Integrated Perspective for Entrepreneurs: The Dos and Don’ts in Strategic Management of New Business Ventures

Abstract

Strategic management (SM) of new business ventures (NBV) has been gathering steam in SM literature over the years. SM in the context of an NBV has its own set of challenges and growth propositions. Given this fact, SM for NBVs require a dedicated treatise in terms of conceptual treatment. The author in this conceptual work develops and integrates perspective regarding SM for NBVs. The author undertakes a review and synthesis of literature to arrive at a set of tables and figures providing an integrated view on SM in NBVs. The author undertakes this through logical argumentation and incremental theorization. The author systemizes the literature into different dimensions and clusters. The author thus contributes to the field of SM because of enhanced conceptual understanding on SM for NBVs. Managers involved in NBV firms would get help in asserting what steps need to be undertaken towards successful SM of NBVs.

Keywords

New business ventures strategic management conceptual integrative model

Introduction

The growth and progress of any economy is marked not just by the role of the conglomerates and large corporations but more so by the new enterprises that were continuously getting created (Keeble & Wever, 2016; Vivarelli, 1991). New Business Ventures (NBVs) defined the exact nature of business ideas and opinions that were moving and shaking the business landscape of the present-day context (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2017). NBVs mattered a lot for an economy because these were the future growth engines of an economy (Adusei, 2016; Carree & Thurik, 2010). Further, NBVs were generally exploiting the opportunities present in the extant environment which large firms were either unable to spot or were unwilling to address or were unable to cater to (Christensen et al., 2002; Romano & Ratnatunga, 1995). Thus, NBVs in a way defined the evolving nature of business world (De Brentani, 2001). Often NBVs were experimenting, exploring, and exploiting regarding the unattended, felt and unfelt needs of customers (extant as well as potential) (Christensen et al., 2002; Gibb, 2002). NBVs generally addressed the needs through technological innovation (Cooper & Park, 2008; Kazanjian, 1988), business model innovation (Morris et al., 2005), business process improvements (Roure & Keeley, 1990), new products development (Huang et al., 2002) and such others. NBVs were of existential importance not just for an economy but also for society in general (Díaz-Foncea & Marcuello, 2012). However, the business landscape upon which NBVs operated were fragile (Bruno et al., 1992; Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990).This occurred because of complexity and chaotic environment inherent in business environment (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011). Thus, often NBVs required a supportive ecosystem to flourish (Roure & Keeley, 1990). NBVs confronted an array of challenges to survive the early stages and become a large firm in the long run (Bruno et al., 1992; Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990). NBVs were generally susceptible to failure at early stages because it often lacked possession of buffer organizational resources (Bruno et al., 1992; Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990; Roure & Keeley, 1990). The importance of slack resources for established firms have been evident in literature coming from the resource-based view perspective and this was more so for NBVs (Azadegan et al., 2013). Management bandwidth toward strategic management (SM) of an NBV both in terms of quality and quantity was also limited for NBVs (Cooper, 1981; Covin & Slevin, 1990; Yang & Gabrielsson, 2017). NBV managers thus were very much required to set their SM perspective correctly from the very beginning (Manev et al., 2015). Further, NBV managers were required to ascertain the cash inflow timings and its volume as well as the extent of cash outflow with jurisprudence simultaneously (Kuratko & Hornsby, 2017). It would be important to note that SM would play a vital role in both NBVs survival and continuance. This would be because for many reasons, cultural, financial, team cohesion, and other kind of problems NBVs though can solve stakeholders problems could fail. The idea of this treatise is to build a comprehensive understanding regarding SM of NBVs for its success. This article has been organized in the following way. The next section presents the literature review followed discussion regarding origin of an NBV and financing, deliberations regarding NBV business model, NBV location, NBV SM decisions, NBV SM decision-making members, NBV performance measurement, NBV value chain, NBV committed resources and capabilities, discussion, and conclusion.

Literature Review

The author carried a conceptual literature review around SM of NBVs to comprehend the contours of SM literature on NBVs (Chen et al., 2015; Steel & Lounsbury, 2009). The words ‘New Business Venture’ + ‘Strategic Management’ was searched together for Title, abstract and keywords. This was (TITLE-ABS-KEY (new AND business AND venture) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (strategic AND management). The method followed has been as advocated by Liñán and Fayolle (2015) and George et al. (2016). All articles, books, book chapters listed in Scopus database were examined. A total of 310 articles were listed, out of which 206 were in ‘Business, Management and Accounting’ category. The author then limited the search to only research articles category. There were 147 articles. The author based on abstract analysis reduced the number of articles for relevance (Callahan, 2010). In Figure 1, documents per year have been listed. The first article appeared in the year 1981. The maximum number of articles was in the year 2006 with 16 documents, followed by 14 documents each in the years of 2005, 2017, and 2018. Till December 31, 2019, 10 documents were present.

Figure 1 indicated that research interest regarding NBVs has followed a crests as well as troughs. The major spike being just prior to 2008 financial crisis. The field gained momentum from mid-1990s. The top 10 journals and its output has been depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 1.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 2.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 3.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

The top two journals in the field are ‘Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal’ and ‘Journal of Business Venturing’. The top domains of footprints have been depicted in Figure 3.

The top two domains were ‘Business Management ‘and ‘Economics’. The top countries of research have been depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

USA has been the predominant country for NBV studies, followed by UK and then Germany. Emerging economies like Brazil and India also feature amongst the top 10 countries. The author went through the 147 articles. Generally, articles with two citations were considered. Only in exceptional cases number of citation rule was relaxed (Rocco & Plakhotnik, 2009). A total of 152 articles were selected for the final analysis. The major dimensions and cluster of literature was identified by the author based upon the author’s understanding. This has been discussed in the subsequent sections. This was based upon the conceptual groundings of the domain of knowledge like as Steel and Lounsbury (2009) and Chen et al. (2015) had suggested. This was done through systematic synthesis of the literature (Callahan, 2010; Rocco & Plakhotnik, 2009; Torraco, 2005, 2016). In this article, the author presents the SM-related aspects of NBVs.

Origin of an NBV and Financing

Any NBV got initiated with an idea or a thought in the minds (of the, to be entrepreneur(s)) (Secundo et al., 2017). These ideas were often laden with perspectives of fulfilling a societal need (either felt or unfelt) through an offering (products or services) (Yitshaki & Kropp, 2016). The idea was subsequently required to be translated into actions (conception and establishment of the NBV) (Secundo et al., 2017). To do so an organized approach and a set process (which was evolutionary) generally at the inception stage was required over a period of time (Bhattacharyya & Shrey, 2019; Ebbers et al., 2016). Thus, when an NBV firm got setup it was generally a very private enterprise (in terms of ownership) initially (Dessein, 2005). It also initially functioned at a micro level (Delmar & Shane, 2003). An often cited critical resource input was financial capital for entrepreneurs at this stage (Ramadani, 2012). For securing fund without losing too much equity was critical (Eckhardt et al., 2006). Specialized funding for NBVs consisted of Seed/Angel Funding (SF/AF) (Ramadani, 2012), venture capital (VC) (Gompers & Lerner, 2001), corporate venture capital (CVC) (Chemmanur et al., 2014), private equity (PE) (Chesbrough, 2000) and such others. VC firm managers and the likes often after investing in an NBV provided valuable advice as critical elements in the strategic thinking regarding SM of an NBV (Hellmann, 2000; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2001). However, if the going wasn’t as per the linking of the funding bodies (like VCs) then the entrepreneurs might find the counsel of the funding bodies meddling, interfering and constraining (Dessein, 2005). Thus, the involvement of an external funding body might be construed as a double-edged sword (Dessein, 2005; Hellmann, 2000). Entrepreneurs were also entailed to answer questions regarding the primary focus on scaling and scoping (Bhattacharyya & Jha, 2015).

To start off from scratch, NBVs first required capital to secure all the necessary resources and capabilities (Alsos et al., 2006) and often the first set of capital and support was provided by the owner’s family members (close or extended) and friends (Sorenson & Bierman, 2009). This stage has been deemed a very fluid one and often the capital infusion (also predominantly relational capital) at such a nebulous stage was through informal interactions (Hormiga et al., 2011). It could be equity, grant, debt, or a hybrid of the mentioned means (Block et al., 2018; Rossi, 2014). The nature of the repercussions of each of these funding mechanisms (Au et al., 2016; Berkery, 2008; Macht & Weatherston, 2014) have been provided in Table 1.

Table 1.

Entrepreneur Fund Seeking and Fund Provider Perspectives

Instrument	Fund
Instrument	Seeker (NBV Entrepreneur)	Provider
Grant	A gift, no return expected only moral sense of gratitude was expected to be provided.	A help extended no return expected.
Equity	Percentage ownership and control over the start-up management was required to be provided.	Gain of stake (ownership) as well as possible control over the start-up resulted.
Debt	Predetermined return amount as well as date of return was set so that obligation was present.	A predetermined quantity of cash inflow over a set time frame was expected.

Source: Au et al. (2016); Berkery (2008); Macht and Weatherston (2014).

It would be pertinent to note that finance was an essential input for NBV specially for running the operations as working capital (Bhattacharyya & Jagadeesh, 2018). At first, in the initial start-up phase the risk would be the highest and financing the way forward to get the NBV to a start would be the existential goal (Langfield-Smith, 2008). Often the first set of entrepreneurs invested their own savings, credit and other personal assets and claim equity ownership while starting off (Welsh et al., 2014). Outside investors also sometimes invested varying on for equity stake (Prowse, 1998) and it was often expected that the entrepreneur who had equity stake were more committed for the start-up (Bruining & Wright, 2002). Often entrepreneurs financing converted the business idea into prototype or a pilot (Secundo et al., 2017). Specialized firms like angel investors provided the seed capital but often angel investors could be friends & family members also (Prowse, 1998; Ramadani, 2012). Angels were often grouped together (Lerner, 1994) as one angel investor might not be sufficient to provide the entire fund required by the NBV entrepreneurs (Prowse, 1998; Ramadani, 2012). Bootstrapping was an extreme form of financing where in if the NBV didn’t require a significant investment with respect to the entrepreneurs savings, the entrepreneur(s) secured 100 percent equity in the start-up based upon their savings (Brush et al., 2006). VC was provided by a group of professionals who undertook due diligence of the NBV & then invested with legal imperatives for the NBV entrepreneur (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Keuschnigg, 2004). Any VC firm would maintain a pool of NBVs and attempt to harness gain for the VC by providing strategic insights to the NBV entrepreneurs (Florida & Mellander, 2016; Zider, 1998). Contrary to popular notion VC firms might invest for equity as well as debt (like convertible bonds or preferred security) (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Syndicate funding occurred when a set of VC garner a larger pool of fund for big ticket investments (Lerner, 1994). Public equity (PE) could be another mode of financing (Bascha & Walz, 2001; Berger & Udell, 1998). Capital could also be gathered by raising initial public offerings (IPOs) from stock exchanges (Deeds et al., 1997). However, to raise public money, the NBV must have a business track history however nascent it might be, which would be indeed challenging (Brav & Gompers, 1997). Corporate financing occurred when the NBV received funding from an established firm (Chesbrough, 2000, 2002). Any corporate would fund an NBV in certain cases because in future it could harness it as a new business initiative of the corporate (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Sykes, 1990). Debt instruments could be loans taken by the NBV based upon its assets and expected cash inflow (De Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). Asset based debt funding was based upon inventory, machines & plant equipment, real estate of the NBV, accounts receivable, secured personal loans of NBV entrepreneurs, government loan and letter of credit (Chua et al., 2011; De Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). Whereas cash flow based funding could also be based upon letter of credit, short or long term debt. NBVs often secure hybrid financing that is a mix of equity and debt like venture leasing and subordinated debt (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). NBVs might plough back the earnings made by the NBV to fund expansion of the NBV (Chua et al., 2011; Gompers & Lerner, 2004). The proceeds made from sale of assets, working capital surplus, accounts receivable, supplier credits, and finally retained earnings (Davila et al., 2003; Eckhardt et al., 2006). This section depicted the variations in financing, means, and instruments based upon the risk and reward perspective, wherein the basic tenet being, higher the risk higher the return (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Thus, as the NBV matured, the nature of funding sources gets altered (Block et al., 2018; Cassar, 2004; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Shane & Cable, 2002). However, it is of essence to comprehend what a start-up would be required to undertake, such that investors would continue to be interested to fund (Cassar, 2004; Shane & Cable, 2002). One pertinent question that would be required to be answered is how much capital or funding would be required by an entrepreneur for an NBV start-up (Eckhardt et al., 2006).

Deliberations Regarding NBV Business Model

NBVs attracted investors based upon its unique or uniqueness in offerings. This has been tabulated in Table 2.

Investors as told by the entrepreneurs (of NBV) believed that there was scope of earning more cash than invested in a given time horizon (Eckhardt et al., 2006). The numbers were ascertained but its possibility, plausibility, and probability could be contested between the entrepreneurs and investors (Certo et al., 2001; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). A set of numbers could be arrived at, but the numbers could actually be a range mathematically speaking (Damodaran, 2009). Often it has been suggested that entrepreneurs regarding their start-up must tell a compelling and convincing narrative to emphasize how they are standing in solid ground regarding their start-up offering in any of the mentioned points (Certo et al., 2001; Damodaran, 2009; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Sanders & Boivie, 2004) listed in Table 2. In modern days, PowerPoint presentations has been supplemented with videos to tell the entrepreneurs’ tale (Manning & Bejarano, 2017; McKenzie, 2011; Vromen, 2015). One of the core features of any start-up or NBV is its business model which is comprised of two dimensions cost and revenue (Kesting & Günzel-Jensen, 2015). The focus of any start-up like any business venture should be towards increasing revenue while reducing costs and start-up need to be innovative in this regard (Ireland, 2007; Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001). The author in Figure 5, based upon the work of Kesting and Günzel-Jensen (2015) explicated the variations of revenue generation and cost reduction.

Table 2.

NBV Offerings

S. No.	NBV Offerings
1	Novel products and services which was meeting the felt need of customers.
2	Products and services offered for the very first time which were addressing the unfelt need of customers. This meant such customers were previously non-customers.
3	Products and services which were available in the market but of better quality or lower cost.
4	Extant products and services in a market in a new manner enhancing the consumption experience of customers.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 5.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Chang (2004) had emphasized the fact that any start-up co habited a space with other firms which work as suppliers, complementary parties, third parties and even customers in certain instances. In terms of cost reduction by the start-up what was important was to ascertain in what manner the start-up could avoid incurring the costs and let other participating entities cover the cost (Ireland, 2007; Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001). From the revenue side classically speaking charging from the customer has been the way but start-ups are in present day context required to secure alternate manner of generating revenue. This could be by charging customers less or not charging the customers at all (Anderson, 2009). Again, other participating entities (apart from the customers) could be charged to cover the revenues (Anderson, 2009). This being self-explanatory as depicted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, red color indicated the lack of desirability of the context. Yellow color indicated moderate desirability of the context while green color indicated maximum desirability. As evident from Figure 1, the best possible scenario occurred when the revenue was coming from non-customers and costs were being borne by other entities.

NBV Location

It would also important for entrepreneurs to figure out where they located their start-up (Ellison et al., 2010; Glaeser & Kerr, 2009). Researchers had deliberated on this and advocated that an NBV should be located in locations where the desired advantages for running the start-up were available (Chatterji et al., 2014; Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2010). This has been tabulated in Table 3.

Table 3.

Location of NBVs

S. No.	Deciding Factors
1	It should be near to cities and regions that have an ecosystem of academics and researchers like university towns (Audretsch et al., 2005). This provided not only educated workforce for the NBV but also enabled exchange of ideas and scope for non-profit seeking technological experimentation between NBVs and research institutions.
2	NBVs should be located in a region large enough (with an extended market) such that access to a sufficient base of labor pool, supplier base, customer base and venture capital & funding existed (Florida & Mellander, 2016).
3	In the present day context, often the NBVs have technology as a vital component in the business model (Schwartz, 2006). Thus, the workforce was often young and educated. So an NBV must be located in a region that provides good quality of life.
4	Any start-up during its early stages would be extremely fragile. Most NBVs often failed at an early stage. Given this an NBV should be located in a region, cluster or city where there was no social stigma attached to business start-up failure rather start-up failure was seen merely as an extension of learning (Lee & Peterson, 2000; Simmons et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2015).
5	NBVs should also be located preferably in a region where the government provided tax breaks to NBVs or have some set of sunset clauses so that the entrepreneurs weren’t hard pressed for payment of tax (cash out flow) from the inception stage (Gale & Brown, 2013; Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2004).
6	Start-ups should also be located in cities that have good infrastructure (for easy movement of goods) as well as robust industrial base for availability of supplies (Armington & Acs, 2002; Baughn & Neupert, 2003; Feldman, 2001).

Source: Chatterji et al. (2014); Ellison and Glaeser (1999); Glaeser et al. (2010); Glaeser and Kerr (2009); Ellison et al. (2010).

Table 4.

SM Approaches Towards Start-Up Growth

Analytical	Intuitive	Hybrid
Undertake market study to ascertain market potency of the NBV offerings (products and services) to be launched. Competitor analysis was also carried out to comprehend the market response.	The entrepreneurs based upon their gut feelings undertook SM decisions. Entrepreneurs started with their individual strengths and based upon it developed business resource and capability commitments. This in turn provided market gains.	Mix of both analytical and hunch approaches were undertaken.

Source: Miller and Ireland (2005); Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004); Huybrechts and Nicholls (2012); Man et al. (2002).

NBV SM Decisions

Once the question of location gets settled down an NBV would look forward to the question of growth. Again, the question regarding growth boiled down to the questions of scaling and scoping (Huybrechts & Nicholls, 2012; Man et al., 2002). There are two perspectives towards expansion, the first being analytical (based upon statistical analysis) and the second being intuitive (hunch, gut feeling based) (Miller & Ireland, 2005; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). However, there was no final truth regarding which approach was better (Miller & Ireland, 2005; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). The underlying philosophy regarding these two contrasting SM approaches has been tabulated in Table 4.

It would be important to remember that often a hybrid of both analytical and hunch approach was followed (Hodgkinson et al., 2009).One could argue that VC firms and their like would prefer an analytical approach (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). This was because with a hunch (gut feeling approach) start-ups often committed mistakes of improper understanding of industry landscape, market characteristics and pricing (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Miller & Ireland, 2005; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). Often there was lack of focus both in clear SM thinking as well as market segmentation (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). Market knowledge was essential but more important was ascertaining the competition perspective so that the NBV could tackle a business opportunity with a well-defined business plan along with contingency plans (Merrifield, 1987; Tarraf & Molz, 2006). Over a period of time, any NBV would gain experiential knowledge (Hilmersson, 2014; Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995). This would be the collective learning of all the NBV start-up members including the bunch of entrepreneurs as well as the first, second, and subsequent set of employees who would join the NBV (Dodgson, 1993; Fiol, 1994; Garwin, 1993). Their collective learning and cumulative capabilities would propel the NBV towards continuance and growth (Ellinger et al., 2002; Namada, 2018) (both accommodating scope and scale). It would be important to understand what kind of analysis entrepreneurs must undertake if they are heavy on the analytical school as discussed earlier. This has been tabulated in Table 5.

Table 5.

The Dozen Steps in Analytical Approach for an NBV

Sr. No.	Steps
1	Analyze the broad environment that the NBV would be going to confront namely political, social, legal, ethical, technological, environmental and regulatory. Find out the merits and potential risks regarding the NBV idea based upon PESTLEE analysis (Ho, 2014).
2	Analyze the industry environment (Porter, 2008) like bargaining power of buyers and sellers, threat of new entrants and substitutes as well as rivalry. Figure out the sources of traction for the NBV in the industry as well as the hurdles that might cause hindrance to the growth of the NBV.
3	NBV would also face stiff competition if the market potency was substantial and market margins were healthy (Merrifield, 1987; Tarraf & Molz, 2006). Thus, a thorough analysis of the existing and potential competitors regarding intent, possibility, ability, and extent of retaliation was required to be ascertained (Peng & Liang, 2016).
4	Analysis regarding how the NBV products and services had to be protected for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by fencing it adequately so that it can’t be imitated easily need to be carried out (Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015).
5	The NBVs organizational resources and capabilities (Inan & Bititci, 2015) needed to be analyzed for strategic aspects like being valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Paradkar et al., 2015).
6	NBVs had to generate new resources and capabilities, nurture the extant ones and acquire the ones that it would not be able to either generate or nurture (Wu, 2007). This needed to be analyzed.
7	To analyze and define the value chain function (Porter, 1985) of the NBV.
8	To analyze and define the business model (Teece, 2018) of the NBV.
9	NBVs had to analyze and plan regarding developing a set of products & services to be offered (Huang et al., 2002).
10	NBVs needed to analyze and design the activities & business processes to rollout the planned NBV activities (Cooper, 1981).
11	A feedback mechanism to comprehend the response of the involved stakeholders was required to be developed by an NBV. Further a mechanism to feed the feedback onto a learning mechanism for improvements in the NBV business model and value chain functions needed to be developed (Monkhouse, 1995).
12	The criteria to measure the actual performance of the NBV as against the planned and expected needed to be analyzed (Gunasekaran et al., 2005).

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

One needed to understand that the dozen analysis steps mentioned in Table 5 were not necessarily to be done in series one after other, but could often be done in parallel as per the specific requirements (Johnson, 2018). It was important to remember that an NBV entrepreneur might fail even after carrying out due diligence through NBV analysis because of the factors mentioned in Table 6.

Table 6

. Failure of NBV Even Subsequent of Undertaking Analytic Approach

Sr. No	Factor	Remarks
1	Bounded Rationality	The NBV management was unable to process the substantial amount of information emancipating from broad environment, industry and competitive environment analysis (Simon, 1972, 1991).
2	Bounded reliability	NBV team is unable to execute (Kano & Verbeke, 2015) in reality the proposed business plans.
3	Culture	NBV team was unable to instill a positive and committed culture (Gibb, 1993; Lee, 1996) sense of mission (Campbell & Yeung, 1991) beyond the set of entrepreneurs amongst the NBV members to cater to targeted market through the NBV offerings. This could be because of weak value chain or business model followed.
4	Entrepreneur superego	Often the entrepreneur ego (Osborne, 1987) couldn’t digest the fact that the NBV was not just failing in the short run but had no future prospect (Cacciotti et al., 2016; Zacharakis et al., 1999). This occurred because the ego of the entrepreneur would delay the individual to let go the NBV and stop the venture.
5	Casual Ambiguity	Often NBV managers were unable to pinpoint the reasons of poor performance in the NBV because of inability to decipher (King, 2007) the value chain or the lacunae in the business model.
6	Lack of fast learning	Entrepreneurs were unable to learn quickly from mistakes being made as time runs out (Cope, 2011; Deakins & Freel, 1998).
7	Politics	NBVs often get misaligned because of the interference made by the funding firms. This resulted in the dominance of political thinking (Quinn, 1977) rather than long term rational thinking for the NBV.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

NBV SM Decision-Making Members

NBV entrepreneurs often found that moving on from the ideation stage to the operations phase required expertise in a wider array of field (Cooper, 2008; Corbett, 2005; Gemmell et al., 2012;). These could be both advisory as well as executive roles (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1995). Generally, at an early stage, NBVs generally required advisory inputs (Zahra et al., 2009). The NBV board, which the entrepreneurs were expected to form for the NBV, would be requiring expertise not just regarding SM but also in other matters (Boussouara & Deakins, 2000; Zahra et al., 2009). This has been tabulated in Table 7.

Table 7.

NBV Desirable Board Expertise

Sr. No	Characteristics
1	Advisory role on strategic aspects to the entrepreneurs
2	Mentoring entrepreneurs on team building and emotional balancing
3	Strategic planning
4	Capital planning
5	Financial management and budgeting
6	Working capital management
7	Financial control
8	Legal management
9	IPR management
10	Strategic implementation for business growth and development
11	Operations management
12	Operations controls
13	Advisory on industry knowledge and critical industry level insights
14	Talent acquisition
15	Leadership development
16	Operations on human resource management
17	Customer acquisition
18	Customer relationship and retention
19	Supplier engagement and relationship
20	Organizational administration
21	New product development management
22	Research and development management
23	Technology management
24	Societal stakeholder engagement
25	Environmental compliance
26	Taxation and financial compliance
27	Media management
28	Government and regulatory engagement
29	Feedback and organizational learning
30	Any other matter of existential importance for the NBV firm

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

The nature of width and depth of expertise required would decide and dictate the diversity of experience of the NBV board as well as the size of the NBV board (Ingley et al., 2017; Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). It would also be pertinent to note that the width and depth of expertise required by the NBV would vary over a period of time (Neville, 2011; Zahra et al., 2009). The classical way of segmenting NBV value chain would be into four stages that a typical NBV underwent namely seed, emerging, growth, and maturity (Gompers, 1995; Kazanjian, 1988; Murray, 1994; Xiao, 2011). It would be important to ascertain at each of these stages what were the goals and value chain actions required. This has been tabulated in Table 8.

Table 8.

NBV Stages and Value Chain Goals

Stage	Goal	Major Action Agendas
Seed	Convert the idea into practical action through experimentation and pilot	Document the story through video or PowerPoint presentation To sell the idea(story) for first seed capital To develop the problem to take the pilot and experiment To interact with the set of customers Formalize the team To register the firm To check legal repercussions on the business To undertake financial viability
Emerging	To start the business operation in a formal manner with standardization step being initiated.	To recruit additional team members formally beyond the initial set of entrepreneurs To develop a customer base Develop formal linkages with external stakeholders (value holders) like suppliers and complementary firms. To raise capital to continue business operations To develop organizational capabilities in business model to be followed and the value chain functions to be carried out.
Growth	To define and enhance the scale and scope of business function. To set and formalize mission and vision	To consolidate the customer base. To raise capital. To increase capacity of manufacturing and operations. To develop strategic resources and capacities. To increase efficiency and efficacy To establish the business model and value chain functions.
Maturity	To stabilize business	To become an industry leader. To look for next set of business lines for growth. To raise capital through IPO To redefine business model and value chain functions

Source: Kazanjian (1988); Gompers (1995); Murray (1994).

Table 9.

NBV Board Members Characteristics Dyadic Perspectives

1	Emphatic yet objective
2	Creative yet structured
3	Critical yet constructive
4	Assertive yet listening
5	Mentoring yet providing independence
6	Friendly yet professional
7	Accepts diversity and difference of opinion but not be conflicting
8	Seek short term gains yet have an eye for long term gains
9	Crisis manager yet not imposing or dominating
10	Seek adequate compensation but not greedy

Source: Knockaert and Ucbasaran (2013); Neville (2011); Ingley et al. (2017); Zahra et al. (2009).

Given, this it would be important that the start-up NBV entrepreneurs sought external members to run the start-up (Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013; Neville, 2011). In Table 9, the exact natures of the members desired to be on the NBV board have been listed.

In essence NBV board members should be critical yet constructive, structured yet creative so that the best shape could be provided to the NBV (Ingley et al., 2017; Zahra et al., 2009; Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013). These set of characteristics helped a start-up in a healthy manner.

NBV Performance Measurement

The question of NBV performance has been a critical one and the questions regarding NBV performance were required to be looked into differently than from established firms because generally an NBV firm initially sinks in substantial cash before generating profit (Covin & Slevin, 1990; Ebben & Johnson, 2005). Thus, the treatment regarding performance needed to be unique (Garnsey & Heffernan, 2005). Ebben and Johnson, (2005) and Stancill (1986) noted that generally most entrepreneurs to begin with underestimated the extent of capital requirement. This could again be attributed to bounded rationality (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) and bounded reliability (Osiyevskyy et al., 2013). Researchers like Stancill (1986) and Ebben and Johnson (2005) advocated that entrepreneurs must undertake a thorough cash flow analysis with an optimistic, pessimistic, and realistic (Maravas & Pantouvakis, 2012) point of view, where in

Gross profit margin = Sales − Cost of goods sold and

Net income = Income before tax − Tax

Stancill (1986) had pointed out that like in classical business new business would have

Total assets = Total current assets (Cash + Accounts receivable + Prepaids + Inventory) + Net plant property and equipment (Plant property equipment at cost − depreciation)

Total current liabilities = Accounts payable + Accrued taxes + Accrued expenses + Current portion of long-term debt

Capital = Equity + Retained earnings or loss

The assessment of performance of NBV has been depicted in Figures 6–8.

Figure 6.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 7.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 8.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

In Figure 6, cash outflow for an NBV has been depicted. In the X-axis, time has been depicted while in the Y-axis, cash outflow has been depicted. Generally, over a period cash outflow was expected to be reduced and normalized for the capacity and scope of operations and offerings. NBV performance has been measured through cash outflow, cash inflow and the difference between cash outflow and cash inflow. However, most NBVs would keep a conservative cash outflow estimate because often the NBV would require more investments and incur higher expenses (Hormozi et al., 2002). In Figure 6, thus this tolerance for extra cash outflow has been accommodated. The maximum limit of cash outflow has been depicted as datum cash outflow (maximum). Datum cash outflow (maximum) line runs parallel to the expected cash outflow but at an outward level. If the actual cash outflow was above the datum cash outflow line, then one could argue as a standalone basis of cash outflow that the NBV was performing poorly. In Figure 7, cash inflow has been presented. Like in Figure 6, in Figure 7 also the horizontal axis was time. Over a period of time cash inflow was expected to go up and it generally started after a certain point of time post investment (cash outflow part). Cash inflow occurred primarily because of revenue. Often in reality, the cash inflow remained subdued as the market transaction would be weak. However, like in the context of cash outflow, for cash inflow also there was a datum which was for the minimum amount of cash inflow. If the cash inflow of any NBV was lower than the datum cash inflow, then the performance of the NBV on a standalone basis of cash inflow could be counted as poor performance. Since poor cash inflow and outflow was a longitudinal process thus no specific time strike point (borrowing the real options logic) was set. The third way of analysis would be to monitor the flow difference between cash inflow and cash outflow over a period of time. Difference of cash inflow and cash outflow has been depicted in Y-axis, whereas time has been depicted in X-axis in Figure 8. During the initial stages net cash outflow would be more than cash inflow. However, over a period of time the cash inflow would be more than cash outflow. Like in Figures 6 and 7, there was an expected line, a datum line, as well as an actual line. The datum line was with a lesser angle to horizontal line and thus at a lower level than the expected. The datum line accommodated for suppressed cash inflows and inflated cash outflow than the expected because of changing ground realities. Unlike in Figures 6 and 7, in Figure 8 there were implications of specific time strike points like te, (the expected time when the cash inflow would be more than cash outflow), td (the maximum allowable time till which valued shareholder of a NBV could tolerate delay in cash inflow and outflow difference to be negative). If the actual time was beyond td as depicted by ta, then the NBV performance could be viewed as poor. One also needed to account for the reasons why an NBV might falter. It would be important to acknowledge the reasons of failure to better achieve success. The reasons noted have been ego of entrepreneurs to change course even if failure was inevitable, to motivate team members, to read the industry well and to execute while enhancing scale and scope. It then became an imperative to comprehend the difference between NBV cash outflow and cash inflow given the differences in scale and scope. The author has depicted this in Figures 9 and 10.

Figure 9.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Figure 10.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

In Figures 9 and 10, the X-axis represented the experiential knowledge of NBV entrepreneurs and the team members collectively. Thus, the X-axis termed here as experiential knowledge time (EKT)

EKT = Time Period × Number of entrepreneurs and managers in the NBV × Experiential knowledge of each individual in the NBV

In Figure 9, the Y-axis was scale, whereas in Figure 10 the Y-axis was scope. There were two parameters measured, namely cash inflow and cash outflow. Cash inflow occurred primarily because of revenue whereas cash outflow occurred because of investments as well as operational expenses. In case of both scaling and scoping expansion initially for an NBV, there was more cash outflow than cash inflow as investments and expenses were more than the earnings from revenue. Over a period of time both in Figure 9 (scale) and Figure 10 (scope), cash inflow would increase as the products and services got offered. In the case of scaling the cash inflow would increase in stepwise manner as the levels of production and operations for products and service offerings escalate. However, because of ‘economies of scale’ post investment the average cash outflow decreases. There were however bumps of cash outflow as the firm moved from one level of scale to the next higher level. In scaling, the NBV required a relatively narrower range of capability depending upon the enhancement of scoping. In enhancement of scoping, the cash inflow offtake for increase transpired relatively at a slower pace and again in a stepwise manner. Each step function like level rise reflected the addition of NBV product service offering type. However, for the cash outflow there was significant, and step function like level rise for every additional scope offering (product or service) of the NBV. Thus, post every scope addition there was a stage of negative cash position (cash outflow being more than cash inflow). This didn’t transpire in scale addition. However, in the long run like in scale enhancement in scope addition also net cash position ought to become positive (cash inflow being more than cash outflow). From Figures 9 and 10, it became an obvious that for NBVs scaling up was relatively less troublesome than scope addition. Thus, from resource-based view and dynamic capabilities perspectives, for scaling one set of capabilities need to be deepened. Whereas in scoping a set of capability augmentation was necessitated which was more time consuming (refer to elongated period of EKT).

NBV Value Chain

Another thread of conversation that was very important in NBVs was regarding the value chain Porter (1985) of an NBV (Jones et al., 2011; Theyel, 2013). For most NBV firms at the beginning resources and capabilities resident at a nascent stage, business model was evolving, substantial investments were being committed upfront, deferred revenues were expected, management bandwidth was thin, product market was evolving and customer base was changing, so NBVs ought to have a different value chain than that of an established firm (Jones & Holt, 2008; Jones et al., 2011; Rae, 2012). Borrowing from this perspective, the value chain model as prescribed by Porter (1985) remained the point of reference. It would also be important to note that there were various studies that have explicitly detailed the stages of an NBV (Kaulio, 2003; Kazanjian, 1988; Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). In this study, the author drew insights from the mentioned studies and proposed a synthesized version for NBV stages.

The author conceptualized NBV with five stages, namely

Stage 1: Ideas, opinions, and thought (IOT).

Stage 2: Experimentation and pilot (E&P).

Stage 3: Configuration, scaling, and scoping (CSS).

Stage 4: Reconfiguration, re-scaling, and re-scoping (RRR).

Stage 5: Cropping and yields (CY).

The exact nature of the five stages has been tabulated in Table 10.

Table 10.

NBV Stages

Sr. No.	NBV Stage	Remarks
1	Ideas, opinions and thought (IOT)	The to be entrepreneur was having ideas, opinions and thoughts regarding a business initiative which could be launched to serve felt and unfelt need of customers and non-consumers respectively in society (Herron & Sapienza, 1992).
2	Experimentation and pilot (E&P)	NBV was launched with a small-scale launch of prototype of the offering (if product) or service. Experimentation around the ideated offerings are carried out (Stevenson & Jarillo, 2007).
3	Configuration, scaling, and scoping (CSS)	The NBV shape got established for the time being on the offerings level (scale) and variety (scope). Operational capabilities get established (Stevenson et al., 1989).
4	Reconfiguration, re-scaling and re-scoping (RRR)	The NBV post learning from the CSS stage renewed the scale and scope of offerings growth of the firm and its resources and capabilities get consolidated (McGee et al., 2009).
5	Cropping and yields (CY)	The entrepreneurs might reduce their stakes through IPOs, sell out (being acquired) or retain the earnings from the positive cash flow (Denis, 2004; Zingales, 1995).

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

In Table 11, the value chain activities Porter (1985) undertaken at the various stages of NBV (IOT, E&P, CSS, RRR, and CY) have been tabulated.

Table 11.

NBV and Value Chain Activities

Value Chain Activities	NBV Stages
Value Chain Activities	I-IOT	II-E&P	III-CSS	IV- RRR	V-C &Y
General administration	Informal association amongst initial set of entrepreneurs is maintained.	Formal organization is established. Skeleton thin organizational rules are set.	Organizational rules, regulations, and procedures are established.	Consolidation of organizational rules, regulations, and procedures occur.	Administration adheres to external regulatory bodies.
Finance	Seed fund is secured from friends and family and managed.	Early stage outside funding like angle or private placements or VC occur and managed.	Outside funding like private placements or VC intensify and managed.	Outside funding like banks, CVC or VC intensify and managed in a structured fashion.	Acquisition based funding, IPO, bank funding occurs and managed in a very structured fashion.
Technology management	Initial developments in laboratories and market research occur.	Research and Development (R &D) for New Products Development (NPD) is established.	R &D plus NPD gets formalized.	R &D plus NPD gets structured.	R&D plus NPD capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.
Human resource management (HRM).	First set of entrepreneurs initiate discussion.	First set of entrepreneurs are complemented with the first batch of recruits initiate business.	HRM gets formalized.	HRM gets structured post iterations.	HRM capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.
Procurement	Very limited scale action occurs.	Small scale action is established.	Procurement gets formalized and a steady level of action occur.	Procurement gets structured post iterations.	Procurement capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.
Logistics (inbound and out bound)	Very limited scale action occurs.	Small scale action is established.	Logistics gets formalized and a steady level of action occur	Logistics gets structured post iterations.	Logistics capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.
Operations	Very limited scale action occurs.	Small scale action is established.	Operations gets formalized and a steady level of action occur.	Operations gets structured post iterations.	Operations capabilities attain competitive levels in the industry.
Marketing	More of a feedback and two way interaction to comprehend regarding the product/service performance with the chosen initial set of consumers occur.	Launch of product/service	Marketing gets formalized and a steady level of action occur.	Marketing gets structured post iterations.	Marketing capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.
After sales engagement	More of a concurrent process with the experimental initial group of customers occur.	Launch of after sales engagement program.	After sales engagement gets formalized based on feedback.	After sales engagement gets structured post iterations.	After sales engagement capabilities attains competitive levels in the industry.

Source: Kazanjian, 1988; Kaulio, 2003, Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001.

NBV Committed Resources and Capabilities

It would be important to comprehend that despite the best efforts provided by NBV managers in the BNV value chain management often many of the NBV initiatives failed. Given this context it became important to understand what happened subsequent to failure. The learnings from failures regarding product/service launch need to be configured and reconfigured. The NBV resources and capabilities (Kor et al., 2007; Morris et al., 2005; Newbert, 2005; Paradkar et al., 2015; West III & Noel, 2009; Wu, 2007) need to be matched with the scaling and scoping being determined. For NBVs’ incremental planning and execution was the key in the effective management of NBV value chain (Jones et al., 2011; Theyel, 2013). An NBV value chain had to absorb the various shocks coming from broad environment, industry environment and competitive environment through organizational repository of resources and capabilities (Bhattacharyya & Jha, 2015). NBV external factors challenges and drivers had been tabulated in Table 12. Like any business firm, NBVs also confronted organizational challenges. NBVs utilized facilitators to ride through the challenges. NBV organizational challenges and facilitators has also been tabulated in Table 12.

Table 12.

NBV External/Organizational Challenges, Facilitators, and Drivers

External Challenges	Drivers	Organizational Challenges	Facilitators
Difficult to ascertain customer taste	Tax breaks	Weak organizational culture	Robust management knowledge
Dynamic technologies	Duty exemptions	Lack of motivation	Strong commitment
Hyper competition	Government subsidies	Lack of strategic intent and sense of mission	Initial focus and energy
Aggressive competitor pricing	Government purchases	Poor leadership	Availability of strategic resources & capabilities
Economic slow down	Industry ecosystem and supporting industries being developed	Loss of strategic resources and capabilities	Presence of creativity
Regulatory hurdles	Funding incentives		Agile process and systems
	Research facilities being provided		Strong organizational learning and feedback
	Consumer demand		Objective performance measurement and monitoring

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

Table 13.

What To Do with Failed NBV Resources and Capabilities

Sr. No	What To Do with Failed NBV Resources and Capabilities
1	Salvaging the entire NBV firm resources and selling it as a used inventory (the machines, materials, real estate and such assets) was one possibility (Bolin, 2012; McGrath & Keil, 2007).
2	Often though an NBV might fail but a certain portion of it might be profitable like a certain IPR, technology developed, new product/service developed and such others. Entrepreneurs could then sell the profitable (potent) part of the NBV to a suitor while sell off the unprofitable part using a salvage perspective (McGrath & Keil, 2007).
3	The entrepreneurs could carry on with the knowledge and experience gathered from the NBV and a portion of NBV resources and start off a new venture. Literally this translated into creation of an NBV from the ashes of a failed NBV (Johnson et al., 2008; McGrath & Keil, 2007).
4	The NBV entrepreneurs might seek towards being acquired by a corporate (Zejan, 1990). A corporate firm because of the possibility and notion of corporate advantage might acquire the NBV because of long-term viability (Park & Steensma, 2012). The NBV entrepreneur would then become a part of the acquiring corporate.

Source: Authors own conceptualization.

As evident from Table 13, for NBV entrepreneurs the focus was on continuous and frequent reality checks regarding the NBV value chain activities efficacy and efficiency. Another dilemma that NBV entrepreneurs often confronted was regarding what to be done when the NBV was not doing well. Every NBV entrepreneur at certain point in time was suffering from poor performance over a period of time (with economic feasibility being challenging and long-term sustainability lacking) confront a Go/No Go question. If the No Go had to be pursued it often became a challenge to ascertain what became of the efforts, resources, capabilities and the learnings from the NBV (McGrath & Keil, 2007). This could be viewed from a salvage perspective. This has been tabulated in Table 13.

This was based upon the perspective provided by McGrath and Keil (2007). McGrath and Keil (2007) had mentioned that individuals who had experience in managing under uncertainty than managers managing established business were more successful in NBVs. Managers who wanted to make their career out of the new venture (than just making a stint) were more appropriate for NBVs. In other words, the managers who experimented yet were performance oriented, were better suited to lead NBVs. One can argue that the same would hold true for NBV entrepreneurs also. The focus ought to be towards taking the NBV and making it a big firm in the long term not to get out of the NBV after a certain stage parting ownership for moolah for the NBV entrepreneurs.

Conclusion

In this section, the discussion and conclusion has been presented. The author in this article deliberated on the entire gamut of concepts, issues and aspects of SM of NBVs. The author did so by both undertaking a conceptual as well as integrative literature review in the field of NBV. Thus, based upon the analysis of articles in the final analysis, the major dimensions and cluster of literature was identified. The literature review was done through systematic synthesis (Callahan, 2010; Rocco & Plakhotnik, 2009; Torraco, 2005, 2016). Specifically, Modgil et al. (2020) had stressed regarding the importance of quality management in operations. This holds true for NBVs also. Jha and Bhattacharyya (2020) had emphasized regarding the importance of technology orientation of business leaders in the context of manufacturing sector. This remains true for NBVs also. Rao et al. (2019) highlighted the role of innovation in the context of small firms. This is also important for the NBVs. Ghosh et al. (2018) had advocated the importance of de-risking in organizational initiatives. This holds good for NBV initiatives also. The discussion agendas were regarding NBV financing mode, actors in NBV financing, external challenges of NBVs, organizational challenges of NBVs, drivers of NBV success, NBV performance, NBV cash inflow/outflow, scaling versus scoping, decision-making, NBV business model, NBV location, NBV resources and capabilities, NBV process, NBV value chain, NBV broad environment analysis, industry analysis, NBV board characteristics, NBV expansion stages and such others. These aspects were deliberated in detail and the 6 figures and 13 tables illustrated the findings systematically. In this literature review analysis article, the author presents the SM aspects of NBVs. Thus, these deliberations extended the points on conversations in the theoretical aspects of NBV. For practitioners, this article provides a plethora of points indicating what NBV entrepreneurs and the initial team of recruits as in managerial role required to undertake so that the NBV attain market growth and competitive success. This was a conceptual article but in future, based upon the various points discussed empirical investigations especially qualitative in-depth studies need to be carried out to explicate the concepts discussed. NBV management and comprehension is a complex process and difficult for generalization, thus from a phenomenological perspective case-based studies are recommended in future. This systematic literature review followed discussion regarding origin of an NBV and financing, deliberations regarding NBV business model, NBV location, NBV SM decisions, NBV SM decision-making members, NBV performance measurement, NBV value chain and NBV committed resources and capabilities. The author hopes that through this article, the author has set a holistic narrative on SM of NBVs that could be explored in future research as well as through practitioner actions.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Som Sekhar Bhattacharyya

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