Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons

Abstract

Our study aims to explore whether simultaneous municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation foster urban sprawl. We discuss the hypothesis that in such a setting, competition between municipalities to attract development leads to high degrees of urban sprawl. A comparison of the 26 Swiss cantons was carried out using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis combining the aforementioned conditions with other urban sprawl drivers. As a result, four consistent, sufficient combinations of conditions were identified. These combinations show that municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation are indeed linked to high degrees of urban sprawl. This is especially true when municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation are combined with the economic triggers of competition between municipalities and oversized designated building zones. These results draw attention to the necessity of stronger supra-municipal coordination within the framework of Swiss land use planning policy.

Keywords

Urban sprawl land use local government qualitative comparative analysis Switzerland

Introduction

Urban sprawl is a worldwide phenomenon and the dominant contemporary pattern of urbanization (Hamel and Keil, 2015). Urban sprawl has been defined in many different ways (Wilson and Chakraborty, 2013); however, most scholars seem to agree on the core features of this phenomenon: low-density and scattered suburban development, along with segregated land use fostering automobile dependency (Couch et al., 2007; Ewing, 1997; Squires, 2002). Moreover, urban sprawl in its spatial manifestation is often referred to as inefficient land use (EEA and FOEN, 2016; Peiser, 2001). Linked to this conception of urban sprawl, recently developed measurement methods combine considerations about the size of settlement areas, their degree of dispersion, and their density (EEA and FOEN, 2016). The existing literature stresses the fact that suburbs may sometimes evolve into more mixed-use “post-suburban” areas (Phelps and Wood, 2011). Nevertheless, both suburban and post-suburban patterns of development contribute to the emergence of city-regions which do not coincide with municipal administrative boundaries. This implies that antisprawl policies at the supra-municipal level would be more suitable to tackle urban sprawl. However, such policies also entail a reduction in the autonomy of the municipalities by limiting their competencies in the field of land use planning. Thus, antisprawl policies risk resistance from municipalities.

This paper explores the advisability of reducing municipal autonomy as a means of addressing urban sprawl. To this end, we discuss two hypotheses: Hypothesis 1 stipulates that simultaneous municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation (the fragmentation of the local level caused by the presence of many small municipalities) are linked to high degrees of urban sprawl (Buzbee, 2009; Couch et al., 2007). This link would be caused by the competition that can arise between municipalities in the context of institutional fragmentation. A “tragedy of the commons” dynamic (Hardin, 1968) would emerge: as each municipality would seek to maximize its benefits through the attraction of local development, urban sprawl would be fostered at the regional level. However, we do not expect municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation to be sufficient conditions for high degrees of urban sprawl. Rather, these conditions would contribute to high degrees of urban sprawl when combined with demographic and/or economic drivers of urban development (Thompson, 2013). Hence, we argue that the relation between high degrees of urban sprawl and these conditions should be understood in terms of conjunctural causation (Ragin, 1987) and causal asymmetry (Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012): necessary conditions and sufficient combinations of conditions for high degrees of urban sprawl should be identified. Hypothesis 2 links the theoretical framework within the Swiss context and posits that oversized designated building zones contribute to high degrees of urban sprawl. Municipalities create or maintain such zones in order to make the necessary space available for the attraction of local development, thus opening the door to potentially high degrees of urban sprawl.

This current research into urban sprawl is particularly relevant for Switzerland for four reasons. First, during the 20th century, urban sprawl increased by varying degrees across Switzerland (Schwick et al., 2012). As a result, a variety of urban forms are currently observable throughout the Swiss cantons, the second-tier state level in the Swiss federal system. Second, despite the presence of legal framework provided by the Federal Land Use Planning Law, the cantons enjoy relative autonomy vis-à-vis the federal level (the first tier). The Federal Land Use Planning Law is a framework law, which typically sets forth guidelines in the concerned field, but gives the cantons certain freedom during the implementation phase. Therefore, cantonal policies can imply different degrees of land use control, in opposition to municipal autonomy in this field. The federal law was revised in 2012,¹ and one of the main goals of this revision was to reduce urban sprawl via the formalization of two main objectives: the restriction of the extension of urban areas and the promotion of urban densification. Finally, the local level in Switzerland is heterogeneous and highly fragmented, particularly in comparison with other European countries (OFS, 2000). In 2016, the 2294 Swiss municipalities ranged from 13 inhabitants to 396,955 inhabitants (OFS, 2017).

Necessary or sufficient combinations of conditions leading to high degrees of urban sprawl in Switzerland have not yet been thoroughly examined. We address this gap using the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) approach to systematically compare the 26 Swiss cantons. This approach enables the identification of relations of necessity and sufficiency. As such, QCA is particularly suited to examination of the role played by municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation in the production of high degrees of urban sprawl. QCA was carried out with data related to the period before the revision of the federal law in 2012. Evaluation of the effects of this revision falls outside the scope of this study as an attempt at field observation is premature.²

The first part of this paper presents the theoretical framework and the resulting hypotheses. The second part of the paper reviews the Swiss context of the study, and the third presents the method and the analysis model. The fourth part presents the results and is followed by a discussion of the results in light of the formulated hypotheses.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Several studies suggest the existence of a link between simultaneous municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation and high degrees of urban sprawl (Couch et al., 2007; Pendall, 1999; Tosics et al., 2010). Urban sprawl may result from the fact that small municipalities struggle to counteract private landowner opposition to urban densification strategies (Siedentop and Fina, 2012). Urban sprawl may also result from the competition that, according to public choice theory (Keating, 1995; Tiebout, 1956), can arise between municipalities in the context of institutional fragmentation. Hardin’s analysis of the “tragedy of the commons” draws attention to the risk of resource over-utilization in the context of individual profit maximization (Hardin, 1968). As Buzbee (2009) points out, the basic dynamics leading to the “tragedy of the commons” contribute to urban sprawl. A parallel can be drawn between this concept and the municipalities that overexploit land to attract development: urban sprawl would be the result of choices that yield short-term advantages for individual actors (in this case the municipalities), but lead to collective costs in the long run (in this case inefficient land use at the regional level). Ostrom and Ostrom (1971: 210) acknowledged that this risk is high when the demand for a common good increases drastically in comparison with its availability (as is the case with land in Switzerland). As Couch et al. (2007) observed, “it appears to be generally the case that the smaller and more independent the units of local government, the more there will be competition between them to attract development and thereby encourage sprawling patterns of urban development” (18). This quote appropriately refers to the size of the municipalities and their autonomy. A more recent study (Pagliarin, 2018) highlighted a similar dynamic, where urban sprawl at the supra-municipal level is the result of the sum of “land-use micro-transformations” (Pagliarin, 2018: 3665) at the municipal level.

However, municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation are not the only factors which lead to high degrees of urban sprawl. In other words, they are not considered sufficient for the production of this outcome. Rather, municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation contribute to high degrees of urban sprawl when combined with demographic and/or economic potential drivers (Thompson, 2013). Nonetheless, high degrees of urban sprawl can be observed in economically strong regions as well as in struggling regions. Similarly, high degrees of urban sprawl can be observed in regions with strong demographic growth as well as in stagnating or declining regions, especially when household purchase power increases at the same time (Couch et al., 2007). Thus, neither demographic nor economic growth can be theoretically considered necessary or sufficient conditions.

In light of the above points, it is now possible to formulate two hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived both from theory and from the Swiss context.

Hypothesis 1

High degrees of urban sprawl are expected in the context of simultaneous high degrees of municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation if demographic and/or economic urban development drivers are present.

Hypothesis 2

According to the logic of competition between municipalities, oversized designated building zones³ are expected to contribute to high degrees of urban sprawl. By creating or maintaining oversized building zones, municipalities ensure the presence of physical space to attract development and potentially open the doors to high degrees of urban sprawl. This condition alone, however, does not create urban sprawl, but contributes to it.

Context

Urban sprawl in Switzerland

“Urban sprawl and the destruction of arable land are unsolved problems of regional planning” (Leuthard and Casanova, 2010 in Schwick et al., 2012: 173). This quote demonstrates the awareness of the Swiss political elite⁴ of the existence of urban sprawl, a phenomenon which has greatly increased in Switzerland in the last decades. Between 1985 and 2009, the urban surface area per inhabitant and job increased from 264 to 281 square meters per inhabitant and job, which is equivalent to an increase of 6.5% (OFS, 2015).

Schwick et al. (2012) developed several complementary urban sprawl metrics, which are also explained in detail in Jaeger et al. (2010), Jaeger and Schwick (2014), and EEA and FOEN (2016). These metrics consider not only the size and the density of urban areas, but also their degree of dispersion. This approach is consistent with the definition of urban sprawl that we provided in the “Introduction” section. In this paper, we use the sprawl per capita (SPC) metric in order to operationalize urban sprawl. Dispersion is measured by the dispersion (DIS) parameter, which “characterizes the settlement pattern from a geometric perspective and is based on the distances between any two points within built-up areas” (EEA and FOEN, 2016: 39). The DIS parameter is expressed as urban permeation units (UPUs) per square meters of developed area (EEA and FOEN, 2016: 39). DIS is then multiplied by the land uptake per person, which represents the size of the urban area divided by the number of inhabitants and jobs. The resulting SPC value is expressed as UPU per inhabitant and job. SPC is well suited for the comparison of regions with differing numbers of inhabitants (EEA and FOEN, 2016; Jaeger et al., 2010). Whereas other metrics measure urban sprawl in relation to the landscape,⁵ SPC indicates how much each inhabitant or job contributes to urban sprawl on average. Hence, SPC appropriately reflects potentially effective cantonal policies implemented in small-area, highly urbanized cantons. In other words, the theoretical links among SPC, municipal autonomy, and institutional fragmentation are more coherent than for other urban sprawl metrics.

The analysis of SPC reveals that between 1935 and 2010 urban sprawl increased in 23 out of 26 Swiss cantons (Schwick et al., 2018). Figure 1 shows urban sprawl in Swiss cantons based on SPC for 2010. The most sprawling cantons are Fribourg (FR), Graubünden (GR), Jura (JU), Thurgau (TG), and Valais (VS). The cantons with the most compact urban forms are Basel-Stadt (BS), Geneva (GE), Neuchâtel (NE), Schwyz (SZ), Zug (ZG), and Zurich (ZH). The SPC values of the most sprawling cantons are three to nearly four times as high as the SPC values of the most compact ones.

Figure 1.

Urban sprawl in the Swiss cantons. Data source: Sprawl per capita metric 2010 in Schwick et al. (2018). Data classification by the author. Base Map: Swisstopo. UPU: urban permeation unit.

A rural type of settlement is often associated with high per capita land usage (Mann, 2009). Thus, one can imagine that in cases such as VS, JU, or GR, the historically dispersed type of settlements (rural and alpine areas) plays a role in the production of urban sprawl. However, the type of settlement does not explain the current variations among comparable cantons, such as Vaud (VD) and FR, Glarus (GL) and SZ, or Lucerne (LU) and Aargau (AG). Moreover, the historically dispersed type of settlement does not explain why urban sprawl remains extremely high in currently highly urban cantons such as VS, whose urban population now accounts for 75% of the cantonal population (OFS, 2011).

Municipal autonomy versus cantonal control in Swiss land use planning policy

The 2012 revision of the Swiss Federal Land Use Planning Law is the most recent development in a long, ongoing debate. The first version of this law was rejected by the Swiss population in 1976 because it was deemed too centralist and constraining of landowners’ rights (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2007). The second version, which passed in 1979, conferred fewer powers on the federation and no longer contained the instrument of the taxation of land value gains (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2007). As a result, the effective power of state influence on land use was severely limited. While measures for land use control were implemented in several cantons and municipalities since at least 1970 (most notably the implementation of urban growth boundaries), the absence of clear targets defined by political institutions prevents the evaluation of their effectiveness (Gennaio et al., 2009). We argue that the absence of such clear targets is a consequence of the autonomy enjoyed by the decentralized governments, which were left free to define (or not) their own targets.

One of the goals of the 2012 revision was to correct this aspect by strengthening the role of the federation and the cantons. The revision was proposed by the Swiss parliament in response to a 2008 popular initiative in favor of landscape protection, which suggested even more rigid instruments for the limiting of the extension of urban areas. The revised law was accepted by 62.9% of the voters in 2013, and the 2008 popular initiative was withdrawn. The federal law dictates that cantonal masterplans more precisely define the size and the distribution of the designated building zones (art. 8a; art. 15). Moreover, preexisting urban areas must be consolidated prior to the creation of new building zones (art. 1, al. 2). This approach represents a remarkable change: despite remaining in charge of the local zoning plans,⁶ which are legally binding for landowners, municipalities now have potentially less autonomy. However, since the Swiss Federal Land Use Planning Law is a framework law, cantons enjoy relative autonomy during the implementation phase. As a result, the cantonal policies can present different degrees of land use control, as opposed to municipal autonomy in this field.

We classified the 26 Swiss cantons according to the degree of control they have over land use using data related to the period before the revision of the law. Based on the 2012 analysis conducted by Mahaim (2014), we distinguished four ordinal categories representing four different degrees of cantonal land use control (Table 1). The categorization considers the presence of measures that limit the extension of urban areas and promote urban consolidation in the cantonal land use laws and masterplans. The specific measures taken into account are the clear separation between building zones and nonbuilding zones, the delimitation of green belts, the indication of perimeters where new buildings are allowed, the indication of the overall maximal size of the designated building zones, targets of minimal density by type of building zone, the introduction of taxes on land value gains, and the maintenance of overall agricultural surface area. The way these measures are implemented also contributed to the ranking of the cantons in Table 1. The measures can have a high level of accuracy, or they can be general; they can be implemented over the entire cantonal territory or only on particular areas (such as for natural resources and landscape protection). The resulting typology was validated by the author of the original analysis during an interview in May 2017.

Table 1.

Typology of cantonal land use planning policies in 2012 (Mahaim, 2014).

Value	Cantons
1 Strong cantonal land use control = low degree of municipal autonomy	Basel-Stadt, Geneva, Zurich(n = 3)
2	Aargau, Neuchâtel, Solothurn, Schwyz, Zug(n = 5)
3	Basel-Landschaft, Bern, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, Ticino, Thurgau, Vaud(n = 7)
4 Weak cantonal land use control = high degree of municipal autonomy	Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Fribourg, Glarus, Graubünden, Jura, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Saint Gallen, Uri, Valais(n = 11)

Institutional fragmentation of the Swiss cantons

Institutional fragmentation is related to the institutional structure of a territorial unit. A territorial unit is more fragmented when its sub-units are many in number and small in terms of population. Consistent with the choice of SPC as an urban sprawl metric, institutional fragmentation is not related to the area of the municipalities. Small-area municipalities can be highly populated and have high urban density. Thus, institutional fragmentation seen from a spatial point of view would not be theoretically relevant in relation to Hypothesis 1.

This condition is measured by the institutional consolidation index (ICI), which has been applied by Kübler (2005) to the study of the Swiss urban agglomerations. The ICI formula, which we adapted to the cantonal level of analysis, is

ICI = \sum_{i = 1}^{n} {(\frac{population of municipality i}{cantonal population})}^{2}

The ICI value depends on the number of municipalities and their size. The ICI value represents high consolidation when it gets close to 1 and high fragmentation when it gets close to 0. The ICI values for the Swiss cantons reflect their highly fragmented character when compared internationally. Sweden, a unitary state that experienced a process of institutional reform in the second half of the 20th century, can be used as a reference since it represents a well-known example of municipal-level consolidation (Norton, 1994). By comparing Switzerland with Sweden, we found a great difference between the mean for Swiss cantons (0.11) and the mean for Swedish counties (0.21).⁷ Moreover, only 5 of 26 Swiss cantons display an ICI that can be considered comparable to the mean of the Swedish counties. The ICI values were computed by the author using raw demographic data. The data were collected via online statistical databases for 2014 (OFS, 2018; SCB, 2018). The complete raw data matrix for the Swiss cantons is provided in online appendix A.

Method

QCA is both a research approach and a technique (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Three main reasons lay behind the adoption of QCA as an approach in this paper. First, QCA is valuable for unraveling asymmetric relations of necessity and sufficiency among several conditions and high degrees of urban sprawl. For instance, since municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation are expected to contribute to the outcome “high degrees of urban sprawl” when they are combined with other potential drivers, they can be considered as potential supersets of this outcome (or, in other words, as necessary but not sufficient conditions). Consequently, cases in which municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation are strongly present, but where high degrees of urban sprawl are not observed, would not automatically contradict Hypothesis 1. Asymmetry also refers to the fact that the explanation of the presence of high degrees of urban sprawl cannot be simply reverted to explain its absence. The second reason is that the QCA approach is particularly relevant in relation to conjunctural causation. Complex phenomena such as urban sprawl result from a combination of conditions, which we can also call paths. The Boolean minimization of the combinations observed across the 26 cantons was performed with the fsQCA 3.0 software (Ragin and Davey, 2017). This approach was useful for identifying the paths that are consistent subsets of the outcome “high degrees of urban sprawl” and that, by virtue of this, represent sufficient but not necessary combinations for its production. Finally, the QCA approach considers that different alternative paths can lead to high degrees of urban sprawl, a property that is designated by the term equifinality (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For instance, the fact that high degrees of urban sprawl can be observed in different economic and demographic contexts (with or without growth) is an example of different paths leading to a similar outcome.

The implementation of QCA as a data analysis technique begins with the analysis model shown in Table 2. The model includes the outcome (“URBSPRA”) and the six conditions identified in the previous sections as high degrees of municipal autonomy (“MUNAUT”), high degrees of institutional fragmentation (“INSFRA”), oversized designated building zones (“OVDBZ”), demographic and economic drivers of urban development represented by strong demographic growth (“DEMO”) and economic power (“ECOPOW”), as well as the urban/rural type of settlements represented by the percentage of urban population (“URBPOP”). These seven dimensions represent seven corresponding sets.

Table 2.

Calibration of the conditions and the outcome.

Outcome	Raw data converted to membership degrees	Raw data source	Calibration
URBSPRAHigh degrees of urban sprawl	SPC metric 2010(UPU per inhabitant and job)	Schwick et al. (2018)	Fully in ≥15,000 UPU/(inhabitants + jobs)Crossover point = 11,000 UPU/(inhabitants + jobs)Fully out ≤7,000 UPU/(inhabitants + jobs)
Conditions
MUNAUTHigh degrees of municipal autonomy	Four-class ordinal index 2012	Operationalization of Mahaim’s (2014) qualitative analysis for 2012	1 = maximal municipal autonomy0.67 = nearly absent cantonal control0.33 = light cantonal control0 = cantonal control
2. INSFRAHigh degrees of institutional fragmentation	Institutional consolidation index 2014	Computed from the Federal Statistical Office (OFS, 2018) demographic data for 2014	Fully in ≤0.03Crossover point = 0.09Fully out ≥0.5
3. OVDBZOversized designated building zones	Per capita surface (m²) of the designated building zones 2012	Computed from the Federal Office for Spatial Development data (FOSD, 2012) and OFS (2018) demographic data for 2012	Fully in ≥500 m²/inhabitantCrossover point = 335 m²/inhabitantFully out ≤150 m²/inhabitant
4. DEMOStrong demographic growth	Demographic growth rate (%) 1995–2010	Computed from OFS demographic data from 1995 to 2010 (OFS, 2018)	Fully in ≥15%Crossover point = 4.8 %Fully out ≤−3%
5. ECOPOWEconomic power	GDP per capita (CHF) 2011	Computed from OFS economic and demographic data for 2011 (OFS, 2018)	Fully in ≥96,000 CHF/inhabitantCrossover point = 67,000 CHF/inhabitantFully out ≤62,000 CHF/inhabitant
6. URBPOPUrban population	Percent of urban population 2011	OFS demographic data for 2011 (OFS, 2018)	Fully in ≥90%Crossover point = 70%Fully out ≤50%

SPC: sprawl per capita; UPU: urban permeation unit.

Starting from the raw data, the membership degrees of the 26 cantons in the seven sets were calibrated according to the fuzzy-set QCA method (Ragin, 2008). As a result, each canton was given a membership value in the set of each dimension. This value varies between 0 and 1. MUNAUT was calibrated by converting the four-class ordinal index of 2012 into four distinct fuzzy-set values. The other conditions and the outcome were calibrated with the direct method of calibration (Ragin, 2008): the raw data were converted into membership degrees by a logistic function based on three qualitative anchors defined by the researcher. These anchors are the “fully in” the set and the “fully out” of the set anchors as well as the crossover point indicating the qualitative distinction between the cases that are “more in” the set and those that are “more out” (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). The calibration values and thresholds are based on substantial case knowledge (MUNAUT) and external references (the example of Sweden previously discussed for INSFRA, official projections or past evolution for DEMO and URBPOP). When theoretical and substantial information was missing, the calibration was based on the data distribution according to common best practices (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012) and in line with published QCA studies (Kammermann, 2018; Thomann, 2015). The calibration thresholds and values are listed in Table 2 and are discussed in online appendix B along with the external references. The calibrated data matrix is also provided in online appendix B.

We subsequently present and discuss the intermediate solution explaining URBSPRA. The intermediate solution was preferred to the conservative and the parsimonious solutions since it represents the best compromise between complexity and parsimony. Moreover, the intermediate solution relies on theory for the treatment of the logical remainders used for counterfactual claims (Ragin, 2008). The procedure for the enhanced standard analysis was applied to avoid untenable assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 197). The treatment of the logical remainders is discussed in online appendix C. The conservative and parsimonious solutions for URBSPRA, a test of the robustness of the results and the analysis for the absence of the outcome (∼URBSPRA⁸) are also provided in online appendix C.

Results

The test for the necessary conditions for the outcome URBSPRA was performed first. No necessary conditions were identified. Although quite high consistency values were found for MUNAUT, INSFRA, and OVDBZ, logically contradictory cases exist for the three conditions. The detailed results of the necessity analysis are provided in online appendix C.

The sufficiency analysis begins with the construction of a truth table (Table 3) listing the combinations of conditions empirically observed across the cantons. Nineteen combinations were observed. These combinations correspond to the rows in the truth table, where the value 1 represents the presence of the condition in the corresponding column, and the value 0 represents its absence. The last column lists the cantons that are covered by the corresponding row. Highlighted in bold are the 13 cantons that are more in than out of the set of URBSPRA. The “Raw consist” and “PRI consist” columns report the values of the raw and PRI consistency parameters. The raw consistency threshold was set at 0.92. In the “outcome” column, we coded the 9 rows above the threshold with 1 and the 10 rows below the threshold with 0. The former are considered sufficient for URBSRPA and are included in the minimization, while the latter are considered insufficient and are excluded from the minimization. Some inconsistent rows (10–13) are quite close to the raw consistency threshold. However, their PRI consistency is low, and they cover cases that are instances of ∼URBSPRA.⁹ An alternative analysis with the raw consistency threshold set at 0.96 was performed. This alternative analysis is part of the robustness test provided in online appendix C.

Table 3.

Truth table for the outcome “URBSPRA.”

row	1.MUNAUT	2.INSFRA	3.OVDBZ	4.DEMO	5.ECOPOW	6.URBPOP	Number	Outcome	Raw consist.	PRI consist.	Cantons
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	JU
2	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	GR
3	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	UR
4	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	AR
5	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	GL
6	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.99	0.98	TG
7	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0.96	0.90	FR, VS
8	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.92	0.61	SH
9	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0.92	0.78	AG, SO
10	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0.90	0.65	TI, VD
11	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0.90	0.62	AI, OW
12	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.89	0.65	SZ
13	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.88	0.30	BE
14	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.86	0.46	LU
15	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.79	0.27	BL, SG
16	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.79	0.12	NW
17	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.61	0.14	ZH
18	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.45	0.00	BS, NE
19	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.38	0.00	GE, ZG

AG: Aargau; AI: Appenzell Innerrhoden; AR: Appenzell Ausserrhoden; BE: Bern; BL: Basel-Landschaft; BS: Basel-Stadt; FR: Fribourg; GE: Geneva; GL: Glarus; GR: Graubünden; JU: Jura; LU: Lucerne; NE: Neuchâtel; NW: Nidwalden; OW: Obwalden; SG: Saint Gallen; SH: Schaffhausen; SO: Solothurn; SZ: Schwyz; TG: Thurgau; TI: Ticino; UR: Uri; VD: Vaud; VS: Valais; ZG: Zug; ZH: Zurich.

The intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table is shown in Table 4. The black dots represent the presence of the condition in the corresponding row, the white dots represent its absence, and the dashes indicate that it does not influence the outcome.

Table 4.

Intermediate solution for the outcome “URBSPRA.”

Conditions	Solution 1a	Solution 1b	Solution 1c	Solution 1d
1. MUNAUT	●	●	●	–
2. INSFRA	●	●	○	●
3. OVDBZ	●	●	–	●
4. DEMO	–	○	○	●
5. ECOPOW	○	–	–	○
6. URBPOP	–	○	●	–
Consistency	0.97	1	0.94	0.96
Raw coverage	0.66	0.26	0.23	0.56
Unique coverage	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04
Cases	FR (0.84,0.89)GL (0.62,0.82)JU (0.82,0.98)TG (0.67,0.94)VS (0.95,0.96)	GR (0.56,0.96)JU (0.77,0.98)	AR (0.55,0.55)SH (0.67,0.62)UR (0.55, 0.72)	AG (0.56,0.69)FR (0.84,0.89)SO (0.55,0.88)TG (0.75,0.94)VS (0.94,0.96)
Solution consistency: 0.95 Solution coverage: 0.77

AG: Aargau; AR: Appenzell Ausserrhoden; FR: Fribourg; GL: Glarus; GR: Graubünden; JU: Jura; TG: Thurgau; SH: Schaffhausen; SO: Solothurn; Solothurn; UR: Uri; VS: Valais.

Four highly consistent sufficient combinations for the production of the outcome “URBSPRA” were identified. These combinations represent four alternative paths to high degrees of urban sprawl in Switzerland. The raw coverage of Solution 1a is higher than that of the other combinations, thus Solution 1a has a greater empirical importance. This combination represents simultaneous high degrees of municipal autonomy, high degrees of institutional fragmentation, and oversized designated building zones in the context of economic weakness. Like Solution 1a, Solution 1b also represents the association of the first three conditions (MUNAUT*INSFRA*OVDBZ), but in this instance in the absence of both strong demographic growth and a large urban population. Solution 1c represents high degrees of municipal autonomy associated with institutional consolidation (not fragmentation), the absence of strong demographic growth, and the presence of a large urban population. Finally, Solution 1d represents high degrees of institutional fragmentation, oversized designated building zones, and strong demographic growth in the context of economic weakness. This combination yields high degrees of urban sprawl regardless of the degree of municipal autonomy.

Figure 2 maps the 26 cantons on an XY plot, where the vertical axis represents their membership in the set of URBSPRA, and the horizontal axis represents their membership in the set of the intermediate solution. The distribution of cantons located primarily above the diagonal line visually confirms the consistency of the results: there are no cases with high membership in the set of the solution that have low membership in the set of the outcome. The cantons in the top-right quadrant strengthen the sufficiency relation among the combinations of conditions and the outcome. Neither Obwalden-OW nor Ticino-TI, in the top-left quadrant, is covered by the solution despite being instances of URBSPRA. While this result does not weaken the consistency of the solution, it slightly decreases its coverage. The cantons in the bottom-left quadrant are more out than in the set of URBSPRA. Finally, it has to be noted that there are no logically contradictory cases, as is demonstrated by the empty bottom-right quadrant. The XY plots of the four solution terms are provided in online appendix D.

Figure 2.

Intermediate solution for the outcome “URBSPRA.” AG: Aargau; AI: Appenzell Innerrhoden; AR: Appenzell Ausserrhoden; BE: Bern; BL: Basel-Landschaft; BS: Basel-Stadt; FR: Fribourg; GE: Geneva; GL: Glarus; GR: Graubünden; JU: Jura; LU: Lucerne; NE: Neuchâtel; NW: Nidwalden; OW: Obwalden; SG: Saint Gallen; SH: Schaffhausen; SO: Solothurn; SZ: Schwyz; TG: Thurgau; TI: Ticino; UR: Uri; VD: Vaud; VS: Valais; ZG: Zug; ZH: Zurich.

The test provided in online appendix C confirms the robustness of the results.

Discussion

The results mainly corroborate our hypotheses. This conclusion is shown by Solutions 1a and 1b, where the combination of high degrees of municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation is present, along with other drivers, in cases with high degrees of urban sprawl (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, oversized designated building zones are present in Solutions 1a, 1b, and 1d (Hypothesis 2), and open the doors to a more dispersed and less dense urbanization. In addition to contributing to high degrees of urban sprawl, oversized designated building zones could also be the result of the “tragedy of the commons” dynamic manifesting itself in the municipal zoning plans. This would support the approach adopted with the 2012 revision of the Federal Land Use Planning Law, which demands an increased role of the cantons in the designation of building zones (see “Context” section).

Cases that deviate from the theory and provide complementary knowledge can be identified as well. Solution 1c shows that high degrees of urban sprawl sometimes occur in consolidated cantons, regardless of the size of the designated building zones. Furthermore, Solution 1d shows that high degrees of urban sprawl can be produced regardless of the degree of municipal autonomy if INSFRA, OVDBZ, and DEMO are present, and if ECOPOW is absent.

The absence of URBPOP plays a role only in Solution 1b, while this condition is irrelevant in Solutions 1a and 1d, and URBPOP is even present in Solution 1c. Conclusions about single conditions based on the observation of combinations must be formulated with caution (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). However, we can affirm that this result only partially corresponds to Mann’s (2009) findings, which identified a positive correlation between urban sprawl and the rural type of settlements at the municipal level. Mann (2009) also carried out four municipal-level case studies whose results, with regard to municipal autonomy, converge with ours: Mann observed that highly autonomous municipalities used land inefficiently by permitting the development of a sprawled urbanization.

In Solutions 1a and 1d, high degrees of urban sprawl are produced in the absence of economic power. This result suggests an alternative interpretation of the role of economic power. This interpretation, which we expose subsequently, remains coherent with the hypothesized causal mechanism. In fact, the competition between municipalities to attract development (which leads to high degrees of urban sprawl) is triggered more easily in the context of economic weakness. In such a context, municipalities have a particular reason to try to maximize their benefits: municipalities are seeking to improve their economic situations. The fact that economic weakness is a powerful trigger of inter-municipal competition and leads to high degrees of urban sprawl is shown by two aspects. First, Solution 1a has the highest raw coverage, meaning that this situation is observed in many cantons with high degrees of urban sprawl. Second, in Solution 1d, high degrees of urban sprawl are produced regardless of the degree of municipal autonomy. However, other conditions are simultaneously present: institutional fragmentation, oversized designated building zones, and strong demographic growth also contribute to high degrees of urban sprawl in this path.

These results diverge from those of Weilenmann et al. (2017) who identified a positive correlation at the municipal level between urban sprawl and economic wealth measured by the amount of direct federal tax revenue per capita. The differences in the level of analysis, method, and operationalization may partly explain this contrast. Nevertheless, both results are consistent with the respective hypothesized causal mechanisms: stronger competition among municipalities (as in our case), and the fact that more affluent inhabitants can afford more spacious dwellings (as in the case of Weilenmann et al., 2017).

Our results also suggest that municipal autonomy “weighs more” than institutional fragmentation in the production of high degrees of urban sprawl. As Solution 1d shows, when MUNAUT does not contribute to the production of high degrees of urban sprawl, INSFRA needs to be combined with several other drivers in order to yield an observable outcome. A possible explanation is that the implementation of cantonal-level measures that limit the extension of urban areas fosters a more coordinated and thus efficient land use, even in the presence of many small municipalities pursuing potentially diverging goals. Solution 1c corroborates this interpretation by showing that high degrees of urban sprawl can be observed in institutionally consolidated cantons as well, but only if high municipal autonomy is present. This result occurs regardless of the economic power and size of the designated building zones.

Solution 1c, like Solution 1b, presents another interesting feature: the absence of strong demographic growth. This means that high degrees of urban sprawl can indeed be caused by other factors, such as historically dispersed types of settlements or the movement of inhabitants and activities toward the suburbs in shrinking cities (Couch et al., 2007).

Conclusion

Municipal autonomy is a fundamental cornerstone of Swiss federal system and is codified in the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (art. 50 Cst.). We concur with Muggli (2014) that neither Swiss federalism nor the relative autonomy enjoyed by cantons and municipalities within its framework are direct causes of urban sprawl: the phenomenon of urban sprawl is, after all, observed in unitary states. However, high degrees of municipal autonomy could indeed obstruct the successful implementation of antisprawl policies when combined with institutional fragmentation, urban development drivers, and oversized designated building zones. A more systematic implementation of cantonal-level measures limiting the extension of urban areas and promoting urban densification would reduce the risk of municipal strategies which contribute to sprawled patterns of urbanization. Nonetheless, such a task can be accomplished within the framework of the existing federal system.

In addition to contributing to the debate on the links between municipal autonomy and urban sprawl, our results provide complementary knowledge on two other aspects. The first maintains that the absence of economic power can be interpreted as a strong trigger for competition between municipalities, which leads to high degrees of urban sprawl when included in a combination of conditions as seen in Solution 1a and Solution 1d. The second shows that in some cases, high degrees of urban sprawl can also be observed in institutionally consolidated cantons, in the absence of strong demographic growth and even in the absence of high degrees of municipal autonomy.

One limitation of our study is that the effects of the revised Federal Land Use Planning Law are not yet observable at the cantonal level. QCA was performed with prerevision data. Thus, further research should be carried out in due time and its results compared to those presented herein. The analysis could be expanded outside of Switzerland in order to determine whether the results can be generalized to Europe. However, in order to broaden the study in this way, the land use autonomy of the municipalities of other countries and other systems of government must be measurable.

Finally, QCA was carried out at the cantonal level of analysis, though as a spatial phenomenon, urban sprawl exhibits different features depending upon the geographic scale of the analysis. Further research on the local level would provide more knowledge on aspects of urban sprawl that cannot be measured with quantitative metrics alone. Those aspects are, for example, the detailed form and localization of new settlements as well as their coherence with existing infrastructure (e.g. transportation, energy, and water supply). Similarly, it is assumed that additional conditions impact urban sprawl at the local level. These additional conditions may include private landowner strategies (Ascher, 2001), the political orientation of the municipal actors or their fiscal strategies (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2007). While the causal mechanisms operating in the field have been hypothesized, the black box of causality remains to be opened through the gathering of more field evidence. However, these aspects exceed the scope of this paper.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material1 - Supplemental material for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons

Supplemental material, Supplemental Material1 for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons by Jacopo Klaus in Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material2 - Supplemental material for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons

Supplemental material, Supplemental Material2 for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons by Jacopo Klaus in Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material3 - Supplemental material for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons

Supplemental material, Supplemental Material3 for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons by Jacopo Klaus in Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material4 - Supplemental material for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons

Supplemental material, Supplemental Material4 for Do municipal autonomy and institutional fragmentation stand in the way of antisprawl policies? A qualitative comparative analysis of Swiss cantons by Jacopo Klaus in Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Jacopo Klaus holds a Master of Science in Geography from the University of Lausanne. He is research assistant and PhD candidate at the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration of the University of Lausanne. His research focuses on local and regional government, urban governance, and land use planning.

References

Ascher

(2001) Les Nouveaux Principes de L’urbanisme. La Tour d’Aigues: L’aube.

Buzbee

(2009) Urban sprawl, federalism, and the problem of institutional complexity. Fordham Law Review 68(1): 57–136.

Couch

Leontidou

Petschel-Held

(eds) (2007) Urban Sprawl in Europe. Landscape, Land-Use Change and Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.

EEA (European Environment Agency) and FOEN (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment) (2016) Urban sprawl in Europe. Joint EEA-FOEN report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-sprawl-in-europe (accessed 8 October 2018).

Ewing

(1997) Is Los Angeles-style sprawl desirable? Journal of the American Planning Association 63(1): 107–126.

FOSD – Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development (2012) Statistique Suisse des Zones à Bâtir 2012. Bern: FOSD.

Gennaio

Hersperger

Bürgi

(2009) Containing urban sprawl – Evaluating effectiveness of urban growth boundaries set by the Swiss Land Use Plan. Land Use Policy 26: 224–232.

Hamel

Keil

(eds) (2015) Suburban Governance: A Global View. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division.

Hardin

(1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859): 1243–1248.

10.

Jaeger

JAG

Bertiller

Schwick

, et al. (2010) Urban permeation of landscapes and sprawl per capita: New measures of urban sprawl. Ecological Indicators 10(2): 427–441.

11.

Jaeger

JAG

Schwick

(2014) Improving the measurement of urban sprawl: Weighted urban proliferation (WUP) and its application to Switzerland. Ecological Indicators 38: 294–308.

12.

Kammermann

(2018) Factors driving the promotion of hydroelectricity: A qualitative comparative analysis. Review of Policy Research 35(2): 213–237.

13.

Keating

(1995) Size, efficiency and democracy: Consolidation, fragmentation and public choice. In: Judge

, et al. (eds) Theories of Urban Politics. London: Thousand Oaks, pp.117–134.

14.

Knoepfel

Nahrath

(2007) Environmental and spatial development policy. In: Klöti

(ed) Handbook of Swiss Politics. Zurich: NZZ, pp.705–733.

15.

Kübler

(2005) La Métropole et le Citoyen. Les Agglomérations Urbaines en Suisse Vues par Leurs Habitants. Lausanne: PPUR.

16.

Mahaim

(2014) Le Principe de Durabilité et L’aménagement du Territoire. Le Mitage du Territoire à L’épreuve du Droit. Genève: Schulthess.

17.

Mann

(2009) Institutional causes of urban and rural sprawl in Switzerland. Land Use Policy 26: 919–924.

18.

Muggli

(2014) Ist der Föderalismus an der Zersiedelung Schuld? Zurich: NZZ Libro.

19.

Norton

(1994) International Handbook of Local and Regional Government. A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Democracies. Aldershot/Brookfield: Edward Elgar.

20.

OFS – Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2000) Recensement de la Population 2000. Berne: OFS.

21.

OFS – Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2011) Statistischer Atlas der Schweiz. Städtische Bevölkerung 2011. Available at: www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/de/12622_8749_71_70/20715.html (accessed 8 October 2018).

22.

OFS – Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2015) L’utilisation du sol en Suisse. Exploitation et Analyse. Neuchâtel: OFS.

23.

OFS – Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2017) Bilan de la Population Résidante Permanente Selon le Niveau Géographique Institutionnel. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/effectif-change.html (accessed 8 October 2018).

24.

OFS – Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2018) Encyclopédie Statistique de la Suisse. Demographic and economic data collected by the author for different years. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population.html (accessed 8 October 2018).

25.

Ostrom

(1971) Public choice: A different approach to the study of public administration. Public Administration Review 31(2): 203–216.

26.

Pagliarin

(2018) Linking processes and patterns: Spatial planning, governance and urban sprawl in the Barcelona and Milan metropolitan regions. Urban Studies 55(16): 3650--3668

27.

Peiser

(2001) Decomposing urban sprawl. Town Planning Review 72(3): 275–298.

28.

Pendall

(1999) Do land-use controls cause sprawl? Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 26(4): 555–571.

29.

Phelps

Wood

(2011) The new post-suburban politics? Urban Studies 48: 2591–2610.

30.

Ragin

(1987) The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

31.

Ragin

(2008) Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago, IL/London: University of Chicago Press.

32.

Ragin

Davey

(2017) fs/QCA [Computer Programme], Version 3.0. Irvine: University of California.

33.

Rihoux

Ragin

(2009) Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

34.

SCB – Statistiska centralbyrån (2018) Statistical database. Demographic data collected online by the author for 2014. Available at: http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se (accessed 8 October 2018).

35.

Schneider

Wagemann

(2012) Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

36.

Schwick

Jaeger

JAG

Bertiller

, et al. (2012) Urban Sprawl in Switzerland – Unstoppable? Quantitative Analysis 1935 to 2002 and Implications for Regional Planning. Bern: Haupt Verlag.

37.

Schwick

Jaeger

JAG

Hersperger

, et al. (2018) Zersiedelung Messen und Begrenzen. Massnahmen und Zielvorgaben für die Schweiz, ihre Kantone und Gemeinden. [Measuring and Limiting Urban Sprawl. Measures and Targets for Switzerland, its Cantons and Municipalities]. Zürich: Bristol-Stiftung; Bern: Haupt-Verlag.

38.

Siedentop

Fina

(2012) Who sprawls most? Exploring the patterns of urban growth across 26 European countries. Environment and Planning A 44: 2765–2784.

39.

Squires

(2002) Urban Sprawl: Causes, Consequences & Policy Responses. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.

40.

Thomann

(2015) Customizing Europe: Transposition as bottom-up implementation. Journal of European Public Policy 22(10): 1368–1387.

41.

Thompson

(2013) Suburban Sprawl: Exposing Hidden Costs, Identifying Innovations. Ottawa: Sustainable Property.

42.

Tiebout

(1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64(5): 416–424.

43.

Tosics

Szemző

Illés

, et al. (2010) National spatial planning policies and governance typology. Deliverable report 2.2.1 PLUREL. Available at: http://www.plurel.org/images/D221.pdf (accessed 11 October 2018).

44.

Weilenmann

Seidl

Schulz

(2017) The socio-economic determinants of urban sprawl between 1980 and 2010 in Switzerland. Landscape and Urban Planning 157: 468–482.

45.

Wilson

Chakraborty

(2013) The environmental impacts of sprawl: Emergent themes from the past decade of planning research. Sustainability 5: 3302–3327.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.12 MB

0.23 MB

0.18 MB

0.13 MB