India’s Call-Center Frauds: A Neocolonial Perspective on Organized Crime

Neocolonialism and Organized Fraud

We argue that Indian call-center fraud functions as a form of organized crime with inherent links to neocolonialism, whereby offenders exploit global economic arbitrage disparities within outsourced roles to justify the targeting of trusting victims in the Global North. Neocolonialism refers to the continued dominance of former colonial powers and countries over less developed countries or former dependencies through indirect (often subtle) economic, political, and cultural policies or pressures (Esposti, 2024). Neocolonialism has come to encapsulate the continued, perhaps inevitable, exploitative nature of the Global North on the Global South, in which transnational corporations and multilateral institutions function to maintain colonial forms of exploitation (Ciocchini & Greener, 2021; Uzoigwe, 2019).

Neocolonialism provides a useful lens through which to examine Indian call-center fraud. While various political economy approaches may help explain aspects of fraud, they do not fully capture the transnational and historically embedded power relations shaping these crimes. Political economy acknowledges the exploitative or destructive nature of global capitalism (Bieler, 2025; Clark, 2016; Radulovic, 2026, p. 48). Similarly, Merton’s (1938) strain theory highlights the pressures associated with restricted economic opportunities, consumer aspirations (see Golladay & Snyder, 2023; Lupu, 2025). This logic is also visible in the Hustle Kingdom literature, where cybercrime apprenticeship emerges as a deviant response to blocked educational, economic, and social mobility pathways (Lazarus et al., 2025; Lazarus & Soares, 2024). However, a neocolonial perspective firmly positions Indian call-center fraud within long-standing unequal relationships between the Global North and South, whereby outsourcing practices reproduce conditions of exploitation that, we argue, contribute to fraud against Western victims.

Scholars (e.g., Ali, 2002; Esposti, 2024; Varman et al., 2024) have linked neocolonialism to globalization, viewing it as an indirect mechanism through which capitalist policies reinforce Western domination. John et al. (2023, p. 7) suggest that neocolonialism reinforces capitalism and suppresses the cultures of former colonies, while Ali (2002) argues that globalization liberalizes markets and in ways that enable multinationals to infiltrate all spheres of economic activity without restriction. Consequently, the global economy remains characterized by uneven distributions of power and resources rather than true global inclusivity (Bockman, 2015, p. 110; Hickel et al., 2022; Phillips, 2017). These asymmetries are also reflected in organized crimes, such as fraud and money laundering, which globalization has facilitated by compressing “time and space” (Harvey, 1990) and enabling offenders to exploit victims across borders with reduced risks and greater financial rewards (Button & Cross, 2017; Dolliver & Love, 2015, p. 75; Gilmour, 2023; Levi, 2008; Passas, 1999; Tiwari et al., 2023; Zabyelina, 2023). Criminal markets often establish most effectively in communities experiencing deep-seated, persistent poverty, and marginalization (Clark et al., 2021), making it important to frame the debates on fraud within the perspective of neocolonialism. This perspective contributes to debates within “Southern criminology” by highlighting how globalization and outsourcing practices in India shape cross-border fraud and organized crime (Abraham, 2008; Brown, 2018; Carrington et al., 2016; Ciocchini & Greener, 2021; Travers, 2017).

A key component of this neocolonial dominance of the Global North is the role of the English language in structuring global economic and cultural hierarchies. The historical trajectory of English as a “hypercentral” language is highly relevant to the proliferation of these call-center frauds (de Swaan, 2001). The operational strategies of these fraudulent enterprises are supported by English’s ascendance to a dominant global position after World War II, particularly, in its transformation into the modern era’s lingua franca (Boussebaa et al., 2014; Mikanowski, 2018). India, historically subjugated under British colonial rule, possesses a large pool of English-speaking individuals. The linguistic proficiency, forged through centuries of colonization, nefariously targets the primarily English-speaking populations. The recruitment and training processes in these centers exploit this global English dominance (Szathmari, 2022). Personnel often selected for their fluency are also further trained to adopt Western accents, lending an air of authenticity to their frauds (Szathmari, 2022). This phenomenon reflects broader neocolonial mechanisms, in which economic and cultural hegemonies maintain their influence through language, turning it into a tool of economic exploitation, a process Phillipson (1992, 2016) terms “linguistic imperialism.”

The Global North’s Arbitrage Advantage

The Global North also benefits from an arbitrage advantage over countries in the Global South, where lower labor costs and extended shift work increase productivity and reduce operational expenses (Agnihotri, 2015; Smith, 2016). Through outsourcing, multinational corporations can relocate labor across jurisdictions and exploit global time differences to maximise efficiency and profit (Nadeem, 2009; Smith, 2016, p. 65). However, these practices can result in workers in outsourced economies experiencing long working hours, alienation, and limited access to the wealth generated by their labor, while their livelihoods become increasingly devalued as corporations in the Global North disproportionately benefit (Nadeem, 2009, p. 21; Sayed & Agndal, 2022, p. 283). More broadly, global demand for outsourced goods and services may intensify economic inequalities and reinforce existing power imbalances between multinational corporations and workers in the Global South (Hickel et al., 2022; Malik et al., 2024, p. 1359). Such conditions may align with what Passas (2013) terms “criminological asymmetries,” whereby globalization intensifies conflicts within politics, culture, the economy, and law that can create opportunities for crime. In this context, economic disparities and weak regulatory oversight may incentivize some Indian call-center workers to exploit market opportunities and the perceived low risk of detection by law-enforcement, in ways that blur the boundaries between legitimate outsourcing and fraudulent activity (Kshetri, 2010; Poster, 2023). These conditions facilitate frauds, such as phishing schemes and prepaid card fraud (Ali & Mohd Zaharon, 2024; Miramirkhani et al., 2017), contributing to increasing international scrutiny of India’s call-center industry.

Typologies of India’s Call-Center Frauds

India’s fraudulent call centers primarily use telephones and internet-based communication to contact victims across jurisdictions. Button et al. (2024b, pp. 119–120) distinguish several typologies, including sales talkers (selling non-existent services), action talkers (manipulating victims into revealing information or granting remote access), automated callers (robotic calls directing victims to premium-rate numbers or scam centers), and receptive talkers (SMS, pop-ups, and emails prompting victims to initiate contact). A dominant pattern involves impersonation of trusted institutions in the Global North, including banks, debt-collection agencies, tax authorities, such as HMRC in the United Kingdom and the IRS in the United States, and Microsoft technical support (INTERPOL, 2024; Poster, 2023). Remote access software is also commonly used in technical support frauds, whereby victims are called by who they think is their internet provider and then convinced to install software granting the fraudster remote access to their computers (Harley et al., 2012; The New Indian Express, 2019). The aim of these schemes is to deceive individuals into transferring money or divulging personal data that can be used or sold on for financial gain (Tzani-Pepelasi et al., 2020).

Recruitment practices are embedded within India’s competitive labor market. Fraudulent operators and unscrupulous recruitment agencies advertise seemingly legitimate, high-paying call-center employment to attract job seekers into roles that facilitate deception (Poonam, 2018). Entry into these roles varies: some recruits are unaware of the fraudulent nature of the work at the outset, while others knowingly participate, with financial incentives outweighing ethical concerns (Poster, 2023). Once recruited, workers are assigned scripted interactions designed to exploit victims’ trust in authority and reliance on customer service, often drawing on cultural stereotypes. This highlights fraudsters’ ability to exploit disparities between economic demands and trust within different global markets or regions in order to profit.

These frauds are increasingly understood as organized cybercrimes involving specialised roles and coordinated processes that extend beyond traditional criminal activities, violence or corruption, as the anonymity of the fraudsters and reach of the internet allow them to target their victims across international borders (Ally & Gadgala, 2022; Leukfeldt et al., 2017). Rather than treating these frauds as a departure from organized crime, it is more useful to view such criminal networks as hybrid organizational groups. Unlike traditional organized crime groups characterized by rigid hierarchies, these fraud networks are typically more flexible, with actors shifting between core and peripheral roles depending on operational needs (Lazarus, 2024; Leukfeldt et al., 2017) although, some retain clear coordination and role specialization (see Nguyen & Luong, 2021).

Although studies provide valuable insights into the structures of organized fraud networks (e.g., Gilbert & Levi, 2025; May & Bhardwa, 2018; UNODC, 2024), this focus on structure alone risks obscuring the wider socio-economic conditions that enable their growth. Franceschini et al. (2023) acknowledge how Southeast Asian fraud compounds, for instance, are not merely criminal enterprises. Rather, they are manifestations of capitalism that exploit inequalities and captive labor, while also extracting resources from the Global North. Button et al. (2024a) note that fraudulent Indian call centers vary in size from a few operatives to hundreds with some call centers operating purely to conduct frauds, while others mix legitimate and illegitimate work. Some operate from dedicated facilities, and some have moved to hotels and less prominent locations to evade enforcement. Similarly, fraudulent Indian call centers vary from small operations to large-scale enterprises, with operatives specializing in generating leads and more experienced ones responsible for closing deals (Button et al., 2024a, pp. 21–22). Such operations also require a variety of technical and money laundering services.

Studies further indicate that India’s call-center frauds operate within an underground economy in which specialized criminal services are exchanged across transnational networks (Joseph & Smith, 2021; Leukfeldt et al., 2017; Leukfeldt & Holt, 2022; Nicaso & Danesi, 2021; Piemontese, 2023; Yang & Xu, 2025). These groups buy and sell services essential for crimes, including using money mules and technical expertise for creating phishing websites and redirecting victims’ calls. Professional and social networks support these operations, connecting criminals with co-offenders who enhance the scale and effectiveness of their schemes (UNODC, 2024). Evidence from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom points to proxies linked to Nigeria and South Africa, with networks across Malaysia, Turkey, and India, suggesting a broader globalized model of fraud offending (Edwards et al., 2018). Like other forms of organized crime, India’s call-center frauds rely on anonymous communications and cross-border money transfers by manipulating rather than coercing victims, while complicating law-enforcement efforts through networks of money mules working across jurisdictions to help evade legal action (Ajayi, 2016; UNODC, 2024). Thus, India’s call-center frauds represent a distinct form of “organized fraud” within the broader typologies of organized crime studies. To fully understand India’s call-center frauds, research must move beyond mere organizational descriptions towards examining the wider socio-economic conditions, drivers and mechanisms that enable such sophisticated and adaptable criminal networks.

Social Engineering Through Impersonation and Fear

Our research has highlighted impersonation as a common fraud technique within India. Impersonation as a common fraud technique was noted in the following quote:

The training is very professional, a proper script, they know exactly what to do and how to do it … told very clearly that they are doing extortion, and that is their goal. People who live abroad have people living in India, you impersonate people in India and ask them to send money as an emergency (cyber expert).

The use of the impersonation technique appears to have begun with debt collection and payday loans, then the SSN (Social Security Numbers) support scheme IRS fraud, and progressed to the Amazon voucher and immigration frauds (Chaganti et al., 2021). Our analysis found that fraudsters learned from earlier schemes when legitimate call centers were used for lead generation (the process by which call centers identify, attract, and convert potential customers into sales, often through cold calling) and debt recovery (Raj et al., 2022). Although lead generation initially emerged within the call-center industry, some fraudsters later shifted to targeting victims through the more lucrative IRS fraud.

We found that the impersonation of officials would also involve the fraudsters using pressure and fear tactics. This is evident from the media reports we reviewed. Adogla-Bessa (2018) noted a case in Delhi in which 50 individuals were arrested for conducting fake security warning frauds that generated approximately $1.5 billion annually. The fraudsters posed as Windows support representatives and targeted victims through pop-up warnings and deceptive calls to extract payments. WIONews (2023) reported the case in which the Delhi Police, FBI, and Interpol dismantle a call-center operation that defrauded US citizens of $20 million. Criminals falsely claimed that child pornography linked to victims’ details had been discovered at the US-Mexico border, coercing individuals—often wealthy, technically inexperienced, or socially isolated—into paying penalties.

Furthermore, one interviewee stated,

There are dedicated call centers, they receive filtered data around specific age groups of [victims] who have been living abroad … [fraudsters] highlight weaknesses in income tax returns, ask [victims] to respond, and create an environment of fear (cyber expert).

Interestingly, the cyber expert noted that frauds often involved Indian women planning to marry abroad, with fraudsters in India creating fake social media profiles of foreigners. This complements other studies (see Edwards et al., 2018) which demonstrate how fabricated profiles are used to manipulate and deceive victims in online dating fraud.

Remote Access and Technology-Enabled Fraud

Technology was described as a practical enabler of fraud and as a channel through which existing global inequalities were reproduced. Respondents were asked about the role of technology in the execution of fraud and many highlighted how digital tools enabled fraudsters to impersonate officials and manipulate victims remotely. These practices were closely tied to linguistic hierarchies, as fraudsters exploited their proficiency in English and familiar accents to gain trust. Here, the mastery of the English language functions as a form of cultural and economic capital; although, repurposed to facilitate deception as part of the frauds. A cyber expert explained that artificial intelligence was being used to steal people’s data and to impersonate and clone the voices of victims’ loved ones. Quotes from Fraudster X and a police officer seemed to contradict this, however, explaining that they were “simply using their human voice,” perceiving their methods as straightforward and relying more on the routine practices of the call-center industry and the familiarity of the Indian accent.

Other respondents stated,

The fraudsters do not use any sophisticated technology. They exploit fear in the mind of the victim. Where the victim is Indian, they do use a lot of technology and sophisticated tools, but not in case of foreign call-center frauds (journalist).

Victims of Indian Call-Center Fraud

Our research also revealed information about the profile of victims targeted by fraudsters. Key targets of these frauds include senior citizens and the technologically inept, primarily from the USA and Canada, with expanding targets in Europe and Southeast Asia. Fraudsters described victims as elderly or socially isolated, echoing patterns noted in prior studies (BBC, 2020; Carlson, 2006; Chaganti et al., 2021; Dadà et al., 2025; Shao et al., 2019). Fraudsters exhibited a degree of rationalization by attributing responsibility to victims’ gullibility, thereby morally distancing themselves from those they defrauded. Some fraudsters also avoid targeting Indians:

We generally avoid taking money from persons of Indian origin. If we understand the person is of Indian origin we disconnect the call and do not scam [them]. Mostly, the Indian victims are because of Pakistani and Bangladeshis [fraudsters]. We don’t like to [de]fraud people of Indian origin (fraudster X).

The Fraudsters and Money Mules

When exploring the profile of the fraudsters and how India’s fraudulent call centers operate, respondents explained that those involved are typically young, English-speaking, computer-literate individuals, recruited through outside agencies. The fraudsters receive little or no training depending on how well organized the operation is. The findings reveal how networks of individuals manage stolen funds, often shifting them offshore to avoid detection or using Informal Value Transfer Systems, such as Hawala, and cryptocurrency transfers to complicate the tracing of funds (Albrecht et al., 2019). Offenders tend to change operational bases, shifting from inbound to outbound calling tactics in response to growing awareness, highlighting the adaptability of fraudsters to law-enforcement efforts.

Fraudster X noted that training was largely informal, with recruits learning on the job and a few skilled “closers” finalising frauds (Button et al., 2024a). Most staff were young and recruited through agencies, often believing they had joined a legitimate call center; victims were abroad, and the risk of complaints or arrest was seen as minimal. In Goa, however, fraudster Y described a more structured system, with short induction training for young English-speaking recruits sourced through agencies.

I gave my resume to an online recruiter … told it’s a call-center job and the salary was good. There was a small [amount of] training for two days … accent training is not important. That can work. I don’t know why, but the Indian accent is not a giveaway (fraudster X).

According to one police officer, the core workforce is aged 18–25, described as young, quick, and technologically adept, with women participating to the same extent as men. Empricial evidence suggests (though do not conclusively establish) that these fraudsseem to rely on a well-organized network of money mules to move funds, increasingly Chinese and Pakistanis individuals, with Indians being less involved. Our findings indicate that transfers are managed through a coordinated system involving multiple players, with calling cards providing an easy means of extracting money due to their anonymity, liquidity, and ready availability.

As Barry (2017) argues, fraudsters use their earnings to fund an aspirational lifestyle, a point supported by respondents who noted that those operating within India’s call centers are primarily motivated by financial incentives:

The salary is good, and the incentive structure is very good. Our bosses and owners are seniors. Some amongst us aspire to become big and own a call center. We work all night and sleep all day, are late risers, mostly “brats” in the family … spend most of the money on lifestyle goods. I have been saving and have bought a house. I know this is not good. I feel bad, but I don’t let my emotions overpower me. Constantly shifting base is a way of mitigating risk (fraudster X).

Fraud in India is a complex issue, not least because of the strong social stigma attached to it, where it is widely regarded as unacceptable. Families often feel shame when a relative is caught, prompting fraudsters to conceal their actions. While there is no cultural rule against cheating fellow Indians, financial gain seems to be the primary motive, and victims are targeted regardless of nationality. Although families generally assume their children work in legitimate call centers, exceptions exist in areas like Jamtara, Mewat, and Nuh, where weak enforcement and low perceived risk create some local tolerance.

Lack of Policing Response in Tackling Indian Call-Center Fraud

Such local tolerance of fraud is indicative of systemic failures in law enforcement, a pattern evident in India’s broader policing response to call-center frauds. There are relevant laws, including the Information Technology Act 2000 and the Indian Penal code 1860, that prohibit such frauds and prescribe punishments. The Indian Evidence Act 1872 further details procedures for investigation and evidence collection in criminal cases (Ally & Gadgala, 2022; Bhangla & Tuli, 2021). Indeed, the landmark 2005 Pune Citibank Mphasis case, where call-center employees deceived four US Citibank customers into disclosing their PIN numbers, enabling the theft of US $350,000, exposed the unethical corporate culture and practices operating within an Indian call center (Ally & Gadgala, 2022, pp. 379–383; Totla, 2020).

Yet, efforts to tackle fraud are hindered by localized police corruption, patronage of politicians, and difficulties in collecting and submitting prosecution evidence (NDTV, 2023). Such challenges extend across jurisdictions and are compounded by fragmented regional or international coordination. While integration efforts from international agencies, such as the FBI, have shifted the enforcement practices to adapt to trends in crime, offenders are finding new ways to avoid detection. Direct evidence and victim testimony are also often elusive, with victims reluctant to come forward to report their crimes, which complicates the legal process and undermines criminal justice (Button et al., 2012). Interviewees noted:

I have a feeling that the nexus between police and politicians must be there for fraud of this scale. Such a large scale of fraud is not possible without complicity and involvement of powerful people in both perpetrators and victims’ country (journalist).

Finally, our study noted that there have also been crackdowns where the suspected call center operatives have been paraded by law enforcement after a raid. However, often the controlling influences behind these operations escape attention, enabling operations to quickly reappear.

Selective Victimization

Our research highlights patterns of selective victimization that clarify the profiles of victims targeted in Indian call-center frauds, the strategies used to exploit victims in the Global North, and the motivations driving individuals to engage in these crimes. These fraudsters tend to target victims who are elderly, socially vulnerable, naive, or highly trusting (Dadà et al., 2025). The study has revealed that some fraudsters within India’s call centers, might prefer not to target victims of Indian origin. This may indicate a cultural or nationalistic bias in targeting, suggesting solidarity with people of Indian origin while placing blame on Pakistanis or Bangladeshis for fraud occurring within India. Therefore, workers might rationalize their actions by focusing on the fact that their victims are foreign, not Indian. This disconnect mirrors the psychological distance inherent in neocolonial exploitative systems, where laborers do not see or feel the human cost of their actions (Ciocchini & Greener, 2021). Our study found that the Indian accent does not raise suspicions among victims. One possible interpretation is that this may reflect a certain cultural neocolonial outcome, in which decades of outsourcing have normalized Indian accents in customer service roles for Western audiences. This may have inadvertently reduced skepticism during fraudulent interactions as a result of anglo-global cultural interchange (de Swaan, 2001; see also Ganguly, 2023). The lack of rigorous training (e.g., accent training) also demonstrates how globalized perceptions of Indian labor have created opportunities for such frauds to thrive. The evidence of shifting target demographics, with fraudsters expanding their focus to include victims beyond Canada, USA and the UK, to elsewhere in Europe, and Southeast Asia, raises important questions about the motivations, methods, and ethical boundaries of the perpetrators.

This paper has emphasized impersonation as a common fraud technique within India. We learnt that criminals gain their victims’ trust through impersonating officials working for a trusted institution (Carter, 2023; Tzani-Pepelasi et al., 2020). These frauds can be perpetrated via phishing emails or telephone calls to the victims to convince them to pay large amounts of money or elicit personal information that can then be stored in a database for future frauds (Tzani-Pepelasi et al., 2020). This tactic is particularly effective as a form of social engineering, as it preys on vulnerable, elderly or naive individuals to confuse or deceive (Abubakari et al., 2026; Carter, 2023).

Our study contributes to understanding how fraud schemes exploit human emotions and social vulnerabilities to manipulate victims. Human emotions, like greed and fear, are exploited for many domestic frauds, with victims lured through social media. Call centers also focus on specific age groups and use filtered data to manipulate their victims with fear tactics about income tax return discrepancies, and even involve local authorities, creating a more believable and intimidating scenario. IRS tax frauds that involve sending bulk phishing emails spoofed to appear official, engage with victims over the phone to groom their victims and extort money. Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram being the common platforms, promise easy returns for simple tasks, only to be deceived once their trust has been gained. In these social media-centric schemes, the money is extracted from the victims after initial small payouts, including job frauds, sextortion and other cyber-enabled exploits (Ajayi, 2016; Ali & Mohd Zaharon, 2024). Such crimes occur following a series of personal interactions, usually blending digital and physical deception tactics. We demonstrate how the deception extends to personal relationships and social engineering to exploit emotional vulnerabilities, where fraudsters craft detailed personas on social media. We find this to be a deeply psychological approach, resembling tactics used in romance fraud (Carter, 2023; Coluccia et al., 2020; Lazarus et al., 2023; Wang & Topalli, 2024), where the creation and manipulation of emotional bonds are central to the success of the frauds. Therefore, we show how this selective victimization constitutes an extractive practice with ties to neocolonialism, whereby wealth is siphoned from citizens of the Global North under conditions influenced by asymmetries in labor costs, market conditions, and rupee-dollar arbitrage, to create fertile ground for exploitation (see Lynch et al., 2023, p. 913). As such, Indian call-center fraudsters rationalize their actions as targeting only outsiders, thereby reproducing the structural divide between the Global South as producer and the Global North as consumer, albeit in an illicit form.

Organized Fraud and Linguistic Capital

Globalization, driven by technological advancements and the integration of global communication networks, has facilitated India’s call-center frauds by enabling fraudsters to exploit transnational digital infrastructures and personal data to target victims across borders (Kuruvilla & Ranganathan, 2010; Leukfeldt et al., 2017). Beyond romance fraud, individuals interested in new financial opportunities, such as cryptocurrencies, are deceived through false promises of investment returns. These frauds are organized and well-funded, aided by artificial intelligence-based clone voices available to create convincing yet entirely fabricated interactions with victims (UNODC, 2024). Nonetheless, our study has shown that much of the technology used to exploit victims still seems to be fairly rudimentary. The use of basic Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology to spoof calls makes the recipient believe they are communicating within the United States. This technique lowers the barrier to entry for fraudsters and exploits the trusting nature of victims who are more likely to engage when the communication appears local and legitimate (Abubakari et al., 2026; Carter, 2023). We highlight how fraudsters impersonate Western officials through the English language and familiar accents, which reflects the neocolonial legacy of language hierarchies. These findings build on Phillipson’s (1992) argument that dominant countries use their languages to maintain economic, political, and cultural control, often suppressing local languages and cultures. As Khan and Jayaraj (2024) note, “linguistic capital” arises from unequal power and resource allocation, which limits the functioning of other languages and constrains access to higher education and employment for those without English proficiency. We conclude that just as outsourcing industries monetized Indian English for clients in the Global North, fraudulent call centers exploit the same linguistic capital to manipulate trust, transforming neocolonial dominance into a mechanism of organized fraud.

Global Outsourcing, Arbitrage, and Youth Aspirations

This paper contributes insights into the operations of India’s large-scale call centers and the motivations of the fraudsters who operate within them. The findings reveal that call-center frauds involve sophisticated operations with offenders of differing ages, demographic and social backgrounds, allured by wealth and status. Victims in the Global North represent wealthier targets who can be extorted more easily due to their high levels of disposable income and trust in formal systems. Such findings indicate that these frauds reflect a form of neocolonial economic exploitation, where fraudsters in India and elsewhere act as intermediaries in a global network designed to extract wealth from more developed nations (Smith, 2016). The wealth extracted from US and Canadian victims flows back to individuals in India and other countries, often into untraceable channels, like cryptocurrency and Hawala systems. The portrayal of workers as “brats” or “late risers” reflects internalised biases against the youth engaged in this work. This perpetuates cultural hierarchies, where globalized influences disrupt traditional family and work values (Nadeem, 2009).

The findings also partly align with Merton’s (1938) notion of “innovation” by suggesting that structural barriers may compel individuals to pursue culturally approved goals, such as wealth and status, through illegitimate means when legitimate pathways are inaccessible. Similar strain-based explanations link cybercrime involvement to unemployment, restricted education, and blocked mobility, making illicit digital work appear practical or attractive (Lazarus, Soares & Button, 2025). Call-center workers may reject legitimate means, such as education or conventional employment and, instead, engage in fraudulent activities to achieve culturally sanctioned goals of financial success. The call-center fraud industry exemplifies how English-speaking youth, disillusioned with conventional pathways to upward mobility, are drawn to the allure of quick financial gain.

The findings point to young fraudsters using their earnings to chase “aspirational lifestyles” showcased in Western media and consumer culture. The systems employed within call centers mirror how neocolonial frameworks perpetuate inequality by normalizing exploitative practices as pathways to success (Abraham, 2008). The call-center fraud industry seems to thrive on young, English-speaking workers who are attracted by easy money and abandon traditional aspirations like education (Barry, 2017). While outsourcing has benefited the Indian economy more broadly, our findings support Karnani and McKague’s (2019, p. 4) view that outsourcing favors the educated upper classes working in urban centers rather than lower classes or more marginalized communities. This implies a neocolonial pattern where global economic forces disrupt local social structures and lead to shifts in aspirations (Chandrasekara et al., 2023). Neocolonialism often shapes aspirations, particularly through Western media and advertising (Varman et al., 2024); thus, potentially creating a cultural environment where quick financial gain is idealised, leading to the normalizing of illicit activities. Participants and media accounts frequently referred to the pursuit of an aspirational “Instagram life” as shaping perceptions of success and financial aspiration among some young people in economically marginalized regions, who in turn might be enticed to exploit global inequalities by committing call-center fraud. The reliance on dollar earnings illustrates how global economic disparities encourage delinquency. Outsourced call-center work, itself a product of neocolonial arbitrage provides, not only, the skills, but also, the structural incentives for illicit actors to appropriate the same logics of arbitrage to accumulate their own wealth (Boussebaa et al., 2014).

Therefore, the societal acceptance or even ignorance of such frauds reflects the pervasive influence of neocolonial power structures that shape the worldview of individuals in the Global South. Ultimately, call-center fraud is not merely an economic issue, but a sociocultural phenomenon firmly grounded in the inequalities perpetuated by neocolonial power structures. This highlights the interactions between structural inequality, neocolonialism, and shifting cultural aspirations in shaping the motivations and behaviours of young fraudsters in the Global South. While many of the fraud techniques we document are well-established in the literature, our contribution lies in situating them within a wider neocolonial context. Our study demonstrates how structural inequalities, outsourcing practices, linguistic hierarchies and arbitrage advantages shape fraudster motivations. Thus, we reframe Indian call-center fraud as a manifestation of neocolonial exploitation, rather than as a mere replication of global fraud tactics.

Implications for Combating India’s Call-Center Frauds

This paper has important implications for government policy and efforts of law enforcement in combating India’s call-center frauds. The synonymous use of “fraud” and “scam” needs to be challenged. Carter et al. (2025) argue that the term “scam” and other ambiguous terms) such as those used by some of the interviewees and media examined in this study, can trivialise offending, distort public understanding and implicitly shift responsibility onto victims, particularly, within media and law-enforcement discourse. Framing these activities as “fraud” instead recognises the seriousness and criminal nature of these call-center operations and the harms caused to their victims. Governments and law-enforcement agencies also need to prioritize victims with simple reporting and support mechanisms, and there needs to be wider education about call-center frauds and impersonation tactics (cf. Carter, 2023).

The finding that offenders exploit fragmented policing responses to call-center frauds suggests a need for more formalised approach to cooperating and sharing capability to investigate and prosecute cross-border cyber-enabled frauds (Gilmour, 2021). Legislators must also improve regulation to prevent money mules from exploiting the financial system. Yet, reforms must address the socio-economic inequalities and exploitative outsourcing practices that underpin these fraudulent operations. Greater labor protections, fairer wages and stronger oversight and accountability for multinational companies operating within outsourced markets may help reduce the exploitative conditions and economic pressures that incentivise some workers to engage in fraud (James & Vira, 2010; Lübker, 2005; Nadeem, 2009; Poster, 2023). This is important given the arbitrage advantages enjoyed by corporations in the Global North through low-cost labor markets in the Global South. Tackling these issues effectively requires political will and an approach that empowers local institutions, respects regional practices, and ensures that measures do not perpetuate systemic inequalities. Without this, interventions risk reproducing the very power imbalances they aim to resolve.