Abstract
This article analyses the life cycle of three Australian public policies (Tasmania Together [TT], South Australia’s Strategic Plan [SASP,] and Western Australia’s State Sustainability Strategy [WA’s SSS]). These policies were formulated at the state level and were structured around sustainable development concepts (the environmental, economic, and social dimensions). This study highlights contexts that led to the making of these public policies, as well as factors that led to their discontinuation. The case studies are based on analysis of parliamentary debates, state governments’ budget reports, public agencies’ annual reports, government media releases, and stakeholders’ feedback. The empirical findings highlight the importance of understanding the political dimension of sustainable development. This fact highlights the need to look beyond the traditional three-dimensional view of sustainability when assessing the success (or lack thereof) of sustainable development policies. Equally important, the analysis indicates that despite these policies’ limited success (and even one of these policies not being implemented at all), sustainability policies can have a legacy beyond their life cycle. Hence, the evaluation of these policies is likely to provide insight into the process of policymaking.
Introduction
Every public policy tries to set out a new norms and value system. The public become aware of the upcoming new public policy or scheme set out by their government for implementation, through the government’s press releases, television, or newspaper articles. However, the question is: ‘where does the initial idea come from?’; ‘who had the idea in the first place?’; ‘why has the agenda become politically important?’; and ‘how has the agenda suddenly lost its political relevance?’ This article explores these questions through the process of analysing the life cycle of three Australian state-level policies Tasmania Together (TT), South Australia’s Strategic Plan (SASP) and Western Australia’s State Sustainability Strategy (WA’s SSS).
In Australia, from 1998 until the first half of the 2000s, all Labor-governed states adopted a strategic plan or strategy based on sustainable development values. The sustainable development concept is often explained from the triple bottom line perspective, which combines environmental, economic, and social dimensions. However, to advance the sustainable development agenda, there is also a need to understand the political dimensions of sustainable development (O’Connor, 2006). The value systems underpinning sustainable development policies are, typically, an amalgamation of ‘hard facts’ regarding economic, social, and environmental dimensions and societal ‘gut feelings’ that represent a sense of responsibility for acting on environmental degradation. In addition to these facts, desires of politicians and policymakers to make a mark in the sustainability policy area and to leave a legacy are also important factors. Hence, the success of a sustainable development policy lies in its ability to mix and match these often-competing factors. Having said that, even if a policy succeeds in finding an optimal way to satisfy ‘hard facts’, societal desires, and politicians’ ambitions, it has its own shelf life. Thus, the real challenge for a sustainable development policy (and, for that matter, any public policy) lies in whether it can have a legacy after its shelf life.
This article examines the life cycle of three overarching sustainable development policies of the early 2000s: TT, SASP, and WA’s SSS. In addition, it also briefly highlights the nature of the legacies these policies have left behind from a stakeholders’ perspective.
State Strategic Planning in the International Context
Over the years, the sustainable development concept has been disseminated and accepted in many jurisdictions, at national, sub-national, and local levels (Quental & Lourenço, 2012). This study contributes to the literature that focuses on sustainable development policies at the sub-national level jurisdictions falling between national and local levels of government (Marks et al., 2008). In the conventional three-tier democratic political structure as observed in many countries around the globe, the sub-national jurisdiction (usually called a state, province or canton) is responsible for implementing a range of policies. This level of government often plays an important role in the development and implementation of sustainable development policies; for example, since the late 1980s, several US state governments and other sub-national jurisdictions have launched state-based strategic planning with holistic sustainability (economic–social–environmental) targets and benchmarks to guide public policies (Happaerts, 2012; Schumacher Center for a New Economics, 2012). However, the specific content of sustainable development policies is found to be strongly dependent on domestic conditions (Happaerts, 2012; Happaerts & Van Den Brande, 2011).
Happaerts and Van Den Brande (2011) have pointed out that major global summits on sustainable development, such as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 that followed from the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987, had an immense influence on the dissemination of sustainability values. In particular, the message expressed at these summits that sustainable development is not necessarily a national government’s issue. Rather it also has to resonate well with local and sub-national governments. Over the years, sub-national governments have shown a desire to participate in (international) sustainable development policy and governance, as it is evidenced by both their ‘on the ground policies’ and their participation in transnational sustainable development and climate change governance networks (Happaerts & Van Den Brande, 2011). Having said that, not all sustainable development activities of sub-national governments can be explained by a ‘voluntary’ eagerness to do good (or to do better than their national context): national governments often mandate sub-national governments to develop, implement, and monitor the performance of sustainable development policies.
State Strategic Planning in the Australian Sub-national Context
Since the 1980s, public sector policymaking in Australia has been guided by the New Public Management (NPM) philosophy (Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013; Johnston, 2000). However, as the Labor Party came to power in most of the Australian states in the late 1990s or early 2000s, the narrow focus of an ‘agency-centric’ effectiveness approach was replaced by ‘whole-of-government’ strategic planning processes centred around sustainable development or holistic sustainability (economic, social, and environmental) values (Considine et al., 2014; Gallop, 2007b; Johnston, 2000). With the change in perspective towards public governance, many Australian state governments embraced strategic planning and incorporated holistic sustainability values or the triple bottom line approach as their core values (Gallop, 2007a, 2007b).
The process started in Queensland with the adoption of the Smart State Plan in 1988 by the Beattie government (Althaus, 2008; Tagliaferri, 2011). In 2001, the Bracks and the Bacon governments launched Growing Victoria Together and TT in Victoria and Tasmania, respectively (Althaus, 2008; Tagliaferri, 2011). In 2004, SASP was adopted by the Rann government. In Western Australia, Better Planning: Better Services and the State Sustainability Strategy were launched by the Gallop government in 2003 (Martin & Christof, 2011; Tagliaferri, 2011; van Schoubroeck, 2010). Finally, in New South Wales, A New Direction for the Future was implemented in 2006 by the Iemma government (Gallop, 2007b; Tagliaferri, 2011).
Previous studies on these state-level strategic plans, concentrated on the different perspectives, are briefly summarised below.
Adams and Wiseman (2003) provided an insider’s perspective on why Growing Victoria Together was undertaken by the Victorian Labor government. The authors noted that the formulation of the strategic plan at the state level was an alternative policy paradigm to withstand an increasingly uncertain global environment. Crowley and Coffey (2007a, 2007b) conducted a comparative study of TT and Growing Victoria Together. Their analysis suggested that TT was created via an apolitical bottom-up process. The political priorities of Growing Victoria Together were intended to bring the social and environmental dimensions into the decision-making process. Nabben’s (2011) study on Growing Victoria Together highlighted how the Victorian Labor government tried, from 1999 to 2006, to use strategic planning as a community development tool. Manwaring’s (2010) research on SASP evaluated the 2006 public consultation process to review the plan. Gallop (2007a, 2007b) saw state-level strategic planning as an alternative to the NPM policy model. He felt that if strategic planning was combined with the concept of sustainability, it would provide a strong framework for policymaking. Similarly, Crowley and Coffey (2007a) concluded that a state’s strategic plan had the potential to fulfil the sustainability agenda. Althaus (2008) pointed out that in each case, these states’ plans were initiated by Labor governments after a tight electoral contest that gave them a surprise win. Therefore, each of these state-level strategic plans made by Labor governments was a tool for managing political risks as well as a communication mechanism to manage the government’s credibility. Van Schoubroeck (2008) analysed the perceptions of the Western Australian political and public sector actors in the Better Planning: Better Services programme. The study revealed that adoption of strategic planning at the state level was the new norm in the era after NPM. McMahon and Phillimore (2013) analysed all the strategic plans adopted by the various state governments between 2001 and 2011. Their study demonstrated how each state plan fulfilled its purpose and function as a monitoring, managing, and marketing tool.
Hence, our policy life cycle study of three selected state-level public policies (TT, SASP, and WA’s SSS) adds a new perspective and advances the body of literature on Australian sub-national public policies.
Research Methodology and Case Policies
In order to undertake this research, the authors adopted an interpretive case study method (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Vennesson, 2008; Yin, 2009). This study applied the process tracing method to understand the policy life cycle process. This method facilitated the identification of links between possible causes and outcomes of policymaking and also helped investigation of the preceding events or motivations that led to the formulation of these selected public policies. Thus, the process tracing technique enabled mapping of sequential events through the systematic study of historical and archival documents and transcripts of interviews with stakeholders (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). Hence, the corroborative data sources are:
Academic literature on the topic, public policy documents, government media releases, and the transcripts of parliamentary proceedings from Hansard (an archive of parliamentary debates) on TT, SASP and the State Sustainability Strategy of Western Australia; Annual reports of key public agencies and each state’s budget reports; and Transcripts from interviews with diverse stakeholders. The authors interviewed a wide range of stakeholders from senior ministerial staff, relevant shadow cabinet ministers, senior departmental executives, academics, and key members from relevant pressure groups.
Triangulation of the data on the three cases within a policy timeframe gives an in-depth understanding of the political–economic dimension of sustainable development and the policy legacy of these three state policies. An overview of each policy is described below.
Case Study 1: Tasmania Together
The Tasmania Together Progress Board Act was passed in 2001 by the Jim Bacon-led Labor government, and TT was formulated based on that Act. The aim of TT was to create overarching community-driven goals and benchmarks that, in turn, would drive the other policies and programmes of the government as a whole. Between 2001 and 2012, TT was revised, first in 2006 and then in 2009 (Tasmania Together Progress Board, 2006, 2009a).
Case Study 2: South Australia’s Strategic Plan
In 2004 the Labor government led by Premier Mike Rann drafted the state’s strategic plan, based on recommendations from the Economic Development Board (EDB) (Hansard, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d; Economic Development Board, 2003). EDB’s core recommendation was to create a state strategic plan integrated across the whole of government to meet the economic, environmental, and social objectives of the community. SASP acted as a template for a holistic (environmental, economic, and social) service delivery system to South Australia. Between 2004 and 2014, SASP was revised twice, in 2007 and 2011.
Case Study 3: Western Australia’s State Sustainability Strategy
In September 2003, Premier Gallop formally launched the State Sustainability Strategy at the 3rd Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development. The State Sustainability Strategy document highlighted the state’s key historic environmental, and social issues and provided a strategy for implementing an economic model for the state, based on sustainable development values. The strategy strove to prepare a smooth transition towards a sustainable future with a holistic sustainability framework that was aligned with national and international sustainable development criteria.
Policy Life Cycle of the Three Selected Case Policies
One of the key objectives of this article is to understand ‘what led to what’ in the policymaking process and ‘which factors influenced the policy making process’. In this regard, this section briefly highlights the life cycle of each policy with a thematic title.
Tasmania Together: A Policy Model for Reconnection
In Tasmania, the Australian Labor Party dominated the political domain for 45 years between the 1930s and the 1980s. At that time, it started to lose its electoral base, with a sharp decline in the number of people voting for it. However, the Tasmanian economy was at an all-time low due to both internal and external factors. On the one hand, the economy was burdened by huge government debt, which led to the end of hydropower-stimulated industrialisation. On the other hand, it was exposed to external shocks due to the gradual removal of tariff barriers, as the process of globalisation was adopted in the 1980s. In addition, the prudent economic austerity measures to reduce the state’s debt burden undertaken by the then Labor Premier Michael Field also alienated the electorate from the Labor Party. The combination of all these factors led to the decimation of the Tasmanian Labor Party in the 1992 Tasmanian state election.
At this critical juncture, the out-of-power Labor Party was in real need of new ideas:
To convince its own electoral base that the Labor Party had better ideas to save Tasmania’s flagging economy and Tasmanian society, and, For the party’s own revival.
The Tasmanian Labor Party, therefore, had to tour for policy ideas in similar regional jurisdictions around the world. This search led them to the State of Oregon in the USA.
The party found merit in Oregon’s state strategic plan (known as Oregon Shines), which was underpinned by sustainable development concepts. The Tasmanian Labor Party saw this policy as a tool for turning around their political fortunes. They promptly internalised the Oregon Shines model. In their 1998 election manifesto, the Labor Party showcased the ideas of the policy model and projected them as a blueprint for Tasmania’s turnaround. However, the real political motivation was to use this policy model as a tool to reconnect with the party’s lost electoral base. In 1998, the Tasmanian Labor Party won the election.
Once the party had come to power in 1998, the government initiated the process of formulating a benchmark-based overarching policy model called TT, and this commenced with a massive community engagement process. For this reason, the theme for TT can be ‘a policy model for reconnection’. In March 1999, the Bacon government formally announced TT as a 20-year socio-economic plan for Tasmania in line with Oregon Shines. Mirroring the Oregon Progress Board, the Tasmanian government created the Tasmania Together Progress Board in 2001 under the Tasmania Together Progress Board Act to monitor the progress of TT. The benchmarks encompassed all three dimensions of sustainable development. The Act stated that TT was an all-encompassing framework ‘for planning, budgeting and policy priorities for the government and non-government sectors’ (Government of Tasmania, 2001, p. 5).
Key Highlights on Tasmania Together Discussion from Hansard of the Tasmanian Parliament.

In general, a policy’s success in achieving its objectives depends on both support from policy champions and the extent of the financial resources allocated for its smooth functioning. To ascertain the effectiveness of TT, the overall life cycle of TT (2000–2012) is, thus, correlated with the Tasmanian state government’s fiscal position. In addition, the authors of the study examined how many times the phrase ‘Tasmania Together’ was mentioned in the government’s budget reports during that period. A pictorial depiction of the life cycle is presented in Figure 1. The data show that the policy life cycle of TT forms a skewed shape with three distinct phases. The first phase can be termed ‘years of internalisation’ (while this new idea was in the process of integration within the government’s existing system, which lasted until 2002). This is followed by ‘years of high relevance’ from 2003 until 2007, during which the relevance of TT as a policy framework reached its high point in around 2004 and remained relevant until there was a budget surplus. From 2005 onwards, the budget deficits started to occur (except in 2007). From 2008 onwards, TT’s ‘years of declining relevance’ coincided with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which was the death knell for TT. The policy was finally abolished in 2012.
South Australia’s Strategic Plan: A Policy Tool to Reposition the Government’s Image
The policy life cycle story of SASP’s is a chronicle of how to reposition the party’s image. In the 1990s, under the Labor government, the state witnessed two major financial debacles:
The collapse of South Australia’s State Bank, and, The failure of the State Government Insurance Commission.
Both these incidents were seen as stemming from the South Australian Labor government’s financial mismanagement. Their fallout led to the Labor Party losing the 1993 state election. For nearly a decade, the Labor Party remained out of power. In 2002, the Rann-led Labor Party came back to power and formed a minority government. At this juncture, political reputation management was the key goal of the government. With this political objective in mind, the South Australian Labor government took a long-term approach by adopting a strategic plan for the state. In order to legitimise the adoption process, an EDB was constituted by the government. The board recommended that the government should adopt a strategic plan, and that it should draw inspiration from the State of Oregon’s Oregon Shines policy model. In 2004, Premier Rann launched the State Strategic Plan for South Australia with the vision of addressing the state’s economic, social, and environmental issues (Hansard, 2004b, 2004d).
However, with the formation of the majority Labor government after the 2006 state election, the government gradually slipped into political complacency, and the leadership became emboldened. In addition, there was an external economic shock from the fallout of GFC and a change in leadership in 2011 from Premier Mike Rann (the policy champion of SASP) to Premier Jay Weatherill. As a result, the relevance of SASP started to reduce considerably.
Documentary evidence suggests that the overall lifespan of SASP was from 2004 to 2014, after which it was unofficially shelved. An analysis of the state’s budget papers reveals that, between 2004 and 2008, the State Strategic Plan’s six interrelated objectives were important for budgetary allocations. However, there was a noticeable shift from the financial year 2009–2010 onwards. The 2009–2010 budget indicated that, because of the impact of GFC and the slowdown in the domestic economy, the state anticipated a decline in its revenue of US$3,520 million (Government of South Australia, 2009).
This shift can also be observed in the manner in which SASP was covered in the budget overview papers. Between 2004 and 2008, SASP received, on average, discussion coverage in 7 pages out of a total of 20–23 pages. However, in the following two years of GFC (i.e., 2009 and 2010), SASP received only two pages of coverage and a similar amount at the end of the budget overview paper. From 2011 onwards, the topic received no mention at all. On the contrary, in the 2012 and 2013 budget papers, the new Premier Jay Weatherill’s Seven Strategic Priorities, which appeared to be a concise version of SASP, received some emphasis. However, from 2014 onwards, even the Seven Strategic Priorities received no mention in the budget documents.
A similar phenomenon is also evident from the analysis of the key agencies’ annual reports; for example, an analysis of the Department of Premier and Cabinet’s annual report showed that the coverage of the strategic plan reduced incrementally over the years, from 8–10 pages’ coverage in 2008–2009, to 4 pages in 2013–2014, and half a page in 2014–2015. The reporting pattern reflects a gradual decrease in the importance of SASP in the government’s decision-making process. In the initial years of SASP (until 2009–2010), the topic was covered in the front section of the annual report (between pages 6 and 8). It then moved to page 20 and to page 33 by 2013–2014. Eventually, in 2014–2015, it moved to Appendix 6 of the annual report.

Key Highlights of South Australia’s Strategic Plan from Public Policy Documents and Stakeholders’ Comments.
From 2012–2013 onwards, SASP was superseded by the new Labor Premier Jay Weatherill’s Seven Strategic Priorities. It is possible that the formal abolition of the strategic plan would not have been a politically prudent decision for the same Labor government that conceived it, and thus, it was gradually side-lined. Based on the above findings, the study presents a pictorial depiction of SASP’s life cycle in Figure 2, and key highlights of discussions on SASP are presented in Table 2. The plateau-shaped skewed graph shows an initial period of high relevance, followed by a phase of gradual slow decline.
Western Australia’s State Sustainability Strategy: An Aspirational Policy
In Western Australia, there was discontent among the people after the Regional Forests Agreement of 1998. This discontent created a suitable chance for the Western Australian Labor Party to capitalise on the situation politically and to win the upcoming state election. In this way, the Western Australian Labor Party, under Dr Geoff Gallop, positioned itself as a sympathetic political force for the cause of the old-growth forests (as demanded by conservationists as well as the public). During the 2001 Western Australian state election, under the leadership of Dr Gallop, the Labor Party made two key electoral promises. These were (a) to address the old-growth forests agenda and (b) to formulate a holistic sustainability strategy for the state that would address all its sustainability issues. Furthermore, Dr Gallop, who was himself an academic, was supportive of the sustainable development philosophy and criticised the prevailing right-of-centre’s NPM public policy model.
In 2001, when the party came to power, the Gallop government formulated and launched an aspirational and visionary document under the guidance of Professor Peter Newman. However, the strategy was never implemented because there was a lack of consensual political support within the government, and there were also some sections within the bureaucracy who opposed it. As a result, there was no budgetary allocation for the strategy, even though it was officially launched at an international sustainable development conference.
Cumulative Budgetary Allocation of WA Agencies.
However, a deeper examination of DPC’s annual reports shows that WA’s SSS did not continue effectively beyond the 2004–2005 financial year (DPC, 2003, 2004). DPC was the lead agency for promoting the State Sustainability Strategy, but there is no further mention of the strategy from the financial year 2005–2006 onwards (DPC, 2005), except for some limited mentions in the annual reports of the Department of Community Development until 2005, of the Department of Industry and Resources until 2006 and of the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) until 2007. Professor Newman, who drafted the State Sustainability Strategy and was also the Director of the Sustainability Policy Unit, left the government in 2003 (Curtin University, 2017). His departure is evident from DPC’s 2004–2005 annual report, as there is no mention of the Sustainability Policy Unit thereafter (DPC, 2004).
In January 2006, Dr Gallop, the policy’s champion and the then Premier of Western Australia, himself left the government. In 2005–2006, DPC’s annual report mentioned that the Environmental Policy Unit, the Greenhouse Unit, the Sustainability Policy Unit, and the Sustainability Round Table were to be transferred (with effect from April 2006) from DPC’s Policy Division to the Department of Environment, following a February 2006 Cabinet decision taken when Allan Carpenter was the Premier (DPC, 2005). In 2006–2007, the DEC’s annual report mentioned that the Sustainability Policy Unit had been renamed the Sustainability Programs Unit (DEC, 2006). However, after 2006–2007, there was no mention of the Sustainability Programs Unit in DEC’s annual reports. In this context, it is also important to highlight that less than 2% of Western Australia’s total state budgetary allocation to departments was allocated to the Department of Environment and other related agencies, whereas 15% was allocated to economic departments and 63% to social (welfare) departments (as shown in Table 3).
It can, therefore, be argued that the financial ability of the environmental department to execute the strategy was in question, which can be seen as a political ploy by the Allan Carpenter government to shelve the State Sustainability Strategy. In his book entitled The Lure of Politics: Geoff Gallop’s Government 2001–2006, van Schoubroeck states that:
Despite sporadic attempts by officers within the premier’s department to more closely align the two strategies [Better Planning: Better Futures & State Sustainability Strategy] s, this did not eventuate leading to some confusion for public sector agencies and potentially detracting from the ownership of each. The sustainability website suggests that little activity has occurred since Gallop’s resignation in 2006 when responsibility was transferred from his department to the Department of Conservation and Environment. The specific legislation has not eventuated, but sustainability principles have been embedded in some legislation. (van Schoubroeck, 2010, p. 210)

Key Highlights of Western Australia’s State Sustainability Strategy from Hansard of the Western Australian Parliament and Stakeholders.
In addition, the West Australian Policy Forum (2008) mentions that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) came to power in 2001 with a list of promises encompassing biodiversity, salinity, climate change, renewable energy, wetlands, air quality, marine issues, waste management, and environmental protection. However, the Gallop-led Labor government and the subsequent Carpenter-led Labor government performed poorly in terms of the implementation of policies in these areas, despite the election promises for the advancement of sustainability agendas. Although the State Sustainability Strategy was technically abandoned during Allan Carpenter’s government, the process of abandonment started during Gallop’s period. This is because no funding was approved even during his tenure, and Professor Newman, who headed the Sustainability Policy Unit, resigned in 2003.
From these documentary analyses, a policy life cycle graph of WA’s SSS has been constructed (as shown in Figure 3, and key highlights of discussions on WA’s SSS are presented in Table 4). The graph shows a relatively flat life cycle line, with a small bulge representing the launch of the policy.
WA’s SSS can, thus, be described as an opportunistic move with good intentions, but, in the end and despite the state’s healthy fiscal surplus, the strategy remained just ‘an aspirational policy vision’.

Key Highlights of Policy Legacy.
A Comparative Overview of Oregon Shines, TT, SASP and WA’s SSS.
Hence, based on the findings of three case policies (TT, SASP, and WA’s SSS), the overall contextual factors at each stage are highlighted in Figure 4. The figure is based on the process tracing analytical technique, as adopted in this study. The policy’s life cycle stages are categorised into four parts: (a) context stage, (b) influence and learning stage, (c) policy adaptation stage, and (d) policy abandonment/shelving stage. Hence, the process tracing figure (Figure 4) provides a comparative overview of TT, SASP, and WA’s SSS life cycle based on the discussion in the previous three sections. Figure 4 also highlights which factors have influenced each policy life cycle stage.
Hidden Successes: A Policy Legacy Perspective
Tasmania Together and SASP were benchmark-based policy models. The benchmarks were allocated to the various government departments according to their statutory economic, social, and environmental functions. In order to understand the impact of these benchmarks, the authors analysed the annual reports of some of the key departments performing economic, social, and environmental functions. The analysis of TT and SASP showed that even though these policies were discontinued or shelved after a certain period, they had certain direct and indirect positive influences on government departments. Based on the values of holistic sustainability, several steps were taken during the policy timeframes.
These steps were manifested through different policies and programmes, such as the adoption of waste management practices, the adoption of climate change initiatives, an emphasis on recycling and sustainable procurement, and investment in public transport systems. In addition, there was policy support for the renewable energy industry and investment in renewable energy. Other social sector initiatives were taken, including support for Aboriginal communities and people with disabilities in public sector jobs, the embracing of gender equality, and the promotion of multiculturalism and cultural diversity. In the case of WA’s SSS, the policy was never implemented, but the policy model acted as a moral normative value. The core idea of the policy received some support within a few of WA’s public departments, and some of these public departments used the concept to argue for public transport systems. Similarly, the policy model also influenced some of the progressive WA local councils, such as the City of Cockburn and the City of South Perth. These local councils drafted their own sustainability strategies at the local level based on WA’s SSS. These policy legacy stories can be described as hidden successes, as they were often overlooked or underappreciated. The highlights of these policy legacies, as mentioned by various stakeholders as well as reported in the annual reports, are presented in Table 5.
Conclusion
Overall, the analysis of these three policies showed there was a renewed interest in public policies based on sustainable development values of the early 2000s within the Australian Labor Party at the state level. A comparative overview of TT, SASP, and WA’s SSS is presented in Table 6. In the case of Tasmania and South Australia, this renewed interest was because of the adoption of the Oregon policy model, which had inbuilt sustainable development features. Hence, as Tasmania and South Australia implemented the imported policy model, they developed a triple bottom line structured policy, by default. In view of the facts about the contextual motivations, it can be implied that the apparent renewed interest in sustainable development was not necessarily because of a strong belief in the sustainable development concept; rather, the adoption of these policy models had strategic electoral–political motivations designed to reconnect with lost electorates and for reputation management of the newly elected Labor government.
In the case of Western Australia, the strategy drew its inspiration from both the UN’s Brundtland Report and Australia’s National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, since Premier Gallop himself believed in sustainable development values. His party may have tried to embrace the strategy with a politically opportunistic motive. In the end, because of the lack of consensus within the party, the State Sustainability Strategy was never internalised as a policy model at government level. Hence, in Western Australia, the contextual motivation for adopting the policy arose from the combination of electoral–political factors and the personal convictions of the key policy champions (such as Gallop and a few of his colleagues in the cabinet). Even though the policy idea seems to have been a failure in the political domain, the State Sustainability Strategy remained an inspirational document. It was an intellectually stimulating normative policy document that remained an ideal policy model. As a result, a few of WA’s public departments, and progressive local WA councils, adopted the core values of the policy as their inspiration.
Furthermore, a key conceptual insight from this study is that even though the theoretical meaning of sustainable development or holistic sustainability (environmental, economic, and social) that was adopted was same, however, what constitutes sustainability and the components of each sustainability pillar differed with the changing aspirations and priorities of the jurisdiction; for example, Tasmania was the only state that focused on poverty and the cost of living. In its 2006 version, TT included benchmarks relating to skills shortages, mental health, flexible working arrangements, renewable energy, organic agriculture, waste management, obesity, road safety, housing cost and availability, health waiting times, business innovation, and leisure and recreational events (Tasmania Together Progress Board, 2006). In the 2009 version, new benchmarks were introduced based on communities’ new priorities and expectations, such as transport accessibility, value-added food production, levels of greenhouse gas emissions (in mega tonnes), growth in the number of small businesses, avoidable mortality, gross value of agricultural and fish production, percentage of Tasmania covered by native vegetation, exports of food, agriculture and fisheries, and overall student performance against national literacy and numeracy benchmarks (Tasmania Together Progress Board, 2009b).
Similarly, in 2007, new benchmarks were added to SASP relating to Aboriginal well-being, early childhood, sustainable water supply, multiculturalism, cultural engagement, employment participation, work–life balance, and venture capital investment (DPC, 2013). In the 2011 version, 21 new targets were added to SASP based on the changing expectations and priorities of the South Australian communities (Government of South Australia, 2011). The new emphases were on increasing the use of urban space, doubling the number of people cycling, reducing violence against women, reducing the number of repeat offenders, increasing the participation of older people in the workforce, increasing access to self-managed funding for people with disabilities, developing a climate change adaptation plan, increasing the purchase of renewable energy, and recycling stormwater and wastewater (Government of South Australia, 2011).
WA’s SSS had seven foundational principles and four process principles; in addition, it had six visions for Western Australia’s sustainability. The strategy had 6 goals for the government and 42 priority areas for action (Sustainability Policy Unit, 2003). All these visions, goals, and priority areas had triple button line aspects. The strategy aimed to enable WA’s smooth transition towards a sustainable future.
Hence, the broad conceptual meaning and structure of sustainability remained the same in all three policies, but the issues or components that constitute a holistic sustainability plan for a society changed with time based on the changing contemporary issues and aspirations of that society. TT and the SASP were benchmark-driven, whereas WA’s SSS was more principle-based and strategic in nature. Furthermore, TT was more community-driven with a bottom-up approach, whereas SASP had a much more government-managed top-down approach. Although both SASP and TT had political as well as leadership support, the implementation process of both policies was suddenly halted due to the high fiscal deficit with the onset of the GFC. As Tasmania and South Australia were both fiscally dependent states, the continuation of these policies slowed down, and TT was later abolished, whereas SASP was discontinued. Ironically, WA was a much more fiscally independent state, but WA’s SSS still did not see the light of the day because of a lack of political support.
The main highlight of this policy life cycle analysis reveals that institutional factors may facilitate the diffusion and learning of sustainable development value-based policies. However, the actual implementation and continuation of a policy rests on fortuitous factors, such as
Electoral politics; the support of policy champions; whether a political entity views sustainable development as a form of political capital that can assist a party to (re)gain the electorate’s confidence; the fiscal position of the jurisdiction; and whether a sustainability-based policy framework contradicts the jurisdiction’s economic model (as was the case with Western Australia’s extraction-based economy).
Therefore, institutional factors are important for dissemination of sustainability values, but electoral politics as well as political–economic factors are necessary as contextual stimuli to incorporate the prevailing sustainability values into the policy model. At the same time, political–economic factors can also act as triggers to distance from a policy model based on sustainable development. However, the chance of a government adopting a sustainable development policy is greater with a government that is run by a left-of-centre political organisation. This insight from the study aligns with the findings of Fielding et al. (2012). At the same time, democratic legitimacy does not guarantee the continuity of a public policy. Hence, two factors must be present simultaneously, such as support from policy champions, and a prolonged period of sound fiscal position, for the continuity of a public policy.
Thus, the empirical findings of this study have confirmed the importance of the electoral–political dimension of sustainable development (see also O’Connor, 2006). We must look beyond the traditional three-dimensional view of sustainability. Finally, the overall analysis suggests that even though two of the three grand policies based on sustainable development lost their political relevance after a certain period, and, indeed, the third was never implemented, the diffusion of holistic sustainability values did not end there. Some aspects of these values continued and remained ingrained in each state’s public policies domain. The study found that that the holistic sustainability value system, which was introduced initially as a new system, has been transformed into part of the ongoing culture because of these strategic plans and strategies. These are the hidden successes, as well as the policy legacy, of these policy interventions, which have previously been overlooked.
Footnotes
Acknowledgement
Special thanks and acknowledgement to Harveen Kaur and Dr Alison-Jane Hunter for their editorial services.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
