experienced violence and needed medical attention but were not offered NGO help to report the incidents. Threats of violence are rarely reported unless an imminent danger to life is suspected.

Community-based participants are often unwilling to make reports directly to the police, instead asking Village Chiefs to do so on their behalf due to a belief they are more literate and able to navigate bureaucratic procedures and are responsible for looking after village members. They also expect that the police are less likely to try to bribe Village Chiefs than other villagers, and in some cases believe that the Village Chief has direct influence over those using violence, especially if that person belongs to the local community. In contrast, police are widely believed to be corrupt, engaging in bribery and colluding with loggers. However, there are several reasons why some CBFM participants would not make reports to the Village Chief either, often out of suspicion of his involvement in illicit activities. In one CF, participants accused the Village Chief of having bought land from the military who had established a base in the CF and later sold it on to villagers, who saw the opportunity to extend their own farms, and to migrants seeking to move to the area.

Attempts to enforce existing laws in order to punish and deter forest-related violence appear to be wholly unsuccessful. No cases were found in which those responsible for forest-related violence against CBFM participants or NGO employees had been arrested, let alone convicted, even in cases where the identity of the perpetrator was known. This mirrors the national trend as even cases that have been prominent in Cambodian and international media have not been fully investigated or have been closed prematurely (Amnesty International, 2017; Cox and Ok, 2012; Lambrick and de Smet, 2015). Interview data are dishearteningly common and repetitive: “we reported them to the police but they did not investigate”; “I reported him to the Village Chief but he did not report to the police or give any punishment”; “the police and the Village Chief came to see the remains [of an arson attack on a house] but up to now, they have not made any arrests.” Explanations for this from interviewees repeatedly point to the authority figure to which the report was made being engaged in illegal logging networks and associated violence or being the political client of those who are – although other causes could not be ruled out given the information available to us. The precise details of these networks remain murky, but a consistent picture emerges that law enforcement authorities do not pursue reports of forest-related violence because of influence from political and institutional patrons. In turn, the attitude of law enforcement authorities makes many CBFM participants less likely to ask law enforcement authorities to uphold their rights and contributes to an attitude of resignation to systemic injustice. Past experience has taught them that law enforcement authorities are, at best, uncommunicative, uncooperative, and under-resourced to investigate and at worst, dismissive, abusive, and predatory – seeking to obtain bribes from villagers in exchange for making reports while also taking benefits from and protecting patrons. In this respect, CBFM participants and NGOs say they are unwilling to pay because they believe it leaves them vulnerable to further bribery in the future, even if they did have the money to pay.

The rigidity of legal-rational hierarchies further compounds the effects of patrimonialism, especially when it occurs at lower levels of the justice system. It is almost impossible for CBFM participants or NGOs to circumvent the hierarchical system in asking authorities to investigate a case. Interviewees repeatedly complained that the four central law enforcement authorities refuse to investigate reports of forest-related violence unless local level officials have already assessed it. This means that although some CBMF participants and NGO staff mentioned corruption among judges and court staff, none had managed to elevate reports of violence to the courts yet as reports of violence will not proceed past local police and administration levels if they are involved or connected to illicit forest use(rs).¹²

The detrimental effects of this administrative rule are reinforced by the cultural norm of deference to social hierarchies, especially when forest-related violence involves people from the same community. CBFM participants do not feel able to report community problems directly to police or other outside authorities, including NGOs (even though this would not contravene legal-rational hierarchies discussed above), because social convention dictates that such matters ‘should’ be first reported to the Village Chief, whose responsibility it is to maintain order within their village. They fear that breaking this social convention would likely lead to their ostracism from the community and, as one CBMF committee member expressed, they “would not feel welcome at events like weddings, funerals, and Water Festival boat races”. Lamenting how this situation robs community forest (CF) participants of their dignity, agency, and political rights one CBFM interviewee asked, “To live as a human being, what should we do? The powerful people treat us like animals.”¹³

Furthermore, CBFM participants are also hesitant to report violent crimes because they fear retributive violence if the law enforcement officer has a “string” to a patron involved in illegal logging. This fear is not only generated by their understanding of the pervasive patrimonial system but is reaffirmed by witnessing its effects when police participate in violence and the judiciary cooperates in false charges against citizens (e.g. in Oddar Meanchey, two villagers were being held in jail awaiting trial for ‘disrupting the peace’ because they asked the police to investigate logging in their CF by soldiers who were guarding a local ELC). Moreover, CF participants who experience violence do not always recognize their right to report such crimes, nor their right to responsive law enforcement and an effective criminal justice system. When asked if they had reported violent incidents to anyone, several interviewees showed confusion or said they had reported illicit forest use to the Forestry Administration (FA) or Village Chief, and even when more specifically asked about reporting precise acts of violence and their perpetrators, none of the interviewees responded that they had reported any, to anyone. Recognizing that CBFM participants are not always aware of their rights or laws criminalizing direct violence, five of the eighteen surveyed NGOs have addressed the issue of violence in training on human rights and laws, with interviews suggesting that such training on human rights can influence how CBFM participants think about violence and their rights.¹⁴ However, although some CBFM participants confirmed that they were more aware of their rights after this training, they had still not reported violence to law enforcement authorities due to lack of trust in their willingness and/or ability to act, as discussed above.

Using accompaniment to implement the rule of law

Impunity has led some communities and NGOs turn to deterrence through military or government official accompaniment during community forest patrols. Among the 32 CF groups visited, nine CF groups and one Community Protected Area (CPA) group attempt to reduce violence by paying soldiers, FA officers, or Forest Rangers to join patrols using money from NGO-supported project budgets, sale of seized timber, and voluntary donations by patrol members or family members.¹⁵ Soldiers and armed Forest Rangers are primarily recruited in response to military loggers and migrants, both of whom commonly carry guns. The accompanying soldiers may have family ties to the community or may be outsiders who have shown an interest in forest protection. CBFM groups using such escort report that accompanying soldiers deter the use of violence by creating a threat of retaliation – physical violence is a greater threat to illicit forest users than the justice system. Military accompaniment is seen as preferable to having patrol members carry guns themselves because CF committee members do not want to encourage the proliferation of guns in their villages (c.f. Roe, 2015) and, they argue, loggers would kill a civilian but are unlikely to shoot a soldier since they would be punished to the full extent of the law, pointing to how the justice system and the ruling elites controlling it do not protect or value all lives equally.

FA Officers are also occasionally paid per diems to accompany patrols to remove migrants or local loggers from CF sites. Although FA Officers are not armed, patrol members believe they increase the appearance of authority over forests. CF groups also suggested that their presence can reduce the occurrence of forest-related violence because they act as witnesses of violence to whom police are more likely to respond than reports made, as a CBFM participant put it, by “a normal person” due to their “good connections”. In this case, CBFM groups still entertain the idea of using the justice system, but they have to try alternative ways to get it to work in their interests. However, the extent to which this tactic deters or successfully punishes violence is questionable. Violence does still occur when FA Officers join patrols, and perpetrators are rarely prosecuted (but see, Sasson, 2018). In Oddar Meanchey, armed soldiers stormed the FA compound to retake timber and a truck the FA had confiscated (Peter and Aun, 2016) demonstrating that not only are soldiers willing to use violence but also that they are confident they outrank a government department in terms of political power. It displaces forest-related violence in time or space rather than eliminating it. For example, during participant observation of an overnight patrol accompanied by an FA Officer, illegal loggers reluctantly but peaceably ceased logging after being instructed to do so by the FA Officer. However, when the patrol encountered the same loggers the following day, no longer accompanied by the Officer, the loggers aggressively pushed and threatened patrol members and did not leave until the FA was called back. Interviewees recounted multiple similar incidents with the military in which, once the accompanying soldiers had left patrol groups back in the village after seizing illegally cut timber, military loggers ambushed the patrol groups and reclaimed logs at gunpoint: “They followed us and trapped us like animals” recalled one patrol member.

NGOs supporting CBFM also sporadically work with journalists to publicize incidents of ‘spectacular’ forest-related violence occurring in CBFM sites. However, this practice is not widespread as the regime has closed many independent media outlets, notably as part of a broader deepening of authoritarian violence that occurred prior to the last election (see Schoenberger et al., 2018). It also requires good relationships with journalists willing to cover such controversial and politically-sensitive issues, and incidents of forest-related violence are rarely sufficiently ‘spectacular’ to make the news. Furthermore, the present model of only covering the most severe examples of direct violence portrays each as a discrete, spontaneous, and unusual event, thereby failing to expose the on-going violence and everyday intimidation that CBFM participants experience and the underlying processes. Several Cambodian human rights NGOs have issued their own press briefings and reports on forest violence, but these are generally focused on violence perpetrated by ELC companies (ADHOC, 2013; Asian Human Rights Defenders, 2015; LICADHO, 2009), and usually omits reports of violence by other actors such as illegal logging groups. An interviewee at a human rights organization lamented that such violence falls beyond the scope of their donor-funded programmes on land politics so they cannot dedicate sufficient time or resources to investigating the issue, a response that reveals the way discourses around natural resource problems are framed and constructed.

Other ad hoc responses

Some CBFM groups have improvised alternative responses to reduce the likelihood of forest-related violence, most notably by announcing their patrols ahead of time so as to reduce the likelihood of encounters and violence with local loggers who are part of their communities – even if patrols thereby do little to reduce forest degradation as logging is only postponed or displaced to another forest. Local loggers who do not use violence against CBFM groups also appear to cooperate with this strategy as it enables them to benefit from illicit activities without increasing direct conflict with neighbours. Several CBFM groups have taken the decision not to confront some illicit forest users in the future, especially organized logging groups and military loggers. Although this means some tree species are lost from their forest, some of these species have little direct value for local livelihoods and many interviewees believe that it is not worth risking their lives in order to protect individual trees. This pragmatic decision does not negate the significant emotional and spiritual value these trees hold for CBFM members, including beliefs that ancestral spirits inhabiting the fallen trees will be angered and bring illness and misfortune to the village (see, Beban and Work, 2014). CF activities have completely ceased in areas where military bases have been established, even where forest remains, because it is considered too dangerous to oppose the military. Yet, members of those villages continue to work for forest protection by joining CF activities in other parts of the province. CBFM interviewees argue that this is necessary because, first, conservation efforts should not be motivated only by personal gain from the forest but by the greater conservation need, and second, they want to oppose political and economic elites’ domination of Cambodia’s forests.

Responding to the consequences of violence

There are very limited direct responses to the physical and material consequences of violence as professional medical attention is often unaffordable for patrol members, so first aid is administered by friends and family unless injuries are serious. In one instance, an international donor provided $5,000 to cover emergency medical treatment when the Head of the Provincial CF Network in Oddar Meanchey was shot in the neck and shoulder by a soldier while on a forest patrol. Such support is not routine and the recipient questions whether it would have been offered if he were not such a prominent figure in Cambodia’s CF movement, remarking “I am famous with NGOs in Cambodia. They could not let me die”. No other instances were found within our sample in which development organizations offered financial or medical support to those who experienced forest-related violence. When forest-related violence causes damage to possessions, such as motorbikes, tractors and trailers, or, in three arson cases, houses, minimal financial support is available. The house owners sought support from the local pagoda and were given timber that had been seized by illegal loggers in the CF but this was insufficient to replace the houses. There is a clear lack of support in this area as NGOs promoting CBFM projects literally pushed defenders to put their bodies on the line, yet have not sufficiently recognized the embodied nature of forest patrols, the bodily risks entailed, the invisibility of ‘violented’ bodies resulting from banalization and media crackdown, and the consequence of their own lack of concern for affected defenders and their families.

Discussion

This study examines the challenges of achieving conservation and development objectives through community-based forest management in a context of pervasive patrimonialism, corruption, and violence. At present, no CBFM group or supporting NGO appears to address the roots of forest-related violence in Cambodia. Rather, responses are reactive, inconsistently implemented, and ad hoc; they are ‘unrooted’ from legal-rational systems, such as the FA, judiciary, or village leaders, while lacking the strategy, as well as political and financial support, to effectively reduce forest-related violence. At the community level, this appears to reflect a feeling of powerlessness to change the underlying socio-political structures that distort legal-rational systems and sustain direct violence, and secondly, a perception that they need to maintain the support of development organizations (see also Grant and Le Billon, 2019). Among supporting NGOs, this ‘unrootedness’ appears to reflect the pervasive influence of the authoritarian patrimonial political system and an unwillingness to push the boundaries of their activities into more overtly political issues of patronage and corruption as a means to tackle some of the ‘root causes’ of forest-related violence. In part, NGOs attribute this attitude to restrictions placed on them by donors (c.f. Brockington and Duffy, 2011; Coventry, 2016; Frewer, 2013). Consequently, proposed activities must directly and clearly contribute to that theme so, for example, some donors do not consider training on human rights or non-violent conflict resolution relevant activities within conservation projects limiting the ability of some environmental or livelihood focused NGOs to address these issues. Relatedly, there is then little scope to redirect funds to pay for medical care for a participant who is injured during CBFM activities, much less pay for material losses such as damage to property or recovery after an arson attack. Despite the complementarities between environmental and political activities, NGOs are also often reluctant to talk to donors about the problems of forest-related violence and related needs of CBFM participants. As one NGO employee observed, “we cannot tell the donors all the problems that happen in the project because they will think we are failing and will not want to support our next proposal.”¹⁶ Yet, by failing the communities they intend to help and thus the forest conservation goals they have set, NGOs ultimately risk losing future funding. These restrictions in topics and channels of communication around REDD+ projects in Cambodia also have other consequences, such as inequitable benefits distribution and representation within forest management committees (Pasgaard, 2015; see also Sanders et al., 2017 for cases in Indonesia and Saito-Jensen and Pasgaard, 2014 on blocked learning from reporting only successes and not failures).

NGOs’ unrooted responses to violence also reflects the influence of local political allies – such as cooperative District and Provincial Governors and FA staff – asking them to stay away from political issues such as human rights or political reform and therefore do not propose budgets to donors that include political activities. NGOs fear that disrupting the political status quo will make it harder to get approval for future project activities. NGOs are also subject to pressure from the government at the national level, which can use legal-rational mechanisms to constrain NGOs’ actions and protect the interests of the ruling elite. The Law on Associations and NGOs (LANGO), which came into effect in August 2015 during this research project, has already been used to revoke the registration of NGOs that engage in political action or support citizens to do so (Amnesty International, 2017; Mech and Ananth, 2017).¹⁷ According to NGO interviewees, LANGO is likely to deter NGOs from responding to violence connected to ruling elites and thus makes it easier for those elites to use direct and structural violence with impunity. At the personal level, some NGO employees also expressed fear for personal safety, exacerbated by low incomes, poor medical insurance, lack of financial savings, and sometimes low job security, and are therefore reluctant to directly engage political issues. Ultimately, the patrimonial system shapes NGOs’ agendas, constrains their behaviour, and limits the possibility for effective responses through existing legal mechanisms.

Overall, two main factors seem to limit NGOs to responses that are unrooted in local power structures and lacking the strategy and support to be effective. First, NGOs are often constrained by patrimonial systems as they are unable to oppose political elites whose cooperation they need for bureaucratic or other purposes. Second, NGOs are dependent on maintaining an appearance of success in order to secure future funding from donors, who are also somewhat beholden to maintaining a good relationship with political elites. Consequently, NGOs are disincentivized from recognizing or responding to forest-related violence since it is easier to ignore forest-related violence, make it invisible, or portray it as inevitable rather than trying to respond and fail or to have only negligible, intangible success. Thus, misrecognition of forest-related violence is not simply an oversight or effect of living in a society where violence of many kinds is pervasive, but it is also functional. While we do not suggest that supporting NGOs and international donors can eliminate forest-related violence – the ‘root causes’ run far too deep and are far too complex to suggest that – organizations supporting CBFM projects must also recognize how these interventions can expose those same local people to harm, denounce them when they occur, and plan to mitigate those risks accordingly.

Conclusion

This study shows that interventions by NGOs to address forest violence have predominantly focused on improving the rule of law because systemic political corruption and patronage are seen as both the root cause of forest-related conflicts and factors that undermine sustainable forest management. Yet we find that patrimonialism and corruption among law enforcement institutions, but also their internalization by many CBFM participants and organizations, obstruct and neutralize ‘rule of law’ attempts to deter or punish forest-related violence. Alternative strategies to respond to forest-related violence are generally focused on preventing CBFM participants from encounters with illicit forest users, thus allowing forest degradation to go unchallenged and negating the conservation objectives of CBFM.

To sum-up, this study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it adds to previous studies recognizing that entrenched neo-patrimonialism and partial judicial system in Cambodia limit rule of law based recommendations and projects (Milne, 2015; Schoenberger, 2017). Rather than an overt and systematic application of law, responses by CBFM participants to forest violence (and associated ‘land grabs’) are often based on personal networks and “informal power” (Beban et al., 2017), and while generally “desperate, sporadic and atomistic”, resistance strategies by peasants have taken both ‘everyday’ forms of resistance and more overt and organized ones (Lilja et al., 2017; Touch and Neef, 2015: 9).

Second, the study suggests that the protection of defenders is at risk of turning into a bureaucratic exercise that fulfills the assertion of some rights while failing to challenge or address the prevailing socio-political conditions that limit meaningful expression of these rights. As such, the study echoes findings pointing at the violence of bureaucratic performance (see Baynes et al., 2016; Milne and Mahanty, 2019), in effect disciplining communities through an effective “protection culture” that remains largely apolitical and unrooted in the realities of injustices and power inequalities.

Third, the study points to a devolvement of responsibility by NGOs upon local communities through rights awareness and demands for justice against forest violence. Yet, while such devolution constitutes a form of empowerment for communities, our study joins others seeing it as placing the burden of responsibility upon communities and putting them at risk of additional harm, especially given the uneven power relations at play and virtual impunity of (local) elites in many countries (Cronkleton et al., 2012; Daudelin et al., 1996; Grant and Le Billon, 2019; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Ystanes, 2016). We suggest that such processes risk pushing some communities, or community members, to buy into neopatrimonal arrangements.

Several areas require further research. The first is that of forest violence ‘lisibility’: making violence more graspable through better documenting it, including at community level. How to record and report details about violence to implementing NGOs, donors, civil society organizations and various Cambodian authorities so as to potentially reduce impunity? Importantly, neither NGOs nor donors should construe this information as a sign of ‘failure’ but rather as qualitative information on the socio-political situation in which their project is implemented and a risk that should be addressed. The second area is that of forest violence visibility: raising the prominence of violence and its impacts in public discourse. What are the means of getting more consistent coverage of the forms and processes of violence in forests? Can long-term trends drawn from data collected by communities and highlighting ‘hot spots’ pointing at violent offenders and neopatrimonial networks help with deterrence and redress, without further demonstrating that violence is normal, inevitable, or acceptable? The third area is that of embodiment: supporting the bodily health of defenders and that of their families. Who should respond, and how, to psychological distress, injuries, and material losses of defenders and their families? Can donors and NGOs mobilize financial resources and personnel? The fourth area is that of authority: reversing the pattern of impunity through legal means while politically reversing neopatrimonial perceptions. How can NGOs establish a jurisprudence of cases against perpetrators and mandators of forest violence? Can strategic lawsuits using the best available evidence and lawyers be effective? Should NGOs seek to maneuver politically to erode patterns of impunity, and how can they do so without reinforcing perceptions of omnipotent patrimonial interventions?

The difficulty of eliminating forest-related violence should not prevent development organizations from taking steps to better recognize it and support those who experience it even if those steps only make incremental improvements. Rather, those planning and managing CBFM projects should take as a starting point the reality of violence in all its forms as historically constructed injustices that are reproduced in the present day and seek a pragmatic approach to upholding human rights by identifying where failings occurred and what actions can be taken to remedy or mitigate the harms caused by specific expressions of violence. As such, CBFM projects should not only seek improved rights (e.g. environmental and economic rights) as an outcome of conservation and development projects, but should also seek to ensure that the implementation process of those projects – in itself – also upholds and promotes participants’ rights.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funding for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and by the National Geographic Foundation (grant number GEFNE156-15).

ORCID iD

Philippe Le Billon

Notes

Hollie Grant holds an MSc from Oxford University and a PhD from the University of British Columbia. She works on natural resource management and governance, carbon credit forestry, REDD+, community forestry, forced displacement and dispossession, forced migration, transitioning agricultural markets, community responses to environmental change and associated governance frameworks.

Philippe Le Billon is professor at the Department of Geography of the University of British Columbia. He holds a PhD from Oxford University and works on natural resource governance, and socio-environmental conflicts. He is the (co)author of 59 refereed articles, 30 chapters, three books, and (co)editor of two collective volumes and four journal special issues.

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