Abstract
The Smart Cities Mission (SCM), an urban development programme, was launched in India in 2015, with the vision of creating 100, expertise-driven, smart cities that would be akin to ‘world cities’. A key feature of this programme is its ‘lighthouse’ approach, wherein most of the smart city projects are concentrated in a small, designated area within the city limits, to create a guiding model for future city development. Drawing from literature that argues that space is not just created geographically but co-constituted temporally, I examine the case of the Pune smart city in western India using a combination of fieldwork data and documentary analysis. I argue that through its ‘lighthouse’ approach, the SCM creates what I call ‘time enclaves’ within geographically contiguous spaces, spatialising time in a way that disassociates the selected areas from the rest of the city. These enclaves operate in a future time, ‘ahead’ of the rest of the city, representing progress and wealth that is always imminent, but never reachable. Operating in a future with an undefined (and therefore unlimited) potential for prosperity, time enclaves are lucrative zones, facilitating speculation for profit. In Pune, the material manifestation of this vision, mediated through the present, has resulted in the appropriation of the smart city tag by local real estate developers and political elites for their own gain. Thus, unravelling the garb of futurism of smart city reveals another dimension of the workings of ‘the anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson, 1994) and its consequences for widening urban inequalities and development.
Introducing the Smart Cities Mission
The Smart Cities Mission (SCM), an urban development programme, was launched in India in 2015 with the vision of creating 100 smart cities that would be akin to ‘world cities.’ Typically, a smart city refers to a city that utilises information and communication technologies for improved governance and development of the city. The contemporary push towards smart cities started from the late 2000s with technology giants such as IBM and Cisco using the smart discourse to push their products such as smart water meters, cloud-backed surveillance cameras and environment sensors, and public Wi-Fi units (Greenfield, 2013; Söderström et al., 2014). ‘Smartness’ is projected as a depoliticised, data-driven, and expertise-backed approach to urban planning and development to create materially prosperous cities of the future. Cities compete to be selected as one of the 100 smart cities participating in the SCM.
The genesis of this programme is not an isolated phenomenon, but is intrinsic to the social, political, and economic changes that have taken place in recent times. The push towards it lies in urban entrepreneurialism of states, in which they act as active facilitators of capitalist development, seeking to brand and transform cities and urban governance to attract capital (Banerjee-Guha, 2009; Brenner, 2004; Guptoo, 2015; Harvey, 1989). While smart city in other urban contexts is typically about digitalisation, in India the idea of a smart city includes everything from infrastructure development, urban housing, e-governance, sanitation, and inclusive and sustainable development. This has led scholars to argue that there is no clarity or consensus over what is meant by a smart city and that in promising everything the smart city offers nothing at all (Prasad et al., 2022; Prasad and Alizadeh, 2020; Smith et al., 2019; Taraporevala, 2018). In this paper, while I use the terms ‘smart city’ and ‘smartness’ throughout, I am not using them in the prevalent sense, as referring to the efficiency brought through digital technologies and the expertise associated with it. Instead, I use them in a dual sense: both as referring to specific ideas and programme of action, but also relatedly, as hollow signifiers of anything and everything that smart(ness) promises.
In this paper, I adopt a case study method to study the SCM’s workings, and do so by studying the smart city of Pune in western India. The SCM’s implementation across the country relies on the pluralisation of governance and networking of the state (Chandhoke, 2003; Jayal, 1999). The urban entrepreneurial logic embedded in the SCM is reflected in its ‘start-up’ model whereby SCM projects are executed by a separate Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), and not the city’s elected municipal body (Pandey, 2022). This SPV is a company, with the sub-national government and urban local body (ULB) being its promoters, holding 50:50 equity. ULBs delegate decision-making powers that they would otherwise have to this SPV (Housing and Land Rights Network, 2017). The SPV, envisioned as a start-up, receives initial ‘seed funding’ through grants from across the three tiers of federal government in India—local, state or regional, and national. The SPV is expected to raise further finances through municipal bonds, loans from agencies like the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, and generate its own revenue stream (MoUD, 2015). SPVs also work with global management consulting firms in their operation. Two such firms—McKinsey & Company and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)—were heavily involved in drafting and implementing smart city projects in Pune.
The corporation form of this entity, the clear distancing from politically elected municipal leaders, and the collaboration with experts in the form of consultants also constructs urban development issues as merely technical problems that can be solved through market-driven solutions. To draw from James Ferguson (1994), through the presumed anti-politics of a technocratic approach, the guise of development takes on a benign and apolitical role. Finally, a key component of the SCM, one which this paper analyses, is area-based development. In every smart city selected, a “compact area” is chosen where a majority of the SCM projects are concentrated. This is done to create ‘lighthouses’, i.e., guiding models for development that can be replicated in other parts of the city, or other cities (MoUD, 2015: p. 5). These lighthouses are presented as an abstract and clinical form of city development, evident in their references to being ‘test labs’ or ‘living labs’ that are experimenting with innovative solutions (MoUD, 2015: p. 5; UN Habitat and MoHUA, GoI, 2023, p. xxvi).
This programme is one of the largest urban development programmes in India, with a total budgetary outlay of roughly 24,416 million USD nationally. However, despite massive spending and ambitious plans, the ground-level story of these smart cities has been very different. I study the implementation of this programme, particularly in the city of Pune, analysing how the SCM spatialises time and to what consequences. Using evidence and insights generated inductively from my fieldwork, I argue that the SCM promotes the creation of certain spatio-temporal zones within the city, which I refer to as ‘time enclaves’. These zones, while geographically contiguous with other parts of the city, are envisioned as operating in a future time. While a great deal of urban planning and development is done keeping the future in mind, to accommodate potential economic and population growth, what is distinctive about the smart city is that it inhabits a future time from the get-go. Smart cities are set at a point in the future that has not yet arrived, serving as an ideal cover to circumvent any critique directed towards their workings. The depoliticised idea of a smart city makes it possible to dis-embed it from the material realities of the present.
This paper also explores how the Pune SCM has facilitated speculative real estate development through the creation of ‘time enclaves’. In the following sections, I explore and analyse how this has occurred, also looking at the local politician-builder nexus in the city in the process. I close by briefly examining how the SCM has altered the spatio-temporal order between the ‘old city’ and the ‘smart city’ in Pune. Here, ‘old city’ refers to areas that are more centrally located in the city’s geography and have been a part of Pune historically, whereas ‘smart city’ refers to the areas located on the fringes of the city, chosen for area-based development under the SCM.
Before proceeding further, some clarifications on terminologies used: ‘state’ refers to the nexus of relations between governmental institutions and political institutions that can be empirically observed and studied (Abrams, 1988). ‘Capital’ refers to those resources (both tangible and intangible) that can be used for further investment, instead of immediate consumption, to enhance productive capacities in a way that can generate even more resources for distribution and consumption. In this paper, ‘speculative development' refers to an ongoing process in urbanisation wherein the production of built environments prioritises conjectures pertaining to the future over existing needs. This process is closely tied to transformations in land valuation which treat land as a tradable asset and vehicle for investment rather than an element of functional habitation (Echanove and Srivastava, 2012; Goldman, 2011; Leitner and Sheppard, 2023; Searle, 2010). ‘Time’ is, conceptualised as an ‘ordering of events’—far from being a unified and linear entity, time is networked and exists in relation to other entities that it interacts with (Rovelli, 2019). ‘Past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’ are relational; notions of ‘there and then’ are contingent on a ‘here and now’.
Research methodology
To study the implementation of the SCM, I take the case of Pune smart city in the sub-national state of Maharashtra in western India. The case is used instrumentally, and not intrinsically, such that the insights generated from the micro-processes of the case may be extended to the macro-processes of urban entrepreneurialism and state restructuring with neoliberalisation and globalisation (Burawoy, 1998). Here, neoliberal(ism) refers to an economic policy agenda that entails privatisation, deregulation, and a ‘lean’ state machinery that prioritises and promotes greater economic growth generated through capitalist development (Venugopal, 2015). ‘Neoliberalisation’ refers to a process wherein neoliberalism is in constant interaction with social, political, historical, and geographical factors (Castree, 2006). Furthermore, the case is used to produce an analytic generalisation, not a statistical one (Yin, 2010).
I conducted fieldwork in Pune from September 2022 to March 2023, after obtaining ethical approval from the Central University Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford. Pune was chosen as the case because it was one of the first smart cities to be commissioned in 2015, providing substantial time for projects to develop, and the workings of the programme to be well-established, creating ample scope for me to examine them. Moreover, Pune grew significantly after the economic liberalisation reforms of 1991 in India, which enabled the growth of the IT industry in the city, making it an apt site to study a programme like the SCM (Kamath et al., 2018). The sites in Pune where I conducted fieldwork were Aundh, Baner, and Balewadi (ABB), where 75% of the smart city projects are concentrated (see Figure 1). These areas lie in the north-western fringe of Pune, close to the IT industry located in Hinjewadi, and constitute 1% of Pune’s municipal area (Prasad et al., 2022). Location of Aundh, Baner, and Balewadi (Pune). Marked in red: location of ABB region in Pune; marked in black: IT-industry dominated area in Pune. Source: Google maps; modified by the author.
I conducted 40 in-depth interviews with a broad range of stakeholders: government officials, consultants, elected municipal officials (or corporators), journalists, residents, and activists. The interviews were conducted in a mix of Hindi and English, and were transcribed and translated (when necessary) by me. In some of the interviews, there was sensitive information that was shared with respect to the politics surrounding the implementation of the SCM in Pune. While this information forms part of the data I used to inductively generate the analysis presented in this paper, I do not share direct, detailed quotations from these interviews to uphold ethical obligations of protection of research participants and commitments to (pseudo)anonymity. In this paper, only pseudonyms are used while referencing quotes from interviews.
In addition to interviews, I carried out non-participant observation of certain field sites. Further, I created a database of 94 relevant news articles from 2015 to 2025, including local news reports as well as ones from national and global news media sources. For local news, I primarily relied on two news outlets—Pune Mirror and Punekar News—and extensively scoped them for relevant data. I also utilised national dailies such as Hindustan Times, The Times of India, The Hindu, The Indian Express, and The Economic Times.
Further, I examined grey literature such as policy reports on the SCM and smart cities more widely from consulting firms such as McKinsey & Company, KMPG, and Deloitte. I also analysed the government’s reports on the SCM, such as the ones produced by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs and by think-tanks, such as the Centre for Policy Research. I attempted to read these documents both ‘along the grain’ and ‘against the grain’—as documents that are not just sources of information, but ones that have been created through an exercise of power (Stoler, 2002).
Lastly, I utilised photographs of smart city sites in Pune and they constitute an important source of empirical data. However, these photographs were not just taken in a positivist sense, as visual records of ‘facts’. Instead, these photographs were captured in recognition of the fact that there are knowledges attached to seeing (Hayes, 2009). Where, when, and what I could photograph were contingent on my positionality as a researcher and the spaces I could access. Furthermore, they are reflective of my interests and judgement calls as a researcher—on what I deemed to be relevant and insightful data. In this way, the photographs used also reflect and communicate my ideas and intentions to the viewer/reader (Langmann and Pick, 2018). Finally, all these sources of data were not analysed in isolation, but examined together to triangulate data and strengthen the veracity of information and the legitimacy of the claims being made on its basis.
The data presented and analysed in this paper was shaped my own positionality as a researcher. As an Indian, I could access my field site relatively easily, compared to someone who may not be from the country. However, as someone who is not from Pune and does not speak Marathi, I still occupied somewhat of an ‘outsider’ status. While my outsider status prevented me from capturing some exchanges and experiences in my field site, the separation between my home and field site helped me put the researcher cap on more proactively and allowed me to observe and interrogate even the small details. My exchanges with my participants were shaped by both my gender identity as a woman, and my identity as a student coming from a foreign, elite university. In some instances, these identities made my presence welcome and non-threatening to my participants, whereas in some other instances they served to deem my presence as inappropriate, and something to be treated with suspicion. I was mindful of navigating my field interactions with an awareness of my multiple identities, and made a conscious attempt to do so with care and thoughtfulness. Throughout my fieldwork, I noted and reflected upon how my positionality shaped my research.
The SCM and speculative development in Pune
ABB [Aundh, Baner, Balewadi] is a classic case of how real estate development happened under the name of smart city. Aundh was the cover page, but Baner and Balewadi were the meat of the thing. They had the highest number of land parcels to be developed. There were real estate decisions and interests involved in the selection of these areas. Half of the city developers are involved with politicians, hand-in-glove with the bureaucrats too… Before the smart city development was started, real estate rates went up. The developers got a bargain in the whole deal. It [smart city] was a conscious decision to serve a certain industry. Since then, carpet area of properties has increased manifold, and real estate prices in that area have doubled. Landowners and developers have also benefitted. Local politics has played a role too. Most politicians are builders too, and bureaucrats are involved with them too. – Interview with Rakesh, Resident-Activist, Baner, 7/12/2023
The above quote is from an active civil society member in Pune—Rakesh. He had been involved in the SCM in its initial phases of implementation, being a member of a citizens’ group representing Baner, one of the three areas chosen for area-based development under the SCM. Right at the beginning of our interaction, he added the caveat that he considers himself a ‘socially active citizen’, and his views are coloured by that position. While my initial fieldwork observations had made it apparent that Baner and Balewadi had experienced few changes by way of the SCM, and instead had become areas of rampant real-estate development, my conversation with Rakesh was the first one that brought to light the hard contours of this aspect of smart city generated development in Pune. From the selection of these areas under the SCM, to their actual development, there seems to be an eye towards real estate development under the garb of smartness. The suggestion here is not that Baner and Balewadi’s rampant development was entirely pre-meditated. Rather, a curious mix of the vision and design of the SCM, with the politician-builder nexus in Pune and the associated political economy produced the outcomes I witnessed.
Despite the non-implementation of several envisioned SCM projects in the city, the tag of smart city has furthered speculative real estate development in Baner and Balewadi. These zones are seen as ‘time enclaves’—as realms of future prosperity, future opportunity, and futuristic living. As Rakesh astutely analysed in the quote I opened with, Aundh served as a ‘cover page’: it was an area that had largely been developed 1 previously. Aundh constituted an outer limit of Pune in the 1970s and 1980s and served as an entry/exit point to the highway connecting the city with the financial capital of the country, Mumbai. The adjoining areas of Baner and Balewadi were village areas that were included in the municipal limits of Pune in the late 1990s. These areas were also included in Pune’s city limits once the geographically proximate area of Hinjewadi saw the growth of the IT industry in the 1990s. Several plots of land were acquired by builders, some of which were handed over to the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) to develop ‘amenity spaces’ for the public in these areas. The farmers cultivating this land were paid to vacate it, creating the presumed sterile ‘test labs’ on which smart city projects were to be executed (interviews with Niharika, former corporator, Balewadi, 3/2/2023; Pramod, academic, 19/10/2022; Reetika, journalist, 9/9/2022; Tejashree, journalist, 14/12/2022; Vinayak, resident, 7/12/2022).
These three areas were identified beforehand, with my field data indicating that this was done largely by bureaucrats and consultants (interviews with Naresh, local politician and activist, 24/11/2023; Pradeep, politician, 20/2/2023; Radhika, civil society activist, 22/11/2022; Sushant, former corporator, Aundh, 30/1/2023). From the 2000s, up until 2015 when the SCM was started, several plots of land remained ‘empty’ in Baner and Balewadi, having been acquired by the PMC or by real estate developers. But since the SCM began, real estate development increased exponentially in these areas. See Figure 2 for instance, which captures this through Google Earth’s archives. While many fringe areas of Pune have experienced real estate development in the last couple of decades as a result of the ongoing agrarian to urban transition, Baner and Balewadi have experienced this at a much faster pace relative to other fringe areas. Baner in particular has repeatedly recorded some of the highest real estate sales in the last few years, in both commercial and residential sectors, in the entirety of Pune (Knight Frank, 2017, 2023). Satellite imagery of Balewadi in 2012 (above; pre-SCM) and 2024 (below; post-SCM). Source: Google Earth Archives.
But what has enabled these areas to become such hotspots for speculative real estate development? In the next sub-section, I explore how the ‘lighthouse’ approach has facilitated this.
Creating ‘time enclaves’: The ‘lighthouse’ approach of the SCM
The Smart Cities initiative is like a test lab where in 3-4% of the area of the city, initiatives like placemaking, Adaptive Traffic Management System (ATMS) are developed. The ULB works hand in hand with the SPV to identify places for replication. The smart cities projects are lighthouse projects to guide other cities and areas for their development. – Interview with Chief Knowledge Officer
2
, Pune SPV, 7/9/2022
The lighthouse approach is a unique feature of the SCM—it combines notions of the entrepreneurial city with that of zones of exception, like Special Economic Zones (SEZs). While inter-related, these notions are distinct. The entrepreneurial city agenda aims to create a ‘good business climate’ and tasks city administrators with it, through the design of policies and programmes that are speculative in nature and can attract capital (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 2002). The idea of a ‘zone of exception’ as applied spatially, comes significantly from Giorgio Agamben’s (1998, 2005) work in which he argues that a state of exception is not a mere temporary state of suspension of law, rather a feature of the structure of governance of modern states. He argues that where this state of exception exists, individuals are excluded from normal legal order and exist in a dis-embedded state between law and lawlessness, stripped of citizenship rights, such as in refugee camps. Scholars like Ananya Roy (2009) and Aihwa Ong (2006) have applied this concept to peri-urban fringes, industrial corridors, and SEZs to discuss how these zones are created through dispossession to facilitate capital’s expansion. Thus, zones of exception also aim to create sites that are lucrative for capital’s expansion and provide a territorial fix to it, but unlike existing city-spaces, they are usually free from ordinary forms of governmental regulation (Slobodian, 2023).
The area-based approach of the SCM combines elements of the two in its vision—by selecting certain sites within the city-space it aims to create a ‘zone of exception’, separate from the rest of the city, but retaining an entrepreneurial, speculative character. It is important to underscore here that this is the vision of the lighthouse approach of the SCM, not necessarily its precise manifestation in execution. But coming back to these lighthouses, how does one create a zone of exception within an existing, geographic city-space? By moving it on to a different temporal space.
The exceptionality of the areas selected under the SCM’s area-based development does not lie in the fact that they are governed by a different set of regulations, although there is another governing body for them in conjunction with the local corporation: the SPV. However, the SPV has no legislative functions and merely manages the formulation and execution of SCM projects—smart city areas are still subject to the same laws and regulations as other city areas and representatives from these areas are also elected to the PMC (Taraporevala, 2024). Lighthouse areas’ exceptionality lies in temporal exceptionalism—in having been envisioned to occupy a future time perpetually. The experimental and innovative quality of SCM projects being implemented in these sites that can ‘guide’ other cities in the future positions them at a point in temporal space that is ‘ahead’ of the rest of the city. The reference to the ‘test lab’ that the Chief Knowledge Officer makes in the quote above reflects that.
There is one key element that characterises the idea of a lighthouse in this programme—replicability. It is intended to work as an exemplar, because it is experimenting with futurity in the present—in doing so it is working as a bridge between ideas and projects that belong to a prosperous world city of the future, and the under-developed city of the present, encumbered by the history of India’s exploitative colonial past which fostered the underdevelopment. To illustrate this further, I provide an excerpt from an interview I conducted with Varun, a senior PwC consultant working on SCM projects in several smart cities across India: Author: Why do you think something like the SCM was started when other urban development programmes like AMRUT were also in place? Varun: Multiple reasons. One of the reasons was that the government wanted a demonstration effect. They wanted to show that it can be done. They picked one area under area-based development. Can you demonstrate that it can be done? Then there can be follow-on projects… if people start liking it, then funding can be secured for all other areas of the city, and even other cities. Smart city was to work as a model. Author: For whom is this demonstration effect for? Varun: It is for everyone—politicians, officers, engineers, and citizens. Conversations change when people see the ideal type in practice. Sab ko lagta hai ki yeh ho sakta hai. [Everyone thinks that it is possible for this to be done.] – Interview with Varun, consultant, PwC, 24/6/2023
Varun attributes the uniqueness of the SCM to its area-based approach, which seeks to create models to provide a demonstration effect: the government wanted to ‘show’ that it can be done, that the ideal-type can be put into practice. There is a fundamental dissonance that this statement and the concept of lighthouses carries, one that extends beyond the issue of semantics.
‘Ideal types’ by their very definition exist in the realm of thought and abstraction. Practice, on the other hand, is unsanitised, and embroiled in the pulls, pressures, and mutability of material realities. Ideal types, when brought into the fold of practice, inevitably lose their pristine quality. Similarly, a future time existing in the present does so by being embroiled in the latter. This may be a seemingly obvious, innocuous, and intuitive awareness that everyone carries. However, in holding up these area-based development projects as ideal types that are produced in sterile lab-like conditions, what is missed are the relations of power that sustain these constructs. What is erased, why, where, and how, and which ‘futures’ are pursued and experimented with are politically driven decisions. As Pradeep, a local politician in Aundh said when asked about the selection of ABB as lighthouses, There was a city survey conducted based on the Central government’s guidelines and the criteria they had set. ABB were selected according to that. The criteria were that the selected area should have a slum in it, should be a developing area, should be place where there is open land, which is easy to develop – Interview with Pradeep, politician, 20/2/2023.
The decision to include a slum area, as the case of Pune shows, was evidently a tokenistic inclusion driven by pressures of democratic politics to extend beyond the elite-centric nature of the SCM, for years later, the slum area has not been redeveloped (Kulkarni, 2023; Shaikh, 2022). Further, the emphasis on choosing sites that are ‘open areas’ and ‘developing areas’ exhibits a speculative development drive.
The futurity of the smart city moves it to a different temporal space, converting geographically proximate spaces into distant ones. Thus, the SCM explicitly shows that the depoliticisation of urban development, which occurs through the creation of a presumed tabula rasa (Basu, 2019; Kennedy and Sood, 2016), is mediated through temporalities. In erasing the pasts of these spaces in pursuit of creating a blank slate, the present is sought to be bypassed as well, so as to create an exceptional space that exists in the realm of futurity and associated possibilities.
This creates even more space for capital’s expansion. Through practices and processes of speculative urbanisation, capital is not just seeking a ‘fix’ for its expansion in geographic space (Harvey, 2001), it is also seeking a fix in temporal space. Take, for instance, Varun’s statement quoted above, “If people start liking it, then funding can be secured for all other areas of the city, and even other cities”. In the case of the SCM, “it” would be the products of technology multi-nationals like the cloud-backed CCTV cameras and sensors that every city in this programme tried to include. This reiterates the entrepreneurial character of the SCM, but also highlights that the state is not simply aiming to create a ‘good business climate’ to facilitate capital’s expansion through this programme but actively aiming to generate ‘demand’ for the business. While so far, neoliberal policy agendas and concomitant structural changes in the Indian economy have made businesses co-producers in public policy (Mathur, 2014), the SCM highlights how the state perhaps seeks to become a co-participant in enterprise, displaying the ongoing restructuring of the contemporary state in India. .
This is further exemplified in the growth of politicians who are hand-in-glove with real estate developers or own real estate businesses themselves. The nexus between real estate developers and politicians has developed most prominently after economic liberalisation in India in 1991, with land becoming monetised through changes in government regulation that liberalised land markets and transformed land into a tradable real estate asset (Balakrishnan and Pani, 2021; Sami, 2012; Shatkin, 2017).
Liberalisation also created a fertile ground for speculative real estate ventures. Small-scale manufacturing firms and even state enterprises began monetising their land assets rather than focusing on production. This trend led to the displacement of industrial activity in favour of high-value real estate developments, such as gated communities and commercial hubs (Balakrishnan, 2019). As Searle (2010) argues, real estate relies on speculation for profit, which is supported through the creation of alternate futures. These imaginaries of an alternate future are characterised by uncertainty as they are premised on conjectures. In imagining another future, they represent a “negation of existing conditions” by rejecting and seeking to reform the very societies that they emerge from (Holston, 1989, as cited in Parikh, 2015). Therefore, speculative real estate development is an endeavour that produces a certain kind of temporal space, for the expansion and accumulation of capital.
So far, in this paper I have discussed the lighthouse or area-based development component of the SCM. In the next section I discuss the material consequences of the lighthouse, as evidenced in Pune.
Lighthouses: Zones of speculation and real estate development in Pune
Author: A common thing I have heard from citizens is that they want smart city developments in their areas as well. They are unhappy that the projects have only been restricted to the ABB area. Pratap: Yes, I have heard a similar thing too. The thing is that Baner and Balewadi areas have rapidly developed in the past four years due to smart city projects. As a result, builders have developed more flats etc. there and they are all sold out. Property prices have gone up. Seeing the rapid development in these areas people want smart city projects in their areas too. Par jo central policy hai usi se chalega. [But things will work according to the central policy]. – Interview with Pratap, engineer, Pune SPV, 29/11/2022
It is undoubtable that the SCM has accelerated real estate development in Baner and Balewadi through the tag of smart city, which ear-marked these areas as prominent and upcoming ones. Figure 3, a billboard advertisement of an upcoming commercial complex in Baner, and Pratap’s quote above, reflect the rampant real estate development underway in these areas. Advertisement in a construction site in Baner for a commercial hub. Source: Author’s own image, 7/2/2023.
According to the multi-national real estate consultancy Knight Frank, in 2017, the west Pune ‘micro-market’ which comprises ABB and the adjoining Hinjewadi and Pashan areas, was the most lucrative in the entire city for setting up office spaces (Knight Frank, 2017). Knight Frank publishes its ‘India Real Estate’ report each year, and year-on-year, west Pune has emerged as the top contender for real estate investments. In fact, in the first quarter of 2024, Pune witnessed a 56% rise in sales value of residential real estate from the previous year to approximately 1.98 billion USD, and a breakdown of sales in specific locations in the city showed that Baner recorded the highest number of residential real estate sales worth roughly 97.6 million USD (Punekar News, 2024).
The SCM has promoted bubble urbanism in Pune and produced fragmented urban landscapes through its area-based approach (Prasad et al., 2022). The gains intended to be generated through the creation of these ‘time enclaves’ rely on their exclusionary nature and temporal distance. Evidently, the speculative real estate development spurred on in these enclaves is also intended for the middle-class consumer-citizen, and not for the working classes or the nearly 30% of Pune’s residential population that lives in informal settlements (Punekar News, 2022; interview with Sahil, journalist, 10/11/2022).
On a walk with an architect in the Pune SCM, Dilip, along the prominent ‘pilot road’ of the SCM in Aundh, he expressed how it was his dream to buy a shop in the commercial areas that flank both sides of the road, but that his dream will now remain unrealised because of how much property prices have appreciated after the construction of this smart road (see Figure 4; interview with Dilip, architect, Pune, 25/3/2023). The commercial value has accelerated in the areas alongside this road, and now shop owners are able to sell or lease their property in the area at double than what the cost was before the SCM. Pilot project of the Pune SCM —A smart road in Aundh. Source: Author’s own image, 9/9/2022.
According to Dilip, the cost of developing this 1 km stretch of pilot road was roughly 1.6 million USD, and the cost of refurbishing that road now would not be less than 700,000 USD (interview with Dilip, architect, 25/3/2023). The PMC has also benefitted monetarily from the escalating commercial value brought by the smart road’s development. The smart city hype has fuelled the development of more offices, residential buildings, and marketplaces in and around the area. As a result, the PMC’s income has increased through the revenue it receives from building construction charges and property taxes (interview with Revati, Chief Finance Officer, Pune SPV and Chief Accounts and Finance Officer, PMC, 12/9/2022).
The SCM’s implementation in the city has been shaped by a power tussle between the PMC and the Pune SPV. While the PMC handed over land to the Pune SPV to formulate and execute smart city projects, it is not obliged to share any revenue generated from the development of the projects with the SPV, as the municipal corporation is the constitutionally mandated body for governing the city, not the SPV. Moreover, the PMC frequently dismisses the smart city projects as not falling in its turf. This brings us to another facet that has shaped the real estate development in Aundh, Baner, and Balewadi, which is the nexus between local politicians and builders.
The political economy of real estate development
In Aundh, SCM projects have been implemented because of a local politician Pradeep’s personal interest in making Aundh the “top suburb in India”, and his strong political position within the city (interview with Pradeep, politician, 20/2/2023). Pradeep’s wife previously served as a corporator in the PMC, and his political office triples as his advocacy office and his real estate business office. When asked about the lack of any notable smart city projects in Baner and Balewadi, like the Aundh pilot road, Pradeep was quick to add that the politicians representing those areas did not have the ‘will’ that he did. Furthermore, he added that he was able to get this impressive road made in Aundh with the help of contractors who were known to him for a long time.
The development of this smart road required extending the existing width of the road, to create wider pavements for pedestrians and lay optic fibre cables and storm water drains underneath. As Pradeep told me, and as was later confirmed by another informant involved in the construction of this road, the land was acquired overnight, by breaking the ground of the areas outside the shops without the shop-owners’ prior consent, and the acquired land was handed over to the Pune SPV for the purposes of making this pilot road. Scholarship on the role of the state in land markets and real estate development in India highlights the informal, mediated, and sometimes predatory nature of its involvement (Goldman, 2011; Shatkin, 2017; Sud, 2014a, 2014b). Moreover, as has been extensively documented, informality is a key aspect of the workings of the local state in India (Bear, 2013; Chattaraj, 2019; Roy, 2009; Sami, 2012). Thus, even in the making of Pune’s smart city, the extra-legal, shadowy, and informal networks of the state have played a role and this instance suggests that like other zones of exception, such as SEZs, the smart city also perhaps facilitates dispossession to an extent as the entire smart road was created by taking land through coercion.
Returning to the real estate developer and politician nexus in implementing the SCM: in the city-level implementation, there is another advisory body to the SPV, namely the Smart City Advisory Forum (SCAF). This advisory forum is to be comprised of a mix of bureaucrats and political representatives from the state legislature and national parliament, but not the municipal corporation. Elite government representation is to be mixed with citizens’ representation through the inclusion of leaders of various associations, such as Resident Welfare Associations, slum-level federations, and youth groups.
In Pune, the SCAF was set up in 2017. It consisted of the requisite representation of government figures, but when it came to the appointment of citizens’ representation, the people who were inducted into the SCAF were two real estate developers. My research participant Rakesh, being a ‘socially active citizen’, filed a Right to Information (RTI) 3 report to find out who was appointed to the forum. Based on the RTI responses he received, which he shared with me, the two non-government people who were appointed to this forum were prominent developers who had created townships outside of Pune. There was no other representation as mentioned in the composition plan of the SCAF.
On one level, this is unsurprising as the vision of the development of ‘lighthouses’ is akin to the development of townships. Quite aptly summarised by a journalist in Pune whom I interviewed, Smart cities does not work for already existing cities. It can work for townships which are controlled by a small group of people. Townships are usually real estate projects and usually only those who can afford it go there. – Interview with Veer, journalist, 10/10/2022
Perhaps these individuals were appointed because they had experience in creating private cities which derive their value from the promise of a futuristic, prosperous lifestyle and profitable returns to speculative investment in real estate. On another level, both real estate developers have been known to have decades-long, prominent connections with powerful politicians in Pune (Joshi, 2010; Sami, 2012).
From the minutes of SCAF meetings, made accessible to me, what became evident is that rather than playing an advisory role to the Pune SPV, it functioned as a voice of opposition, and even audit to the SPV, questioning its non-implementation of projects and the large amounts of money it was spending on management consultants. In other words, it became another source of curtailing the SPV’s power and influence.
In Pune, the SCM’s implementation has been heavily shaped by a power tussle between the PMC and the SPV. Smart city projects were envisioned to bring in hefty financing at the start of the programme, both from federal funding and private sector financing. These projects were to be built on land owned by the local corporation and so, the PMC actively contested this attempt at bypassing its influence, authority, and politico-economic interests in the city through the SPV’s creation. The smart, global, supposedly apolitical consultants of the SPV were also painted as being inept and out of touch with the local realities of the city (interviews with Pramod, local politician, Aundh, 20/2/2023; Vikram, former corporator, Balewadi, 6/2/2023). Therefore, while appointed as members of the SCAF, the real estate developers, entrenched in the local politician-builder nexus, imagined the future of the smart city differently than the SPV. For the local politicians and developers, the perpetual and abstract futurity of the smart city was less lucrative and less enticing than a future that was imagined in a way that could bring gains in the present—either in the form of economic profit through speculative real estate development, or political credit for projects completed, such as in the case of the smart road’s development in Aundh. Thus, the political contestation between the SPV and the local actors is also characterised by a distinct temporal dimension, and this is why the SCAF also questioned and contested what the SPV was doing in Pune.
This is further reiterated by the fact that despite the vision of creating these ‘time enclaves’, local/regional capital in Pune sought to appropriate the state of exceptionality created through the tag of smart city for its own gains, for the ‘future’ of the smart city is conceived differently by different actors. For the national state, the SCM is an exercise in creating world cities that can be engines of economic growth, overcoming underdevelopment caused by the nation’s colonial past and its concomitant pathologisation as being ‘backward’. Smart cities in this programme are symbolic of modernity with their emphasis on consultants, digital technologies, and SPVs, and are envisioned to achieve development with speed. In other words, the national scale of the state imagines the future-inhabiting smart city from a point in the past—driven by the legacies of the postcolonial developmental state in India that sought to overcome colonial underdevelopment through an emphasis on science and technology. The SCM extends this agenda by aiming to fast-track development (Datta, 2019).
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, for local politicians, builders, and developers, the future of the smart city is conceived from the present—gains to be made (both political and economic) through speculative, smart futures, today. Time is networked, and the future of the smart city’ is built on the co-existing present and past of the space it is interwoven with. So far, I have discussed the lighthouse approach of the SCM and how, in conjunction with the local political economy of real estate development, it has fuelled speculative development in west Pune. I now briefly discuss how this has further altered the spatio-temporal relations between the ‘old city’ and the ‘smart city’.
Spatio-temporal order of relations between the old city and smart city
While the threads of the past and the present run through the making of these futuristic time enclaves, it is undeniable that the SCM is altering the spatio-temporal relations of Pune’s city-space, such that existing inequalities in the city are being exacerbated. In her analysis of the spatial temporality in the smart city of Shimla, Ayona Datta (2024) finds that the SCM spatialises time in a way that reproduces marginality between the smart city areas and other parts of the city. Similarly, in Pune, the lighthouse approach of the SCM is geared towards increasing the temporal distance between the smart city and the old city, in a way that keeps the latter in a marginal position.
In an interview with an engineer at the Pune SPV, I had asked why smart roads were not made in the older parts of the city. To this, he had replied, Purane city mein nahi ho sakta. [It cannot be done in the old city.] There the road area is only 18 m in total. It would be very difficult to create wide footpaths and lay down all the necessary infrastructure underneath that. – Interview with Pratap, engineer, Pune SPV, 29/11/2022
While Pratap’s response was from a purely technical point of view as someone executing the SCM project, this technicality is also built upon certain assumptions. Recall that Aundh’s smart road was also built by deploying some degree of coercion. It was not the case that a ready-made open tract of land was available for its creation. But as a lighthouse area, Aundh was chosen to be a space of futurism and aspiration, and therefore, these projects were to be implemented there. In bringing Aundh’s smart future to the present, an alignment of political and economic interests amongst powerful stakeholders played a role, shaping the material manifestation of this envisioned time enclave. But the old city is assumed to be too old for smartness.
The temporal distance between the smart city and the old city is far wider than their geographic distance, and with the SCM, the temporal order between the two has been inverted. Baner and Balewadi were once agricultural areas, existing on the outskirts of Pune. In 1994, Pune’s largest sports stadium was built on Balewadi’s soil, somewhat developing the area as a road was built, passing through Baner, to connect it to the core of the city. With the establishment of an IT park in Hinjewadi, these two adjoining areas acquired greater significance and were included within the municipal limits. Even in the early 2000s, these areas, along with Aundh, remained as fringe areas to the core city. Baner and Balewadi, especially, were considered undeveloped, semi-rural, and therefore ‘behind’ the rest of the city. While the value of these areas increased with the growth of the neighbouring IT industry through the 2000s, the SCM was what sealed the deal.
Baner is now a real estate hotspot and represents a future moment of urbanisation, rather than its agrarian past. Figure 5 depicts a photograph of a billboard in Baner with an advertisement of an upcoming real estate project called Baner NX, with a slogan saying “The Future is Baner NX. Decoding Soon…” The imagery behind is that of the skyline of a megacity, with orange-yellow light beaming through the gaps between skyscrapers, as though the sun is rising and a new day is beginning, ushering in a global city life and all its associated possibilities. The words ‘Decoding Soon’ are geared towards marketing the project to its intended audience, the IT professionals who work nearby, but perhaps also seek to signal the eminence of this class of professionals in the city, in its polity and economy—smart citizens of a smart city. A billboard advertisement of an upcoming real estate project in Baner. Source: Author’s own image, 7/2/2023.
Similarly, Balewadi has witnessed substantial commercial development, alongside real estate development. ‘Balewadi High Street’, inspired by UK-style high streets which are often the primary market streets of a town or city, has developed in the area in the past few years. The High Street is glitzy, and comprises of high-end supermarkets, restaurants, and several notable international retail brands, and is always abuzz with young people, often seen live-streaming or taking selfies. Offices of technology firm Siemens and other multinationals such as Cummins exist are located behind this street.
From being areas that were considered ‘undeveloped’ and lacking in infrastructure, Baner and Balewadi have become areas that symbolically (if not entirely tangibly) represent the future, with modern city lifestyles, and wealth. In the spatio-temporal order of Pune, the smart city areas’ relationship with the core city is changing.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed a unique aspect of the SCM in India, which is its area-based development approach. This approach seeks to create exceptional zones within the city-space, wherein their exceptionality lies in the occupation of a different temporal space than that of the rest of the city. Smart cities are always set in an unreachable future, one that the rest of the city, or other cities, have not quite caught up to yet.
An exploration and analysis of the smart city’s futurism reveals another dimension of the depoliticisation of urban development. The temporal distance created in the form of this ‘lighthouse’ and the scientific, expertise-driven experimentation happening in these ‘test labs’ are strategies for creating more space for capital. Through the smart city, capital is seeking a fix in temporal space, alongside the co-constituted geographic space. If a spatio-temporal zone always exists beyond the possibility of reach, then there are ever-more possibilities of speculation-driven profit-making.
However, the local political economy of the present is what shapes the smart city’s material manifestation. While the national scale of the state imagines this futuristic smart city through the legacies of the postcolonial developmental Indian state of the past, in a bid to overcome historic underdevelopment, local actors in the city imagine the smart city’s future from the present. For local politicians and builders, the future-inhabiting smart city is imagined through present-day political and economic calculations. There exists a nexus between real estate developers and politicians in the city, with several politicians owning real estate businesses themselves. The income generated through real estate finances expensive political careers, either the individual ones of politicians or the political party that they belong to. In turn, their political positions help in undercutting regulation to generate profit for the business. Thus, in Pune, the tag of smart city has facilitated speculative real estate development, the actual success of SCM projects notwithstanding.
The “actually existing” smart city, as Rob Kitchin (2015, p. 134) called for to be examined, exists in cross-cutting spatio-temporalities, and is defined through their interconnections and variance. In this paper, I explored and analysed some of these sites of intersection. I argued that the SCM is altering the spatio-temporal order between the ‘old city’ and the ‘smart city’, and inverting the relationship that previously existed wherein the lighthouse areas that are now envisioned to occupy a future time were formerly considered to be steeped in the past and ‘undeveloped’. The old city, on the other hand, is deemed to be too far behind for the experimentation and innovation involved in becoming smart. This is a dynamic and contested process, and is by no means a solidified equation. Smart city as a concept carries an inherent temporal tension, which is reflected in the complex and often contradictory material development of Baner and Balewadi in Pune, India.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
I thank my doctoral supervisor, Professor Nikita Sud for her valuable comments that continuously helped me refine my work. Equally, I thank my research participants for their valuable time and input, without which this paper would not be possible. I also extend my gratitude to Zara Ismail for her feedback and edits on my work. Finally, I thank the conference participants at the South Asia Graduate Students Conference 2025, University of Chicago where an earlier version of this paper was presented. Their feedback, in particular that of Professor Constantine V. Nakassis helped me in advancing my ideas.
Ethical consideration
Fieldwork for this research work was conducted only after obtaining approval from the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the University of Oxford (Ref No: SSH/ODID DREC: C1A_22_081). Data from research participants was collected after explaining the research project, use(s) of collected data, and obtaining informed consent.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research received financial support received from the Oxford Department of International Development and Wolfson College through travel grants for fieldwork.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
