What Makes Pro-poor Public Policy Dysfunctional? Evidence from the Select Public Policies in Odisha,India

Abstract

As a welfare state, India brought many pro-poor reformist public policies and programmes now and then, but some got dysfunctional or produced little outcomes. In this context, this article addresses the issues with implementation by critically examining the land reform legislation, the Other Backword Classes reservation policy and the idea of making Odisha an industrially viable state. It uses a mixed-method research approach and draws on both primary and secondary data. The analysis shows the conflict between an upper caste and feudal-dominated state power and socially marginalised groups over access to and distribution of resources. Thus, it argues that the dysfunctional land reform legislation, under-utilised agriculture and forest resources and the tokenism in OBC reservation policy are embedded with the nature of state power and leadership, posing a conflict of interest in the creation, utilisation and distribution of resources. The study has implications for social development and public policy in India and South Asia.

Keywords

Agriculture and forest-based economy India land reform legislation OBC reservation Odisha politics of development

Introduction

Since India’s independence in 1947 from British colonial rule, it has evolved into a democratic and republic state. The newly formed welfare state envisioned freedom, liberty, equality, justice and fraternity for every citizen of the country, irrespective of caste, creed, religious faith and sexual orientation. That ensured the protection of interests and promoted the well-being of marginalised sections namely the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Minorities, Other Backward Classes (OBC), women, children and the elderly. The Indian welfare state also focused on its overall development through the directive principles of state policy, rural development and reduction of inequality (Rodrigues, 2002). This led to the idea of a strong state for development in the initial decades of independence which was carried out through a centrally planned development model. The aim of building a strong state justified the establishment of heavy industries, large dams and hydropower projects by Nehru—India’s first prime minister—for self-reliance and national progress. Land reform legislation was also implemented throughout India with a nationalistic spirit to bring equality between landlord and land-less sections. After the foundation of a strong state was laid, Indira Gandhi—the later prime minister—nationalised private banks and invested a large amount of money in eradicating poverty through its ‘Gareebi Hatao’ (eradicate poverty) programme. However, later in 1991, India adopted liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation as part of the new economic policy while doing away with the earlier state-led development model approach. The New Economic Policy paved the way for privatising the public sector and a greater role of private agencies in financial growth and development.

In nearly eight decades, India has developed and progressed significantly from its initial statist developmental model to the current day neo-liberalism. The economy has moved forward, the poverty rate has decreased substantially (Sen & Himanshu, 2004), and people’s standard of living has improved. However, only a few have reaped the benefits of this growth, resulting in high inequality since most of the disadvantaged sections continue to live in deprivation and poverty (Dreze & Sen, 2013). It has come to a point where the richest 10% possess 80% of the country’s total wealth (Hardoon, 2017). Regarding inclusive development, the country stands at the 62nd position among emerging economic countries (World Economic Forum, 2018). So, the fruits of development have become concentrated around people of a few specific castes, classes and regions. Some flagship programmes are either not implemented with their true spirit or do not achieve the intended goal, despite investing a lot of money in them. To look at this phenomenon, this article first discusses leadership, state and the politics of development in India. Second, by stating the objectives and research methods used, it introduces Odisha state. Third, it discusses the three policy themes—land reforms, OBC and mining and industry focus—to demonstrate the non-implementation of policies and the neglect of certain groups. Finally, bringing all these analyses together, it argues that policies and programmes for the benefit of the larger section of the marginalised communities are overlooked in the state policy decision-making and implementation.

Leadership, State and the Politics of Development

There are various ways of promoting development based on the interests and ideologies of those who are in power and also depending on the possibility of future benefits (Tornquist, 1999). It is because of the ‘public contestations of organised and unorganised powers over access to resources that create and distribute the resources in a particular way benefiting one group over another at one or some point of time’ (Wolin, 1996, p. 31). Similarly, Besley (2007) argued that in a representative democracy, the pattern of representation and identity of the candidate—who gets elected to the office—matters in policy-making and implementation. That shows the level and nature—caste, regional, ideological—of political representation in a representative democracy that determines the performance related to development.

Thus, all development is political and not managerial or administrative in the conceived technical sense (Leftwich, 1993, 2000). The development process in human societies involves the organisation, mobilisation, use and distribution of resources—capital, land, human beings or their combination—in new ways. This involves inevitable disputes among individuals and groups or both in the process of using the resources in new ways (Leftwich, 2000, p. 5). It is based on the assumption that there are various ways of promoting development based on the interest and ideology that depend upon who is in power and the possibility of future benefits. Human society has diverse interests, preferences, values and ideas. Thus, with varied interests, society becomes more complex, and conflict becomes part and parcel of the community. In every conflict, resources are involved directly or indirectly, whether for ownership or how these resources should be used, keeping in mind the interests of individuals or groups. That is the core problem in general, as people prefer to get their way. Still, at the same time, they have to live together and cooperate with others if they are to prosper. However, constant friction is possible when there is a difference of interests and accepting diversity and equality becomes essential for a long-term solution.

In Indian politics and society, although the domination of ruling elites is seen, there is no uniform trend of domination (Chatterjee, 2010). The patronage character of Indian society based on caste, religious loyalties and solidarity based on ethnicity was still there in the first two decades of independence. That did not change despite the gradual development of the democratic decision-making process, rational administration and modern citizenship. Caste and religion are very much present in modern political institutions. The dominance is visible with the coalition and consensus building. The modern elites tried to use state power to transform society into an electoral system through consensus building. The dominant classes’ coalition existed with the coalition of the Indian capitalist class and traditional land-owning elites. However, the country witnessed the rising power of marginalised castes and poor classes in the political institutions, but there was also an attempt by upper-caste and middle-class groups to protect their privileges in the public institutions (Frankel & Rao, 1990). Again, with the structural economic reforms in 1991, politics and society also changed as the power of corporates increased compared with land-owning elites, and the monopolistic role of the state weakened vis-a-vis the power of bureaucracy and urban middle class.

However, on the politics of development, Kohli (2010) argued that the redistribution of resources is linked with the nature of politics that is practised. For instance, some southern states perform well in poverty reduction, while Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (BIMARU) states are below the national average. This is a matter of redistribution of resources and the nature of politics practised in the respective states. The difference between southern and BIMARU states is that Brahminical domination was challenged in the early twentieth century in the former. On the other hand, it is the opposite in the BIMARU states, where Brahminical domination was challenged only recently. This fact has had an influence on development policy and outcomes as Southern states have invested more heavily in health and education than BIMARU states. Further, the Southern states have benefited more from the subsidised public distribution system due to populist leaders and superior bureaucracy. In contrast, BIMARU states are characterised by low growth rates and distinct socio-political structures comprising the narrow political base of the upper castes and classes with patron-client ties of civic society. They did not use the state power for growth or distribution effectively. For instance, the land reforms were poorly implemented because the upper-caste landowners had considerable power in the state and society and due to a longstanding tradition of the Zamindari system—with easily corruptible bureaucracy.

Objectives

In this context, the article explores how leadership and state power have influenced Odisha’s development policy and practice. The objective is to understand why some pro-poor public policies got dysfunctional in Odisha. Taking the case of Odisha, one of India’s poor states, it makes sense for (non)implementation of certain development policies. It discusses what makes pro-poor public policy not work in general, and in particular, it addresses questions like: Why did the land reform legislation get derailed? Why has the OBC reservation policy not been implemented fully? Why were the rich agriculture and forest resources ignored in the initial state economic policy?

Research Method

The study adopts a mixed-method research design using interviews and secondary data collection methods (Bryman, 2012). The key participants of the study were social, political, developmental, environmental and Dalit rights activists, who were purposively selected, though all the data are not used due to the limitation of space. Verbal consent was obtained before the interview. The pertinent secondary data are related to the period 1950 to 2020. The state of Odisha is considered for analysis because of its typical development dynamics and the relative neglect of marginalised and disadvantaged groups. Thematic analysis method was used to analyse both primary and secondary data. To understand state power and leadership, the article has analysed the background of various successive chief ministers who have run the government and the state. Further, it has used two analytical categories of caste and region to understand state power. Similarly, it has selected three development policy themes relating to land reforms, making Odisha an industrially viable state, and the reservation of OBC for its analysis. These policy themes were selected because of their popular reform agenda and greatest impact on society, economy and politics of the state.

The Paradox of Odisha State

The state has a total population of more than 40 million, constituting 3.47% of India’s total population (2011 census), possessing a total of 4.7% of India’s landmass (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2016). It further has a diverse population of 62 tribes, constituting 22.8% of the total population and 93 types of SC groups, constituting 17.1% of the total population, respectively. It also has 13 particularly vulnerable tribal groups within the tribes (Government of India, 2013). The southern and western hilly regions are inhabited mainly by the ST and SC, while Non-SC/ST groups dominate the plain eastern region. The present state in its shape was constituted in 1936, which evolved as a separate state on a linguistic basis. Before that, the parts of its eastern region were under Bengal-Bihar Province, the western region was under the Central Province, and the southern region was under Madras Province.

Since the beginning of planning and development, it has been a low-performance state known for its high poverty rate. Other states have bypassed the national average poverty rate, but this state remains at the bottom. Again, the development has become polarised among regions and social groups. It portrays a sample of India’s uneven development in contemporary times—where there is the rapid growth of one privileged class, but the other underprivileged sections continue to live with deprivation (Drèze & Sen, 2013). It is reflected in income levels, poverty and other human development dimensions like health and education for various social groups (De Haan & Dubey, 2005; Planning and Coordination Department, 2004). The state has registered a high growth rate over the last decade, above the national average rate in the industrial and agricultural sectors (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2019b). Its average per capita income has increased, and it is highest among some lower-income states. The monthly per capita consumption expenditure among rural Odisha’s bottom 30% population shows a positive trend (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2019b).

However, a large population still lives in poverty (The World Bank, 2016). A sizeable population in the western and southern regions live with limited choices and opportunities in terms of human development.¹ In contrast, the eastern region has access to more advanced facilities (Government of Odisha, 2008).² The most historically disadvantaged social groups, like the SC and ST, are still higher below the poverty line (Figure 1) and illiteracy (Figure 2). They remain behind the other social groups in several parameters.

Figure 1.

Source: NITI Aayog, New Delhi, and DES, Odisha, quoted in Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2017, p. 241).

Figure 2.

Source: Census Data, 1961–2011, cited in Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2017, p. 257).

The Dream of Land Reform, OBC Reservation and the Making of an Industrially Viable State

This section presents three such policies that were not implemented in letter and spirit despite having the potential for a significant impact on the larger sections of society. It discusses the situation of land reform legislation of the 1960s, the popular demands and the flagship programme implemented all over India in the early decades of independence to bring equality between the landlords and land-less masses. Second, it reflects the aspiration of making Odisha industrially viable despite having other agriculture and forest resources. The third point for discussion is the reservation policy for the OBC, which took momentum in the 1990s at all Indian levels to uplift and empower the socially and economically backward classes.

Land Reform Agenda, Legislation and Unsuccessful Implementation

The post-independence land reform legislation yielded limited success; this is a well-known fact in India which aimed to bridge the gap between the landlord and landless population. However, the land reform legislation got derailed in the state of Odisha. The current landholding pattern in Odisha shows that it is distributed unequally within the social groups. The landholding percentage is lowest among SC, which is only 15.25%, followed by the ST (30.02). As the data for OBC and General category are not available separately other than the SC and ST data, the land holding data across social groups is not able to present (Table 1). The distribution of the total land operated across social groups shows closer to their share of the population (SC-17.1% and ST-22.8% of the population as per the Census 2011).

Table 1.

Distribution of Various Social Groups Based on Landholding and Operated Land Area in the State.

S. No.	Social Groups	Landholding (in Percentage)		Area of Operation (in Percentage)
S. No.	Social Groups	2010–2011	2015–2016	2010–2011	2015–2016
1	SC	15.05	15.25	11.65	11.88
2	ST	30.54	30.02	33.28	33.29
3	Others	54.37	54.70	53.97	54.11
4	All	100	100	100	100

Source: Report on Agricultural Census, Odisha 2015–2016 (Phase II) by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2019a).

Notes: The Government of India does not conduct an agricultural survey for OBC as a separate category like the SC and ST. Therefore, the ‘Others’ category in Table 1 includes the OBC and Other Castes. Hence, there is a limitation in caste-wise comparison and analysis of land holding patterns among SC, ST, OBC and General Category.

It means there is both inter and intra caste-tribe inequality in the landholding pattern in the state. Further, according to the agricultural census 2010 and 2015, the land holding percentage has increased for SC and Other castes groups, but it has reduced for ST. More than 80% of the SC and around 70% of the ST are marginal landholders within the landholder’s category (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2019a). Most of its population lives in rural areas and depends on agriculture as the primary economy. Thus, their livelihood, food security and other progress are also directly dependent upon the amount and type of land they hold. Nevertheless, the current situation in the land holding pattern shows, despite the implementation of six decades of land reform legislation, there are miles to go to reduce the social inequality in land holding.

According to a research participant, ‘poverty is there because kings, landlords and Gaontia possess agricultural land’, indicating the western region of Odisha, which was under princely rule. He shared that his family and neighbours are landless and depend upon labour work. The livelihood and family conditions improved with the development of road and transport facilities. According to him,

My family had no land or money. My father was a security guard, and the family situation was such that there was no basi pakhal (stale rice used for breakfast) even on his school exam day. All his neighbourhoods, around 100 families belonging to the Dalit community in his locality, had the same condition as his family. They all are landless and do labour work, but the conditions have improved a lot after the improvement of communication and road facilities where people migrated to Raipur and other places for their livelihoods.

He further shared that ‘nobody knows better than us what poverty is because we have experienced it in our life and come to this position today’ (indicating his improved condition).

In Odisha, the land reform process started in 1960, but till 1974, the distribution of surplus land had not taken place. That year, 0.7 acres of land were distributed to each landless family for agricultural purposes for the first time. According to UNDP, there were three major issues in the delayed distribution of ceiling land that is ‘litigation’ around the ceiling of land, ‘land reserved for public purposes’ and the ‘land unfit for cultivation’. Other underlying problems were ‘lack of actual possession of land by the beneficiaries’ and ‘lack of records—patta ownership—with the beneficiaries’. Therefore, the impact of the legislation was not felt as there was a ‘delay in the enactment and actual implementation’, which provided a window of sufficient opportunities for large Zamindars—landowners—to escape the ceiling restrictions (UNDP, 2008, pp. 16–17). Another issue was allocating land to people in distant villages away from their own villages. That led to disputes with adjacent villages’ claiming the same property. It also includes the difficulties in identifying the plot as there are issues with the demarcation of land, and people are declared as encroachers sometimes.

In terms of implementing the legislation, the responsibility of the land ceiling and distribution of surplus land was given to revenue officers. The revenue officers were also given the role of working with SC and ST’s beneficiaries, who had to buy the surplus land to be the land owner and had to furnish the documents before the revenue officers. Thus, amidst all these legal complications and official formalities, how serious the ceiling and distribution process from 1960 to 1974 can be well understood. The fact that the landless sections—the SC and tribes—were also illiterate and economically impoverished added to the overall challenges. The act could have made the ceiling limit to ten standard acres in the year 1952, but that was done in the year 1972. This way, the intention of policymakers themselves is questionable because initially, the ceiling limit was 33 standard acres per family, but later that was reduced to ten standard acres. This way, many landlords were able to keep the land to themselves because, by the time the ceiling was changed from 33 acres of land to 10 standard acres, they had already distributed the land among their family members. As a result, the chance of surplus land owned by one person was reduced in this process.

Similarly, with agricultural land, homestead land was also distributed among the people with no homeland from the year 1974 to 1975. The allotted plot area was four decimals per family, which was later increased to 10 decimals per family in 2008. That could be because a four-decimal plot area is too small for a family to construct a house. This way, landless people might have benefited from ten decimal homelands. According to the survey in 2004–2005, there were 249,334 homestead-less families in the state. Out of which, 229,885 families were provided homestead land between the years 2005 to 2008 (odisha.gov.in, 2008). Presently a scheme called ‘Vasundhara’ is underway to distribute the land to the homestead-less family. According to one of the surveys by the state government, 149,266 families were homestead land-less as of 31st April 2012, and 115,827 families were provided homestead land by the year 2013 under the Vasundhara programme.

Furthermore, in the Bhoodan movement, the bottlenecks were attributed to issues like the unproductive or barren land donation by the volunteer donors (Parida, 2010); litigation around the donated land because of the lack of non-distribution of land records to the beneficiaries and the encroachment of land by influential local persons and landlords due to slow in distribution land (UNDP, 2008) contributing to the failure of the movement in Odisha. Bhoodan movement collected ‘638,706.50 acres of land and 579,994.21 acres (234,720.45 ha) of land has been distributed among 152,852 landless persons’ (UNDP, 2008, p. 22). Similarly, a balance of 58,722.29 acres (23,764.59 ha) of land was to be distributed among the landless by 31st March 2006.

An interviewee stated that the Bhoodan Movement and land redistribution programme have had little success due to the lack of political will and pressure groups.

Nabakrushna Chaudhuri, the first chief minister of independent Odisha, did some excellent work and laid the foundation for land distribution. After Nabakrushna Chaudhuri, nobody did the job like him except Nandini Sathpathi in the 1970s, who took a few actions. Earlier, Nabakrushna Chaudhuri bought land reform legislation, gave tenants rights, and a provision was brought in with the non-transfer of tribal land to the non-tribals. Despite that, the majority of Dalits and Adivasis are landless. The Forest Rights Act of 2006 is also not fully successful in granting land titles to forest dwellers. There are social justice movements all over India, including Odisha, by many Ambekarites organisations, but it has the least benefit on land reforms.

Tokenism in the Implementation of the Reservation Policy for Other Backward Classes

A commission was set up in 1978 by the Union Government of India under the chairmanship of B. P. Mandal, popularly known as the Mandal Commission. The commission aimed to identify the socio-economic and educationally backward communities and recommend suitable measures for their upliftment. The commission submitted its report in December 1980 and came out with the findings that 52% of the population of India is socio-economic and educationally backward. It recommended various affirmative actions for the empowerment of backward communities. One of the main recommendations was to provide 27% reservation to the OBCs in educational institutions and government employment and concession/financial assistance in educational institutions of central and state government (Government of India, 1980). However, that has not been implemented in Odisha state, but some benefits have been given as a token to please the communities. For instance, in 2020, the state government approved the proposal of the Odisha State Commission for Backward Classes to survey the social and educational conditions of the backward classes from time to time (Government of Odisha, 2020). Second, the ruling party joined hands with other national political parties, pressuring the Union government to enumerate OBC in the 2021 census. Third, the ruling Biju Janata Dal party announced a 27% reservation for socially and educationally backward classes (SEBC) in selecting party candidates in the upcoming Panchayat Raj Election 2022 (Kalinga TV, 2021).

Currently, there is a provision of 11.25% reservation for the SEBC communities in government employment and the panchayat level elections despite the government declaring it 27% in line with the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. There is no reservation for the OBC/SEBC in the educational institutions for students’ admission. However, some scholarship provisions exist, like the pre- and post-matric scholarships for SEBC students. On the contrary, the central government institutions and universities have reserved 27% of seats for OBC students since the academic year 2008–2009. Again, the union government has recently declared a 27% reservation for OBC students in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) exam 2021. There was reservation earlier in some of the centrally funded medical institutions, but for the first time, it was implemented in the NEET exam (NDTV, 2021). Besides, almost all other states have made provisions for reservations in their educational institutions. In Tamil Nadu, reservations account for 69% of opportunities, of which 20% are for Maha Backward Castes (MBC) and 30% for OBCs. Chhattisgarh has 27% reservations for OBCs, and 58% reservations cumulatively. Similarly, Haryana, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra provide more than 50% reservations for SC, ST and OBC sections combined.

The dynamic is that the state can implement the 27% reservation provisions for SEBC/OBC students in its educational institutions, similar to that of the central government institutions and universities. It is illogical when there is a similar provision in the employment and representatives of Panchayati Raj institutions but not in the educational institutions. In contrast, reservation in educational institutions is equally important with reservation in employment and political representations for uplifting the SEBC/OBC communities. The data show an unequal pattern in attendance of various social groups at the education level (Figure 3). The calculation is based on the state sample data of the National Sample Survey 71st round (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Odisha, 2018). These are the aggregate data of OBCs, where many of them are land-holding communities and, economically, in a better situation. However, the data across the communities among the OBCs could be a different picture.

Figure 3.

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Odisha (2018).

Explaining the situation of SC, ST and OBC, an activist found two reasons. First, the honest and reactionless Dalit, Adivasi and Backward classes and second, the ideological deviation of the Socialist and Marxist leaders in Odisha politics. According to him:

SC, ST and OBC people are so honest and straightforward that they react less to exploitation on them. The consciousness in the state of Uttar Pradesh amid the domination of upper caste like Mishra, Tandon, and Singh, a Dalit girl who became chief minister, is all missing in Odisha. Further, Yadav backward groups could emerge as political forces in Bihar. The way self-respect movement was led by Periyar in south India, but one is yet to see such a movement in Odisha. Thus, awareness is missing among the communities in Odisha despite the majority of the population.

He further stated:

The socialist leaders who believed in social justice lost their identity and power by accepting Biju Babu as their leader. So are the Marxists who believed in class structure and struggle. Since then, Odisha politics witnessed an ideological dilution; otherwise, those socialist and Marxist leaders who were leading here were eligible to lead the whole country. Surendranath Dwibedi was a veteran socialist leader and a parliamentarian, Rabi Ray, from the OBC community, was also a socialist leader and a parliamentarian.

Underutilised Agriculture and Forest Resources and Emphasis on Mining and Industrial-based Viable State

State politics was obsessed with making the state industrially viable since the beginning of the planned economy in the 1950s. The state has deposits of mineral resources, but at the same time, it is also rich in agriculture and forest resources. Thus, the question here is why a European modernisation model was followed over the local need-based model. The dream of establishing an industrially viable state commenced with establishing the Rourkela Steel Plant in the first decade of independence. Later, making Odisha an industrial state was the political agenda, becoming the core of state politics over the years. In the 1980s and 1990s, politics in Odisha was obsessed with establishing the second steel plant and making the state industrially developed. There was resistance by the people, but they were forcefully displaced. According to a social activist and farmer’s leader, a narrative was floated that Chhattisgarh and Odisha as mineral-rich states, but people are poor, so the ultimate remedy is to exploit the minerals for economic growth. He said:

From the beginning, it is said that Chhattisgarh and Odisha states are abundant in minerals, but their people are poor. It has become a phrase like a minerally prosperous state, but the people are poor. So, the thinking was that exploiting mineral resources was necessary to become a wealthy state. In 1980s politics in Odisha, when the Chief Minister was Janaki Ballav Patnaik and Biju Patnaik was the opposition leader, there was only one slogan to have a second steel plant in Odisha. At that time, only one steel plant in Rourkela was established in the 1950s. So, establishing a second steel plant in Odisha was the main political agenda. They tried but could not build another one. Biju Patnaik also attempted when it came to power again in the early 1990s. He planted a Kadam tree in Kalinga Nagar but could not make his promises come true. As you see, establishing a second steel plant was the state’s only development discourse in the 1980 and 90s.

However, the earlier attempt to make Odisha a mineral-based developed state took momentum in the post-liberalisation phase in early 2000.

Odisha is on the path of rapid industrial development, contributing 36% of its Gross Value Added (GVA) to the state compared to 26% at the national level in the year 2020–2021. The high growth rate with around 40% contribution to the state GVA has been there since 2011–2012. Similarly, within the industrial sector, the manufacturing sector contributes 48.4% to the GVA, mining and quarrying contribute 24.6% to the GVA, followed by Electricity, Gas and Water supply sectors, which contribute 18.4%. The construction sector contributes 8.6% to the state GVA (Planning and Convergence Department, 2021). It is a mineral-rich state with deposited chromite, nickel, bauxite, manganese, iron ore and coal. It is also the largest producer of aluminium, steel and stainless steel among all the states. A total of INR 11,019.86 crore (INR 110.19 billion) was collected during 2019–2020 towards revenue from the production of 313.60 million tonnes of minerals and the dispatch of 320.08 million tonnes to other states.

Like the southern region, some parts of the state’s northern, western and central regions are also full of forest and agricultural opportunities. For instance, the forest cover growth in the year 2019–2020 was highest in the Kandhamal district (9.6%), followed by Mayurbhanj (7.3%), Sundargarh (7.2%), Sambalpur (6.6%), Rayagada (5.8%) and Malkangiri (5.8%) (Planning and Convergence Department, 2021). Even today, the agriculture and allied sectors make the largest contribution to the economy, providing livelihood to most of the state’s population. It is important to note that 83% population of the state lives in rural areas. Despite its neglect, Odisha is the third-largest economy contributing 18.9% to the States GVA in 2018–2019 (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2019b). About 7,056,507 MT of paddy was procured through 3,543 mandies in the state during the Kharif season in 2019–2020. Again, the western district of Bargarh is the top paddy-producing district, followed by Kalahandi and Subarnapur (Planning and Convergence Department, 2021).

Despite this, the situation of farmers was not good, and cases of farmer suicides have occurred in the last few years. A study by the Indo-Global Social Service Society (2017) reveals that in the year 2009, around 40 farmers committed suicide in Sambalpur and Bolangir districts alone. In 2015, 200 farmers committed suicide in Odisha. Shockingly, about eight farmers killed themselves within a single day on 6th November (The Sambad, 2015). The daily Odia newspaper, the Sambad (24th August 2018), reports that in the past two years, more than 12 farmers have attempted suicide because of crop failure and farm loan burden in the community blocks of Belpada, Balangir, Patnagarh, Khaprakhol, Kantabanji, Bangomunda and Muribahal (The Sambad, 2018). These statistics show that the State has grown, but there is a lack of livelihood opportunities and persisting poverty which results in inequality (Nayyar, 2017). This kind of development does not directly benefit the local people. Thus, it could have given better results if, in the initial years of independence agriculture and forest-based development model was adopted while gradually shifting the focus towards building a mineral-rich and industrially viable state. In that model, greater participation of the people and more benefits would have been possible, unlike today.

According to another research participant, locally produced cotton and paddy have not been utilised to their maximum. As a result, youth lack employment opportunities in their locality, and the state also loses the additional economy. He says:

Good quality cotton is produced in the western region, but because of the lack of spinning mills, youth migrate to the Cotton Mill of Sirpur, and we export raw cotton there. That means even after the availability of locally produced cotton, due to the lack of infrastructure, we miss the chances of producing clothes and creating employment locally. Besides, the region also produces excellent quality paddy, but because of the distressed sale, farmers are committing suicide.

Dynamics of State Power, Leadership and the Development Policy

Land reform legislation has become a big failure in the State. Similarly, the state followed the Western idea of the industrialised development model by exploiting the mineral-based economy. Besides, the OBC reservation policy in education has yet to be implemented, although other states have implemented it. So, what does it symbolise? Why have the reformist policies not been implemented in their true spirit? The answer lies in state power, leadership, vested interests and control over resources.

The Brahminical domination (Kohli, 2010) of state power is very much evident in Odisha, like other BIMARU states. Dominance, discrimination and exclusion are characteristics of state power operating in the state of Odisha (Currie, 2000; De Haan, 2004; Mohanty, 2014; Pati, 2012) with three broader distinct features like upper caste-class dominating politics and leadership; continuation of feudal-landlord and dynastic political leadership; and eastern region dominated politics and leadership. That way, there is a ‘domination of Brahmin-Karan’ (Mohanty, 2014, p. 41) and Khandayat (Pati, 2012) in state politics and society. There is a regular and frequent control of state power by Brahmin-Karan-Khandayat of eastern leaders as chief ministers and ministers (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Distribution of Chief Minister Position with Caste Background, Number of Times and Years of Ruling.

S. No.	Caste	Number of Times	Years of Ruling
1	Karan	13	47
2	Brahmin	06	11.4
3	Kshatriya	01	04
4	Khandayat	01	03
5	ST	03	1.2
6	OBC (other than Khandayat)	–	–
7	SC	–	–
Total		24	66.6

Source: odishaassembly.nic.in; Pattanaik (2003, pp. 81, 83) and researcher’s own calculation for caste background, number of times and years of the ruling.

Note: From 1952 to 2020, it is 68 years, but due to the president’s rules total number of the ruling year is 66.7, which is a round figure of 67 years.

However, domination operates with the continued rule of upper-caste feudal landlords of the western region. Power and resource-sharing are mediated through the background of caste, region and wealth, as most chief ministers are from the eastern region and upper-caste background. There is a coalition by all dominant upper castes of eastern and feudal-landlords of the western region, the dominant castes and class, to exercise their power through building coalitions in modern political institutions (Chatterjee, 2010).

In response to a question of why the Brahminical-dominated state did not follow a locally based development model, a research participant believed that the industry-focused development model is in the interest of the upper caste/classes, and the lower caste/classes have not benefited much from it. There is a clash between sections of the upper caste/class and the deprived sections of society regarding the pattern of development policy. Whatever has been considered development by the upper caste/class is opposed by the poor farmers and tribal community, but political leaders and some elites call them anti-development people. He said:

…so whatever has been considered development by the upper and middle-class elites, whether that is the same for farmers, Tribals, or Dalits?

So, he says that the nature of the development model depends on who will take advantage of it. According to him, the substantial benefits of the development model go to specific sections. He further said that leadership emerged from the agriculturally connected castes and classes in the case of states like Punjab, Haryana, Western UP and Andhra Pradesh. Hence, they gave priority to the agricultural economy along with other sectors. In contrast, in Odisha tribal community has not emerged as a ruling class that would otherwise have emphasised the forest-based resources in the state. So, he says how someone perceives development depends on their social base.

Most of the Tribes got affected by the industrial development project. Jojo (2004) argued that people are being displaced due to most industrial development projects directly and indirectly. In the Bolani Ores Mines (one of the mines in Odisha),³ although the local tribals are not displaced directly, they have been dispossessed of their socio-economic resources after their private and community land has been acquired by the mines’ authority. Additionally, the business and mining opportunities attracted a labour force from other states, and as a result, there is competition between the tribal and in-migrants. The migrants are seen to grab the opportunities resulting in further loss of livelihood for locals. On the other hand, mining has also polluted the air and water, which affects the agricultural production and economy of the local Bhuyan tribes. Ultimately, with the destruction of the local subsistence economy and the introduction of the market and capitalist economy, the local tribals have suffered economically, socially and culturally.

In the case of land reform legislation, there has been litigation and resistance by the land owners who captured the power in democratic space. Because the redistribution of land was not just an economic programme but demanded changes in the status quo by changing the socio-economic and political power (Bag, 2009), in another way, land as a resource has economic, social and political importance. Since the political power was captured by the same upper-caste landlords and feudal land-owning class (Currie, 2000; De Haan, 2004; Mohanty, 2014; Pati, 2012), they did not bother about the success of the policy. At the same time, the marginalised communities, especially the SC and ST, could not emerge as a pressure group for the redistribution of land (Mohanty, 2001). They continued to struggle with the complexity of their legal rights.

The non-implementation of OBC reservation in education is similar to that of the land reform legislation and industrial development policy. As the top political leadership and state power are controlled by Brahmin-Karan-Khandayat (Mohanty, 2014; Pati, 2012), they did not take an interest in taking affirmative action for OBC. In addition, people are unaware of their rights, and there is no collective resistance against the power structure.

In politics, the development process involves the organisation, mobilisation and use or distribution of resources in new ways, and conflict arises due to different configurations (Leftwich, 2000). That is why the land-owning elites does not want to lose their land because land redistribution threatens the economy. However, it is interesting to see that even though land redistribution was in the larger interest of society and the nation, it did not succeed due to the non-cooperation of upper-caste landowners. Overall, policies and programmes for the benefit of the larger section of the marginalised communities are overlooked in state policy decision-making and implementation.

Conclusion

In a representative democracy, those elected to state power matter in policy planning and implementation (Besley, 2007). That is because all development is political. It involves new ways of using, producing and distributing resources, and, as a result, conflicts arise based on diverse interests and ideologies (Leftwich, 1993, 2000). That means there are various ways of promoting development based on the interest of those in power and the possibility of future benefits (Tornquist, 1999). It is also because of the ‘public contestations of organised and unorganised powers over access to resources that create and distribute the resources in a particular way benefitting one group over another at one or some point of time’ (Wolin, 1996, p. 31).

Similarly, there lies differential interest and ideology deriving from caste, class and regional affiliation in the non-implementation of pro-poor reformist policy. Kholi (2010) argued that there is a relation between Brahminical domination in state power and the unsuccessful redistribution policy in BIMARU states. The state power in Odisha is also Brahminical in nature (Currie, 2000; De Haan, 2004; Mohanty, 2014; Pati, 2012). That is, the upper caste class dominated politics and leadership, resulting in the continuation of feudal-landlord and dynastic political leadership. It means there are conflict of interests between the ruling class and the implementation of pro-poor reformist policies, which threatens the very base of the domination of the existing state power. Thus, the non-implementation of land reform legislation, the reservation policy for OBCs in education and making the state into a mining and industrially viable state with underutilised agriculture and forest resources have to do with the nature of leadership and state power. In the contestation over access to resources, the ruling social class does not want to give up their interest in the pro-poor policies and ideology. Hence, leadership, state power and politics derail pro-poor reformist public policy in Odisha and elsewhere with similar contexts.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

This article is derived from the PhD research of the corresponding author on ‘politics of development and regional disparities in Odisha’. Therefore, we acknowledge all the support from the affiliated institution and the UGC-JRF. Besides, the article was presented at the 22nd Biennial Conference of the International Consortium for Social Development, held online in July 2021. We acknowledge the contribution of research participants for their valuable time and sharing of information. We also thank the anonymous reviewers and editor of the journal for their comments and suggestion to improve the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interest

The authors declare that no conflict of interest is involved in carrying out this study and writing the article.

Ethical Statement

Verbal consent was obtained from all the research participants for the study, which is used for academic purposes only.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors acknowledge the UGC-JRF for the research but receive no financial support for the authorship and publication of this article.

Notes

ORCID iDs

Deepak Kumar Nanda

Bipin Jojo

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