Cosmopolitan Bioethics Under Pressure: Reflections on the Global Observatory for Genome Editing International Summit

Introduction

Since its first meeting in 2017 and official inception in 2020, the Global Observatory for Genome Editing has functioned as a forum to consider fundamental questions related to the emergence of novel biotechnologies (particularly human genome editing) and the ways in which these technologies may alter perspectives on the dignity and integrity of human life. ¹ In May 2025, the Observatory hosted an International Summit at the National Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that brought together a purposefully broad group of academics and public stakeholders to discuss the governance of human genome editing and to continue the process of scientific, ethical, legal, and cultural exchange started in the first three summits in 2015, 2018, and 2023. ²

One of the goals of this fourth summit was to highlight the perspectives of underrepresented disciplines and communities by juxtaposing unlikely conversation partners and to improve the conversation between the scientific community and broader society. The event was overshadowed (but also emboldened) by the funding restrictions imposed on nearby Harvard University by the U.S. government in its on-going attempt to weaken the exact kind of open, intercultural, and transdisciplinary discourse the Global Observatory stands for. ³ This concerning development exemplified the importance of international networks that support scientific freedom and democratic deliberation. On the other hand, it points to the substantial challenges currently facing the governance of human genome editing and cosmopolitan bioethics as the foundational concept underlying the Global Observatory.

These reflections are, namely (1) balancing inclusivity and expertise, (2) overcoming the limitations of the “anthropology-first” stance, (3) reconciling divergent scientific and governance practices, and (4) addressing ethnocentric legacies in light of postcolonial critique. They are intended as a constructive contribution to future interdisciplinary discussions about emerging biotechnologies, of which there are hopefully many more to come.

Establishing Cosmopolitan Bioethics

There is no denying that cosmopolitanism as a political theory has come a long way since Kant first developed the concept of jus cosmopoliticum in his philosophical essay Perpetual Peace. ⁴ First, the term “cosmopolitanism” is no longer burdened by negative connotations that linked it to concepts such as “rootlessness” or “immorality,” as the Global Observatory Director Sheila Jasanoff (Harvard Kennedy School) pointed out.

Second, cosmopolitanism core beliefs have developed that can be traced across different approaches, as follows: “Cosmopolitans posit the existence of ethical values and principles that are universally applicable to all human beings, regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion, or nationality. They maintain that our shared humanity carries with it a moral imperative to respect and care for the dignity of every human being, an imperative that takes precedence over local and national political and moral values and principles”. ⁵

Third, postcolonial, deconstructivist, and liberal thinkers such as Mohandas Gandhi, Jacques Derrida, Martha Nussbaum, or Kwame Appiah have shaped, sensibilized, enriched, and democratized what is thought of as cosmopolitan today—without abandoning any of the basic tenets of cosmopolitanism altogether.

Cosmopolitan bioethics, which are a more recent undertaking still in infancy, draw from all of these thinkers and traditions. From Kant, they take the focus on anthropology and the belief in humanity shared by all humans. ⁶ From Gandhi, they take the so-called “talisman,” according to which peace of mind can be achieved by acting in ways that benefit the poorest and weakest members of human society. ⁷ From Derrida, they take a nuanced understanding of hospitality; ⁸ from Nussbaum, a certain affinity for liberal principlism; ⁹ and from Appiah, a high regard for social narratives and moral imaginaries. ¹⁰ Coupled with a healthy dose of Heideggerian skepticism toward emerging (bio-)technologies, ¹¹ these impulses inform a concept that Jasanoff described in her acceptance speech for the 2022 Holberg Prize as follows: “We hope to develop a ‘cosmopolitan bioethics’ that is welcoming to diverse ideas of what it means to be human, and how to protect the essence of human-ness against the assaults of a newly overwhelming machine age.” ¹²

The first part of this objective—to consider a variety of (previously overlooked) perspectives on the anthropological implications of genome editing—was clearly emphasized at the international summit. Not only was the event free and open to public participation, but also the panels featured experts from diverse disciplinary, civic, cultural, religious, and economic backgrounds. The program also featured contributions from the world of dance and theatre that looked at CRISPR and the rights of people with disabilities in an artistic way.

Alondra Nelson (Princeton) in particular drew attention to the fact that it is a privilege to be able to address bioethical issues in such an intensive, inclusive, and open-ended manner. In times in which the foundational structures of research, such as scientific inquiry and democratic deliberation, are increasingly under threat, it is a privilege to have the time, freedom, and resources to be able to think in terms of the cosmopolitan.

It is a key challenge for both the Global Observatory and the Institute for Advanced Study, at which Nelson teaches, to defend what is positive and worth preserving about this privileged status while simultaneously expanding the diversity of perspectives considered in a meaningful way. To that end, Laurence Lwoff (Council of Europe) and Katherine Littler (World Health Organization) emphasized that public engagement should be pursued because it is considered a worthwhile, ethically substantiative measure of inclusivity, accountability, and transparency and not just as the fulfillment of a procedural need to tick off a box or to self-interestedly provide information, or because it creates a more positive image. For example, the Observatory might benefit from increased dialogue with nonacademics, patient representatives, socially conservative groups, or religious voices outside the Abrahamic tradition, but only if there is sincere interest in their inclusion. This could, then, also take account of a phenomenon perceived by Ben Hurlbut (Arizona State), according to whom there is a kind of inadvertent self-censorship regarding genome editing characterized by people assuming not to have enough knowledge about the technology. This leads to their nonparticipation in the discussion about its use or regulation.

At the same time, the commitment to inclusivity, diversity of perspectives, and low thresholds does not negate the need for a shared basic understanding of the technologies discussed and a willingness to present alleged threats to the essence of human-ness posed by technologies accurately and appropriately. It is true, for example, as Patricia Williams (Northeastern University), Kaushik Sunder Rajan (University of Chicago), and others noted, that dealing with questions related to the governance of human genome editing requires a high degree of critical attention with regard to possible beneficiaries and disadvantaged parties of these technologies or undesirable consequences such as the treatment of marginalized groups as less than human. Nevertheless, it is neither fair nor helpful to place interventions in the human germline or the collection and analysis of genomic data under a blanket suspicion of eugenics. Such generalizations are inevitably oversimplified and often based on misunderstandings, imprecise problem descriptions, and catastrophic thinking. Instead, Judy Norsigian’s (Our Bodies Ourselves) appeal to avoid conflating terms, misleading language, and under-complexity and to instead be honest about gray areas and unclear demarcations (e.g., the unclear line between treatment and enhancement) should be highlighted. And as Carrie Wolinetz (Lewis-Burke Associates) pointed out, regulators in particular need to be very well-educated about the issue, so that technologies can be implemented well and trust with the public can be built.

Furthermore, instead of leaning toward a view that ultimately pits scientific and humanities perspectives against each other, it is worth considering whether the “anthropology-first” approach endorsed at the end of the 2025 summit over-corrects the shortcomings of the prevalent “science-and-technology-first” approaches rightfully problematized by Jasanoff and others. ¹³ “Questions of human identity, purpose, and obligation” may be at least as important for the governance of human genome editing as are the “considerations of feasibility, safety, and physical risk.” ¹⁴ This insight, however, does not have to lead to an attitude that privileges humanities or social science perspectives and diminishes the value of empirically validated scientific knowledge about technologies, their modes of operation, potentials, and risks. Rather, it could also result in a sustained commitment to broad interdisciplinarity across scientific cultures and to a serious examination of the simultaneity with which both the technological and anthropological aspects of gene editing demand our cultural, scientific, legal, political, religious, economic, or ethical attention.

Different Speeds and Ways of Solving Problems

The fact that cosmopolitan bioethics, as envisioned by the Global Observatory, tend to focus on the antagonistic aspects of the relationship between technology and humanity while advocating for the prioritization of humanities and social science considerations became clear at various points during the summit, as follows: 1)

Over the course of the conference, little was referred to as much as the normative imperatives derived from a shared human responsibility for and duties toward future generations, which indicates an adherence to a strong version of the precautionary principle in the sense of Hans Jonas. ¹⁵

These positions pose various challenges, some of which were addressed during the summit. First, Glenn Cohen (Harvard Law School) pointed out that moratoria only make sense if there is something that needs to be learned before a technology can be allowed or stopped, and he questioned the prohibitory nature of the general approach to genome editing. There might be valid reasons to decelerate or halt research on certain types of somatic or germline interventions. But what exactly are the open anthropological and socio-ethical questions (since feasibility, safety, and physical risk are not considered to be the primary issues at stake by the Observatory) that need to be answered or clarified by the envisaged charter before a decision could be made on the (in)permissibility of genome editing, heritable or otherwise? And how can it be justified that genome editing is treated so completely differently from other technologies? Is there a convincing defense against Cohen’s own provocative thesis that smartphones and social media are way more socially disruptive than most biotechnologies? And what to make of O. Carter Snead’s (Notre Dame University) assumption according to which hereditary germline interventions might not remain as broadly unpopular and indefensible as they currently appear?

Second, to call genome editing a “wicked problem” does not result in anything less vague than calling the human genome “the heritage of humanity […], in a symbolic sense,” ¹⁸ a notion Woopen and David Winickoff (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) justifiably criticized for its imprecision and lack of practical implications. It is indeed questionable to present the human genome as something to be protected in the same way as other human heritages (the moon, the deep-sea floor, Antarctica, etc.), ¹⁹ as long as it is unclear what this analogy is supposed to mean. Siobhan O’Sullivan (Royal Irish Academy) and the Chinese journalist Jane Qiu have raised the counterargument that the notion points to an interrelatedness and interconnectedness of all people as well as to inalienable human rights, common values, and shared responsibility. However, these links are associative at best and at worst—as with the genomization of human rights deeply problematic.

The situation is similar with the equally symbolic description of genome editing as a “wicked problem” (i.e., a very complicated and controversial social issue that requires a lot of detailed consideration and careful deliberation). The concept has so far been applied to unique, regulatory, and almost insoluble global challenges such as social injustice, poverty, climate change, or pandemics. ²⁰ However, the categorical uniqueness of the problem as well as its primarily negative character, monolithic nature, and regulatory insolubility are questionable in the case of genome editing; reproductive cloning, brain–computer interfaces, and other (bio)technologies also have enormous anthropologically and socially disruptive potential; genome editing procedures not only pose regulatory challenges but also open up scope and possibilities; if anything, genome editing is not one problem with countless facets but several problems under the same umbrella; and overall, genome editing is already a highly regulated issue with a high affinity for international governance and the setting of global scientific boundaries—boundaries that, as far as is currently known, have been kept remarkably well (aside from one prominent, major exception). ²¹

Third, George Church (Harvard Medical School) noted that much of the bioethical debate is understandably focused on heritable human genome editing, as the longevity of hereditary interventions poses difficult ethical and regulatory questions, including the problem of the unobtainable consent of future generations mentioned by Judy Norsigian. For Church, however, this focus distracts from the governance issues relating to somatic editing, which he considers to be more pressing. Fyodor Urnov (University of California, Berkeley), who coined the term “genome editing” back in 2005, and Kiran Musunuru (University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine) went even further in their contributions. Urnov argued that it is no less morally reprehensible to withhold available somatic gene therapies from people who want and need them for overriding considerations than to let people burn in a wildfire to deal with climate change issues instead. Musunuru, who together with Rebecca Ahrens-Nicklas recently treated K.J. Muldoon (an infant suffering from severe carbamoyl phosphate synthetase 1 deficiency) by using bespoke base editing,^22,23 was less strident but argued that personalized somatic genome editing should be recognized as a form of surgery. In the United States, this would reduce some regulation (as the technology would no longer be overseen by the Food and Drug Administration) and potentially accelerate approval procedures. This, in Musunuru’s estimation, would result in gene therapies becoming significantly cheaper, marketable, and, therefore, more widely available.

These arguments betray a certain tension between the Global Observatory’s anthropology-first/forward agenda and the path that had been taken in the previous summits (Washington D.C. in 2015, Hong Kong in 2018, London in 2023). In London, somatic editing, especially when aimed at the treatment of serious somatic diseases, was officially considered less problematic than germline editing, even though it was acknowledged that there remain questions related to equitable access, price, and other issues. ² Consequentially, the recent suggestions by Church, Urnov, and Musunuru expressed a sense of urgency and impatient expectation on the part of the scientific community to finally provide answers to the questions posed 2 years ago, whereas the general mood at the summit was more in the direction of wanting to continue to think more closely and thoroughly about the broader social implications of these therapies and their regulation first.

While this is by no means a new situation, going forward, the Observatory is still faced with the question of whether and how it can live up to its claim of being a formative, governance-, and solution-oriented body as well as a reactive-reflective group engaged in thorough discussions. Carefully considering a multitude of complex social issues and ethical problems over a long period of time on the one hand and advising competently in the face of time-sensitive decisions made necessary by rapid technological progress and economic interests on the other hand might just prove to be an incommensurable task, especially in times of waning institutional and governmental support.

Different Worlds

Despite their global orientation and a penchant for self-critical evaluation, cosmopolitan bioethics are still an undeniably Western concept dominated by Western perspectives. This is by no means a criticism in itself. As Daniel Wikler (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health) pointed out, the same could be said for bioethics in general, a subject that to this day is the most prevalent in European and North American countries. But the acknowledgment of this inherent “westernness” does underline specific critical remarks by Sunder Rajan, John Evans (University of California, San Diego), and others that point to a minimum of two potential conceptual weaknesses and blind spots of cosmopolitan bioethics: a misplaced reliance on American principlist and individualistic thought as well as an excessive consideration of issues almost exclusively relevant to citizens of wealthy countries.

The main arguments put forward by Evans were as follows: (a) principles, such as those made prominent by James Childress and Tom Beauchamp (autonomy, nonmalevolence, benevolence, justice), ²⁴ ultimately do not help with decisions concerning how to use or treat novel technologies; (b) these principles are arbitrary and inconclusive, and that to use them as a general guideline leads to conceptual mistranslations or inadequate reductions of complex ethical issues; and (c) principlism is designed around the agenda of social liberalists but does not consider other viewpoints.

Sunder Rajan even suggested polemically that American universalist thought might be a less appropriate approach for ensuring the rights and the recognition of all people than universalist approaches from the Global South as follows: “Rather than propagating tired and parochial sociotechnical imaginaries of long colonial provenance, perhaps, the time has come to embrace a cosmopolitan ethic that is attuned to the varied constitutionalisms through which debates about public good, healthy societies, and social compacts materialize around the world. At a time when the most oligarchic forms of corporatism and the most libertarian forms of social contract are directly threatening the strength and viability of the biomedical research enterprise and the capacities of health systems alike, the call for cosmopolitanism and constitutionalism feels more urgent than ever.” ²⁵

In addition, Sunder Rajan pointed out that for countries with strictly limited resources, it is much easier to recognize that expensive gene therapies for individuals who suffer from a rare disease may be in direct conflict with public interest—a sentiment shared by other contributors. Jay Salimullah (4BIO Capital) and Sarojini Nadimpally (SAMA Resource Group for Women and Health) asked pointedly, what would be the use of offering personalized gene therapy in countries where newborn screening is not available or people cannot even afford to treat a genetic disorder such as sickle cell disease with hydroxyurea? And while Vijay Chandru (National Centre for Biological Sciences, India) and Roli Mathur (Indian Council of Medical Research) stressed the importance of making somatic gene therapy available in Global South countries that suffer from a high burden of genetic diseases and view these therapies as a promising relief of that burden, Mathur also warned that advanced therapeutic measures might even further social divides if only wealthy people can afford them. Dealing appropriately with wealth disparities, therefore, is a major challenge for cosmopolitan bioethics, one that might be aided, however, by religious motives and traditions that–according to Jennifer Herdt (Yale Divinity School)–are among the greatest contexts for the discussion of normative issues and a bridge between rich and poor.

Now, the ability to connect people who inhabit different national, religious, cultural, economic, and political spaces is the great promise of cosmopolitan bioethics. But it is also the standard by which cosmopolitan bioethics must be measured. Considering the deep chasms between the various conditions under which humans live in different parts of the world, Vardit Ravitsky (Hastings Center for Bioethics) has rightfully called the strive for truly global and diverse cosmopolitan bioethics the most pressing issue related to bioethics today. Clearing up the remnants of ethnocentric thinking is only one side of that coin. The other side is to give bioethics a new, more resilient foundation on which those who previously did not see themselves represented can also stand. Whether (monastic) virtues such as the ones James Keenan (hospitality and humility) or Littler (solidarity) suggested are sufficiently broad to serve as such a foundation remains to be seen. But what is already clear is that concrete questions regarding the regulation, distribution, and accessibility of emerging technologies cannot (just) be solved by appealing to broad notions such as the common heritage of humanity, inalienable rights, or human dignity, which are more suited to emphasizing commonalities than weighing conflicting positions and perspectives against each other and assigning priorities.

Conclusion

The latest International Summit on Genome Editing illustrated, in many ways, the advantages and difficulties of cosmopolitan bioethics and drew attention to the challenges faced by the Global Observatory. In addition to the increasing political pressure, this article has highlighted the following points: 1.

The tension between the desire for broad inclusivity and the professional, institutional, and scientific prerequisites on which global governance is generally based.

In closing, I note the nuanced, honest discussions about the competing practical implications and consequences entailed in the many different values, concrete needs, levels of knowledge, and moral convictions that were expressed during the summit (not to mention the positions of those who could not attend the conference). The Fourth International Summit on Genome Editing has certainly created important inroads toward these kinds of discussions. The discussion needs to continue.