Abstract
This paper explores the significance of current paradigms for connecting across difference in environmental governance, with a focus on dominant practices and the erasures that occur in the process. It focuses on three core concepts and corresponding practices: rights (adhering to both persons and property, procedural, and substantive); recognition (of harms done, of those harmed, or of those deserving of special recognition); and participation (in which information, decision authority, and/or benefits are shared with affected populations). The paper begins with a literature review on the history and purported benefits of each of these concepts, the environmental arenas where they occur, and the critiques that are leveraged against them. To envision what it might look like to connect across difference differently, we situate these critiques in the literature on coloniality and use this to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating efforts to connect across difference in environmental governance. We then illustrate the application of this framework in the environmental arenas of biodiversity conservation and extractivism to crystalize through lived experiences what it means to operate inside of these paradigms and to move beyond them. The paper highlights how current paradigms for connecting across difference are deeply situated in (settler) colonial logics of hierarchies of value, state sovereignty, and Indigenous erasure. We conclude with a vision of how environmental governance can move beyond its current colonial hegemony by centering decolonial and abolition ecologies scholarship that decenters settler ontologies in favor of more radical alternatives for relating with the so-called “natural” world.
Keywords
Introduction
The history and present of environmental governance have not only failed to address the pace and scale of environmental destruction in the Anthropocene but have also been experienced as racializing, dispossessory, and violent by communities on the front lines of both environmental destruction and conservation worldwide. Many scholars argue that past and ongoing forms of environmental degradation emerge from ongoing systems of colonialism, imperialism, and racial capitalism rooted in centuries of global European domination (Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Wynter, 2003). Conceptualizations of “difference” are often enrolled into hierarchies to justify violence and oppression across axes of race, class, gender, ability, nationality, and more. We see this from the “de-matter[ing]” of Black and Native lives in the early plantation economies of the United States to the myths of pristine wilderness and of environmental harms caused by local land users at work in justifying displacement and dispossession within contemporary biodiversity conservation (Anderson and Grove, 1987; Brockington, 2002; Homewood and Rodgers, 1987). Although we wish to expand the ontological spaces of environmental governance (DePuy et al., 2021), we draw from Lemos and Agrawal (2006) to situate our understanding of environmental governance as “the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (298).
In the contemporary era, the socially progressive language of rights, recognition, and participation is advanced as solutions to these historical injustices and attempts at reconciliation (Coulthard, 2014). In this paper, we scrutinize claims that represent these practices as overcoming the discriminatory and dispossessory relationships of the past. Our analysis reveals how coloniality and settler colonialism are both ongoing and deeply entwined with contemporary environmental governance practices, with states, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations often using these mechanisms to instead reinforce asymmetrical power relationships. This paper understands coloniality to be a broad term for a set of processes that continue to structure unequal global political–economic relations by reinforcing dominant systems of knowledge and culture (Simpson, 2014; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Wynter, 2003). Further, we understand settler colonialism as an ongoing structure of Indigenous dispossession in nations where the settlers never left (Coulthard, 2014; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Wolfe, 2006).
We aim to deconstruct and move beyond common paradigms for connecting across difference in environmental governance, calling for more emancipatory forms that destabilize colonial power relationships and create the possibility for truly just and sustainable futures. In so doing, we hope to contribute to the call to decolonize conservation (Whyte, 2017), nature (Adams and Mulligan, 2003), and environmental governance (Mathews, 2021; Reed et al., 2020).
Theorization
Theorizing difference and its importance in environmental governance
The concept of “difference” is used disparately and deployed in seemingly opposing ways in scholarly literature. One body of scholarship treats difference as a social construct that creates categories and hierarchies to justify and advance the superiority of powerful actors. Others treat difference as real and as lived through distinct histories, ontologies, and values, and call for a more emancipatory and celebratory theorization of difference (Klenk, 2018).
Theories framing difference as socially constructed reveal how difference is often used to categorize humans into hierarchies and deployed as means of oppression and dispossession (Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Simpson, 2014; Wynter, 2003). These hierarchies of difference were historically used to justify colonialism and contemporarily manifest as part of the ongoing white supremacist and Western imperialist project in settler colonial nations and beyond (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Melamed, 2015; Moreton-Robinson, 2015). Socially constructed differences, then, are used to create binaries (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002), reify otherness (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Hacking, 1986; Omi and Winant, 2009), dehumanize and subjugate (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Simpson, 2014), and further entrench uneven power dynamics (Blaser, 2013). These hierarchies tend to have negative material consequences (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002) and serve as a form of cultural erasure and essentialization (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Blaser, 2013; Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2014). This body of literature further explores how such constructs are deployed to naturalize hierarchies of knowledge and authority, and in so doing, to justify intervention by those occupying privileged positions in these hierarchies (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2014).
In the environmental governance arena, difference is similarly used to justify intervention in the name of “conservation” and “development” and establishes hierarchies of expertise and governing modalities that position Western expertise as superior (DePuy et al., 2021; Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Simpson, 2014). These strategies of categorizing cultural “others” obscure political differences, serving to legitimize (neo)colonial power structures while undermining (an)other group's rights and ability to govern (Blaser, 2013). They are also used to justify environmental non-governance, wherein degraded landscapes are considered expendable (Pulido, 2000).
Although rejecting supremacist conceptions of difference, Black, Asian, and other scholars of color have warned against ignoring difference altogether (Chen, 2007; Lorde, 2007; Shiva, 1993). For these scholars, it is not difference that is the problem but rather hierarchies that have been superimposed to structure and justify uneven power relations, whereby any human not a mirror image of the white Western bourgeois male is likened to the subhuman (Weheliye, 2014; Wynter, 2003). As Audre Lorde explained in a 1980 speech, fear of difference is foundational to hierarchical systems: “As members of such an economy, we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate. But we have no patterns for relating across our human differences as equals” (Lorde, 2007).
An intersectional feminist lens demonstrates that to ignore difference would be to fail to see the complex and interlocking axes of gender, race, history, culture, ability, class, and situated knowledges which shape the way we experience and understand the world (Combahee River Collective, 1983; Haraway, 1988; Lorde, 2007).
Writings on ontology also center on difference as both real and central to more emancipatory politics. We focus here on Indigenous ontologies, which affirm diverse relationships to the world, in contrast to Western and masculinist “one-world” conceptions that present a singular, objective and all-encompassing reality (Burow et al., 2018; Law, 2015). Indigenous ontologies of land and place tend to be defined not in terms of ownership and rights, but of duty, reciprocity, care, and kinship (Burow et al., 2018; Kimmerer, 2013). These forms of relationality are oriented around “alternative citizenships to the state that are structured in the present space of intra-community recognition, affection, and care, outside of the logics of colonial and imperial rule” (Deloria, 2001, cited by Simpson, 2014: 109). Coulthard and Simpson (2016) put forward the concept of “grounded normativity” to describe the ethical frameworks of Indigenous place-based practices, based on reciprocal relationships that teach us how to be in the world in a “profoundly nonauthoritarian, nondominating, nonexploitative manner” (254).
In order to create a more just future, difference must be reconceptualized beyond its hierarchical and often colonial deployments (Blaser, 2013; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Simpson, 2014). Moves toward the normalization of pluralism are crucial, where more emancipatory ways of conceiving of difference are centered (Kimmerer 2013; Klenk, 2018). Difference does not form from unlocatable histories and cultures but from lived, embodied experiences, through lines of becoming that have stories to tell and learn from, enabling the “flourishing of life along diverse lines” (Klenk, 2018: 320). Thinking about difference through a lens of reciprocal responsibilities dismantles hierarchies and makes possible just futures that embrace and work across difference without erasure or homogenizing outcomes (Coulthard, 2010; Kimmerer, 2013; Klenk, 2018; McLerran, 2019; Sepulveda, 2018). As Kimmerer states in reference to the three sisters’ reciprocal relationship of corn, beans, and squash, “[t]he gifts of each are more fully expressed when they are nurtured together” (Kimmerer, 2013: 140).
Review of current environmental governance paradigms to connect across difference
In this section, we discuss dominant approaches for connecting across difference in present-day environmental governance, centering on three prominent concepts and fields of practice: rights, recognition, and participation. For each, we review the history of the concept, purported benefits of its deployment, and where it shows up across environmental governance arenas.
Rights
One key construct framing efforts to connect across difference is that of rights. We pay particular attention to three spheres of rights relevant to environmental governance—namely, property rights emerging from 17th century Europe, global human rights in the aftermath of World War II, and movements for Indigenous rights since the 20th century. These three spheres demonstrate how rights discourses and practices have been deployed as a means of connecting across difference in the service of redress for historical injustices.
The history of property rights is traced by most scholars to 17th century Europe, where rights to land and rights of the individual were entwined with the shift from feudalism to capitalism—specifically, the enclosure of previously communal and publicly held lands (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). Marxist scholars note how this transition enabled “primitive accumulation” through the taking of land, “enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation” (Harvey, 2005: 149; see also Marx, 1967; Lloyd and Wolfe, 2016). Yet contemporary approaches to the recognition of customary property rights in the so-called “developing countries” emphasize the benefits of clearly codified rights and rights holders and of formal state recognition of those rights. The legal certainty that results is said to reduce conflict by fixing boundaries of individual and collective landholdings, create incentives for investment and sustainable land management, enhance access to credit, increase agricultural productivity, and empower women (de Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003; FAO, 2014; USAID, 2018; World Bank et al., 2008).
Global human rights discourses were first codified following WWII in the wake of international human rights abuses, under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which enshrined a global commitment to the preservation of the “inherent dignity and … the inalienable rights of all members of the human family” (UN, 1948). Although many human rights scholars trace a much deeper history, pointing to the Stoics of Ancient Greece and Rome, the Roman legal system of rights or the revolutionary struggles of the Enlightenment, Moyn (2010) marks the contemporary era as unique in recasting human rights doctrines “as entitlements that might contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and outside rather than serve as its foundation” (13). Emerging in response to revolutionary nationalism, contemporary human rights were crystallized through an internationalism revolving around the inalienable rights of the individual against sovereign power.
The movement to recognize Indigenous rights also took root in the post-WWII era with the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention of 1957 (ILO 107). However, this early codification of Indigenous rights embodied a modernist and assimilationist orientation that viewed Indigenous and tribal peoples as “less advanced” and sought “their progressive integration into their respective national communities” (ILO 1957: preamble; see also Hodgson, 2002). It was not until the international Indigenous rights movement coalesced in the 1980s and 1990s through grassroots struggles that international commitments shifted to supporting Indigenous cultural, social, economic, and political self-determination—albeit within the framework of the nation states in which they reside (Conklin and Graham, 1995; Hodgson, 2002; ILO 1989). These new aspirations were codified in the International Labor Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention, 1989 (ILO 169), which gave governments the duty to recognize and protect the values and practices of peoples who self-identify as Indigenous and to consult them when any legislative or administrative measures that may affect them directly, “with the objective of achieving agreement or consent” (Art 6).
In 2007, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples went further, condemning colonization, dispossession, and genocide and affirming Indigenous rights to self-determination and to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (United Nations, 2008). These instruments affirm a broad suite of both Indigenous rights (e.g. to collective land and resources, to self-govern, to preserve their unique cultural identity) and government responsibilities—such as the prevention of discrimination and the duty to consult or obtain consent for projects that may impinge on these rights (Gilbert, 2007; Hodgson, 2002). The purported benefits of formal recognition of Indigenous rights include Indigenous groups’ existence and perseverance as distinct peoples (e.g. through the freedom to practice one's customs and language, and rights to cultural self-determination and autonomy); increased participation in environmental governance and resource access (e.g. through procedural rights attached to Indigenous identity, cooperative agreements, or treaties); and environmental protection (Anaya, 2005; Low and Shaw, 2011).
Scholars point to a convergence of property, human, and Indigenous rights within environmental arenas and in the wake of economic globalization. Explosive levels of capitalist production and consumption worldwide transformed relations with the environment in ways that generated tension between state interests and local livelihoods (Büscher and Fletcher, 2020; Zarsky, 2002). This led to the implementation of international treaties with the commitment to recognize and operationalize human rights approaches in environmental governance. These mechanisms include protected area management and biodiversity conservation (Baillie and Groombridge, 1996); forestry and renewable energy sectors (Forest Stewardship Council, 2019; World Wildlife Fund, 2018), as well as efforts to call for the recognition of Indigenous rights to land (Feiring, 2013).
Recognition
A second instrument for connecting across difference in environmental governance is recognition—or the acknowledgement of the existence of distinctive identities (e.g. Indigeneity), of environmental crises that disproportionately impact specific groups of people (e.g. environmental racism), or historical and contemporary environmental harms as a form of social injustice (Paavola, 2006). Recognition is a crucial component of the relationship between Indigenous nations and settler governments, promoting recognition of personhood, procedural justice (Paavola, 2006), rights to sovereignty and territory, and ontological difference (Mascarenhas, 2007). This relationship is codified in and mediated through international law, connecting recognition to rights (Moreton-Robinson, 2015). Recognition of personhood is written into ILO 160 and UNDRIP, especially as it pertains to the legal recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands (Moreton-Robinson, 2015).
In settler colonial contexts, recognition is further codified in policies and programs between settler and tribal governments. In the United States, for example, it has led to a commitment to foster a “government-to-government relationship” between the federal government and federally recognized Indian nations (FERC, 2019). In Canada, early traces of Indigenous political recognition are found in the 1951 amendments to the Indian Act (Coulthard, 2017), in which the state sought “to move away from casting Indians as wards of the state and instead facilitate their becoming contributing citizens of Canada” (Hanson, 2009). This shift in the politics of recognition toward Canada's First Nations emerged following the Second World War with the shift in the political discourse of human rights, as well as the acknowledgement that those who contributed significantly to the war effort were met with repressive and dispossessive policies at home (Coulthard, 2017; Hanson, 2009).
Recognition is said to be a crucial step to the participatory process and legitimate, effective environmental governance (Paavola, 2006). A just environmental governance must ask: “which parties and whose interests are recognized and who can participate?” (Paavola, 2006: 96). In this way, recognition is purported to lead to “fair participation and legitimate distributions of power” in environmental governance (Paavola, 2006: 101). The effectiveness of recognition is also said to rest on the level of access of affected parties to the governance process (Prado, 2020). Yet the benefits attributed to recognition tend to be differentiated according to forms of difference that are recognized—be it a unique tribal identity, a customary claim, or an uneven environmental harm.
Participation
Participation is another key concept and suite of practices in efforts to connect across difference that took root in the late 1980s and 1990s and appears in environmental governance as both a practice and a manifestation of (procedural) rights. Some authors trace the history of discourses and practices of “participation” to reforms associated with the first and second waves of neoliberalism, in which the state role shifted from one of “rowing” to “steering.” This led to opening spaces for multistakeholder rather than state-led governance and creating a space for civil society to increase its role in governance (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Holmes and Scoones, 2000; Merino Acunã, 2015). Its origins in the environmental arena are largely traced to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment & Development (“Earth Summit”) and Agenda 21 (UN, 1992), and its emphasis on the need for greater public involvement in the design and implementation of environmental policy (Holmes and Scoones, 2000).
The purported benefits of citizen, community, and Indigenous participation in environmental governance are many. Cleaver (1999) finds increased efficiency and improved project outcomes, and democratization, equity, and empowerment—whereby participation “enhances the capacity of individuals to improve their own lives and facilitates social change to the advantage of disadvantaged or marginalized groups” (Cleaver, 1999: 598). Others point to its ability to enhance downward accountability in governance and responsiveness of the public sector to the will of the people (Ribot, 2004; World Bank, 2000). Participation is also credited with the ability to counter cynicism and build trust in state institutions, politicians, and scientific expertise by overcoming the dominance of elites in environmental planning and providing spaces for deliberation of policy and practice through the inclusion of various stakeholders in consultation and decision-making (Holmes and Scoones, 2000). Finally, it is said to enhance social justice by providing political opportunities for “the inclusion and deepening of social demands” (Merino, 2018: 75; see also Chambers, 1994; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017).
Participation has spread throughout the world across a wide array of environmental governance arenas. From decentralization and local government planning (Ribot, 2002) to participatory approaches in conservation and development, participation is now seen as a deliberative and inclusionary process in environmental policymaking (Holmes and Scoones, 2000; Prado, 2020). Participation may take the form of “prior consultation” or “free, prior and informed consent” in the final stages of approval of production and extractive activities or large-scale land acquisitions to govern the impacts and distribution of benefits of these activities in customary and Indigenous territories (FAO, 2014; The Interlaken Group and the Rights and Resources Initiative, 2019).
Why these paradigms for connecting across difference need to be challenged
Despite claims that rights, recognition, and participation facilitate meaningful engagement with marginalized peoples, there is a large and growing literature highlighting the shortcomings of—and harms committed through—these same practices. Here, we review the critiques of each of these concepts and conclude with a reflection on the underlying structures that help account for these failures that reinforce current power structures.
Critiques of the discourse and practice of rights
Although there are numerous critiques of rights discourses and practices, we focus on the centrality and hegemony of settler law in environmental governance. Various scholarship focuses on the role of property rights in new commodifications of nature under neoliberalism; however, these dimensions lie beyond the scope of this paper (Fairhead et al., 2012; German and Braga, 2021; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004).
Critiques of the hegemony of settler law in colonial nations, and of European legal traditions advanced throughout the world, focus on questions of power and ontology. Scholars point to the different ways power manifests in rights discourses/practices by locating (i) who is deemed worthy of rights (Maldonado-Torres, 2017; Moreton-Robinson, 2015); (ii) what rights are recognized and foreclosed (Blomley, 2014, Maganga et al., 2016); and (iii) who has the authority to decide (McCreary & Milligan, 2021, Moreton-Robinson, 2015).
Scholars find that rights rest on the deployment of statutory frameworks and in so doing, help to legitimize and consolidate the sovereignty and power of the (settler) state, often prioritizing the “individual” over “collective” rights (Anaya, 2005; Merino, 2018). Critics argue the emancipatory potential and universality of human rights are conceptually and historically delimited by systems of oppression that see certain people as not fully human (Maldonado-Torres, 2017), or require forms of expression and governance that can undermine the very ways of life that are claimed to be protected (Nadasdy, 2003). Recognition of Indigenous rights in Canada, for example, reveals “a record of continual expansion of state authority to designate specifically bounded forms of Indigeneity,” with Aboriginal title conceived of as a burden on the underlying Crown title in a framework of Crown sovereignty (McCreary and Milligan, 2021: 120; see also Blomley, 2014). Furthermore, Indigenous rights to self-determination, territory, and FPIC as enshrined in international law often take the form of superficial “consultation” through state institutions, to ensure Indigenous or local claims to land and rights do not come in conflict with the economic pursuits of the state (Anaya, 2005; Maganga et al., 2016; Merino, 2018; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017; Youdelis, 2016).
Rights tend to be institutionalized through Western/Modernist ontologies separating nature and culture, prioritizing the human over other life forms and curtailing the forms of relationality that are recognized. All too often, communities are forced to assimilate their multidimensional relationality and systems of governance into settler/Western “common law.” This is not a simple process but one that tends to “remake their very reality”—leading to ontological tensions between Indigenous/local people and the state (Blaser, 2013; Blomley, 2014: 1295) and threatening loss of “the spirit of the [sacred] relationship itself” that binds humans to the natural world (Craft et al., 2018: 55). Although international law can challenge state oppression of Indigenous or local peoples, that law relies on similar Western ontological conceptions of rights (Anaya, 2005).
Critiques of recognition
Critiques of recognition are also multifaceted, emphasizing the curtailed space of possibility it engenders through its erasures as well as its constructive elements. These critiques highlight the need to consider not just whether recognition is being granted and what is being recognized, but also what is being left out and who is defining it (Coulthard, 2007; Moreton-Robinson, 2015).
In the context of settler colonial nations, recognition is said to narrow cultural claims and sideline radical political and economic demands (Coulthard, 2007, 2014). When recognition is granted from an outside entity with uneven power dynamics, “the terms of accommodation…end up being determined by and in the interests of the hegemonic partner in the relationship” (Coulthard, 2014: 18), as can be seen in “official” recognition of tribal status. In the U.S. context, the politics of recognition have worked to justify forms of racialization that have “defined tribes and their land base with the goal of shrinking both” (Krakoff, 2012: 1041) and continue to “seek to erase [Indigenous peoples] in [their] own homelands” (Whyte, 2016: 91). Recognition also functions alongside liberal multiculturalism, which is said to reaffirm racist and colonial relationships of power, enrolling diverse peoples into the state on its terms and for its benefit (Coulthard, 2007, 2014). There can be no reciprocity or “equality”—claimed by Taylor (1994) to be the foundation of recognition—when the relationships of power are deeply uneven, and recognition is something granted by the oppressor. When recognition is a function of the state it can be easily revoked or superseded. What recognition forecloses, then, is genuine sovereignty and self-determination.
Critiques of participation
Participation is extensively critiqued from numerous angles, from “internal” critiques focused on the technicalities of participatory processes to more fundamental “external” critiques that situate participation in wider fields of power (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Despite notable exceptions, communities tend to be idealized as homogenous, allowing the strategic use of participatory processes to advance certain interests over others. Participatory discourse is also said to obscure repressive structures of gender, class, caste, and ethnicity, which “operate at the micro-scale but are reproduced beyond it” (Williams, 2004: 562).
These critiques point to the importance of how participation is instrumentalized, depoliticized, and embedded within larger political and settler colonial projects. Other scholars highlight how Indigenous and community participation initiatives reinforce existing (settler) colonial power structures and inequalities by bolstering neocolonial and neoliberal development agendas (Buscher and Fletcher, 2020; Coulthard, 2014; Youdelis, 2016); reshaping tribal governance and relations through everyday bureaucratic processes (Nadasdy, 2003); and/or curtailing the scope of that participation (Merino, 2018). Participation has also been reframed from the full involvement of local groups in decision-making over socio-environmental change to mere compensation schemes (Cernea, 2004; Guzmán-Gallegos, 2017), signaling the colonial logic of nature commodification (Ekers et al., 2020; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). Mohan and Stokke (2000) frame participation as a “softened” neoliberalism that views empowerment in narrow market terms and acts to devolve responsibility for development to the grassroots level.
Another suite of critiques explores the role of participatory discourses and practices as mechanisms for advancing political control through depoliticization, legitimation, and subject formation. Ferguson (2006), for example, employs the concept of the “anti-politics machine” to explain local inclusion as a technocratic tool in international development to amplify the power of the state, while framing poverty as a problem that can be addressed through technical rather than political means. By advancing participation as a managerial exercise based on “toolboxes” of procedures and techniques, it has been “domesticated away” from its radical roots (Cleaver, 1999: 608). When used in an instrumental manner to address perceived implementation and legitimization problems (Holmes and Scoones, 2000: 49), participation may do little more than bind people more tightly to structures of colonial and state power (Kothari, 2001; Merino, 2018), or “reconfirm the status quo, and provide public acts of legitimation for power brokers” (Williams, 2004: 573).
A final set of critiques emphasizes how participation may work to curtail the space of political action, perpetuating dispossession because its formalization “obstruct[s] meaningful change through endless negotiation, legalistic evasion, [and] compromise” (Brosius, 1999: 38), or upholds dispossessory processes through the commodification and essentialization of culture and land (Cameron, 2008; Salemink, 2016). Others note how it may reproduce (neo)colonial structures of governance that dispossess people from effective management (Büscher, 2010; Youdelis, 2016); advance (weak versions of) procedural rights while leaving substantive rights unchanged; or undermine Indigenous claims for self-determination and territorial rights by confining the scope of rights to participatory provisions within specific projects (Merino, 2018; Merino Acunã, 2015). As a result, environmental projects that purport to achieve Indigenous and/or local inclusion often fail to support the purported beneficiaries in their pursuits of resources, (territorial) rights, or self-determination (Coulthard, 2014; McCreary and Milligan, 2014; Trelka, 2020).
Making sense of critiques
Based on the above critiques, it is clear that current practices for connecting across difference are largely failing to create just environmental governance outcomes. Yet what explains the crosscutting failures of rights, recognition, and participation to advance social justice and their tendency to instead entrench uneven power relations? Why do processes meant to redress historical harm fail in their current applications?
The most obvious point of departure is the notion that colonial power relations are not a thing of the past but an ongoing global presence. We choose to center coloniality as the umbrella term for a set of processes that continue to consolidate a world order involving the concentration—through both violent and “polite” means—of the world's resources under the control and for the benefit of a small minority and its ruling classes (Quijano, 2007). It is also important to cater for the variability of its contemporary manifestations: the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous land and life in places where the colonizers never left (settler colonialism); a global economic system that continues to benefit the perpetrators of Euro-centered colonialism and their North American and European descendants (neocolonialism); and continued forms of domination by (often European-descendant) elites in postcolonial states in what are often hybrid settler and neocolonial formations. We elevate “coloniality” as the umbrella term understanding that not every nation is a settler colonial nation yet do so with some reservation given the intellectual clarity with which Indigenous scholars from settler colonial nations have crystalized the terms of debate (Coulthard, 2014; Sepulveda, 2018; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Whyte, 2018).
Common to these concepts is discourses that cement and reify socially constructed differences and identities and their use in reproducing inequality across axes of race, class, gender, and nationality (Quijano, 2007). In settler colonialism, these discourses tend to construct Indigenous peoples as unchanging, unsettled/nomadic, and cultural (and their lands as empty), while advancing white settlers as civilized, sedentary, and knowledgeable (Burow et al., 2018; Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2014; Wolfe, 2006). In neocolonialism, these discourses involve the construction of global hierarchies of knowledge, governing capacity, and worth (whether cloaked in the language of modernity or productivity, efficiency, and rationality) that position the West as the ideal to be emulated (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Chakrabarty, 1992; Escobar, 2004; Quijano, 2007). Both also center state sovereignty yet do so in distinct ways. Within neocolonial relations, state sovereignty is advanced as an ideal that is upheld in normative frameworks (e.g. international law) but often undone in practice (Sassen, 2013), whereas it is an irreducible political, material, and territorial presence in settler colonial nations—impinging upon the freedoms, territorialities, and sovereignties of Indigenous peoples, migrants, and citizens (Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Wolfe, 2006).
In addition to locating the failures of rights, recognition, and participation theoretically, it is also important to identify what more emancipatory forms of environmental governance might look like. Here, we turn to decolonization scholarship for its importance to environmental governance and centering the voices of Indigenous, Black, and Brown scholars. Decolonization centers on radical alternatives to settler colonialism's ongoing efforts to eradicate and replace (Wolfe, 2006) by centering on alternative and specifically Indigenous ontologies, aspirations, and systems of governance (Burow et al., 2018; Sepulveda, 2018; Todd, 2016). These replace the human-nature dichotomies of Western modernity with ontologies of care, reciprocity, connection, and belonging (Kimmerer, 2013; Latulippe and Klenk, 2020; Sepulveda, 2018). Decolonization, including decolonizing environmental governance, “means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole” (Tuck and Yang, 2012: 31). Rather than the settler government re-entrenching power through rights, recognition, and participation, decolonial and abolitionist practices call for the repatriation of Indigenous land and sovereignty which erode the abusive power of colonial relationalities (Tuck and Yang, 2012).
Methodology
The methodology consisted of developing a conceptual framework for evaluating efforts to connect across difference in environmental governance and its application to select environmental governance arenas. The conceptual framework was developed by drawing on the above critiques of rights, recognition, and participation and situating them within theories of coloniality that help to (i) explain their failures and (ii) highlight more emancipatory possibilities. We sought to distinguish between the colonial present and what lies “beyond” by identifying key features of each. Two lenses were utilized to frame the colonial present: settler colonialism (SC) and neocolonialism (NC). For inspiration of what might lie beyond, we turned to abolition ecologies and theories of decolonization. From the reading of these literatures, we distilled a list of features that authors attribute to colonial practices or practices that move “beyond” coloniality. From these features, we found themes that cut across this continuum of practices as the basis of our framework (Table 1). Although this heuristic suggests a binary, it should be read as a spectrum, as any given set of practices can combine elements of each.
Conceptual framework for evaluating efforts to connect across difference in environmental governance.
SC: settler colonialism; NC: neocolonialism; AE: abolition ecologies; DC: decolonization.
Burow et al., 2018; Chakrabarty, 1992; Escobar, 2004; Law 2015; Lloyd and Wolfe, 2016; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Quijano, 2007; Sepulveda, 2018; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Wolfe, 2006.
This framework was subsequently used to evaluate two dominant environmental governance arenas: biodiversity conservation (with a focus on protected areas), and extractivism (with a focus on mineral resource mining). For each arena, we explored literature from specific geographies that were representative of both settler colonial and neocolonial contexts as two lenses to frame the colonial present: Canada and Malaysian Borneo for biodiversity conservation, and Peru and Bolivia for extractivism. For chosen geographies, we begin by situating the common practices of rights, recognition, and participation with an effort to look across colonial and purportedly postcolonial contexts. Next, we review published case studies to evaluate these practices against the framework, with an emphasis on work published in the past 10 years to center on current practices. We filtered the literature by (i) describing practices that purport to move beyond mainstream colonial environmental governance practices and (ii) reviewing forms of Indigenous efforts that strive to move beyond the limitations in newer forms of environmental governance. Finally, we evaluate the cases based on the preceding conceptual framework.
Environmental governance arena: Biodiversity conservation
Many international environmental organizations recognize biodiversity loss to be a global concern and understand the need to conserve the social, scientific, and economic components of biodiversity that “…[maintain the] life sustaining systems of the biosphere” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2007: preamble). Although the governance of biodiversity conservation involves multiple strategies, we focus on protected areas (PAs) given their predominance both historically and in contemporary biodiversity governance.
Protected areas and other enclosures for purposes of biodiversity conservation (e.g. national parks, nature reserves, and wilderness areas) are historically situated within the paradigm of “fortress” conservation, or the “Yellowstone Model”—a globally applied conservation approach that enforces the separation between humans and alleged natural environments (Domínguez and Luoma, 2020; Gomez-Pampa and Kaus, 1992). Fortress conservation is arguably a colonial practice, as it has deep roots in Indigenous territorial dispossession in which Indigenous peoples globally were forcefully removed and excluded from lands for the sake of wildlife conservation (Buscher and Fletcher, 2020).
In order to examine how environmental governance has been adjudicated in the focal geographies, we look to PAs in a Malaysian state of Borneo and settler colonial nation of Canada—each with histories of state control over conservation. In Sarawak, Malaysia, the rapid increase in deforestation in the late 20th century driven by timber and palm oil industries generated an incentive to preserve pockets of biodiversity, leading to land use restrictions for local Indigenous communities (Colchester, 2018) and “alienating these resources from local people while allowing the state to maintain an outwardly conservationist image” (Horowitz, 1998: 389; see also Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). Similarly, Indigenous peoples were evicted from the earliest protected areas in Canada for purposes of territorial expansion and market environmentalism like tourism (Youdelis, 2016). In the early 20th century, Canada forcibly removed the Keeseekoowenin Ojibway nation using tactics of terror, burning residences in order to create the Riding Mountain National Park in Manitoba. This allowed the settler state to “systematically extend state control over land” and reinforce the settler colonial project of eradication and replacement (Finegan, 2018: 5).
Recent attempts to move beyond colonial environmental governance
More recently, nation states and nongovernmental and conservation organizations have attempted to redress these histories in biodiversity governance through the extension of newer manifestations of rights, recognition, and participation. Although PAs are historically situated within a strictly enforced human-nature binary, the definition of PAs has expanded to mean an area designated “to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (IUCN, n.d.). The mechanisms within PA management are often dubbed “rights-based approaches” as they emphasize local and Indigenous participation in decision-making (Büscher and Fletcher, 2020; Myers et al., 2018), equitable sharing of economic benefits (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2007), and a limited array of procedural rights to reconcile land loss (Merino Acuña, 2015; Merino, 2018; Paavola, 2006). At times, these so-called “rights” are extended or withheld depending on the recognition of Indigeneity.
Yet in Sarawak, while the Malaysian state attempts to connect across difference through recognition of Native Customary Rights (NCR), a formal system for recognizing Indigenous land tenure (Nelson et al., 2016), these rights do not apply to state land designated as a PA. When land is transformed into a PA in Sarawak, “hunting rights, along with customary practices and self-determination, are erased and restricted in order to save one charismatic species [the orangutan]” (Rubis and Theriault, 2020: 973). Although the Batang Ai National Park encompasses the territories of seven Iban longhouses, these families only reside there because they returned to the area following the government's efforts to resettle them elsewhere (Horowitz, 1998). Further, Indigenous people's NCR is typically recognized in ways that confer only limited access for subsistence land use within PAs (e.g. foraging) as well as benefits from development projects such as ecotourism, community-based conservation, and the promotion of alternative resource use (Hitchner, 2010). The park works alongside Indigenous Iban communities to foster a comanagement strategy for sustainable resource use and self-enforcement of wildlife protection. The participatory practices in this state-owned enclosure are said to foster a “sense of ownership” (Horowitz, 1998: 393), and conservation education was said to help prevent orangutan poaching (Rubis and Theriault, 2020). This suggests that communities are being enrolled in supporting exogenous conservation objectives, and efforts have been made to align local interests with these objectives by finding economic alternatives to activities deemed to threaten the park's wildlife (Horowitz, 1998). Conflict stemming from the government's transferal of management from the Forestry Department of Sarawak (FDS) to the Sarawak Forestry Corporation (SFC), the private sector arm of the FDS, illustrates how private profits have been prioritized to the detriment of local employment (Gumal, 2007).
Meanwhile, communally reserved forests (CRFs) that Indigenous Iban communities deliberately preserve within their shifting cultivation areas, and which have tree species diversity equivalent to primary forest, are ignored within conservation actions and at risk of conversion under the pressure of economic incentives provided by the state and local governments and current market trends (Takeuchi et al., 2017). One village even converted part of their CRF to palm oil as a means to retain their land, for fear that they would lose their land to the government or plantation companies if left “unused”—a trend that is apparently widespread (Takeuchi et al., 2017). Forms of Indigenous relationality to nonhuman beings extend beyond the economic to the sacred and include prohibitions on the felling of trees within sacred forests; the harvesting of certain tree or bird species with recognized spiritual, medicinal, or ecological values; the disturbance of known breeding grounds; and prohibitions on certain species of animal known as tua thought to be their deceased ancestors who continue to provide assistance to their living descendants (Horowitz, 1998). Although tua tend to vary by family, the orangutan was found to be a tua for all families in Batang Ai's seven longhouses—challenging the very foundation and relevance of fortress conservation in this landscape and the nature/culture dichotomy within Western ontology.
Similarly, in trying to move away from colonial environmental practices, the settler nations of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States (notorious for initially not ratifying the UNDRIP) began the “Indigenous Guardians Programs” (IGP) in the 21st century as means to safeguard Indigenous peoples’ natural and cultural resources and further Indigenous-led governance (EcoPlan International, 2016; Reed et al., 2020; Thompson et al., 2019). These programs are predicated upon the recognition of the unique relationship and crucial knowledge Indigenous communities have with the nonhuman world and are said to be “used increasingly as Indigenous-led efforts to reassert jurisdiction over their ancestral territories” (Reed et al., 2020: 2), despite competing claims to land and natural resources. Canada, for instance, began the Indigenous Guardians Pilot Project in 2017 as a four-year funding opportunity that recognizes Indigenous people's customary rights to land and enhances participation in conservation through various financial support mechanisms like “good-paying” jobs for Indigenous experts, which is said to support families and local economies (Pearlman, 2021). For example, the Ni Hat’ni Dene peoples are full-time environmental and wildlife Guardians of the Thaidene Nene protected area, ensuring appropriate harvest of caribou and “document[ing] visitor activity, cultural features, and environmental/wildlife values” (Nature United, 2021). This program is said to help “assert Lutsel K’e Dene First Nations Indigenous rights and authority in Thaidene Nene” wherein the Guardians maintain traditional lifestyles (Nature United, 2021). Although Indigenous Guardian Programs are widespread and often experienced positively by tribal nations (EcoPlan International, 2016; Reed et al., 2020), in many cases, the settler colonial nation maintains territorial authority, controls much of the governance process, and creates a “colonial entanglement” that requires further investigation around the ability of IGP to promote Indigenous self-determination (Dennison, 2012; Reed et al., 2020: 186).
Indigenous agency “beyond” coloniality
There are several documented instances of Indigenous people either expanding spaces of sovereignty within existing paradigms or refusing state authority outright, illustrating both the limitations of dominant paradigms for connecting across difference and Indigenous agency. Often, rights, recognition, and participation are understood as mechanisms for achieving “institutional ‘visibility’ as a form of empowerment for socio-politically ‘invisible’ populations” (Rubis and Theriault, 2020: 965). However, some communities engage with biodiversity conservation beyond these standard practices in ways that center the interests of the Indigenous peoples against the interests of the state and foreign conservation interests. Iban people involved in the conservation of Batang Ai National Park seek empowerment by co-opting the conservation narratives that often conflict with their lifeways and experiences. The selective cultural narrative the Iban present is one that is reflective of what they know conservationists and tourists want to hear. They tell romanticized stories evoking the importance of orangutans to their culture, not the stories reflecting the reality of the contentious relationships between Iban and orangutans. For example, Iban does not reveal the situations in which it is acceptable to cull an orangutan, such as when one “is eating your hard-won crops or moving to attack you” (Rubis and Theriault, 2020: 972). Strategically, concealing aspects of their culture to outsiders are interpreted as an effort to maintain some form of territorial control and prevent more restrictive forms of state surveillance.
In Victoria, Canada, the Indigenous Lekwungen take a radical approach to environmental governance by refusing non-Indigenous authority over the use and conservation of their ancestral homelands—including what is now called Beacon Hill Park. The Lekwungen managed these lands for millennia, and their ways of tending are in opposition to the local conservationist group Friends of Beacon Hill Park, causing “tensions and conflicts with both local conservationists, who consider their actions to be ecologically disruptive, and the parks officials, who claim sole jurisdiction” (Simpson and Bagelman, 2018: 565). Friends of Beacon Hill Park eradicate non-native plants in order to preserve native species, while the Lekwungen maintain a more reciprocal relationship with the land, one that includes both native and non-native species (Simpson and Bagelman, 2018). The Lekwungen-led group does not seek state permission to maintain the biodiversity of their territory, with respect to native or non-native flora species (Simpson and Bagelman, 2018); rather, they “recognize this land as the rightful territory” of their own people and tend to it in their traditional ways (Simpson and Bagelman, 2018: 565), emphasizing place-based reciprocity, supporting biocultural diversity and restoration of human relationships with the nonhuman in a form of “grounded normativity” (Coulthard and Simpson, 2016).
Evaluation of case studies using the conceptual framework
Biodiversity conservation practices do exist that recognize difference through the acknowledgement of unique relationships to—and knowledge of—place and territorial rights. However, these practices fail to fully value and respect difference without imposing hierarchies. Customary “rights” are often limited to the procedural realm or are compensatory in nature, restricting Indigenous agency and reproducing inequality in resource access, ownership, and authority. In this way, state sovereignty over territory is also reaffirmed through the continued de jure dispossession of Indigenous territory, through the maintenance of state authority over territory and environmental governance, and by tightly curtailing Indigenous self-determination over territory and ways of life. Although the protected area in Sarawak is considered a procedurally just approach due to Indigenous participation in conservation decisions, there is a continual centering of state sovereignty in decision-making regarding land use, and Iban residents must employ creative ways to maintain territorial control. As evidenced by the privatization of PA management to the private arm of the SFD and the resulting prioritization of private profits over local employment benefits, the interests of private elites are also advanced as capitalist relations are expanded into PA governance.
Although Indigenous groups in Canada are asserting their sovereignty through acts of refusal, nongovernmental conservation groups and the park service alike continue to undermine these efforts through discursive tactics and claims of exclusive jurisdiction. In so doing, they center the interests of the state by advancing settler hegemony over territory and lives. In terms of ontology and relationality, the current paradigm of conservation continues to operate through the fundamental ontological assumption that nature is separate from people, people are harmful to nature, or people preside over nature as stewards or guardians. In the Malaysian case, this is seen in the continued assumption that the Iban presence is inherently antithetical to orangutan conservation, in spite of widespread cultural norms prohibiting their hunting and ontologies which erode the human/nonhuman binary. Protected areas and wider economic policies aiming to open up frontiers (and their implications for cultural and economic change) are contributing to the erosion of relations that might otherwise advance sustainability and conservation of endangered species. Similarly, Lekwungen practices of place-based reciprocity with native and non-native species are suggestive of forms of relationality that move beyond hierarchical relations between humans and other species or ecological processes. Such relations do not just go unrecognized by state and nongovernmental conservation actors but continue to be undermined through both discursive and political-administrative means. Thus, efforts to connect across difference in biodiversity conservation remain entrenched in coloniality, as they fail to address the repatriation of land to Indigenous people and continue to advance state interests and sovereignty at the expense of Indigenous self-determination and place-based relations of reciprocity and care.
Environmental governance arena: Extractivism
Extractivism, or the large-scale removal of natural resources for global trade and commodity production, is an environmental arena that demonstrates the inadequacy of rights, recognition, and participation in dismantling state practices of coloniality. Common resources for extraction include subsurface metals such as copper, steel, and gold; minerals such as oil, coal, natural gas, lithium, and diamonds; and forest or industrial agricultural products such as timber, palm oil, and other biofuels (De Castro et al., 2016; Leifsen et al., 2017; Perreault, 2015). These raw materials are typically processed and transformed into new commodities, including energy sources, that circulate in the global economy. Across settler colonial and neocolonial contexts, states’ rights to these natural resources tend to supersede the rights of other groups, like Indigenous or local rights to territory. For example, in 1962, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution for “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” (Szablowski, 2010) to affirm resource rights of newly independent or decolonizing countries post-World War II (Armstrong, 2015), while simultaneously declaring colonial nation-states’ “permanent” territorial sovereignty (Armstrong, 2015). Extractivism is therefore intimately bound with uneven power relations within the boundaries of the nation state—as well as between nation states, with corporations from wealthy, western regions often extracting the resources of non-western states (Shapiro et al., 2018).
States exercise their rights to extract natural resources even when in direct conflict with Indigenous, local, or other claims to land through the legal principle of eminent domain (Preeti, 2013)—or the right of governments to appropriate property for what they deem public use or public benefit, following some form of compensation determined by the state. In relation to Indigenous or local claims to land, eminent domain is a mechanism wherein settler colonial or neocolonial states evict, displace, and dispossess local or Indigenous peoples when their claims to land and resources are in direct conflict with the economic interests of the state (Procter, 2020; Spiegel 2016). Eminent domain centers on the rights of the colonial state through neoliberal policies of enclosure, privatization, and un(der) regulation (Ekers et al., 2020), while affirming settler futurities and state sovereignty over the rights of Indigenous or marginalized peoples in the context of the ever-expanding appetite for lands from which to extract natural resources.
Recent attempts to move beyond colonial environmental governance
In an attempt to connect across both difference and competing territorial interests during extractive development projects, governments have instituted participatory mechanisms largely focused on recognition of property rights and sovereignty. These are mechanisms through which national polities and multilateral institutions claim to facilitate a more equitable process of natural resource extraction (Merino, 2018; Perreault, 2015; Szablowski, 2010). These include international guidelines like the ILO 169 Convention, the UNDRIP, and the standards set by authoritative bodies like the World Bank; participatory processes such as consultations that take place in the context of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA); and variable forms of consultation with Indigenous peoples. These mechanisms purport to make a more “legitimate and effective” environmental governance that “empowers marginalized social groups” (Leifsen et al., 2017: 1043).
Several South American countries are viewed as models for local engagement and empowerment in the context of extractive industries. For example, in response to a bloody confrontation between Indigenous peoples and the state in the context of extractive activities on Indigenous lands, Peru implemented the first generalized prior consultation law in Latin America—the Law of the Right to Prior Consultation of Indigenous or Original Peoples, Recognized in Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (Law No. 29785) (German, 2022; Monterroso et al., 2017). The country recognizes the land rights of “native communities,” and through participatory processes such as ESIAs, claims to redress these violent histories of discrimination and create pathways for participation in the extractive development process (Merino, 2015; 2018). The law establishes a legal duty to consult Indigenous communities prior to “taking any administrative or legislative action that directly affects their collective rights, physical existence, cultural identity, quality of life or development” (German, 2022) as well as financial compensation for extractive use. Since the passage of the law, the Peruvian government consults with various groups (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) affected by oil extraction in recent years, with some state departments advocating for stronger consultation frameworks (Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017).
In 2015, the Peruvian state consulted with Indigenous groups in regard to a “bidding process” for an oil field, a process that ultimately resulted in state-funded treatment facilities for contaminated waterways impacted by oil spills and “compensation for use of indigenous lands” (Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017: 1114). Here, the prior consultation law required the Peruvian state to consult affected Indigenous communities in the oil bidding process; however, various exogenous constraints (finances, communication, representation) limited the scope and reach of consultation, narrowing the reception of who was consulted and whose interests were represented (Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017). Although the consultation process resulted in both compensation and a much-needed state response to oil spills and water contamination in Indigenous territories, the process was largely viewed as exclusionary, bureaucratic, and overly political. Such a convoluted process was made worse by competing Indigenous communities and territories, some of whose leadership favored compensatory negotiations over meaningful participation and recognition. Ultimately, “…the communities who became important and who are benefitting from the slow and partial implementation of the agreements are those located near installations which are currently producing oil. In so doing, Peru's prevailing extractive model is reinforced” (Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017: 1123).
Bolivia is also heralded in some contexts as “revolutionary” in its progressive stance toward Indigenous rights and recognition (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012). The country is rich in hydrocarbon resources making it a target for fossil fuel extraction; indeed, this extraction is intimately tied to the country's socialized economies (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012: 104). Bolivia, like Peru, implemented new practices of consultation, modeled after tenets in the ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP, in order to increase Indigenous participation in extractive development projects. In the state's attempt to build a new oil field in Indigenous and non-Indigenous territory (the Lliquimini oil block), the Bolivian government consulted with both groups in the region, although only consulting with Indigenous representatives ad hoc (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012). Nevertheless, the consultation process created an opportunity for the Indigenous groups to voice their concerns and put forth a list of demands with regard to oil exploration in their territory—a list that included compensation requirements, participation in the exploration process, and “co-monitoring of the seismic work” (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012: 111). Yet, despite these accomplishments, critics point to insufficient Indigenous recognition and participation, leading to conflict and compensation schemes that “weaken[ed] local and Indigenous resistance” (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012: 111). The Bolivian government failed to properly consult with multiple affected Indigenous communities prior to the hydrocarbon project, instead opting to consult non-Indigenous, “parliamentary majority” communities in an effort to expedite—and garner favor for—the multinational investment project (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012). Further, consultation processes were not carried out equally among affected Indigenous parties, with only some represented in the process, resulting in a weakened Indigenous representation (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012).
Indigenous agency “beyond” coloniality
Despite the proceeding failures, there are instances of affected local communities and Indigenous peoples who exploit these failings to move “beyond” colonial environmental governance practices. In their treatment of capitalism, resistant communities attempt to dismantle extractive capitalist power from institutions that enforce colonial relationalities between people and place. Although we recognize Indigenous resistance to extractive use is nonhomogeneous, as there are cases of affected communities whose grievance lies in unfair compensation in extractivism (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012), we present two examples from Indigenous scholars who document resistance to fossil-fuel extractivism as an analytic for understanding the “beyond” in environmental governance.
Nick Estes details Indigenous resistance to fossil-fuel extractivism in his account of the 2016 protests against the North American Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) (Estes, 2020). In solidarity with the Standing Rock Sioux nation, whose reservation and water sources were directly threatened by the planned pipeline construction, the nine-month uprising drew thousands of Water Protectors from around the world, led by Indigenous peoples and supported by an array of social movements and organizations. Drawing on a long history of Indigenous resistance to colonial “infrastructures of dispossession” (Estes, 2020) on Turtle Island, these protests offered a look at a world beyond extractivism, one that works against capitalist economic systems. Although the Water Protectors experienced extreme militarized violence from the settler state throughout the protests, these were also sites of “anti-colonial place-making,” where “an emerging Indigenous future was actively under construction” (Estes, 2020). As Estes explains: “Access to food, education, health care, legal services, a strong sense of community and community security were guaranteed to all. Most reservation communities in the U.S. don't have access to these services, and neither do most poor communities. Yet, in the absence of empire with Indigenous governing structures in the camps, people came together to help each other, to care for one another as relatives” (Estes, 2020).
Coulthard (2014) reflects on the Indigenous movement “Idle No More,” which provides another framework for moving beyond rights, recognition, and participation in environmental governance that decenters the settler capitalist state. This movement emerged as a response to a controversial suite of federal legislation that many Indigenous communities argued threatened their rights and livelihoods by enabling easier access to First Nation reserve lands for “economic development and settlement,” limiting the scope of projects that require environmental assessments, and reducing environmental protections for waterways (Coulthard, 2014: 160).
Grassroots resistance led to a blockade by the Aamjiwnaag First Nation, culminating in a meeting between the state and the Assembly of Nations. Yet this meeting prompted debate among members about the utility of meetings with the federal government, over the question of whether these were spaces to be heard, or spaces that seek to neutralize resistance. Days of oppositional action and resistance followed, and while the legislation passed thus ending hunger strikes among prominent First Nations chiefs, a “Declaration of Commitment” was issued, committing the state to improving Indigenous education, inquiries into murdered and missing Indigenous women, and a stronger commitment to UNDRIP (Coulthard, 2014).
These accounts demonstrate a move “beyond” contemporary environmental governance practices—moves that treat sovereignty and difference in ways antithetical to colonial relationships with the natural world. The above examples center place-making across differing identities and geographies, centering anti-capitalist resurgence, scaling up of localized direct actions, and economic alternatives that “seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries….mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations” (Coulthard, 2014: 170). An abolitionist and anti-capitalist economy demonstrate anti-hierarchical understandings of land, property, and governance, thus redirecting our knowledge to Indigenous cosmologies of “equal access…to food and shelter; and equal access to pleasure and enjoyment of life” (Armstrong et al., 2020: 165). Abolishing imperial environmental governance requires following the lead of Black, brown, and Indigenous movements that decenter settler ontologies, positioning settlers as “guests” and in this way, “offer[ing] a decolonial possibility based on culture and tradition in which settler relations to land can be reformed and settler colonialism can eventually be abolished” (Sepulveda, 2018: 39).
Evaluation of case studies using the conceptual framework
The Peruvian and Bolivian governments used participatory mechanisms like prior consultation for extractive uses on Indigenous lands. This mechanism purported to create pathways for participation through bottom-up community engagement (Leifsen et al., 2017; Merino, 2018; Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012). Yet, the consultation process in Peru exacerbated, if not created, inter- and intra-community competition and hierarchies. We argue the creation of hierarchies is part and parcel of the colonial treatment of difference—a process that reifies socially constructed identities and uses these to reproduce inequality across axes of difference at diverse scales. In their treatment of difference, the Bolivian state similarly exploited socially constructed differences and identities among affected Indigenous communities. The state used these to reproduce inequitable representation in the consultation process, prioritizing a non-Indigenous majority and failing to grant equal representation in consultation practices. This is seen through the use of resolutions from certain minority community leaders as proof of consent in violation of the requirement for decisions to be made through representative organizations (Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012).
In both instances, the consultation process claimed a desire to foster recognition of Indigenous territorial rights and center Indigenous sovereignty; however, the process resulted in centering of the pecuniary needs of the state, one rooted in extractive economies (Merino, 2018) and state sovereignty over territory and resources. Further, the Peruvian case demonstrates that although the state has a legal duty to consult Indigenous communities prior to extractive use, the law continues to advance state interests. Indigenous communities fought for decades for state recognition and remediation of contaminated waterways from oil projects; yet, their needs were not addressed until the state was legally required to consult with them for extractive purposes (Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017). Here, we argue that an advancement of state interests is aligned with the treatment of capitalism. Specifically, the consultation efforts prior to the extraction on Indigenous land ultimately facilitated the expropriation of natural resources for capitalist profit in the hands of national and global political and economic entities.
Finally, adjudicating state or Indigenous sovereignty over territory is ontologically rooted in colonial understandings of relationality with land and so-called “resources.” These cases speak to the way consultation processes can exacerbate socially constructed differences, center state (economic) sovereignty, and advance state interests. Ultimately, colonialism is at the root of new environmental governance mechanisms to connect across difference, mechanisms rooted in a colonial ontology that views humans as separate from—and dominant over—the natural world (McCreary and Milligan, 2021; Merino, 2018; Niederberger, 2020).
Conclusion
In an effort to move beyond the discursive and theoretical framings of rights, recognition, and participation, we brought into conversation two dominant global environmental governance arenas—biodiversity conservation and extractivism—in settler and neocolonial contexts to more clearly locate the limitations in how these practices are contemporarily applied. In both domains, newer participatory mechanisms are claimed as means of more meaningfully connecting across difference and recognizing the rights and sovereignty of local or Indigenous groups. However, these practices create a facade of equitable approaches to conservation (like protected area management in Malaysia and Canada) and extractivism (like mining for hydrocarbons in Peru and Bolivia), while failing to achieve what they purport to do. Thus, while rights, recognition, and participation are contemporarily deployed as means of connecting across socially constructed differences created by colonialism, they fall short in disrupting the imperial hegemony dominant in environmental governance paradigms. These practices are still firmly rooted in Western ontologies of governance and territory, placing certain categories of humans (like Indigenous peoples) as outside the natural order and commodifying nature to secure national economic integrity and legitimacy. In this way, the space of local or Indigenous engagement is curtailed to efforts aligned with state interests, thus further consolidating state sovereignty.
Although current studies recognize the limitations of newer rights-based approaches to environmental governance (Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016; Gúzman-Gallegos, 2017; Pellegrini and Arismendi, 2012; Tomlinson 2019), their critiques are limited in their explanation as to why such important international tools—like prior consultation and FPIC—fail in their application in new environmental governance practices. Our intervention crystalizes how current practices of rights, recognition, and participation continue to be situated within, and therefore reflect and perpetuate, colonial frameworks. These Western practices advance forms of environmental governance that are antithetical to Indigenous aspirations, territorial sovereignty, and ways of being despite claims to the contrary.
This paper demonstrates the ways contemporary efforts to connect across difference in environmental governance have continued to fail Indigenous peoples and local communities, while recentering settler and neocolonial frameworks of governance and Western economic imperialism. We conclude by asking: what are other ways we can imagine environmental governance? What would environmental governance look like beyond the current paradigms and practices? By centering insights from decolonization studies and abolition ecologies in the evaluation of different environmental governance practices within these arenas, it is possible to imagine futures that take seriously the rapacious consequences of the Anthropocene while dismantling colonial state power.
We follow (other) Indigenous scholars in calling for an environmental governance that decenters the colonial enterprise in order to view the so-called “natural world” beyond the lens of commodities and human use value (Armstrong et al., 2020). This dominant Western modus operandi is at the root of what Donna Haraway (2015) calls the Capitalocene and its attendant ecological and environmental disasters. An environmental governance that moves beyond the colonial logics of modernity will center Indigenous voices, dismantle Western hegemonic practices, and embrace a new paradigm that centers Indigenous aspirations and governance. This is a practice of decolonizing relationships to land and each other that asks, “how [decision making] will impact the land? How is it going to impact our food? How is it going to impact our water?” (Armstrong et al., 2020: 167).
Finally, an environmental governance “beyond” dominant frameworks must direct attention to “radical acts of place-making,” or what Heynen and Ybarra (2021) call abolition ecologies (Heynen and Ybarra, 2021: 11). Building on multiple abolitionist and decolonial literatures, as well work from the environmental justice movement, “abolition ecology seeks to build institutions and processes that are explicitly focused on the political-ecological imperatives of access to fresh air, clean water, sufficient land, amelioration of toxic chemicals, and beyond” (Heynen and Ybarra, 2021: 2). This includes a focus on how place-making requires dialogue across multiple axes of oppression toward shared liberation.
Highlights
Explores the significance of current paradigms for connecting across difference in environmental governance.
Focuses on dominant practices and erasures related to rights, recognition, and participation of local and Indigenous communities in environmental governance.
Reviews literature on the history, purported benefits, and critiques of rights, recognition, and participation.
Highlights how current paradigms to connect across difference are deeply rooted in (settler) colonial logics of governance.
Envisions a just environmental governance through decolonial and abolition ecologies scholarship.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
